

Dogn. 982 $\frac{wx}{-2}$

<36637810160015

<36637810160015

Bayer. Staatsbibliothek

A RATIONAL ACCOUNT
OF THE
GROUNDS OF PROTESTANT RELIGION:
BEING A VINDICATION
OF THE
LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S
RELATION OF A CONFERENCE, &c.
FROM THE PRETENDED ANSWER BY T. C.

Wherein the true GROUNDS of FAITH are cleared, and the false discovered; the CHURCH
of ENGLAND vindicated from the imputation of schism; and the most
important particular controversies between us and those
of the church of Rome thoroughly examined.

BY EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D. D.

DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S, AND CHAPLAIN IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.

A NEW EDITION.

VOL. II.


OXFORD:

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

MDCCCXLIV.

135

Dogm. 982 WX





CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

PART II.

Of Schism.

CHAP. I.

OF THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH.

The question of schism explained.—The nature of it inquired into.—Several general principles laid down for clearing the present controversy.—Three grounds of the charge of schism on protestant churches by our author.—The first of the Roman church's being the catholic church, entered upon.—How far the Roman church may be said to be a true church.—The distinction of a church morally and metaphysically true justified.—The grounds of the unity of the catholic church, as to doctrine and government.—Cardinal Perron's distinction of the formal, causal, and participative catholic church examined.—The true sense of the catholic church in antiquity manifested from St. Cyprian, and several cases happening in his time; as, the schism of Novatianus at Rome; the case of Felicissimus and Fortunatus.—Several other instances out of antiquity to the same purpose, by all which it is manifest that the unity of the catholic church had no dependence on the church of Rome.—The several testimonies to the contrary of St. Ambrose, St. Hierome, John patriarch of Constantinople, St. Augustine, Optatus, &c., particularly examined; and all found short of proving that the Roman church is the catholic church.—The several answers of his lordship to the testimonies of St. Cyprian, St. Hierome, St. Greg. Nazianzen, St. Cyril, and Ruffinus, about the infallibility of the church of Rome, justified.—From all which it appears, that the making the Roman church to be the catholic is a great novelty and perfect Jesuitism Page 1

CHAP. II.

PROTESTANTS NO SCHISMATICS.

Schism a culpable separation; therefore the question of schism must be determined by inquiring into the causes of it.—The plea from the church of Rome's being once a right church, considered.—No necessity of assigning the punctual time when errors crept into her.—An account why the originals of error seem obscure.—By Stapleton's confession, the Roman and catholic church were not the same.—The falsity of that assertion manifested, that there could be no pure church since the apostles' times, if the Roman church were corrupt.—No one particular

church free from corruptions; yet no separation from the catholic church.—How far the catholic church may be said to err.—Men may have distinct communion from any one particular church, yet not separate from the catholic church.—The testimony of Petrus de Alliaco vindicated.—Bellarmine not miscited.—Almain full to his lordship's purpose.—The Romanists guilty of the present schism, and not protestants.—In what sense there can be no just cause of schism; and how far that concerns our case.—Protestants did not depart from the church of Rome, but were thrust out of it.—The vindication of the church of Rome from schism at last depends upon the two false principles of her infallibility, and being the catholic church.—The testimonies of St. Bernard and St. Austin not to the purpose.—The catalogue of fundamentals, the church's not erring, &c., referred back to their proper places.

P. 58

CHAP. III.

OF KEEPING FAITH WITH HERETICS.

The occasion of this dispute.—The reason why this doctrine is not commonly defended: yet all own such principles from whence it necessarily follows.—The matter of fact as to the council of Constance and John Huss opened.—Of the nature of the safeconduct granted him by the emperor, that it was not a general one, *salva justitia*, but particular, *jure speciali*; which is largely proved.—The particulars concerning Hierome of Prague.—Of the safeconduct granted by the council of Trent.—Of the distinction of secular and ecclesiastical power, and that from thence it follows that faith is not to be kept with heretics.—Simancha and several others fully assert this doctrine.—Of the invitation to the council of Trent, and the good instructions there; and of public disputation P. 89

CHAP. IV.

THE REFORMATION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND JUSTIFIED.

The church of Rome guilty of schism by unjustly casting protestants out of communion.—The communion of the catholic and particular churches distinguished.—No separation of protestants from the catholic church.—The devotions of the church of England and Rome compared.—Particular churches' power to reform themselves, in case of general corruption, proved.—The instance from the church of Judah vindicated.—The church of Rome paralleled with the ten tribes.—General corruptions make reformation the more necessary.—Whether those things we condemn as errors were catholic tenets at the time of the reformation.—The contrary shewed, and the difference of the church of Rome before and since the reformation.—When things may be said to be received as catholic doctrines.—How far particular churches' power to reform themselves extends.—His lordship's instances for the power of provincial councils in matters of reformation vindicated.—The particular case of the church of England discussed.—The proceedings in

our reformation defended.—The church of England a true church.—The national synod, 1562, a lawful synod.—The bishops no intruders in queen Elizabeth's time.—The justice and moderation of the church of England in her reformation.—The pope's power here a forcible and fraudulent usurpation P. 110

CHAP. V.

OF THE ROMAN CHURCH'S AUTHORITY.

The question concerning the church of Rome's authority entered upon.—How far our church, in reforming herself, condemns the church of Rome.—The pope's equality with other patriarchs asserted.—The Arabic canons of the Nicene council proved to be supposititious.—The polity of the ancient church discovered from the sixth canon of the council of Nice.—The rights of primates and metropolitans settled by it.—The suitableness of the ecclesiastical to the civil government.—That the bishop of Rome had then a limited jurisdiction within the suburbicary churches, as primate of the Roman diocese.—Of the Cyprian privilege; that it was not peculiar, but common to all primates of dioceses.—Of the pope's primacy according to the canons; how far pertinent to our dispute.—How far the pope's confirmation requisite to new elected patriarchs.—Of the synodical and communicatory letters.—The testimonies of Petrus de Marca concerning the pope's power of confirming and deposing bishops.—The instances brought for it considered.—The case of Athanasius being restored by Julius, truly stated.—The proceedings of Constantine in the case of the Donatists cleared, and the evidence thence against the pope's supremacy.—Of the appeals of bishops to Rome, how far allowed by the canons of the church.—The great case of appeals between the Roman and African bishops discussed.—That the appeals of bishops were prohibited, as well as those of the inferior clergy.—T. C.'s fraud in citing the epistle of the African bishops for acknowledging appeals to Rome.—The contrary manifested from the same epistle to Boniface, and the other to Cœlestine.—The exemption of the ancient Britannic church from any subjection to the see of Rome asserted.—The case of Wilfrid's appeal answered.—The primacy of England not derived from Gregory's grant to Augustine the monk.—The ancient primacy of the Britannic church not lost upon the Saxon conversion.—Of the state of the African churches, after their denying appeals to Rome.—The rise of the pope's greatness under Christian emperors.—Of the decree of the Sardican synod in case of appeals: whether ever received by the church: no evidence thence of the pope's supremacy.—Zosimus's forgery in sending the Sardican canons instead of the Nicene.—The weakness of the pleas for it manifested . . . P. 152

CHAP. VI.

OF THE TITLE OF UNIVERSAL BISHOP.

In what sense the title of "universal bishop" was taken in antiquity.—A threefold acceptation of it, as importing, 1. A general care over the

Christian churches, which is attributed to other catholic bishops by antiquity besides the bishop of Rome, as is largely proved: 2. A peculiar dignity over the churches within the Roman empire: this accounted then œcumenical, thence the bishops of the seat of the empire called œcumenical bishops; and sometimes of other patriarchal churches: 3. Noting universal jurisdiction over the whole church, as head of it; so never given in antiquity to the bishop of Rome.—The ground of the contest about this title between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople.—Of the proceedings of the council of Chalcedon about the pope's supremacy.—Of the grammatical and metaphorical sense of this title.—Many arguments to prove it impossible that St. Gregory should understand it in the grammatical sense.—The great absurdities consequent upon it.—St. Gregory's reasons proved to hold against that sense of it which is admitted in the church of Rome.—Of Irenæus's opposition to Victor.—Victor's excommunicating the Asian bishops argues no authority he had over them.—What the more powerful principality in Irenæus is.—Ruffinus's interpretation of the 6th Nicene canon vindicated.—The suburbicary churches cannot be understood of all the churches in the Roman empire.—The pope no infallible successor of St. Peter, nor so acknowledged to be by Epiphanius.—St. Peter had no supremacy of power over the apostles P. 212

CHAP. VII.

THE POPE'S AUTHORITY NOT PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE OR REASON.

The insufficiency of the proofs from scripture acknowledged by Romanists themselves.—The impertinency of Luke xxii. 32. to that purpose.—No proofs offered for it but the suspected testimonies of popes in their own cause.—That no infallibility can thence come to the pope as St. Peter's successor confessed and proved by Vigorius and Mr. White.—The weakness of the evasion of the pope's erring as a private doctor, but not as pope, acknowledged by them.—John xxi. 15. proves nothing towards the pope's supremacy.—How far the pope's authority is owned by the Romanists over kings.—T. C.'s beggings of the question and tedious repetitions passed over.—The argument from the necessity of a living judge considered.—The government of the church not monarchical, but aristocratical.—The inconveniencies of monarchical government in the church manifested from reason.—No evidence that Christ intended to institute such government in his church, but much against it.—The communicatory letters in the primitive church argued an aristocracy.—Gerson's testimony from his book *De Auferribilitate Papæ*, explained and vindicated.—St. Hierome's testimony full against a monarchy in the church.—The inconsistency of the pope's monarchy with that of temporal princes.—The supremacy of princes in ecclesiastical matters asserted by the scripture and antiquity, as well as the church of England. P. 259

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.

The illegality of it manifested, first from the insufficiency of the rule it proceeded by, different from that of the first general councils, and from the pope's presidency in it.—The matter of right concerning it discussed.—In what cases superiors may be excepted against as parties.—The pope justly excepted against as a party, and therefore ought not to be judge.—The necessity of a reformation in the court of Rome acknowledged by Roman catholics.—The matter of fact inquired into, as to the pope's presidency in general councils.—Hosius did not preside in the Nicene council as the pope's legate.—The pope had nothing to do in the second general council.—Two councils held at Constantinople within two years; these strangely confounded.—The mistake made evident.—St. Cyril not president in the third general council as the pope's legate.—No sufficient evidence of the pope's presidency in following councils.—The justness of the exception against the place manifested; and against the freedom of the council from the oath taken by the bishops to the pope.—The form of that oath in the time of the council of Trent.—Protestants not condemned by general councils.—The Greeks and others unjustly excluded as schismatics.—The exception from the small number of bishops cleared and vindicated.—A general council in antiquity not so called from the pope's general summons.—In what sense a general council represents the whole church.—The vast difference between the proceedings in the council of Nice and that at Trent.—The exception from the number of Italian bishops justified.—How far the Greek church and the patriarch Hieremias may be said to condemn protestants; with an account of the proceedings between them P. 297

 PART III.
Of Particular Controversies.

CHAP. I.

OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF GENERAL COUNCILS.

How far this tends to the ending controversies.—Two distinct questions concerning the infallibility and authority of general councils.—The first entered upon, with the state of the question.—That there can be no certainty of faith that general councils are infallible, nor that the particular decrees of any of them are so; which are largely proved.—Pighius's arguments against the divine institution of general councils.—The places of scripture considered which are brought for the church's infallibility, and that these cannot prove that general councils are so;

Matth. xviii. 20. Acts xv. 28. particularly answered.—The sense of the fathers in their high expressions of the decrees of councils.—No consent of the church as to their infallibility.—The place of St. Austin about the amendment of former general councils by latter at large vindicated.—No other places in St. Austin prove them infallible, but many to the contrary.—General councils cannot be infallible in the conclusion, if not in the use of the means.—No such infallibility without as immediate a revelation as the prophets and apostles had; taking infallibility not for an absolute unerring power, but such as comes by a promise of divine assistance preserving from error.—No obligation to internal assent but from immediate divine authority.—Of the consistency of faith and reason in things propounded to be believed.—The suitableness of the contrary doctrine to the Romanists' principles P. 345

CHAP. II.

OF THE USE AND AUTHORITY OF GENERAL COUNCILS.

The denying the infallibility of general councils takes not away their use and authority.—Of the submission due to them by all particular persons.—How far external obedience is required in case they err.—No violent opposition to be made against them.—Rare inconveniences hinder not the effect of a just power.—It cannot rationally be supposed that such general councils as are here meant should often or dangerously err.—The true notion of a general council explained.—The freedom requisite in the proceedings of it.—The rule it must judge by.—Great difference between external obedience and internal assent to the decrees of councils.—This latter unites men in error, not the former.—As great uncertainties supposing general councils infallible as not.—Not so great certainty requisite for submission as faith.—Whether the Romanists' doctrine of the infallibility of councils, or ours, tend more to the church's peace.—St. Austin explained.—The keys, according to him, given to the church.—No unremediable inconvenience, supposing a general council err.—But errors in faith are so, supposing them infallible when they are not.—The church hath power to reverse the decrees of general councils.—The power of councils not by divine institution.—The unreasonableness of making the infallibility of councils depend on the pope's confirmation.—No consent among the Romanists about the subject of infallibility, whether in pope or council.—No evidence from scripture, reason, or antiquity, for the pope's personal infallibility. . . . P. 390

CHAP. III.

OF THE ERRORS OF PRETENDED GENERAL COUNCILS.

The erroneous doctrine of the church of Rome in making the priest's intention necessary to the essence of sacraments.—That principle destructive to all certainty of faith upon our author's grounds.—The absurdity of asserting that councils define themselves to be infallible.—

Sacramental actions sufficiently distinguished from others without the priest's intention.—Of the moral assurance of the priest's intention, and the insufficiency of a mere virtual intention.—The pope's confirmation of councils supposeth personal infallibility.—Transubstantiation an error decreed by pope and council.—The repugnancy of it to the grounds of faith.—The testimonies brought for it out of antiquity examined at large, and shewed to be far from proving transubstantiation.—Communion in one kind a violation of Christ's institution.—The decree of the council of Constance implies a *non obstante* to it.—The unalterable nature of Christ's institution cleared.—The several evasions considered and answered.—No public communion in one kind for a thousand years after Christ.—The indispensableness of Christ's institution owned by the primitive church.—Of invocation of saints, and the rhetorical expressions of the fathers which gave occasion to it.—No footsteps of the invocation of saints in the three first centuries: nor precept or example in scripture, as our adversaries confess.—Evidences against invocation of saints from the Christians' answers to the heathens.—The worship of spirits and heroes among the heathens justifiable on the same grounds that invocation of saints is in the church of Rome.—Commemoration of the saints without invocation in St. Augustine's time.—Invocation of saints, as practised in the church of Rome, a derogation to the merits of Christ.—Of the worship of images, and the near approach to pagan idolatry therein.—No use or veneration of images in the primitive church.—The church of Rome justly chargeable with the abuses committed in the worship of images P. 423

CHAP. IV.

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SALVATION IN THE ROMAN CHURCH.

Protestants' concessions ought not to be any ground to prefer the communion of the church of Rome.—How far those concessions extend.—The uncharitableness of Romanists, if they yield not the same to us.—The weakness of the arguments to prove the Roman church the safer way to salvation on protestant principles.—The dangerous doctrines of Romanists about the easiness of salvation by the sacrament of penance.—The case paralleled between the Donatists and the Romanists, in denying salvation to all but themselves; and the advantages equal from their adversaries' concessions.—The advantage of the protestants, if that be the safest way which both parties are agreed in, manifested and vindicated in several particulars.—The principle itself at large shewed to be a mere contingent proposition, and such as may lead to heresy and infidelity.—The case of the leaders in the Roman church, and others, distinguished.—The errors and superstitions of the Roman church make its communion very dangerous in order to salvation P. 517

CHAP. V.

THE SAFETY OF THE PROTESTANT FAITH.

The sufficiency of the protestant faith to salvation manifested by disproving the cavils against it.—T. C.'s tedious repetitions passed over.—The argument from possession at large considered.—No prescription allowable where the law hath antecedently determined the right.—Of the infallibility of oral tradition.—That contrary to the received doctrine of the Roman church, and in itself unreasonable.—The grounds of it examined.—The ridiculousness of the plea of bare possession discovered.—General answers returned to the remaining chapters, consisting wholly of things already discussed.—The place of St. Cyprian to Cornelius particularly vindicated.—The proof of succession of doctrine lies on the Romanists by their own principles P. 540

CHAP. VI.

THE SENSE OF THE FATHERS CONCERNING PURGATORY.

The advantage which comes to the church of Rome by the doctrine of purgatory; thence the boldness of our adversaries in contending for it.—The sense of the Roman church concerning purgatory explained.—The controversy between the Greek and Latin church concerning it.—The difference in the church of Rome about purgatory.—Some general considerations about the sense of the fathers as to its being an article of faith.—The doubtfulness and uncertainty of the fathers' judgments in this particular, manifested by St. Austin, the first who seemed to assert a purgation before the day of judgment.—Prayer for the dead, used in the ancient church, doth not infer purgatory.—The primate of Armagh vindicated from our adversaries' calumnies.—The general intention of the church distinguished from the private opinions of particular persons.—The prayers of the church respected the day of judgment.—The testimonies of the fathers in behalf of purgatory, examined; particularly of the pretended Dionysius, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Hierome, St. Basil, Nazianzen, Lactantius, Hilary, Gregory Nyssen, &c.—And not one of them asserts the purgatory of the church of Rome.—St. Austin doth not contradict himself about it.—The doctrine of purgatory no elder than Gregory I., and built on credulity and superstition.—The church's infallibility made at last the foundation of the belief of purgatory.—The falsity of that principle: and the whole concluded P. 558

PART II.

269

Of Schism.

CHAP. I.

OF THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH.

The question of schism explained.—The nature of it inquired into.—Several general principles laid down for clearing the present controversy.—Three grounds of the charge of schism on protestant churches by our author.—The first of the Roman church's being the catholic church, entered upon.—How far the Roman church may be said to be a true church.—The distinction of a church morally and metaphysically true justified.—The grounds of the unity of the catholic church, as to doctrine and government.—Cardinal Perron's distinction of the formal, causal, and participative catholic church examined.—The true sense of the catholic church in antiquity manifested from St. Cyprian, and several cases happening in his time ; as, the schism of Novatianus at Rome ; the case of Felicissimus and Fortunatus—Several other instances out of antiquity to the same purpose, by all which it is manifest that the unity of the catholic church had no dependence on the church of Rome.—The several testimonies to the contrary of St. Ambrose, St. Hierome, John Patriarch of Constantinople, St. Augustine, Optatus, &c. particularly examined ; and all found short of proving that the Roman church is the catholic church.—The several answers of his lordship to the testimonies of St. Cyprian, St. Hierom, St. Greg. Nazianzene, St. Cyril, and Ruffinus, about the infallibility of the church of Rome, justified.—From all which it appears, that the making the Roman church to be the catholic is a great novelty and perfect Jesuitism.

§. 1. **S**INCE so great and considerable parts of the Christian church have in these last ages been divided in communion from each other, the great contest and inquiry hath been, which party stands guilty of the cause of the present distance and separation. For both sides retain

still so much of their common Christianity, as to acknowledge that no religion doth so strictly oblige the owners of it to peace and unity as the Christian religion doth; and yet notwithstanding this, we find these breaches so far from closing, that, supposing the same grounds to continue, a reconciliation seems to human reason impossible. An evidence of which is, that those persons who, either out of a generous desire of seeing the wounds of the Christian world healed, or out of some private interest or design, have made it their
270 business to propound terms of reconciliation between the divided parties, have been equally rejected by those parties they have professed themselves the members of. For whether any of the Roman communion have ingenuously confessed the great corruptions crept into that church, and desired a reformation of them, or any of the protestant communion have endeavoured to excuse, palliate, or plead for the corruptions of the Roman church; we find how little encouragement they have had for such undertakings from that church whose communion they have professed to retain. The distance then being so great as it is, it is a very necessary inquiry what the cause of it is, and where the main fault lies; and it being acknowledged that there is a possibility that corruptions may get into a Christian church, and it being impossible to prove that Christianity obligeth men to communicate with a church in all those corruptions its communion may be tainted with, it seems evident to reason, that the cause of the breach must lie there where the corruptions are owned and imposed as conditions of communion. For can any one imagine it should be a fault in any to keep off from communion, where they are so far from being obliged to it, that they have an obligation to the contrary, from the principles of their common Christianity? and where men are bound not to communicate, it is impossible to prove their not communicating to be schism. For there can be no schism, but where there is an obligation to communion; schism being nothing else but a wilful violation of the bonds of Christian communion; and therefore whenever you would prove the protestants guilty of schism, you must do it by proving they were bound to communicate with your church in those things which they are protestants for disowning of. Or that there is so absolute and unlimited an

obligation to continue in the society of your church, that no conditions can be so hard, but we are bound rather to submit to them, than not join in communion with you. But we who look on the nature of a Christian society in general, the foundations of its constitution, the ends and designs of it, cannot think ourselves obliged to communion in those things which undermine those foundations, and contradict those ends.

§. 2. This being a matter of so vast consequence, in order to the settling men's minds in the present disputes of the Christian world, before I come to particulars, I shall lay down those general principles which may manifest how free protestants are from all imputation of schism. Schism then importing a violation of that communion which we are obliged to, the most natural way for understanding what schism is, is to inquire what the foundations are of Christian communion, and how far the bonds of it do extend. Now the foundations of Christian communion in general depend upon the acknowledgment of the truth of Christian religion. For that religion which Christ came to deliver to the world being supposed true, is the reason why any look on themselves as obliged to profess it; which obligation extending to all persons who have the same grounds to believe the truth of it, thence ariseth the ground of society in this profession, which is a common obligation on several persons joining together in some acts of common concernment to them. The truth then of Christian religion being acknowledged by several persons, they find in this religion some actions which are to be performed by several persons in society with each other. From whence ariseth that more immediate obligation to Christian society, in all those who profess themselves Christians; and the whole number of these who own the truth of Christian religion, and are thereby obliged to join in society with each other, is that which we call *the catholic church*. But although there be such a relation to each other in all Christians as to make them one common society; yet for the performance of particular acts of communion, there must be lesser societies 271 wherein persons may join together in the actions belonging to them. But still the obligation to communion in these lesser is the same with that which constitutes the great body of

Christians, which is the owning Christianity as the only true religion and way to eternal happiness. And therefore those lesser societies cannot in justice make the necessary conditions of communion narrower than those which belong to the catholic church; i. e. those things which declare men Christians ought to capacitate them for communion with Christians. But here we are to consider, that as to be a Christian supposeth men's owning the Christian religion to be true, so the conveyance of that religion being to us now in those books we call the scriptures, there must be an acknowledgment of them as the indispensable rule of faith and manners, which is, that these books are the great charter of the Christian society, according to which it must be governed.

§. 3. These things being premised as the foundation in general of Christian society, we shall the better understand how far the obligation to communion in it doth extend. For which it must be considered, that the grounds of continuance in communion must be suitable and proportionable to the first reason of entering into it; no man being obliged by virtue of his being in a society, to agree in any thing which tends to the apparent ruin of that society; but he is obliged to the contrary, from the general grounds of his first admission into it; his primary obligation being to preserve the honour and interest of it, and to join in acts of it so far as they tend to it. Now the main end of the Christian society being the promotion of God's honour and the salvation of men's souls, the primary obligation of men entering into it, is the advancement of these ends, to join in all acts of it so far as they tend to these ends; but if any thing come to be required directly repugnant to these ends, those men of whom such things are required, are bound not to communicate in those lesser societies where such things are imposed, but to preserve their communion with the catholic society of Christians. But these general discourses seeming more obscure, it will be necessary for the better subserviency of them to our design, to deduce them into particulars. Setting then aside the catholic society of Christians, we come to inquire how far men are bound to communicate with any lesser society, how extensive soever it may pretend its communion to be.

1. There is no society of Christians of any one communion,

but may impose some things to be believed or practised which may be repugnant to the general foundations of Christian society. But if any society shall pretend a necessity of communion with her, because it is impossible this should be done by her; this privilege must in reason be as evident as the common grounds of Christianity are; nay much more evident, because the belief of Christianity itself doth (upon this pretence) depend on the knowledge of such infallibility, and the indispensable obligation to communion depends upon it.

2. There being a possibility acknowledged, that particular churches may require unreasonable conditions of communion; the obligation to communion cannot be absolute and indispensable; but only so far as nothing is required destructive to the ends of Christian society. Otherwise men would be bound to destroy that which they believe, and to do the most unjust and unreasonable things. But the great difficulty lies in knowing when such things are required, and who must be the judge in that case: to which I answer,

3. Nothing can be more unreasonable than that the society imposing such conditions of communion should be judge ²⁷² whether those conditions be just and equitable or no. If the question only were in matters of peace and conveniency and order, the judgment of the society ought to overrule the judgments of particular persons; but in such cases where great bodies of Christians judge such things required to be unlawful conditions of communion, what justice or reason is there that the party accused should sit judge in her own cause?

4. Where there is sufficient evidence from scripture, reason, and tradition, that such things which are imposed are unreasonable conditions of Christian communion, the not communicating with that society which requires these things cannot incur the guilt of schism. Which necessarily follows from the precedent grounds, because none can be obliged to communion in such cases, and therefore the not communicating is no culpable separation.

5. By how much the societies are greater which are agreed in not communicating with a church imposing such conditions, by how much the power of those who rule those societies so agreeing is larger, by so much the more justifiable is the reformation of any church from these abuses, and the settling the bonds of Christian communion without them. And on

those grounds, viz. the church of Rome's imposing unlawful conditions of communion, it was necessary not to communicate with her; and on the church of England's power to reform itself by the assistance of the supreme power, it was lawful and justifiable, not only to redress those abuses, but to settle the church upon its proper and true foundations. So that the church of Rome's imposing unlawful conditions of communion, is the reason why we do not communicate with her, and the church of England's power to govern and take care of herself, is the reason of our joining together in the service of God upon the principles of our reformation. On these grounds I doubt not but to make it appear, how free the church of England is from all imputation of schism.

§. 4. These things being thus in general premised, we come to consider what those principles are on which you can found so high a charge as that of schism on the protestant churches. And having thoroughly considered your way of management of it, I find all that you have to say may be resolved into one of these three grounds: 1. that the Roman church is the true and only catholic church; 2. that our churches could have no power or cause to divide in their communion from her; 3. that the authority of the Roman church is so great, that upon no pretence soever could it be lawful to withdraw from communion with her. I confess, if you can make good any one of these three, you do something to the purpose; but how little ground you have to charge us with schism from any of these principles, will be the design of this part at large to manifest. I begin then with the first, which is the pretence of your church's being the catholic church; and here we again enter the lists to see how fairly you deal with your adversary. Mr. Fisher saith, "that from the controversy of the resolution of faith the lady called them; and desiring to hear, whether the bishop would grant the Roman church to be the right church, the bishop," saith he, "granted that it was." To which his lordship answers, (after a just complaint of the abuse of disputations by men's resolution to hold their own, though it be by unworthy means and disparagement of truth,) that the question was neither asked in that form, nor so answered. And that "there is a great deal of difference (especially as Romanists handle the question of the church) between *the church* and *a church*, and there is some between a *true church* and a *right*

Conf. p. 104.
sect. 20. n.
1.

church. For *the church* may import *the only true church*, and perhaps the root and ground of the catholic. “And this,” saith he, “I never did grant of the Roman church, nor ever 273 mean to do. But *a church* can imply no more than that it is a member of the whole. And this I never did,” saith he, “nor ever will deny, if it fall not absolutely away from Christ. That it is *a true church* I granted also, but not *a right*. For truth only imports the being; right, perfection in conditions; thus, a thief is a true man, though not an upright man. So a corrupt church may be true, as a church is a company of men which profess the faith of Christ and are baptized into his name; but it is not therefore a right church, either in doctrine or manners. And this,” he saith, “is acknowledged by very learned protestants before him.” This is the substance of his lordship’s answer, to which we must consider what you reply: that about the terms of the lady’s question you grant to be a verbal controversy, and that whatever her words were, she was to be understood to demand this alone, viz. whether the Roman were not the true, visible, infallible church, out of which none can be saved; for herein (you say) she had from the beginning of the controversy desired satisfaction: and in this “subject the Roman church could not be any church at all, unless it were the church and a right church.” “The reason is, because St. Peter’s successor being the bishop of Rome and head of the whole church, (as you tell us you will prove anon,) that must needs be the church *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, if it be any church at all. And because the church can be but one, if it be a true church it must be the right church.” But all this amounts only to a confident assertion of that which wants evident proof, which is, that the notion of a church relates to one as appointed the head of the whole church, without which it would be no church at all. Which being a thing so hard to be understood, and therefore much harder to be proved, we must be content to wait your leisure till you shall think fit to prove it. When you therefore tell us afterwards, that the universal church supposes the acknowledgment of the same vicar of Christ, and that those dioceses which agree in this acknowledgment, as well as in the same faith and communion, of the same sacraments, make up one and the same universal church;

Lab. p. 127.

c. 2. n. 1.

Lab. p. 128.

n. 2.

when you further add, that the Roman church is therefore styled *the church*, because it is the seat of the vicar of Christ and chief pastor of the church universal: I can only say to all these confident affirmations, that if you had sat in the chair yourself, you could not have said more, or proved less. It is not therefore in what sense words may be taken by you, (for who questions but you may abuse words?) but in what sense they ought to be taken. You may call the bishop of Rome the vicar of Christ, but before you can expect our submission to him, you must prove that he is so. You may call the Roman church *the church*, if you please, among yourselves; but if by that you would persuade us there can be no church but that, you would do an office of kindness to offer a little at some small proof of it, i. e. as much as the cause and your abilities will afford. And what if the ancients by a *true church* did mean an orthodox church? I know but one of these things will follow from it, either that they took a true church for one morally and not metaphysically true; or that if your church be not an orthodox church, it can be none at all. From hence you proceed to quarrel with his lordship for saying, that may be a *true church* which is not a *right church* (which is all the thanks he hath for his kindness to you); “for,” say you, “how can you call that a true church in which men are not taught the way to heaven, but to eternal perdition?” Which is as much as to ask, how you can call that man a true man that hath a leprosy upon him? But if you had considered what his lordship had said, you would never have made such an objection. For his lordship doth not speak of the soundness of a church, but of the metaphysical entity of it. For he saith, it is true in that sense as “*ens* and *verum*, *being* and *true*, are convertible one with another; and every thing that hath a being is truly that being which it is in truth of substance.” “But,” say you, “how can that be a true church which teacheth the way to eternal perdition by some false doctrine in matter of faith? because it either teacheth something to be the word of God which is not, or denies that to be his word which is: to err in this sort is certainly to commit high and mortal offence against the honour and veracity of God, and consequently the direct way to eternal perdition.” An excellent discourse to prove

Lab. p. 128.
n. 3.

Conf. p. 105.
sect. 20. n.
2.

that no man can be saved that is not infallible ! for if he be not infallible, he may either teach something to be God's which is not, or deny that to be his word that is ; either of which being a mortal offence against the honour and veracity of God, it is impossible any man that is not infallible should be saved : either then we must put off that humanity which exposes us to error, or pronounce it impossible for any man to be saved, or else assert that there may be error where God's veracity is not denied. And if so, then not only men severally, but a society of men, may propound that for truth which is not, and yet not mortally offend against God's veracity ; supposing that society of men doth believe (though falsely) that this is therefore true because revealed by God. In which case that church may be a true church in one sense, though an erroneous church in another : true, as there is a possibility of salvation in it ; erroneous, as delivering that for truth which is not so. But here is a great deal of difference between a church acknowledging herself fallible, and that which doth not. For suppose a church propose something erroneous to be believed, if she doth not arrogate infallibility to herself in that proposal, but requires men to search and examine her doctrine by the word of God, the danger is nothing so great to the persons in her communion ; but when a church pretends to be infallible, and teacheth errors, that church requiring those errors to be believed upon her authority, without particular examination of the doctrines proposed, is chargeable with a higher offence against the honour and veracity of God, and doth as much as in her lies (in your expression) "teach men the way to eternal perdition." And of all sorts of blind guides, it is most dangerous following such who pretend to be infallible in their blindness ; and it is a great miracle if such do not fall past recovery. The more therefore you aggravate the danger of error, the worse still you make the condition of your church, where men are bound to believe the church infallible when she proposeth the most dangerous errors. When you say, "the whole church is not liable to these inconveniences of seducing or being seduced," if^{n. 3.} you mean (as you speak) of that which is truly the whole church of Christ, you are to seek for an adversary in it ; if you mean the Roman church, you are either seduced or

endeavour to seduce in saying so, when neither that is or can be the whole church, neither is it free from believing or proposing errors, as will appear afterwards. You quarrel with his lordship again for his similitude of a man that may be termed *a man* and not be *honest*, and say it comes not home to the case.

§. 5. But we must see how well you have fitted it. Instead of *a man*, you would have *a saint* put, and then (you say) the parallel would have held much better. But certainly then you mean only such saints as Rome takes upon her to canonize ; for the question was of one that might be a man, and not be honest ; will you say the same of your saint too ? If instead of *saint* you had put *his holiness* in, there are some in the world would not have quarrelled with you for it. But you are an excellent man at paralleling cases : his lordship was speaking of the metaphysical truth of a church being consistent with moral corruptions, for which he instanced in a thief's being truly a man, though not an honest man ; now you, to mend the matter, make choice of moral integrity being consistent with metaphysical truth, which is of a saint and a man. And doth not this now come home to our case ? That which follows, to shew the incongruity of his lordship's similitude, would much more shew your wit, if it were capable of tolerable sense : “ For,” you say, “ the word *church* in our present debate implies not a simple or uncompounded term, as that of *man*, but is a compound of substance and accidents together.” We had thought man had been a compound of substance and accidents, as well as a church ; or did you mean some transubstantiated man, that had accidents without substance ? But as his lordship spake of a true real man, who yet might want moral integrity ; so he supposed there might be a true real church, as to the essential parts of it, which yet might be in other respects a corrupted and defiled church. But when you add, that the notion of a church implies integrity and perfection of conditions, still you betray your weak or wilful mistakes of a church morally for metaphysically true. If you will prove it impossible for a church to retain its being that hath any errors in doctrine or corruptions in practice, you will do something to the purpose : but when you have done it, see what you get by it ; for then we shall not so

Lab. p. 129.
n. 3.

275

much as acknowledge your church to be metaphysically a true church. If his lordship therefore be so charitable as to say, that because your church receives the scripture as a rule of faith, (though but as a partial and imperfect rule,) and both the sacraments as instrumental causes and seals of grace, (though they add more, and misuse these,) it cannot but be a true church in essence: and you, on the other side, say, If it doth misuse the sacraments, and make the scripture an imperfect rule of faith, it would be unchurched; let the reader judge whether his lordship's charity for your own testimony against your church be built on better grounds. What follows concerning the holy catholic church in the Apostles' Creed, the entire catholic faith in the Athanasian Creed, the church's being the spouse of Christ and a pure virgin, are all things as true in themselves as your church is little concerned in them. The truly catholic church being quite another thing from that which goes under the name of the Roman catholic church; and this latter may prostitute herself to error, while the other remains a pure virgin; and it is only your saying, that yours only is the catholic church, which is in effect to say, that Christ hath a harlot to his spouse, as you speak.

§. 6. To omit that which you call, "a further skirmishing Lab. p. 129. about the form of words, and whether it savoured more of ^{n. 4.} prudence and charity, or cunning in the Jesuit, to instruct the lady what questions she should ask;" we come to that which is the main subject of this chapter, viz. "whether the church be styled *catholic* by its agreeing with Rome, which," you say, "was a received and known truth in the ancient church," but is so far from being in the least true, that his lordship deservedly calls it "a perfect Jesuitism." "For," Conf. p. 106. sect. 20. n. 4. saith he, "in all the primitive times of the church, a man, or a family, or a national church, were accounted right and orthodox as they agreed with the catholic church, but the catholic was never then measured or judged by man, family, or nation. But now in the Jesuits' new school, the one holy catholic church must be measured by that which is in the diocese or city of Rome, or of them which agreed with it, and not Rome by the catholic. So upon the matter, belike the Christian faith was committed to the custody of the

Roman, not of the catholic church ; and a man cannot agree with the catholic church of Christ, (in this new doctrine of A. C.) unless he agree with the church of Rome ; but if he agree with that, all is safe, and he is as orthodox as he need be." To which you seem to answer at first by some slight tergiversations, "as though this did not follow from A. C.'s words, and that the lady did not trouble herself with such punctilios as those of the agreement of the catholic church with Rome, or Rome's agreeing with the catholic church;" but at last you take heart, and affirm stoutly, "that the church is styled catholic from its agreement with Rome, and that this is no Jesuitism, but a received and known truth in the ancient church. In these terms then I fix myself, and this present dispute, as containing the proper state of the controversy concerning the catholic church. And if you can
276 make it appear that the church is styled catholic by agreeing with Rome, and that this was a received truth in the ancient church, then you may very plausibly charge us with schism in our separation from Rome ; but if the contrary be made evident, by your own pretence we are freed from that charge.

Now in the handling this controversy, you first explain your terms, and then produce your testimonies. In the explanation of your terms, you tell us, "the word *catholic* may be used in three different acceptions, viz. either formally, causally, or by way of participation. Formally, the universal church, i. e. the society of all true particular churches, united together in one body, in one communion under one head, is called *catholic*. Causally the church of Rome is styled *catholic*, because it hath an influence and force to cause universality in the whole body of the church catholic ; to which, two things are necessary, multitude and unity. The Roman church therefore, which as a centre of ecclesiastical communion infuses this unity, which is the form of universality, into the catholic church, and thereby causes in her universality, may be called *catholic* causally, though she be but a particular church ; as he that commands a whole army is styled *general*, though he be but a particular person. Thirdly, every particular orthodox church is termed catholic *participativè*, by way of participation, because they agree in and participate of the doctrine and communion of the catholic church." For

Lab. p. 131.
n. 5.

Lab. p. 130.
n. 5.

which (you bring) the instance of the church of Smyrna writing to the catholic church of Philomilion, &c. “Thus we see,” say you, “both how properly the Roman church is called *catholic*, and how the catholic church itself takes causally the denomination of *universal* or *catholic* from the Roman, considered as the chief particular church, infusing unity to all the rest, as having dependence of her and relation to her.” Thus I have recited your words, that we may fully understand your meaning, the substance of which is couched in your last words, that the reason why any church was accounted catholic, was from its union with the church of Rome. But if it appear that this sense of the catholic church is wholly a stranger to antiquity, that the catholic church was so called upon far different accounts than those mentioned by you; if the church of Rome had no other relation to the catholic church but as a member of it, as other churches were; then all this discourse of yours comes to nothing; and that is it which I now undertake to prove. Now the unity of the catholic church lying in two things, the doctrine and the government of it, if in neither of these it had any dependence of the church of Rome, then certainly it could not be called *catholic* causally from the church of Rome.

§. 7. First, the church was called *catholic* from the universal spread of its doctrine, and the agreement of all particular churches in it. So Irenæus derives the unity of the church spread abroad over the world from the unity of that faith which was universally received, and from thence saith, “that the church is but as one house, and having one soul and heart, and speaks as with one mouth.” Nothing can be more plain than that Irenæus^a makes the consent in doctrine to be the ground of unity in the catholic church. And that he did not suppose this consent to arise from the church of Rome appears from what he saith before, “that this faith was received in the church so universally spread from the apostles and their disciples^b.” Which must be understood of that

^a Hanc prædicationem cum acceperit, et hanc fidem quemadmodum prædiximus, ecclesia, et quidem in universum mundum disseminata, diligenter custodit, quasi unam domum inhabitans, et similiter credit iis,

videlicet quasi unam animam habens, et unum cor, et consonanter hæc prædicat et docet et tradit quasi unum possidens os.—Irenæus advers. hæres. l. 1. c. 3.

^b Ecclesia enim per universum

universal diffusion of it by the first preachers of it in the world, the continuance of which doctrine was the ground of the unity in the catholic church. To the same purpose Tertullian 277 gives an account of the church's unity, "by the adhering to that doctrine which was first preached by the apostles, who having first delivered it in Judæa, and planted churches there, went abroad, and declared the same to other nations and settled churches in cities, from whence other churches have the same doctrine propagated to them, which are therefore called apostolical churches, as the offspring of those which were founded by them. Therefore so many and so great churches are all that one prime apostolical church from whence all others come. And thus they are all prime and apostolical in regard of their unity, as long as there is that communication of peace, title of brotherhood, and common mark of hospitality^c." Wherein we see, that which made churches in Tertullian's sense apostolical, is the embracing and continuing in that doctrine which was first delivered by the apostles; and thus churches, though remote from the apostolical times, may have the denomination of *apostolical* from their consent in doctrine with those which were founded by them. But here is not the least intimation of any centre of ecclesiastical communion infusing unity into the catholic church; for this unity ariseth from that doctrine which was declared in and propagated by all the apostolical churches. So likewise Theodoret speaks, "that there is one church throughout the world, and therefore we pray for the holy, one, catholic, and apostolic church, extended from one end of the earth to the other. Which," saith he, "is divided by

orbem usque ad fines terræ disseminata, et ab apostolis et a discipulis eorum accepit eam fidem, &c. Ibid. l. i. c. 2.

^c Statim igitur apostoli——i. per Judæam contestata fide in Jesum Christum, et Ecclesiis institutis; dehinc in orbem profecti, eandem doctrinam ejusdem fidei nationibus promulgaverunt, et proinde ecclesias apud unamquamque civitatem condiderunt, a quibus traducem fidei et semina doctrinæ, cæteræ exinde ecclesiæ mutuatae sunt, et quotidie

mutuantur ut ecclesiæ fiant: ac per hoc et ipsæ apostolicæ deputantur, ut soboles apostolicarum ecclesiarum. Omne genus ad originem suam recenseatur, necesse est. Itaque tot ac tantæ ecclesiæ, una est illa ab apostolis prima, ex qua omnes. Sic omnes primæ et apostolicæ, dum una omnes probant unitatem: dum est illis communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis.—Tertull. de præscript. hæret. cap. 20.

cities and towns and villages, so that there are infinite and innumerable churches in the islands and continent, but all these are reduced to one, being united in the agreement of the same true doctrine^d.” So Constantine in his epistle to the bishops who were absent from the council of Nice, saith, “that our Saviour would have one catholic church, whose members, though dispersed in many several places, yet are nourished by the same spirit, which is the will of God^e.” In all which, and many other places which might be produced to the same purpose, we see a quite different account given of the unity of the catholic church, from that which you mention as the cause of it; we find the church called *catholic* in regard of its large extent in the world, (as is apparent besides these testimonies, from the controversies between St. Austin and the Donatists,) and the unity of that catholic church not placed in the least respect to the church of Rome, but in the consent in the apostolical doctrine in all those churches which concurred as members to make up this catholic church. So that the formal reason of any particular church’s having the denomination of catholic, must come not from any communion with the church of Rome; but from the owning the catholic and apostolic faith, and joining in communion with those churches which did own and acknowledge it. And therefore we find that the symbol of communion in the ancient communicatory letters never lay in the acknowledgment of Christ’s vicar on earth, or communion with the church of Rome, but in such things which were common to all apostolical churches. And therefore the church of Rome could not be then accounted the centre of ecclesiastical communion, as you speak after cardinal Perron^f, from whom you have verbatim transcribed all your former discourse. This being therefore the utmost which that great wit of your church was able to plead

^d Μία μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἐκκλησία· διὸ προσευχόμενοι λέγομεν, ὑπὲρ ἁγίας καὶ μόνης καθολικῆς καὶ ἀποστολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, τῆς ἀπὸ περάτων ἕως περάτων τῆς οἰκούμενης. οὕτω μυρίαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοῦ κρείττους εἰσὶν ἐκκλησίαι, καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ ἐν ἡπείροις. εἰς μίαν δὲ κοινὴν πᾶσαι τελοῦσι τῇ συμφωνίᾳ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἠνωμένων δογμάτων. Theodoret.

in Psal. 47. 4. tom. i. p. 580.

^e Μίαν εἶναι τὴν καθολικὴν αὐτοῦ ἐκκλησίαν βεβούληται, ἧς εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα εἰς πολλοὺς τε καὶ διαφόρους τόπους τὰ μέρη διήρηται, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐνὶ πνεύματι, τουτέστι τῷ θεῷ βουλήματι θάλπεται. Theod. Eccles. Hist. l. i. c. 9.

^f Perron’s Reply to King James, l. 4. c. 9.

in behalf of its being the catholic church, it deserves to be further considered.

§. 8. We come therefore to that kind of unity in the catholic church which depends on the government of it; and 278 this is that which is pretended as the ground of the Roman church's being the catholic church; because though (as cardinal Perron says) "she be in her own being particular, yet she may be called *catholic* causally, as the centre and beginning of ecclesiastical communion, infusing unity, which is the form of universality, into the catholic church." This therefore must be more narrowly searched into, to see if this were a known and received truth in the ancient church. Which is so far from it, that we find no such causal influence from the church of Rome then owned or asserted, but that the catholic church was a whole consisting of homogeneal parts, without any such subordination or dependence as the contrary supposition implies. This is by none more fully asserted than by such who have with the greatest zeal and industry stood up for the unity of the catholic church. The first of whom is St. Cyprian; in whose time and writings there are very remarkable cases occurring, to clear upon what terms the unity of the catholic church did then stand. The first I begin with is the case which arose in the church about the schism of Novatianus, which will give us the fuller discovery of the grounds of unity in the catholic church, because the first rise of this schism was in Rome itself. For Novatus coming to Rome in a discontent from Africa, falls in with Novatianus, (which two names the Greek writers of the church commonly confound,) who being likewise under discontent at the election of Cornelius to be Bishop of Rome, was ready to join with the other in fomenting a schism. For which they made this their pretext, that Cornelius had admitted such to communion who had lapsed in the persecution of Decius, which tended to the overthrow of the church's purity. Upon this, Novatianus gets himself ordained by three bishops bishop of Rome, in opposition to Cornelius; the fame of which schism being spread abroad, there was great making of parties on both sides. Cyprian, and the churches of Africa, after full inquiry into

g V. Rigalt. ad Cypr. ep. 49. Petav. ad Epiphan. hæres. 59. p. 226. Vales. ad Euseb. l. 6. c. 43, 44. Albaspin. et Balduin. in Optat.

it, declare for Cornelius, so did Dionysius of Alexandria and the churches there; but Fabius of Antioch, with the churches of Pontus and Cilicia, suspend, and rather incline to Novatianus for some time; till they were after more fully satisfied by Dionysius of Alexandria. Now here is a case wherein the grounds of unity in the catholic church may be easily discerned, which it is plain, from the proceedings in it, were (as in all such emergent cases) what should be determined and agreed on by the consent of the catholic church; i. e. of those churches which all consented in the same catholic faith, and therefore made up one catholic church. Now if the church of Rome had been the centre of ecclesiastical communion, and had infused catholic unity into the church at this time, what way or possibility had there been for restoring the church's unity? Neither was the appeal made to foreign churches merely because Rome itself was divided; and so the controversy could not be ended there; but it appears, from the whole story of the proceedings, that this was looked on as the proper means for preserving the unity of the catholic church at that time; when the faith and communion of the apostolical churches were so fully known and distinguished from all others. These things will more fully appear from St. Cyprian's^h epistle to Antonianus upon the occasion of this schism; who it seems at first adhered to Cornelius, and with him to the catholic church, (not as though his joining with Cornelius was the cause of his being with the catholic church, but because in joining with him he joined with the catholic church which declared for him;) but it seems afterwards, by some letters of Novatianus, he began to stagger, and desires Cyprian to give him an account what heresy Novatianus broached, and what the reason was why Cornelius communicated with the lapsed persons. As to which particulars he endeavours to satisfy him, and withal to give an account why they joined with Cornelius in opposition to Novatianus, and what the practice of the church was as to lapsed persons, and 279 on what reasons it was built: wherein he tells him, that though some of their own bishops had formerly denied communion to lapsed persons, yet they did not recede from the

^h Cyprian. ep. 52. ed. Rigalt.

unity of the catholic church, or communion of the fellowships, because by them they were admitted. “For,” saith he, “the bond of concord remaining, and the communion of the catholic church continuing, every bishop orders and disposeth his own actions as one that must give an account of his design to Godⁱ.” Doth St. Cyprian here speak like one that believed the church of Rome to be the centre of ecclesiastical communion? or that the unity of the church lay in acknowledging the pope to be Christ’s vicar, or in dependence on the church of Rome? when every bishop is left to himself and God, in all such things which he may do, and yet hold communion with the catholic church? And therefore afterwards he tells us, “that there is one church divided into many members throughout the world, and one episcopal office spread abroad, by the consenting multitude of many bishops^k.” If this church be one in this sense, and the whole government of the church be but as one bishopric, as all the bishops unanimously consent in the management of it; then here is not the least foundation for the catholic church’s taking its denomination causally from the Roman church, and much less for the bishops having dependence on her, or relation to her; since the care and government of the church, by these words of Cyprian, appears to be equally committed to all the bishops of the catholic church. And from thence it was, that in this epistle we read that St. Cyprian writ to the church of Rome after the death of Fabianus, to advise them what to do in the case of lapsed persons, which letters of his were sent through the world; which, Rigaltius well observes, did arise from “that unity of ecclesiastical discipline whereby Cyprian, not doubting but the care of all churches was upon him, dispatched these letters to the clergy at Rome; from whence they were sent through the catholic church as an evidence that there was but one episcopal office in the whole church, part of which was committed in full power to every bishop^l.”

ⁱ Manente concordiae vinculo, et perseverante catholicæ ecclesiæ individuo sacramento, actum suum disponit ac dirigit unusquisque episcopus, rationem propositi sui Domino redditurus.—Cyprian. ep. 52. p. 79.

^k Cum sit a Christo una ecclesia

per totum mundum in multa membra divisa: item episcopatus unus, episcoporum multorum concordie numerositate diffusus.—Id. ib. p. 81.

^l Itaque ex unitatis ecclesiasticæ disciplina, Cyprianus solitudinem omnium ecclesiarum ad se pertinere non ambigens, etiam Romam se

Thus we see a quite different account given of the unity of the catholic church than what you from cardinal Perron would persuade us of. It being an easy matter for men of wit and parts (especially such as that great cardinal was master of) to coin distinctions to make the most absurd things seem plausible ; but yet, when they come to be examined, they are found to have no other bottom but the invention of that person who coined them.

§. 9. And that it is so as to this distinction of the formal, causal, and participative catholic church, will be further evident from another case which happened in St Cyprian's time, which was this : Felicissimus and Fortunatus being cast out of communion by a synod of African bishops, when they saw they could do little good in Africa, run over to Rome, and bring letters to Cornelius the bishop there, misrepresenting the whole business of their being ejected out of the church, on purpose to persuade Cornelius to admit them into communion. Who at first being unwilling to hearken to them, was at last by their threats and menaces brought to receive their letters. Upon which St. Cyprian writes an epistle to Cornelius, wherein he tells him, that if the threats of such profligate persons should relax the church's discipline, all the power and strength of it would be soon taken away ; that the ground of all schism and heresy arises from disobedience to the bishop. Certainly he doth not mean the bishop of Rome, but every bishop in the catholic church ; (for it was 280 not Cornelius, but Cyprian and the African bishops who were disobeyed ;) upon which he falls upon the matter of their appeal to a foreign church, and after some fair commendations of the church of Rome, (the meaning of which will be afterwards examined,) he very sharply condemns these appeals to foreign churches as unreasonable, unjust, and dishonourable to those bishops whose sentence they appealed from : " For what cause," saith he, " could these persons have of coming and declaring against their bishops ? For either they are pleased in what they have done, and continue in their wicked-

dedisse literas ait ad clerum. Eas vero literas per totum mundum missas, h. e. per ecclesiam catholicam, cujus ecclesiæ unus est epi-

scopatus, atque hujusmodi episcopatus a singulis episcopis in solidum pars tenebatur.—Rigalt. Observ. ad Cypr. p. 64.

ness; or if they are displeased at it, and recede from it, they know whither to return. For since it is decreed by us all, and it is a thing just and reasonable in itself, that every one's cause be heard where the fault was committed, and every pastor hath a part of the flock committed to him which he is to rule and govern as being to give an account of it to God; it is requisite that those whom we rule over ought not to run about and break the concord of bishops by their headiness and subtilty; but there to defend their cause where they may have accusers and witnesses of their faults. Unless it be, that to a few desperate and profligate persons the authority of the bishops of Africa seems less to them, who have already sat in judgment upon them, and solemnly condemned them lately for their crimes^m." Can any thing be more express and punctual than this testimony of Cyprian is, to overthrow that sense of *the catholic church* which you contend for? How far were Cyprian and the African bishops from making Rome the centre of ecclesiastical communion, when they looked on appeals thither as very unjust and unreasonable! What acknowledgment and dependence was there on the church of Rome in those who looked on themselves as having a portion of Christ's flock committed to them, of which they were to give an account to God alone? And I pray what excellent persons were those who undervalued the authority of the African bishops, and ran to Rome? St. Cyprian tells us, they were *pauci, desperati, perdit*, and translate these with as much advantage to your cause as you can. So fatal hath it been to Rome, even from its first foundation, to be a receptacle for such persons. And is not

^m Quæ autem causa veniendi et pseudoepiscoporum contra episcopos factum nunciandi? Aut enim placet illis quod fecerunt, et in suis elere perseverant: aut, si displicet et recedunt, sciunt quo revertantur. Nam cum statutum sit omnibus nobis, et æquum sit pariter ac justum, ut uniuscujusque causa illic audiatur, ubi est crimen admissum, et singulis pastoribus portio gregis sit adscripta, quam regat unusquisque et gubernet, rationem sui actus Domino redditurus: oportet

utique eos quibus præsumus non circumcursare, nec episcoporum concordiam cohærentem sua subdola et fallaci temeritate collidere, sed agere illic causam suam, ubi et accusatores habere et testes sui criminis possint: nisi si paucis desperatis et perditis minor videtur esse auctoritas episcoporum in Africa constitutorum, qui jam de illis judicaverunt, et eorum conscientiam multis delictorum laqueis vinctam judicii sui nuper gravitate damnarunt.—Cyprian. ep. 55. p. 95.

this a great credit to your cause, that such persons who were ejected out of communion for their crimes at home, did make their resort to Rome? and the more pious and stout any bishops were, the more they defended their own privileges in opposition to the encroachments of the Roman see: which was apt to take advantage from such renegados as these were by degrees to get more power into her hands, and lift up her head above her fellow-churches. But, lest you should think that St. Cyprian only spake these things in an heat, out of his opposition to these persons, and his desire to crush them, you shall see what his judgment was concerning the same things when he purposely discourseth of them. For in his book of the Unity of the Churchⁿ, he useth that expression which destroys all your subordinate union in the church; which is, *episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur*. They who consider and understand the importance of that speech, will find nothing more destructive to your doctrine of the catholic church than that is. For when he makes the universal government of the church to be but one episcopal office, and that committed in the several parts of it with full power to particular bishops, can any be so senseless to imagine that he should ever think the government of the church in general to depend on any one particular church as chief over the rest? And that the former words do really import such a full power in particular bishops over that part of the flock which is committed to them, appears from 281 the true importance of the phrase *in solidum*; a phrase taken out of the civil law, where great difference is made between an obligation *in partem* and *in solidum*, and so proportionable between a tenure *in partem* and *in solidum*: those things were held *in solidum* which were held in full right and power without payments and acknowledgments: but where the *usus-fructus* belonged to another, it was not held *in solidum*. So that when St. Cyprian saith, "that every part belonging to each bishop was held *in solidum*," he therein imports that full right and power which every bishop hath over his charge; and in this speech he compares the government of the church to an estate held by several freeholders, in which every one hath a full right to that share which belongs to

ⁿ De Unitate Eccles. p. 208.

him. Whereas according to your principles, the government of the church is like a manor or lordship, in which the several inhabitants hold at the best but by copy from the lord; and you would fain have it at the will of your lord too. But thus far we see St. Cyprian was from your modern notion of the catholic church, that he looks on the unity of it as depending on the consent of the catholic bishops and churches under their full power, and not deriving that unity from any particular church as the head and fountain of it. And therefore, in the former schism at Rome about Cornelius and Novatianus, St. Cyprian employed two of his colleagues thither, Caldonius and Fortunatus, that not only by the letters they carried, but by their presence and counsel, they should do their utmost endeavour “to bring the members of that divided body to the unity of the catholic church^o :” which is certainly a very different thing from the catholic church’s deriving its unity from the particular church of Rome. Many other instances of a like nature might be produced out of the reports of St. Cyprian’s times, but these are sufficient to evidence how far the unity of the catholic church was then from depending on the church of Rome.

§. 10. But lest we should seem to insist only on St. Cyprian’s testimony, it were easy to multiply examples in this kind; which I shall but touch at some of, and proceed. If the church of Rome then had been looked on as the centre of ecclesiastical communion^p, is it possible to conceive that the excommunications of the church of Rome should be slighted as they were by Polycrates, for which St. Hierome commends him as a man of courage? that Stephen should be opposed as he was by Cyprian and Firmilian in a way so reflecting on the authority of the Roman church? that appeals to Rome should be so severely prohibited by the African bishops? that causes should be determined by so many canons to be heard in their proper dioceses? that when the right of appeals was challenged by the bishops of Rome, it was wholly upon the account of the imaginary Nicene canon? that when Julius^q

^o Ut ad catholicæ ecclesiæ unitatem scissi corporis membra componerent.—Cypr. ep. 42. p. 62.

^p Eusebius, *Histor. Ecclesiastic.* lib. 5. cap. 24.

^q Hieron. de Scriptor. Ecclesiast. tom. i.

^q Socrat. l. 2. c. 5. Sozom. l. 3.

c. 5. Socrat. l. 2. c. 11.

undertook by his sole power to absolve Athanasius, the Oriental bishops opposed it as irregular on that account, at the council at Antioch? that when afterwards Paulus, Marcellus, and Lucius repaired to Rome to Julius, and he seeks to restore them, the eastern bishops wonder at his offering to restore them who were excommunicated by themselves? and that as when Novatus was excommunicated at Rome they opposed it not, so neither ought he to oppose their proceedings against these persons. What account can be given of these passages, if the unity of the catholic church had depended on the particular church of Rome? Besides, while the church of Rome continued regular, we find she looked on herself as much obliged to observe the excommunications made by other churches, as others were to observe hers. As in the case of Marcion, who being excommunicated by his father the bishop of Sinope in Pontus, and by no means prevailing 282 with his father for his admission into the church again, resorts to Rome, and with great earnestness begs admission there, where he received this answer; “that they could not do it without the command of his father; for there is one faith and one consent, and we cannot contradict our worthy brother your father^r.” This shews the unity of the catholic church to proceed upon other grounds than the causal influence of the church of Rome, when the consent of the church did oblige the church of Rome not to repeal the excommunication of a particular bishop. Upon which ground it was, that Synesius proceeded so high in the letters of excommunication against Andronicus; that he forbids “all the churches upon earth to receive him into their communion.” And withal adds, “that if any should condemn his church because it was of a little city, and should receive those who were condemned by it, as though it were not necessary to obey so poor a church, he lets them know that they make a schism in that church which Christ would have to be one^s.” We see here

^r Οὐ δυνάμεθα ἄνευ τῆς ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦ τιμίου πατρὸς σου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. μία γάρ ἐστιν ἡ πίστις, καὶ μία ἡ ὁμολογια, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα ἐναντιωθῆναι τῷ καλῷ συλλειτουργῷ πατρὶ δὲ σῷ. Epiphanius Hæres. 42. sect. 1.

^s Εἰ δέ τις ὡς μικροπολίτιν ἀπο-

σκυβαλίσει τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ δέξεται τοὺς ἀποκηρύκτους αὐτῆς, ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῇ πένητι πείθεσθαι, ἴστω σχίσας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἣν μίαν ὁ Χριστὸς εἶναι βούλεται. Synes. epist. 58. p. 203. ed. Petav.

on what equal terms the communion of the catholic church then stood; when so small a church as that of Ptolemais could so far oblige by her act the catholic church, that they should be guilty of schism who admitted them to communion whom she had cast out of it. If Synesius had believed the church of Rome to have been the centre of ecclesiastical communion, had it not been good manners, nay duty in him, to have asked first the pleasure of the church of Rome in this case, before he had passed so full and definitive a sentence as this was? But the wise and great men of those ages were utterly strangers to these rare distinctions of a causal, formal, and participative catholic church. It is true indeed they did then speak honourably of the church of Rome in their age as a principal member of the catholic church, and having advantages above other churches by its being fixed in the seat of the empire, on which account her communion was much desired by other persons. But still we find the persons most apt to extol her authority were such as were most obnoxious, who not being able to hold any reputation in their own churches, where their crimes and scandals were sufficiently known, ran presently to Rome, which was ready still to take their part, thereby to enhance her power; as is most evident in the many disputes which arise upon such accounts between the Roman and African bishops. But these things we shall have occasion to discuss more particularly afterwards. At the present, it may be sufficient by these few (of very many examples which might be produced) to have made it appear, that it was far from being a known and received truth in the ancient church, that the church of Rome was the centre of ecclesiastical communion, or that the church was called *catholic* from the union with her and dependence upon her.

§. 11. But we must now consider what strenuous proofs you produce for so confident an affirmation: your instances therefore being the most pregnant to your purpose which you could find in antiquity must be particularly examined: your

Lab. p. 131.
u. 5. first is of St. Ambrose, relating that his brother Satyrus going on shore in a certain city of Sardinia, (where he desired to be baptized,) “demanded of the bishop of that city whether he consented with the catholic bishops; that is,” saith he,

“with the Roman church^t.” These words I grant to be in St. Ambrose, but whosoever thoroughly considers them will find how little they make for your purpose. For which it will be sufficient to look on the following words, which tell us, that 283 at that time there was a schism in the church, and Sardinia was the chief seat of it. For Lucifer Caralitanus had newly separated himself from the church, and had left societies there which joined in his schism^u. For Caralis was the metropolis of Sardinia, and it appears by St. Hierome, that the Luciferians confined the church only to Sardinia, which is the cause of that expression of his, “that Christ did not come merely for the sake of the Sardinians^x.” So that those Luciferians were much like the Donatists, confining the church only to their own number. Now there being such a schism at that time in Sardinia, what did Satyrus any more than inquire whether the bishop of the place he resorted to was guilty of this schism or no? “but,” say you, “he made that the trial whether he was a catholic or no, by asking whether he agreed with the church of Rome.” To which I answer, that there was very great reason for his particular instancing in the church of Rome. 1. Because Satyrus was originally of the church of Rome himself; for Paulinus, in the life of St. Ambrose, (Satyrus his brother,) speaking of him after his consecration to be bishop, says, *Ad urbem Romam, hoc est, ad natale solum perrexit*, “He went to Rome, i. e. to the place of his birth;” now Satyrus being originally a Roman, what wonder is it that he should particularly inquire of the Roman church? As suppose one of the Gallican church of Arles or Vienna should have been cast upon shore in another island belonging to France at the same time, and understanding there was a schism in the place, should particularly inquire whether they

^t Advocavit ad se episcopum loci, percontatusque ex eo est, utrumnam cum episcopis catholicis, hoc est, cum Romana ecclesia conveniret.—D. Ambros. Orat. in obit. fratr.

^u Et forte ad id locorum in schismate regionis illius ecclesia erat. Lucifer enim se a nostra tunc temporis communione diviserat, et quanquam pro fide exulasset, et fidei suæ reliquisset hæredes, non putavit tamen fidem esse in schis-

mate.—Id. ib.

^x Nec ob Sardorum tantum mastrucam Dei Filium descendisse.—Hieron. c. Lucifer. init.

Mastruca vestis barbaricæ genus, quam Sardi sua lingua Mastrucam appellant: significans multos adhuc superesse bonos Christianos, etiamsi nulli essent in Sardinia, in qua sola ille Christi ecclesiam esse volebat.—Erasmus in Scholiis.

agreed with the catholic bishops, i. e. with the church of Arles or Vienna; could you hence infer that either of these were the centre of ecclesiastical communion, and if not from hence, how can you from the other? Or suppose in the time of the Donatists' schism in Afric, a stranger coming accidentally thither, and desiring communion with the Christians of that city he was in, should inquire of the bishop of the city, whether he communicated with the catholic bishops, i. e. with the church of Hippo or Carthage, could you hence infer that Hippo was causally the catholic church, and if not, with what reason can you do it from so parallel a case? 2. Because Sardinia did belong to the metropolitan province of the church of Rome; it being one of the suburbicarian provinces under the jurisdiction of the Roman lieutenant, and consequently one of the suburbicarian churches appertaining to the metropolitanical power of the bishop of Rome: and therefore it was but reason to ask, whether the churches in Sardinia did agree with their mother church or no. But all this is very far from implying that the unity of the catholic church comes from the particular church of Rome; on this account, because at that time, when the unity of the catholic church was preserved by that continual correspondence between the parts of it by the formed letters and otherwise, whoever was known to have communion with any one particular church (which communicated with the rest) had thereby communion with the catholic church. So that on that account the question might as well have been asked of the churches of Milan, Agobio, or any other in Italy, as of the church of Rome. For whosoever communicated with any of them did communicate with the catholic church, as well as those who did communicate with the church of Rome. So that your first instance will prove no more the church of Rome to be the fountain and centre of ecclesiastical communion, than any other particular church. Your second is from St. Hierome's saying, "that the church of Alexandria made it her glory to participate of the Roman
284 faith^z." But doth it hence follow that the church of Alexandria was therefore catholic, because she participated of the

^y Sed tamen scito, &c. Romanam fidem apostolico ore laudatam, cujus se esse participem Alexandrina ec-

clesia gloriatur.—Hieron. ep. 68. ad Theophil.

faith of the Roman church considered as a particular church? For any one who reads that epistle will easily see, that St. Hierome there speaks of the Roman faith, not as it proceeds from the Roman church, but as it was received by it; and that he doth not understand it of the then present Roman faith, any further than it agreed with that faith which the apostle commended in them. So that the utmost which can be extracted out of this testimony is, that it was the glory of the church of Alexandria to hold the same faith which the primitive Roman church did, for which the apostle commended it. Which is apparent by the design of the whole epistle, which is to encourage Theophilus, the patriarch of Alexandria, to suppress the nefarious heresy (as he calls it) of the Origenists; for it seems Theophilus then dealt more mildly with them, which Hierome was displeased at; and therefore tells him, that although he took some care by the discipline of the church to reduce them, yet that was not enough, and thence brings in these words; “but withal know, that nothing is more our design than to preserve the rights of Christ, and not to transgress the bounds of our fathers, and always to remember the Roman faith, commended by the mouth of the apostle, which is the glory of the church of Alexandria that she is a partaker of^z.” If you had dealt so fairly as to have cited St. Hierome’s words at large, any one might easily see how remote they were from your purpose; it being manifest by them, that St. Hierome’s only design was to persuade Theophilus to assert the ancient faith against the encroachments of modern heresies; and to encourage him to it, mentions that commendation which was given to the ancient faith by the apostle writing to the Romans upon their receiving it; and therefore since the same faith was in the church of Alexandria which the Romans were commended for receiving of, Theophilus ought to be a vigorous assertor of it, against the oppositions of heretics. But how from hence we should infer that the church of Rome was the fountain of faith as well as centre of communion, is a

^z Sed tamen scito, nobis nihil esse antiquius quam Christi jura servare, nec patrum transferre terminos, semperque meminisse Romanam fidem apostolico ore laudatam, cujus se esse participem Alexandria ecclesia gloriatur.—Hieron. Ibid.

thing we are yet to seek for till you further direct us. Yet, it may be, the strength of it lies in this, that the Roman faith was commended by the apostle. And was not the faith of other churches, where it was pure, commended as well as that? And although the fathers in their complimentary addresses to the church of Rome were pleased often to mention this, “that the Roman faith was praised by the apostle; yet, as Rigaltius well observes, that the Latin fathers took those words of the apostle, as though their faith were more pure and sincere than in other places; whereas the apostle only saith, that he gave thanks to God that there was such a fame abroad, that the Romans who swayed the world had embraced the Christian faith. Which by reason of the dignity of the city which was head of the world, and empress of nations, did conduce much to the propagation of the Christian faith^a.” For that there was no peculiar excellency in the Roman faith above the faith of other churches, appears from the scope of this epistle, which was to instruct and settle them in the right faith, and from the testimonies of the author of the commentaries under St. Ambrose’s name, and St. Hierome himself. The former tells us, the reason why St. Paul commended their faith, was, “because though they saw no miracles yet they believed, though not so purely
 285 as they ought to have done^b.” And afterwards saith, “that St. Paul commends their faith although it were not exact according to rule, yet since by that they came to worship God in Christ he rejoiceth in it, knowing they might increase more in it.” And St. Hierome elsewhere speaking without design or interest, saith, “Not that the Romans have any other kind of faith than what all other churches have; but that there was greater devotion and simplicity in believing^c.” And

^a Sic omnes fere Latini patres, Pauli ad Romanos verba acceperunt, quasi rectior et sincerior fuisset apud Romanos fides: cum hoc tantum dicat apostolus; agere se gratias Deo, quod ubique passim fama sit, etiam Romanos, rerum dominos, fidem Christianam suscepisse. Quod certe ob dignitatem urbis quæ totius orbis erat caput et gentium domina, valde ad fidei Christianæ propaga-

tionem conducebat.—Rigaltius, Observat. ad Cyprian. epist. p. 78.

^b Quia nulla insignia virtutum videntes, nec aliquem apostolorum, susceperant fidem Christi ritu licet Judaico, in verbis potius quam in sensu.—Ambros. præfat. in epist. ad Roman.

^c Quamvis non secundum regulam ab autoribus traditæ veritatis, tamen quia quod ab uno Deo erat,

withal adds, that the very same faults which the apostle condemned them for then, did continue still among them, the greatest of which was pride. And if this present controversy do not make good St. Hierome's observation till this time, we are strangely mistaken; for what greater pride can there be, than for any particular church to arrogate the title of *catholic* to herself, and to make all others no further catholic than they participate of her faith and communion^d?

§. 12. Your next testimony is that of John the Patriarch of Constantinople, who did, in his epistle to Hormisda, judge those to be severed from the communion of the catholic church who did not consent in all things with the see apostolic^e: but the main force of your testimonies lies in a presumption that men will never take the pains to examine them. We must therefore consider the occasion and manner of the writing this epistle; for those words you cite, are not the words of the patriarch himself, but of the form of subscription required by Hormisda in order to an union of the eastern and western churches; which had been then a long time in a schism. For after that Acacius stood up so resolutely in defence of the rights of his see at Constantinople, the Roman bishops (who made it then their design to infringe the liberties of other churches, the better to enhance their own) would by no means admit of any reconciliation, unless the names of Acacius, and those who defended him in that see being his successors, as Phravita, Euphemius, Macedonius, &c., were expunged out of the diptychs of the church; which being so unjust and unreasonable a demand, for a long time the patriarchs of Constantinople would by no means assent to it. But after the death of the emperor Anastasius, Justin succeeds in the throne, one who made it his business to have this breach made up; in order to which he writes to Hormisda, and earnestly persuades him to a reconciliation; and so likewise doth the patriarch John. But it hath been the common practice of the bishops of that church to be therein unlike the unjust judge, that they will not be wrought on by

interposito Christi nomine, cœperant venerari, gratulatur; sciens illos posse proficere.—Id. ad v. 8. c. 1.

^d Non quod aliam habeant Romani fidem, nisi hanc quam omnes

Christi ecclesiæ; sed quod devotio in eis major sit et simplicitas ad credendum.—Hieron. præfat. in l. 2. Comment. in Epist. ad Galat. tom. 9.

^e Concil. tom. 3. p. 767.

importunities ; but have been the more implacable the more they have been sought to ; as it appeared in this present case. For this sour and inflexible pope would not yield to any terms of union, but upon conditions of his own prescribing, which were, the expunging of Acacius, and subscribing that form which he sent to them. Which when the emperor and patriarch saw, though they were sufficiently displeased at it, yet out of their greedy desire of peace, they were contented rather to swallow these hard conditions than suffer the schism to remain still. Now it is in this form of subscription that these words are contained wherein they promise not to recite the names of those in the sacred mysteries who are severed from the communion of the catholic church, i. e. who consent not in all things with the see apostolic. But lest these words being thus inserted by the pope himself should be interpreted to the disadvantage of other churches, and particularly that of Constantinople ; the patriarch makes a preface to that subscription by way of protestation ; wherein, after declaring the
 286 reception of the pope's letters, and congratulating the hopes of union, he manifests his own desire of peace and his willingness to refuse the communion of all heretics. " For," saith he, " I look on those most holy churches of your elder and our new Rome, as both making but one church^f." And after, declaring his assent to the decrees of the four general councils, he adds, " that those who opposed them he judged fallen off *a sancta Dei generali et apostolica ecclesia*, from the holy catholic and apostolic church." Now when the patriarch was thus careful to explain himself, so as to assert that the church of Rome and that of Constantinople made but one church, when he adds what he means by *the catholic church*, viz. the truly general and apostolical church ; infer as much from Hormisda's words as you will, I am sure you can do little to your purpose from the patriarch's taking them in the sense he explains himself in, by this protestation. So that the meaning of them is only this : that as he judged the church of Rome a member of the catholic church, (whose unity required

^f Sanctissimas enim Dei ecclesias, augustæ civitatis unam esse definio.
 i. e. superioris vestræ, et novellæ —Joh. Patriarch. ep. inter ep. Hormisd. 35.
 istius Romæ unam esse accipio,
 illam sedem apostoli Petri, et istius

that those who were out of communion in one church should be so with the rest,) so he consented to acknowledge them justly excommunicated whom the church of Rome would have to be so. So that hence nothing ariseth to your purpose more than will equally advance the authority of any other particular church, whose excommunications did oblige the whole church, as we have seen already in the case of Sinope and Ptolemais.

§. 13. You proceed to another testimony of St. Austin addressing himself to the Donatists, telling them, “that the succession of the Roman bishops is the rock which the proud gates of hell overcome not^g,” thereby insinuating, that the very succession of those bishops is in some true sense the catholic church. But from whence doth it appear that the succession of the Roman bishops is the rock here spoken of? For St. Austin was there arguing against the Donatists, and shewing them the danger of being separated from the unity of the catholic church; that if they were cut off from the vine, they would wither, and be in danger to be cast into the fire; and therefore exhorts them, “to come and be planted into the vine, it being a grief to them to see them cut off^h.” Now in order to this, he brings in the former words, to acquaint them with the way whereby they might better understand the catholic church, which could not in reason be confined to their own age, but must be derived from the apostles. So that his counsel is of the same nature with that of Tertullian and Irenæusⁱ, who put men upon a diligent search into the successions of the apostolical churches. But now, when by this search they have found out the catholic church, he tells them, “that is the rock which the proud gates of hell cannot overcome.” For so elsewhere St. Austin calls the catholic church *a rock*, as he calls it likewise *a house* and *a city* in several places of these disputations against the Donatists^k; as here before he calls it *the vine*, from whence all who are cut off wither and die. But what is all this to the particular church of

^g Numerate sacerdotes vel ab ipsa sede Petri et in ordine illo patrum quis cui successit videte. Ipsa est petra quam non vincunt superbæ inferorum portæ.—D. August. in Psalm. 100.

^h Venite fratres, si vultis ut inseramini in vite: dolor est cum vos

videmus præcisos ita jacere. Ibid.

ⁱ Tertull. de Præscript. c. 36. Iren. l. 3. c. 3.

^k August. de Baptism. c. Donatist. l. 3. c. 18. l. 4. c. 12. l. 7. c. 51. Advers. Petilian. l. 2. c. 70. De Unitat. Eccles. cap. 20.

Rome, which none of the disputes with the Donatists at all concerned? as is fully manifest from the whole management of that controversy; in which though he was so much put upon shewing what and where the catholic church was, yet he never once expressed any such thing as that the church was called *catholic* from any relation to the church of Rome, but 287 still mentions it as a particular church, which with other churches made up one catholic church. So in his commentaries on the xlvth psalm: "Behold Rome," saith he, "behold Carthage, behold several other cities; these are king's daughters, and have delighted the king in his honour, but they all make up but one queen¹." How incongruous had this expression been, had St. Austin believed the Roman church to be so much above all others, that the ground why any others were called catholic was from their union with her; and therefore he must, according to your principles, have saluted the church of Rome as the queen of all the rest, and made other particular churches but as her daughters and handmaids. But St. Austin knew of no such difference, but looked on all particular churches, whether at Rome, Carthage, or elsewhere, as making up but one catholic church. And to the same purpose he frequently speaks, when he says, "that the church is called one in regard of her unity, and many in regard of the several societies of Christians abroad in the world;" when he calls the several churches, "members of that one church which is spread all over the world^m," without setting any note of discrimination upon one above all the rest; when he reckons the Roman, Corinthian, Galatian, Ephesian churches together, and that all these, and the churches propagated from them, do conspire in one universal churchⁿ. But the places are so many to this purpose in him, that it would look too much

¹ Ecce Roma, ecce Carthago, ecce aliæ et aliæ civitates: filiæ regum sunt, et delectaverunt regem suum in honore ipsius; et ex omnibus fit una quædam regina.—Aug. in Psal. 44.

^m Propter unitatem ecclesiæ, una ecclesia; propter congregationes fraternas per loca multæ sunt ecclesiæ.—Id. in Psal. 141.

An placet vobis, ut contra ecclesias quæ membra sunt unius ecclesiæ tot orbe diffusæ, &c.—Id. de

Unitat. Eccles. c. 11.

ⁿ Verum etiam illas ecclesias quas in scripturis apostolicis et canonicis pariter legimus, non solum Romanorum, verum etiam Corinthiorum, Galatarum, Ephesiorum, &c. ut taceam de aliis tam latis atque universis terrarum partibus, in quas ex his apostolicis laboribus et plantationibus porrecta crevit et crescit ecclesia.—Id. c. Crescon. Grammat. l. 2. c. 37.

like ostentation to offer to prove a matter so evident to all that read any thing in him. And is it possible then for you to think that St. Austin made the succession of bishops at Rome in any sense the catholic church? You might as well say, that he made the church spread all over the world a particular church, as that he made any particular church, whether at Rome or elsewhere, (for he makes no difference,) to be in any sense the universal church.

§. 14. But that which you seem to lay the greatest force on, is the testimony of Optatus Milevitanus, “who,” say you, ^{Lab. p. 131.} “after he had said that St. Peter was head of all the apostles, ^{n. 5.} and that he would have been a schismatic who should have erected another chair against that singular one of St. Peter, as also that in that chair of St. Peter, being but one, unity was to be kept by all; he adds, that with Syricius, then pope, he himself was united in communion, with whom the whole world,” saith he, meaning the whole catholic church, “agrees by communicatory letters in one society of communion.” “See here,” say you, “how clearly he makes the union with the bishop of Rome the measure of the catholic church; which the bishop calls a *jesuitism*; and further proves himself to be in the catholic church, because he was in communion with the see of St. Peter.” For our better understanding the meaning of these words of Optatus, we must consider the state of the controversy between Optatus and Parmenianus, by which it will appear how very little these words of his make to your purpose. The main question between the catholics and the Donatists was about the catholic church, to whom it was that title did belong. The difficulty seemed the greater, because there was no difference between them in any matter of faith, or in the substance of the sacraments, and therefore they were fain to find out other means to decide this controversy than by either of those two. For which the catholics made choice of these two arguments, *universality* and *succession*; the former, as agreeing with that large spread of the church which was prophesied to be in the times of the gospel, whereas the Donatists confined the church to a corner in Africa; the latter, in regard of the necessity of deriving 288 themselves from the apostolical churches. Now the Donatists denying any but themselves to be the catholic church, the proof

lay on their adversaries' part, who upon all occasions offer to make it good, that the church from which the Donatists separated themselves was the only true and catholic church. Accordingly Optatus having in the first book discussed the matters of fact about the rise of the schism, the ordinations of Cecilian and Majorinus, and the proceedings used for the ending the schism, in this second book he enters on the controversy of the church which Parmenianus would have to be only among themselves; against which he urgeth, first, that then certainly the church could not be called *catholic*, because it was so called "from its large comprehension and universal spread^o." Had Optatus believed the ground of the church's being catholic had been its union with the church of Rome, he would never have given that account of its being called so which here he doth. After which he produceth many places of scripture to prove the large extent of the church, and concludes that to be the catholic church which was diffused over all the world; than which nothing can be more contrary to your pretensions, who limit and confine the catholic church to your own party, as the Donatists did. And if those arguments then used against the Donatists had any force against them, they have still as much against you, who exclude so great and considerable churches from being members of the catholic church because not of your communion. From hence Optatus proceeds to examine which had the better title to be the catholic church on the account of succession; and Parmenianus reckoning the *cathedra* in the first of the *notes ecclesiae*, Optatus begins with that, by which is understood the lawful derivation of power for governing the church; so Albaspinæus (as well as others) understands it. Now the controversy was, where this *cathedra* was. Optatus proves, "there can be no lawful power but what is derived from the apostles^p," and therefore, where the succession is plain and uninterrupted, there and nowhere else can that *cathedra* be. "Which episcopal chair being first placed at Rome by St. Peter, in which he as chief of the apostles sat, from

^o Ubi ergo erit proprietas catholici nominis, cum inde dicta sit catholica, quod sit rationabilis et ubique diffusa?—Optat. l. 2.

^p Cathedram episcopalem, primam missionem, omnem potestatem, a qua cæteræ deducerentur.—Albaspinæus in Optat. lib. 2.

whence he had his name *Cephas* ; in which one chair unity should be kept by all, lest the other apostles should set up others against it ; so that he must be a schismatic and offender who should place another chair against that. Therefore in this one chair St. Peter sat first, to whom succeeded Linus, to him Clemens, and so on to Siricius, who joins with us, with whom the whole world communicates by the intercourse of formed letters. Do you now give an account of your chair, who challenge to yourselves the name of *the holy church* ^q." To pass by that ridiculous account of the name Cephas, which Baldwin supposes to be inserted into the text from some ignorant gloss made in the margin, the main thing to be considered is the scope and design of these words ; in which he doth two things : 1. He shews the evident succession of the catholic bishops from St. Peter in the church of Rome, which he doth by a distinct and particular enumeration of them. 2. From thence shews the unlawfulness of setting up another chair in opposition to that ; i. e. pretending to another right of government than what was conveyed down from the apostles ; or setting up another chair in opposition to that of St. Peter at Rome ; i. e. that succession of bishops which was derived from him. Now, 289 saith he, God, providing for the unity of the church, intended there should be but one chair in a place ; i. e. that the several apostles should not in the same place set up a distinct *cathedra* or succession of church-governors ; and therefore, though St. Paul as well as St. Peter were instrumental in the settling the church of Rome, yet, that the church's unity might be preserved, there were not two distinct series of bishops, the one deriving from St. Peter and the other from St. Paul. So that

^q Igitur negare non potes, scire te in urbe Roma Petro primo cathedram episcopalem esse collatam ; in qua sederit omnium apostolorum caput Petrus ; unde et Cephas appellatus est ; in qua una cathedra unitas ab omnibus servaretur, ne cæteri apostoli singulas sibi quisque defenderent : ut jam schismaticus et peccator esset, qui contra singularem cathedram, alteram collocaret. Ergo cathedra unica quæ est prima de dotibus, sedit prior Petrus : cui

successit Linus, Lino Clemens, &c. Damaso Siricius hodie, qui noster est socius : cum quo nobis totus orbis commercio formatarum in una communionis societate concordat. Vestræ cathedræ vos originem reddite, qui vobis vultis sanctam ecclesiam vindicare.—Optatus l. 2. Sed suspicor hæc verba (unde Cephas appellatus est) esse ineptæ alicujus glossæ ad marginem temere ascriptæ et deinde abs librariis contextui insertæ.—Baldwin in Optat. l. 2.

Optatus's saying is much of the same nature with that of Cyprian in the case of the schism about Cornelius and Novatianus, who urgeth that most, That there ought to be but one bishop in one church, now the bishop and his *cathedra* are correlates to each other. Optatus therefore, saying that there was but one *cathedra* at Rome, puts the Donatists upon this issue, that if they could not deduce their succession from St. Peter at Rome, they could have no pretence to the *cathedra* there. And therefore challengeth them to deduce the succession of their bishops there, as at large appears in his following discourse. Which could be no higher than of Macrobius from Encolpius, Encolpius from Bonifacius Ballitanus, as he from Victor Garbiensis, who was sent over on purpose from the Donatists in Afric to make a faction and a party at Rome among the African inhabitants there^r. Now this being the utmost succession they could pretend to, and that being in opposition to that succession which was derived from St. Peter, nothing could be more plain than that at Rome (about which the contest was) the *cathedra* could not belong to the Donatists but their adversaries; and therefore that being by Parmenianus acknowledged one of the dowries of the catholic church, the title of that could not belong to the Donatists, but their opposers. This therefore doth not at all concern Rome's being causally the catholic church, but is only produced as a particular church for a known instance whereby to decide this particular controversy of succession. For otherwise the argument would have held as well for any other apostolical church where the succession was clear: and therefore afterwards he makes the communion with the seven churches as plain an argument of communion with the catholic, as he doth here of the church of Rome^s. You may therefore every jot as well make the seven churches of Asia to be causally the catholic church, as the church of Rome. And to the same purpose he instanceth in the Corinthian, Thessalonian, Galatian churches, as he doth in that of Rome, or the seven churches. We see then, Optatus's^t design was to

^r Ubi sedit Victor Garbiensis, a vestris jam dudum de Africa ad paucos erraticos missus, &c.—Optatus l. 2.

^s Extra septem ecclesias quicquid foris est, alienum est.—Id. ib.

^t Tibi unitas displicet; hoc si crimen putas, argue nos Thessaloni-

shew that their church from which the Donatists separated was the true catholic church, which he proves from their communion with all the apostolical churches, which had a clear and distinct succession from the apostles their planters. And because of the vicinity and fame of Rome, and the easier knowing the succession there, he instanceth in that in the first place, and then proceeds to the rest of them. But withal, to shew the unity of all these apostolical churches, when he had mentioned Siricius as the present bishop of Rome, he adds, that all the world agreed with him in the intercourse of the formed letters; not thereby intimating any supremacy of that church above others, but to shew that that succession he instanceth in at Rome was of the catholic church, because the whole Christian world did agree in communion with him that was the bishop there. And when he speaks of one chair, it is plain he means it of the particular church of Rome, because every apostolical church had an apostolical chair belonging to it. So Tertullian expressly, “that in all the apostolical churches there were their chairs still remaining^u.” And Eusebius^v particularly mentions the 290 apostolical throne or chair at Hierusalem, as others do that of Mark at Alexandria, and of the rest elsewhere. Nothing then can possibly be inferred from these words of Optatus concerning the church of Rome, but what would equally hold for any other apostolical church; and how much that is, let the reader judge: and how much soever it be, it will be very little for your advantage, who pretend to something peculiar to the church of Rome above all other churches.

§. 15. From Optatus you proceed, or rather return to St. Lab. p. 131. Hierome, “who,” say you, “professes the church is built upon St. ^{n. 5.} Peter’s see; and that whoever eats the Lamb, that is, pretends to believe in Christ, and partakes of the sacraments out of that house, that is, out of the communion of that church, is profane, and an alien; yea, that he belongs to Antichrist, and not to Christ, whoever consents not with the successor of St. Peter^x.”

censibus, Corinthiis, Galatis, septem ecclesiis quæ sunt in Asia, communicasse.—Ibid.

^u Percurre ecclesias apostolicas apud quas ipsæ nunc cathedræ apo-

stolorum suis locis præsidentur.—Tertull. Præscript. ad Hæret. cap. 36.

^v Euseb. Hist. Eccles. l. 7. c. 32.

^x Ego nullum primum (præmium fortasse rectius) nisi Christum se-

This testimony sounds big and high at first, and I shall not impute these expressions either to St. Hierome's heat or his flattery, although it looks the more suspicious, because at that time he had so great a pique against the eastern bishops, and that these words are contained in a complimentary address to Damasus. But, setting aside what advantages might be gained on that account to weaken the force of this testimony, if we consider the occasion or nature of these expressions, we shall find that they reach not the purpose you design them for. We must therefore consider that at the time of the writing this epistle, St. Hierome seems to be in a great perplexity what to do in that division which was then in the church of Antioch, concerning Paulinus, Vitalis, and Miletius; but besides this schism, it seems St. Hierome suspected some remainders of Arianism to be still among them, from their demanding of him whether he acknowledged three distinct hypostases in the Trinity. Now St. Hierome by *hypostasis* understands *the essence*, as many of the Greek fathers did^y; and thence the Sardican council defined, that there was but one hypostasis of the Father, Son, and Spirit; and therefore he suspects, that when they require of him the acknowledgment of three hypostases, they might design to entrap him, and unawares betray him into Arianism. And therefore argues stiffly in the remainder of that epistle, that *hypostasis* properly signifies *essence*^z, and nothing else; and from thence urgeth the inconvenience of admitting the terms of *three hypostases*. Now St. Hierome being thus set upon by these eastern bishops, he keeps off from communion with them, and adviseth with the Egyptian confessors, and follows them at present; but having received his baptism in the church of Rome, and being looked on as a Roman^a, where he was, he thought it necessary to address himself to pope Damasus,

quens, beatitudini tuæ, id est, cathedræ Petri, communione consocior. Super illam Petram ædificatam ecclesiam scio. Quicumque extra hanc domum agnum comederit,—profanus est.—Quicumque tecum non colligit, spargit, hoc est, qui Christi non est, Antichristi est.—Hieron. ep. 57. ad Damas.

^y Theodoret. l. 2. c. 8.

^z Tota secularium literarum schola nihil aliud hypostasim nisi οὐσίαν novit.—Hieron. ep. 57. ad Damas.

^a Inde nunc meæ animæ postulans cibum, unde olim Christi vestimenta suscepi.—Ib.

Ab Arianorum præsule et Campensibus, novellum a me homine Romano nomen exigitur.—Ib.

to know what he should do in this case. And the rather, because if St. Hierome had consented with them, they would have looked on it as an evidence of the agreement of the Roman church with them. Therefore he so earnestly and importunately writes to Damasus concerning it, as being originally part of his charge, having been baptized in that church.

“But,” say you, “whatever the occasion of the words were, is it not plain that he makes the church to be built on St. Peter’s see, and that whosoever is out of the communion of that church is an alien, and belongs to Antichrist?” To that therefore I answer, 1. That he doth not say that the catholic church is built on the particular church of Rome: for it is not *super hanc petram*, as referring to the *cathedra* immediately preceding, but *super illam*; and therefore it is not improbably supposed by some that the rock here refers to Christ. And 291 although Erasmus doth imagine that some particular privilege and dignity did belong to Rome above other churches from this place, (which is not the thing we contend about,) yet withal he says, that by *the rock* we must not understand Rome, for that may degenerate, but we must understand that faith which Peter professed^b. And it is a much easier matter for Marianus Victorius to tell him he lies^c, as he doth here in plain terms, than to be able to confute what he saith. And that the rather, because he begins his discourse in that manner, *Ego nullum primum nisi Christum sequens*, whereby he attributes the supreme power and infallible judgment in the church only to Christ. For as for your learned correction of *præmium* for *primum*, though you follow cardinal Perron in it, yet it is without any probability at all, it being contrary to all the MSS. used by Erasmus, Victorius, Gravius, Possevin, and others; and hath no authority to vouch it, but only Gratian, who is condemned by your own writers for a falsifier and corrupter of authors.

2. I answer, when St. Hierome pronounces those *aliens* and *profane*, who are out of the communion of the church;

^b Non super Romam arbitror, nam fieri potest ut Roma degeneret, sed super illam fidem quam Petrus professus est.—Erasmi schol. in ep. 57.

^c Etsi non minus aliis eam laborasse, Erasmus hic mentiatur.—Mar. Victor. schol. in ep. 57.

either it belongs not to the particular church of Rome, or, if it doth, it makes not much for your purpose. 1. There is no certainty that he there speaks of the particular church of Rome, but that he rather speaks of the true universal church; for it is plain he speaks of that church which is built upon the rock: now by your own confession, that cannot be the church of Rome, for that you suppose to be the rock itself, viz. the see of Peter, and therefore the church built upon it must be the universal church. And that this must be his meaning, appears from his plain words; for he saith, “Upon that rock the church is built, and whosoever eats the Lamb without this house is profane;”——he cannot certainly mean, whosoever eats without the rock, but without the house built upon it; so that the house in the latter clause must needs be the same with that which was built on the rock in the former. Either therefore you must deny the see of Peter to be the rock, or you must of necessity assert the house built upon it to be the universal church, and not the particular one of Rome; and consequently the danger lies not upon men’s not being in communion with the Roman, but with the truly catholic church. And how from hence you will infer that they are profane who are out of the Roman church, it would be worth our while to understand. 2. Suppose I should grant that St. Hierome did mean the particular church of Rome, yet I am not satisfied that this comes home to your purpose, unless you could prove that St. Hierome spake of what was necessarily and unalterably to be in the church of Rome, and not merely of what was in that time when he spake these words. But that is your perpetual paralogism in the citations of the fathers in praise of the church of Rome, what they spake, and it may be deservedly, of the church of their own time, (although sometimes their rhetoric swelled too high in their encomiastics,) that you will needs have to be understood of the same church at all times, and in our present age. As though it were not possible for a church to be eminent for purity of doctrine in one age, and to decline as much from it in another. But I need give no other instance in this case than St. Hierome himself; for if we believe St. Hierome in his catalogue, the two immediate predecessors of Damasus in the see of Rome, Liberius and Felix, were

tainted with heresy^d; and that very heresy, viz. Arianism, which St. Hierome writes to Damasus about now. I pray tell us then, whether if St. Hierome had lived in Liberius's time, would he have writ to him after the same rate he now writes to Damasus? if he had been of the same mind then, he would have been so far from scrupling the three hypostases, that he must have subscribed the Arian confession, as St. 292 Hierome tells us Liberius did through the instigation of Fortunatianus. And therefore, to let us see on what account he was now so liberal in his commendations of the church of Rome, he begins this epistle with the praise of her present orthodoxness in the catholic faith, "and that amongst all the divisions and breaches of the eastern churches they preserved the faith of their forefathers entire.....That now the Sun of righteousness rises in the west; but that Lucifer, who fell, now reigns in the east^e:" with many expressions to the same purpose. Which supposition being granted true at that time, that which follows infers very little to your purpose, unless you can prove that what was so then must necessarily continue so in all ages. If the east was then corrupted, and the west only sound, what praises belonged to the catholic church in general did of right devolve to that part which remained sound in the opinion of those persons who judged so. You would needs therefore from hence have your church accounted catholic now, by the same argument that Tully said (of the Roman lady who still affirmed she was but thirty years of age) that he believed it, for he had heard her say so twenty years before; so must we believe your church sound and catholic, because it was said so of her so many hundred years since; as though no other infirmities or wrinkles could have come upon her ever since. Prove your church to be as sound and orthodox, as pure and holy now, as she was in the primitive fathers' time, and we will not grudge her the highest of those commendations which were given her by them. But without doing this, your testimonies come to nothing. The same answer will serve the remaining testimonies of

^d Vid. Fortunat. et Acacius.

^e Profligato a sobole mala patri-
monio, apud vos solos incorrupta
patrum servatur hæreditas.... Nunc
in Occidente Sol justitiæ oritur, in

Oriente autem Lucifer ille, qui ceci-
derat, super sydera posuit thronum
suum, &c.—Hieron. ep. 57. ad
Damas.

Eulalius and the emperor Gratian, who only spake of the communion of the church of Rome as it was then : that of Fulgentius, styling the Roman church *the top of the world*, only imports the eminency of it in regard of the power of that city it was in, and so is wide enough from your purpose. Thus we have considered all that you have produced out of antiquity, to prove that the church is called *catholic* with a particular relation to and dependence of the church of Rome ; and can find nothing at all belonging to her as the centre of catholicism, but that those things which are said of her and communion with her in relation to being called *catholic*, might as well have agreed with any other apostolical church remaining sound in the catholic faith.

Lab. p. 132.
n. 6.

Hence it appears, that what his lordship is pleased to term *a perfect jesuitism*, viz. the measuring the catholic church by that of Rome, is really nothing else, and that the perfect mistake belongs to you, who assert that it was a received and known truth in the ancient church. Your vindication of the propriety of your church's being called *the Roman catholic church* from the Roman empire and the Jewish church, would then signify something when you have proved that the pope hath as much the government of the church as the Roman emperor had of all the provinces within the confines of the empire, or that we are all bound as much to resort to Rome as the Jews were to Jerusalem for the solemn worship of God. In the mean time the absurdity is never the less for being vulgar in calling yours *the Roman catholic church*. And yet, as though you had been only demonstrating these things, you tell us very magisterially, the truth is, in all doubts concerning matter of doctrine, recourse is to be had to St. Peter's successor, who (at least with a general council) can infallibly resolve all difficulties. An excellent way of proving, to say, *The truth is* : might not I as well say, *The truth is*, the pope, neither in council nor out of it, hath any infallibility at all? And would not this be full as good an answer as yours is an argument? But the very truth is, 293 you had rather have these things believed than go about to prove them ; lest the weakness of the arguments should lay too much open your found pretence of infallibility. Before you prove that the pope can carry his infallibility out of

Rome with him, shew us that he hath it there. I grant St. Peter had been infallible, though he had never been at Rome ; and it is far from being clear, that the pope is at all the more infallible for his being there. How far you have been from proving that the faith of every particular church is to be examined and proved to be catholic by its conformity to the faith of the Roman church, may abundantly appear from the preceding discourse. Those questions, which, you say, make nothing to your purpose concerning the pope's transferring his chair at Rome, and the Roman clergy's deserting him and the true faith, I shall so far believe you in, as to ease myself of the trouble of considering them any further than hath been done already in the very entrance into this conference.

§. 16. And here you tell us, "you now come to perform your promise, viz. to examine more fully his lordship's pretended *solutions* (as you call them) of Bellarmine's authorities in behalf of the infallibility of the church of Rome." But for all your boasting at first what great things you would do, you seem a little fearful of engaging too far, and therefore are resolved only to maintain them in general as they make for the infallible authority of the church, or of the pope defining articles of faith in a general council. But as far as you dare go, I shall attend your motions, and doubt not to make it evident that none of these authorities have any reference to that sense which you only offer to maintain them in, and that though they had, yet no such thing as infallibility can be proved out of them.

The first authority is out of St. Cyprian's letter to Cornelius Lab. p. 133. n. 6. bishop of Rome, whose words I am contented should be recited as fully as may be ; in which he chargeth Felicissimus and Fortunatus, with their complices, "that having set up a bishop against him at Carthage, they sail to the chair of Peter and the principal church from whence the sacerdotal unity had its rise, and carry letters from profane and schismatical persons, not considering that the Romans (whose faith was commended by the apostle) were such to whom perfidiousness could not have access^f." Now the meaning of

^f Post ista adhuc insuper pseudo- tuto, navigare audent ad Petri ca-
episcopo sibi ab hæreticis consti- thedram, atque ad ecclesiam prin-

Lab. p. 134.
n. 6.

this place you would have to be this, and no other, viz. “that the see of St. Peter, which is the principal of all churches, was so infallibly directed by the Holy Ghost, that no error in faith could have access to it, or be admitted by it, if not as a particular church, yet at least as the head of the universal church of Christ, and as the fountain of priestly unity; which St. Cyprian here expressly affirms that church and see to be.” This you sum up at last, as the most which can be made of this testimony; and which is indeed far more in all particulars than it can amount to. Which will appear by particular examinations of what you return in answer to his lordship.

Conf. sect.
3. n. 3, pp.
3, 4, 5, &c.

Three things his lordship answers to this place; 1. That *perfidia* can hardly stand here for error in faith; and if so, then this can make nothing for infallibility. 2. That supposing it granted to signify error in faith and doctrine, yet it belongs not to the Romans absolutely, but with a respect to those first Romans whose faith was commended by the apostle. 3. That it seems to be rather a rhetorical insinuation than a dogmatical assertion. And that St. Cyprian could not be supposed to assert herein the pope’s infallibility, appears by the contracts between him and the bishops of Rome. This is the short of his lordship’s answers to this place, to which we must consider what you reply. 1. His lordship says, “that *perfidia* can hardly stand for error in faith or misbelief, but it properly signifies malicious falsehood in matter of trust and action, not error in faith, but in fact against the discipline and government of the church.” And

294 to make this interpretation appear the more probable, his lordship gives an account of the story which was the occasion of writing that epistle, which is this, as his lordship reports it from Binius and Baronius: “In the year 255. there was a council in Carthage in the cause of two schismatics, Felicissimus and Novatian, about restoring of them to the communion of the church, which had lapsed in time of danger from Christianity to idolatry. Felicissimus would admit all even without penance, and Novatian would admit none, no not after penance. The fathers, forty-two in number, went, as truth

cipalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est, a schismaticis et prophanis literas ferre, nec cogitare eos esse Romanos (quorum fides apo-

stolo prædicante laudata est) ad quos perfidia habere non possit accessum. —Cyprian. ep. 55. ad Cornel. n. 16.

led them, between both extremes. To this council came Privatus, a known heretic, but was not admitted, because he was formerly excommunicated and often condemned. Hereupon he gathers his complices together, and chooses one Fortunatus (who was formerly condemned as well as himself) bishop of Carthage, and set him up against St. Cyprian. This done, Felicissimus and his fellows haste to Rome with letters testimonial from their own party, and pretend that 25 bishops concurred with them: and their desire was to be received into the communion of the Roman church, and to have their new bishop acknowledged. Cornelius, then pope, though their haste had now prevented St. Cyprian's letters, having formerly heard from him both of them and their schism in Afric, would neither hear them nor receive their letters. They grew insolent and furious, (the ordinary way that schismatics take.) Upon this, Cornelius writes to St. Cyprian, and St. Cyprian in this epistle gives Cornelius thanks for refusing these African fugitives, declares their schism and wickedness at large, and encourages him and all bishops to maintain the ecclesiastical discipline and censures against any the boldest threatenings of wicked schismatics. This being the story, his lordship says, he would fain know why *perfidia* (all circumstances considered) may not stand here in its proper sense for cunning and perfidious dealing, which these men, having practised at Carthage, thought now to obtrude upon the bishop of Rome also, but that he was wary enough not to be overreached by busy schismatics?" This demand of his lordship seeming very just and reasonable, we are bound to consider what reasons you give why *perfidia* must be understood for error in faith, and not in the sense here mentioned. "Why calls he," say Lab. p. 113. you, "St. Peter's chair *ecclesiam principalem*, (the chief church,) n. 6. but because it is the head to which all other churches must be subordinate in matter of doctrine? the words following signify as much, *unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*, from which chair of St. Peter, as it were from its fountain, unity in priesthood, and consequently unity in faith, is derived. Why brings he the apostle as panegyrist of the Roman faith? Is it forsooth because no malicious falsehood in matter of trust or error in fact against the discipline and government of the church can have access unto them, as the bishop will needs

misinterpret the place? or rather because no error in faith can approach the see apostolic? Certain it is, *perfidia* in this sense is diametrically opposed to the faith of the Romans immediately before commended by the apostle, (which was true Christian faith,) and consequently it must of necessity be taken for the quite contrary, viz. misbelief or error in faith." Three arguments in these words you produce, why *perfidia* must be understood of error in faith. 1. Because the church of Rome is called *the chief church*. But is it not possible it should be called so in any other sense, but as the head of all other churches in matter of doctrine? Is it not sufficiently clear from antiquity, that there were other accounts of calling the church of Rome the chief or principal church, as, the eminency of it, joined with the power of the city, (the *potentior principalitas* in Irenæus,) which advanced its reputation to the height it was then at? What matters of doctrine do you find brought to the church of Rome to be infallibly decided there in St. Cyprian's time? how little did St. Cyprian believe this when he so vehemently opposed the judgment of Stephen bishop of Rome in the case of rebaptization? Doth he write, 295 speak, or carry himself in that controversy like one that owned that church of Rome to be head of all other churches, to which they must be subordinate in matter of doctrine? Nay, in the very next words St. Cyprian argues against appeals to Rome; and is it possible then to think that in these words he should give such an absolute power and authority to it? And therefore any one who would reconcile St. Cyprian to himself must by those words of *ecclesia principalis* only understand the dignity and eminency, and not the power, much less the infallibility of the church of Rome. And no more is implied in the second, "that it is said to be the fountain of sacerdotal unity;" which some think may probably refer to the priesthood of the church of Afric, which had its rise from the church of Rome, as appears by Tertullian and others; in which sense he might very well say that the unity of the priesthood did spring from thence; or if it be taken in a more large and comprehensive sense, it can import no more than that the church of Rome was owned as the *principium*

§ Tertull. de Præscript. c. 36. Greg. l. 7. Ind. 1. ep. 32.

unitatis, which certainly is a very different thing from an infallible judgment in matters of faith. For what connexion is there between unity in government and infallibility in faith? Suppose the church of Rome should be owned as the principal member of the catholic church, and therefore that the unity of the church should begin there in regard of the dignity of it, doth it thence follow that there must be an absolute subordination of all other churches to it? Nothing then can be inferred from either of those particulars, that by *perfidia*, error in faith must be understood, taking those two expressions in the most favourable sense that can be put upon them. But considering the present state of the church of Rome at the time when Felicissimus and Fortunatus came thither, I am apt to think another interpretation more probable than either of the foregoing. For which we must remember that there was a schism at Rome between Novatianus and Cornelius, the former challenging to be bishop there as well as the latter, upon which a great breach was made among them. Now these persons going out of Africa to Rome, that they might manage their business with the more advantage, address themselves to Cornelius and his party; upon which St. Cyprian saith, *Navigare audent ad Petri cathedram atque ad ecclesiam principalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*; thereby expressing their confidence, that they not only went to Rome, but when they were there, they did not presently side with the schismatical party of the Novatians there, but, as though they had been true catholics, they go to Cornelius, who being the legal successor of St. Peter in opposition to Novatianus calls his see the chair of St. Peter, and the principal church, and the spring of the unity of the priesthood; because the contrary party of Novatianus had been the cause of all the schism and disunion which had been among them. And in this sense, which seems very agreeable to St. Cyprian's words and design, we may easily understand what this *perfidia* was, viz. that falseness and perfidious dealing of these persons, that although they were schismatics themselves, yet they were so far from seeming so at their coming to Rome, that, as though they had been very good catholics, they seek to join in communion with Cornelius and the catholic party with him. By which we see

what little probability there is from those expressions that *perfidia* must be taken for an error in faith. But, 3. you say, “to what purpose else doth he mention St. Paul’s commendation of their faith, if this *perfidia* were not immediately opposite to it?” But then inform us what part of that apostolical faith was it which Felicissimus and Fortunatus sought to violate at Rome? It is apparent their whole design was to be admitted into communion with the church of Rome (which in all probability is that access here spoken of): if therefore this *perfidia* imported some error in faith, it must be some error broached by those particular persons as contrary to the old
 296 Roman faith which was extolled by the apostle. And although these persons might be guilty of errors, yet the ground of their going to Rome was not upon any matter of doctrine whereby they sought to corrupt the church of Rome, but in order to the justifying of their schism by being admitted into the communion of that church. Notwithstanding then any thing you have produced to the contrary, there is no necessity of understanding *perfidia* for an error in matter of faith. And St. Cyprian’s mentioning the praise given to the Romans for their faith, by the apostle, was not to shew the opposition between that and the *perfidia* as an error in faith, but that being the greatest elogium of the church of Rome extant in scripture, he thought it now most convenient to use it, the better to engage Cornelius to oppose the proceedings of the schismatics there. Although withal, I suppose St. Cyprian might give him some taste of his old office of a rhetorician in the allusion between *fides* and *perfidia*, without ever intending that *perfidia* should be taken in any other sense than what was proper to the cause in hand.

Lab. p. 133.
n. 6.

You having effected so little in the solution of his lordship’s first answer, you have little cause to boast in your following words, that “hence his other explication also vanishes into smoke, viz. when he asserts that *perfidia non potest* may be taken hyperbolically for *non facile potest*; because this interpretation suits not with those high elogiums given by St. Cyprian to the Roman church as being the principal church, the church whence unity of faith and discipline is derived to all other Christian churches. If you indeed may have the liberty to interpret St. Cyprian’s words as you please, by adding such

things to them of which there is no intimation in what he saith, you may make what you please unsuitable to them. For although he calls it the principal church, from whence the unity of the priesthood is sprung; yet what is this to the unity of faith and discipline as derived from thence to all other churches, as you would persuade the unwary reader that these were St. Cyprian's words, which are only your groundless interpretation of them. And therefore there is no such improbability in what his lordship says, that this may be only a rhetorical excess of speech, in which St. Cyprian may *laudando præcipere*, by commending them to be such, instruct them that such indeed they ought to be, to whom perfidiousness should not get access. And for this he instanceth in such another rhetorical expression of Synesius^h to Theophilus of Alexandria, wherein he tells him that he ought to esteem what his throne should determine as an oracle or divine law. And certainly this comes nearer infallibility than that of St. Cyprian doth. But what inconveniency there should be that St. Cyprian by this interpretation should give no more prerogative to the church of Rome than to that of Alexandria or Antioch, I cannot easily imagine, till you prove some greater infallibility attributed then to the church of Rome than was to other apostolical churches; which as yet we are to seek for.

“But at length,” you tell us, “after much ado he grants *perfidia* may be taken for error in faith, or for perfidious misbelievers and schismatics who had betrayed their faith; but then,” say you, “he cavils with the word *Romanos*. This must be limited only to those Christians who then lived in Rome, to whom *qua tales*, as long as they continued such, error in faith could not have access.” What you say his lordship doth at length and after much ado, he did freely and willingly; but that you might have occasion for those words, you altered the course of his answers, and put the second in the last place. But still you have the unhappiness to misunderstand him. For although he grants that *perfidia* may relate to error in faith, yet, as it is here used, it is not understood of it abstractly but concretely for perfidious misbe-

^h Synes. ep. 67.

lievers; i. e. such perfidious persons, excommunicated out of other churches, were not likely to get access at Rome, or to
 297 find admittance into their communion. And in this sense it is plain that St. Cyprian did not intend by these words to exempt the Romans from possibility of error, but to brand his adversaries with a title due to their merit, calling them *perfidious*, i. e. such as had betrayed or perverted the faith. When you therefore ask, Is not this great praise? I suppose none but yourself would make a question of it, viz. that the church of Rome had then so great purity as not to admit such perfidious misbelievers into her communion. And it were well if the present church of Rome were capable of the same praise. But when you add, it is as if St. Cyprian should say St. Peter's see could not err so long as it continued constant in the truth, you wilfully misunderstand his lordship's meaning, who speaks of the persons, and not merely of their errors: but however, is it not a commendation to say that the church of Rome consisted of such persons then who adhered to the apostolical faith, and therefore error could not have access to them? And I look on it as so great a commendation, that I heartily wish it could be verified of your church now. Neither is this any such identical proposition as that you produce, but only a declaration of their present constancy, and inferring thence how unlikely it was that errors should be admitted by them. His lordship, to make it plain that St. Cyprian had no meaning to assert the unerring infallibility of either pope or church of Rome, insists on the contest which after happened between St. Cyprian and pope Stephen; upon which he saith expressly, "that pope Stephen did not only maintain an error, but the very cause of heretics, and that against Christians and the very church of Godⁱ." And after this he chargeth him with obstinacy and presumption; "and I hope this is plain enough," saith his lordship, "to shew that St. Cyprian had no great opinion of the Roman infallibility." To this you answer, with a famous distinction of the pope's erring as a private doctor and as the universal pastor, and

Lab. p. 134.
n. 6.

ⁱ Stephanus frater noster hæreticorum causam contra Christianos et contra Dei ecclesiam asserere conatur.—Cypr. ad Pompeium per Erasm. Basil. p. 327.

that St. Cyprian might very well be supposed to think the pope erred only in the first sense. Not to spend time in rifling this distinction of the pope's erring personally, but not judicially, or as a private doctor, but not as universal pastor, which it were an easy matter to do by manifesting the incongruity of it, and the absurdities consequent upon it, in case that doctrine which the pope errs in comes to be judicially decided by him; it is sufficient for us at present to shew that this distinction cannot relieve you in our present case. For your doctors tell us, the pope then errs personally and as a private doctor, when he errs only in his own judgment, without obliging others to believe what he judges to be true; but then he errs judicially and as universal pastor, when he declares his judgment so as to oblige others to receive it as true. Now can any thing be more evident than that St. Cyprian judged pope Stephen to err in this latter, and not in the former sense? For doth he not absolutely and severely declare himself against St. Cyprian's opinion; condemning it as an error and an innovation? But, say you, "he did not properly define any doctrine in that contestation; but said, *nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum*." But was not that the question, what was *traditum* and what not? for Cyprian and his party denied it to be a tradition which Stephen asserted was so; and doth he not therefore undertake to define something in this cause? But, say you, "if this argument hold good against the infallibility of popes, viz. that St. Cyprian held pope Stephen erred, therefore the pope may err in matters of faith; it will be a good consequence also to say St. Cyprian held pope Stephen erred, even whilst he maintained an universal immemorial tradition—therefore the pope may err whilst he follows such a tradition." I answer, 298

1. Who besides you would not have seen that the question was not whether the pope was infallible or no, but whether St. Cyprian judged him to be infallible or no? for if it appear that St. Cyprian did not judge him infallible, then those former words cannot be interpreted to such a sense as doth imply infallibility. 2. No doubt if the pope may err in other things, he may err when he thinks he follows an universal immemorial tradition; not that he doth err when he doth really follow such a one, but he may err in judging that to be

an universal immemorial tradition which is not: and this was the case between St. Cyprian and pope Stephen; the pope pretended to follow an universal tradition, St. Cyprian judgeth him to err in it, and that it was not so. And is it not plain still, notwithstanding these frivolous pretences, that St. Cyprian had no opinion at all of the pope's infallibility in any sense? and therefore out of honour to him you are bound to interpret his former words to some other sense than that of any infallibility in the church of Rome. Thus all his lordship's answers standing good, you have gained no great matter by this first testimony of St. Cyprian.

The second authority is out of St. Hierome, whose words are, "The Roman faith commended by the apostle admits not such *præstigiæ*, deceits and delusions, into it, though an angel should preach it otherwise than it was preached at first; being armed and fenced by St. Paul's authority, it cannot be changed^k." Here you tell us, "you willingly agree with his lordship, that by *Romanam fidem* St. Hierome understands the catholic faith of Christ," and so you concur with him against Bellarmine, that it cannot be understood of the particular church of Rome. But by the way, you charge your adversaries with great inconsequence, that in this place they make *Roman* and *catholic* to be the same, and yet usually condemn you for joining as synonymas *Roman* and *catholic* together. A wonderful want of judgment! as though the Roman faith might not be the catholic faith then, and yet the catholic faith not be the Roman faith now. The former speech only affirms that the faith at Rome was truly catholic; the latter implies that no faith can be catholic but what agrees with Rome: and think you there is no difference between these two? But you say further, "that this catholic faith must not here be taken abstractly, that so it cannot be changed, for Ruffinus was not ignorant of that, but that it must be understood of the immutable faith of the see apostolic so highly commended by the apostle and St. Hierome; which is founded upon such a rock, that even an angel himself

Lab. p. 135.
n. 6.

^k Attamen scito Romanam fidem apostolica voce laudatam ejusmodi præstigias non recipere, etiamsi angelus aliter annunciet, quam semel

prædicatum est, Pauli autoritate munitam non posse mutari.—Hieron. l. 3. Apol. c. Ruff. cap. 4.

is not able to shake it." But St. Hierome speaking this with a reference to that faith he supposeth the apostle commended in them, (although the apostle doth not so much commend the catholickness or soundness of their faith, as the act of believing in them; and therefore whatever is drawn from thence, whether by St. Hierome or any else, can have no force in it; for if he should infer the immutability of the faith of the church of Rome from so apparently weak a foundation, there can be no greater strength in his testimony than there is in the ground on which it is built; and if there be any force in this argument, the church of Thessalonica will be as infallible as ¹ Thess. i. 8. Rome, for her faith is commended rather in a more ample manner by the apostle than that of Rome is;) St. Hierome, I say, referring to that faith he supposes the apostle commended in them, must only be understood of the unchangeableness of that first faith which appears by the mention of an angel from heaven preaching otherwise. Which certainly cannot with any tolerable sense be meant thus, that St. Hierome supposed it beyond the power of an angel from heaven to alter the faith of the Roman church. For in the 299 very same apology he expresseth his great fears lest the faith of the Romans should be corrupted by the books of Ruffinus. "But," say you, "what is this then to Ruffinus, who knew as well as St. Hierome that faith could not change its essence?" However, though St. Hierome should here speak of the primitive and apostolical faith which was then received at Rome, that this could receive no alteration; yet this was very pertinent to be told Ruffinus, because St. Hierome charges him with an endeavour to subvert the faith, not merely at Rome, but in all other places, by publishing the books of Origen with an encomiastic preface to them; and therefore the telling him the catholic faith would admit of no alteration, which was received at Rome as elsewhere, might be an argument to discourage him from any attempts of that nature. And the main charge against Ruffinus is not an endeavour to subvert merely the people of Rome, but the Latin church by his translation¹; and therefore these words ought to be taken in

¹ Non tibi sufficit scandalum Græciæ, nisi illud et Latinorum auribus ingeras.—Id. ib.

their greatest latitude ; and so imply not at all any infallibility in the Roman see.

Lab. p. 136,
137. n. 6.

The remaining testimonies of Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, and Ruffinus, (as appears to any one who reads them,) only import that the Roman church had to their time preserved the catholic faith ; but they do not assert it impossible it should ever do otherwise, or that she is an infallible preserver of it ; and none of their testimonies are so proper to the church of Rome, but they would equally hold for any other apostolical churches at that time. Gregory Nazianzen indeed says, “ that it would become the church of Rome to hold the entire faith always : and would it not become any other church to do so too ? Doth this import that she shall infallibly do it, or rather that it is her duty to do it ? And if these then be such pregnant authorities with you, it is a sign there is little or nothing to be found in antiquity for your purpose.

§. 18. But before we end this chapter, we are called to a new task, on occasion of a testimony of St. Cyril^m produced by his lordship instead of that in Bellarmine, which appeared not in that chapter where his name is mentioned. In which he asserts, “ that the foundation and firmness which the church of Christ hath, is placed, not in or upon the person, much less the successor, of St. Peter, but upon the faith which by God’s Spirit in him he so firmly professed : which,” saith his lordship, “ is the common received opinion both of the ancient fathers and of the protestants. Upon this rock, that is, upon this faith, will I build my church.” On which occasion you run presently out into that large commonplace concerning

Lab. p. 138,
139. n. 1.

Tu es Petrus, and *super hanc petram* ; and although I should grant all that you so earnestly contend for, viz. that these words are not spoken of St. Peter’s confession, but of his person, I know no advantage which will accrue to your cause by it. For although very many of the fathers understand this place of St. Peter’s confession as containing in it the ground and foundation of Christian religion, “ Thou art Christ,

^m Petram opinor per agnominationem nihil aliud, quam inconcusam et firmissimam discipuli fidem vocavit ; in qua ecclesia Christi ita fundata et firmata esset, ut non labe-

retur, et esset inexpugnabilis inferorum portis, in perpetuum manens. —S. Cyril. Alex. Dial. de Trinit. l. 4. p. 278. Paris. A. 1604.

the Son of the living God," which therefore may well be said to be the rock on which Christ would build his church, and although it were no matter of difficulty to defend this interpretation from all exceptions; yet, because I think it not improbable (the words running by way of address to St. Peter) that something peculiar to him is contained in them, I shall not contend with you about that. But then, if you say that the meaning of St. Peter's being the rock is, the constant infallibility in faith which was derived from St. Peter to the church of Rome, as you seem to suggest, you ³⁰⁰ must remember you have a new task to make good, and it is not saying that St. Peter was meant by *the rock* will come within some leagues of doing it. I pass therefore by that discourse as a thing we are not much concerned in, for it is brought in by his lordship as the last thing out of that testimony of Cyril: but you were contented to let go the other more material observations, that you might more freely expatiate *super hanc petram*. Touching Ruffinus, I grant his lordship is of opinion, "that he neither did nor could account the Roman church infallible," for which he gives this reason, ^{Conf. p. 13. sect. 3. n. 12.} "for if he had so esteemed of it, he would not have dissented from it in so main a point as is the canon of scripture, as he plainly doth: for reckoning up the canonical books, he most manifestly dissents from the Roman church. Therefore either Ruffinus did not think the church of Rome was infallible, or else the church of Rome at this day reckons up more books within the canon than heretofore she did. If she do, then she is changed in a main point of faith, the canon of scripture, and is absolutely convinced not to be infallible; for if she were right in her reckoning then, she is wrong now; and if she be right now, she was wrong then; and if she do not reckon now more than she did when Ruffinus lived, then he reckons fewer than she, and so dissents from her, which doubtless he durst not have done had he thought her judgment infallible. Yea and he sets this mark upon his dissent besides, that he reckons up the books of the canonⁿ just so, and no otherwise, than as he received them out of the monuments of the forefathers, and out of which the assertions of

ⁿ Ruffin. in Symbol. p. 188, 189.

our faith are to be taken." Now what have you to say to this strong and nervous discourse of his lordship? "Why," forsooth, "this argument of the bishop is far from being convincing." And why so? "For," say you, "though it should be granted that the catholic church (the Roman you mean) at present declares more books to be contained in the canon than she did in Ruffinus his time, yet this could be no error in her." That is strange, that the church should declare the canon to be complete then without these books, and now not to be, and yet neither time be in an error! "No," say you, "unless it be shewed (which I am sure cannot be) that she condemned those books then as not divine scripture, or not canonical, which now she declares to be divine or canonical." Excellent good still! that which you are sure cannot be shewed, is obvious to any one that hath eyes in his head. For I only ask you, whether the church of Rome did declare any canon or no in that age? If not, according to your principles those who lived in that age could have no divine faith as to the scripture: if she did declare the canon of scripture without these books, did she not thereby condemn these books to be not canonical? For you say, that all are bound to take her judgment what is in the canon and what not; if therefore she did not put them into the canon, did she not leave them out of the canon? or can you find any medium between being put in and being left out? "Yes," say you, "these books were left then under dispute:" with whom were they under dispute? with the church of Rome or not? If with her, was she not infallible the meanwhile, when so great a matter as the canon of scripture was under dispute with her? But this whole business concerning the canon of scripture is largely discussed already; only here it is sufficient to shew how you are pent in on every side, so that there is no possibility of getting out.

As to the strait (his lordship takes notice of) that the church of Rome is driven to, in borrowing a testimony for her infallibility from one whom she branded with heresy in that very book from whence this testimony is taken; you answer, "that it evidently argues the truth and uncorruptedness of that church, which is so clear that even her adversaries cannot
301 but confess it. But if they confess it no better than Ruffinus

doth, she will have little cause to applaud herself for her integrity in that respect. And although a testimony may be taken from persons suspected in some things, yet it argues those have but very few friends who are fain to make use of their enemies to bear witness for them. What follows concerning a particular church being infallible, because you disown it, (although not consonantly to the principles of your party, as was shewed in the occasion of the conference,) I pass by. Lab. p. 140.
n. 6.

The errors of the church of Rome (which his lordship mentions, but you say proves not) you shall find abundantly proved before our task is over.

Your vindication of Bellarmine from inconsistency in saying a proposition is most true, and yet but peradventure as true as another, is so fine and subtle, that it were an injury to the reader to deprive him of the pleasure of perusing it. And yet when all is done, a proposition very false might be as true as this which Bellarmine speaks of, viz. that the pope when he teacheth the whole church in matters of faith cannot err.

And thus I have cleared that there can be no ground of an imputation of schism on our church from hence, that the Roman church is the catholic church, which acception of the catholic church I have manifested to be as great a stranger to antiquity as it is an enemy to reason; and that the calling the Roman church the catholic church is (as his lordship truly saith) “a mere novelty and perfect jesuitism.”

PROTESTANTS NO SCHISMATICS.

Schism a culpable separation ; therefore the question of schism must be determined by inquiring into the causes of it.—The plea from the church of Rome's being once a right church, considered.—No necessity of assigning the punctual time when errors crept into her.—An account why the originals of errors seem obscure.—By Stapleton's confession, the Roman and catholic church were not the same.—The falsity of that assertion manifested, that there could be no pure church since the apostles' times, if the Roman church were corrupt.—No one particular church free from corruptions ; yet no separation from the catholic church.—How far the catholic church may be said to err.—Men may have distinct communion from any one particular church, yet not separate from the catholic church.—The testimony of Petrus de Alliaco vindicated.—Bellarmine not miscited.—Almain full to his lordship's purpose.—The Romanists guilty of the present schism, and not protestants.—In what sense there can be no just cause of schism ; and how far that concerns our case.—Protestants did not depart from the church of Rome, but were thrust out of it.—The vindication of the church of Rome from schism at last depends upon the two false principles of her infallibility, and being the catholic church.—The testimonies of St. Bernard and St. Austin not to the purpose.—The catalogue of fundamentals, the church's not erring, &c., referred back to their proper places.

§. 1. **B**EFORE I come to examine the particulars of this chapter, it will be necessary to see what the state of the controversy was, concerning schism between his lordship and his adversary. His lordship delivers his sense clearly and fully in these words : “ It is too true indeed that there is a miserable rent in the church, and I make no question but the best men do most bemoan it ; nor is he a Christian that would not have unity, might he have it with truth. But I never said nor thought that the protestants made this rent. The cause of the schism is yours ; for you thrust us from you because we called for truth and redress of abuses. For a schism must needs be theirs whose the cause of it is. The

Conf. p. 109.
sect. 21. n.
1.

woe runs full out of the mouth of Christ ever against him that gives the offence; not against him that takes it ever." And in the margent, shewing that a separation may sometimes be necessary, he instanceth in the orthodox departing from the communion of the Arians: upon which he says, "It cannot be that a man should do well in making a schism." There may be therefore a necessary separation, which yet incurs not the guilt of schism; and that is, when "doctrines are taught contrary to the catholic faith." And after saith, "the protestants did not depart; for departure is voluntary; Conf.p. 111. sect. 21. n. 3. so was not theirs; I say not theirs, taking their whole body and cause together. For, that some among them were peevish, and some ignorantly zealous, is neither to be doubted, nor is there danger in confessing it. Your body is not so perfect (I wot well) but that many amongst you are as pettish and as ignorantly zealous as any of ours. You must not suffer for these, nor we for those, nor should the church of Christ for either." And when A. C. saith, "that though Conf.p. 111. sect. 21. n. 4. the church of Rome did thrust the protestants from her by excommunication, yet they had first divided themselves by obstinate holding and teaching opinions contrary to the Roman faith;" his lordship answers, "So then in his opinion, excommunication on their part was not the prime cause of this division, but the holding and teaching of contrary opinions. Why but then in my opinion," saith he, "that holding and teaching was not the prime cause neither, but the cor- 303
 ruptions and superstitions of Rome, which forced many men to hold and teach the contrary: so the prime cause was theirs still." And A. C. telling him, "that he said that it was Conf.p. 117. sect. 21. n. 6. ill done of those who first made the separation," he answers, that though he remembered not that he said those words; yet withal adds, "if I did not say it then, I do say it now; and most true it is, that it was ill done of those, whoever they were, who first made the separation. But then A. C. must not understand me of *actual* only, but of *causal* separation. For (as I said before) the schism is theirs whose the cause of it is: and he makes the separation that gives the first just cause of it, not he that makes an actual separation upon a just cause preceding. And this is so evident a truth that A. C. cannot deny it, for he says it is most true." These

passages I have laid together that the reader may clearly understand the full state of this great controversy concerning schism; the upshot of which is, that it is agreed between both parties, that all separation from communion with a church doth not involve in it the guilt of schism, but only such a separation as hath no sufficient cause or ground for it. So that the question comes to this, whether your church were not guilty of such errors and corruptions as gave sufficient cause for such a separation. The question being thus stated, we now come to consider how you make good your part in it.

§. 2. Your first pretence is, (if reduced into argument, for you seem to have a particular pique against a close way of disputing,) “that your church is a right and orthodox church, and therefore could never give any just cause of separation from it.” For the lady asked (as A. C. would have it) “whether the Roman church was not the right church; not, *be not*, but *was not* ;” that is, relating to the times before the breach was made. Now his lordship tells him, that as to the terms, he might take his choice; “for the church of Rome neither is nor was the right church, as the lady desired to hear. A particular church it is and was, and in some times right, and in some times wrong: but the right church, or the holy catholic church, it never was nor ever can be. And therefore was not such before Luther and others left it, or were thrust from it. A particular church it was; but then A. C. is not distinct enough here neither. For the church of Rome both was and was not a right or orthodox church *before* Luther made a breach from it. For the word *ante*, before, may look upon Rome and that church a great way off, or long before; and then, in the prime times of it, it was a most right and orthodox church. But it may look also nearer home, and upon the immediate times before Luther, or some ages before that: and then in those times Rome was a corrupt and tainted church, far from being right. And yet both these times before Luther made his breach.” And so he concludes that section with this clause, “That the Roman church, which was once right, is now become wrong by embracing superstition and error.” And what say you now to all this? Two things you have to return in answer to it, or at least to these two all that you say may be reduced: 1. That

Conf.p.107.
8,9. sect.20.
n. 5.

if the Roman church was right once, it is so still; 2. That if the Roman church were wrong before Luther, the catholic church was so too. These two containing all that is said in this case must be more particularly discussed.

1. "That if the Roman was the right church, it still is so, Lab. p. 142. seeing no change can be shewn in her doctrine. If there have been a change, let it appear when, and in what the change was made." Thus you say: but you know his lordship never granted that the Roman church ever was the right church (in the sense you take those words for the true catholic church); that it was once a right particular church he acknowledged, and as such was afterwards tainted with errors and corruptions. If so, you desire to know what these were, and when they came in: to the former I shall reserve an answer till I come to the third part of my task, where you shall have an account of them; to the latter, the time when these came in, 304 because this is so much insisted on by your party, I shall return you an answer in this place. And that I shall do in these following propositions:

1. Nothing can be more unreasonable than to deny that errors and corruptions have come into a church, merely because the punctual time of their coming in cannot be assigned. For will any one question the birth of an infant because he cannot know the time of his conception? will any one deny there are tares in the field because he did not see them sown? and our Saviour hath told us, that the "time of sowing tares Matt. xiii. by the enemy was when the men were asleep." So we say, ^{25.} the errors and corruptions of your church came in in a time of great ignorance, when little notice was taken of them, and few records preserved of those times and all the passages of them. Since learning and religion commonly decay and flourish together, how is it possible there should be as exact an account given of the decay of religion as of the flourishing of it? Besides, are there not many things you judge errors and corruptions yourselves, which you can give no account when they first entered into the church? As the necessity of communicating infants: name us the person who first broached that doctrine, and the time in which it was first received in the church? That no souls of men departed shall see God till the day of resurrection, is, I suppose, with you an error; yet it

would puzzle you to find out the first author of it. So for the rebaptizing heretics, and many things of a like nature, it is easier to shew when they appeared publicly, than when they first came into the church. And as evident is it in the decay of the primitive discipline of the church, the altering the orders of penitents and the rites belonging to them, the leaving off the communicatory letters between churches, and many other customs of the church grown into disuse: and yet I suppose you will not presume to name the persons who first altered the former orders of the church; and methinks this is as reasonable as the naming the punctual time when other corruptions came in. If you say the primitive discipline decayed gradually and insensibly; so say I, that the church's corruptions came in as the other went out, in the same gradual and insensible manner: and if you cannot name the precise time of the one, it is not reasonable you should expect the other from us.

2. We may have sufficient reason to judge what are errors and corruptions in a church, though we cannot fix on the time when they came in: which is, by comparing them with that rule of faith which is delivered down by an uninterrupted tradition to us, and with the practice of the first ages of the Christian church. What is apparently contrary to either of these we have reason to reject, though we cannot determine when it first came in. For as long as these are our certain standards, it matters not who first departed from them, as long as we see that they have departed. But when we own an absolute and infallible rule of faith and manners, to question whether any thing contrary to it be an error or no, because we cannot tell when it first began, would be, as if the Egyptians, when they saw their land overflowed by the Nile, should question whether it were so or no, because they could not find out the head of Nilus.

3. They who assert their doctrines and practices to be apostolical, are bound to shew the continued succession of them from the apostles' times. And if they fail in this, upon their own principles they must be errors and corruptions, though the punctual time of their first obtaining in the church cannot be set down. Since therefore you affirm, you are bound to prove. If you say, the judgment of your church being infallible, you need prove no more than that, I an-

swer, you must prove that this infallibility then hath been ever received in the church; but if there be not the least footstep of it in the records of the ancient church, we justly 305 look on this as an error of the first magnitude, though we cannot tell you the minute of its first rising.

4. We have sufficient evidence from yourselves, that many doctrines and practices are owned by you which are of no great antiquity in the Christian church. Thus, by the confession of Scotus, transubstantiation is no elder than the council of Lateran; purgatory not much heard of in the primitive church, by the acknowledgment of bishop Fisher; communion in one kind confessed by most to be contrary to the primitive practice and institution; prayer in an unknown tongue can be no elder than the general disuse of the Latin tongue in the Roman provinces. And so for many others, for which we have the confessions of your own party: but I need not insist upon that, since your very doctrine of the church's power to declare matters of faith, may make things necessary in one age which were not in a foregoing, and in that case, sure it is no great difficulty to tell you when some things of school points became necessary doctrines; but then the question goes off from the time to the matter, whether any thing declared by your church can be an error: but of that enough hath been said already.

5. There may be a sufficient account given why the beginnings of errors and corruptions in your church have been so obscure; because they came not in all of a sudden, but some at one time, some at another; because they rise gradually, as is apparent in invocation of saints and worship of images; because many of those things which ended in great corruptions were taken up at first out of good designs to win more upon the Gentile world; because many things were at first practised freely which afterwards were urged as necessary; because barbarism came into the church along with these corruptions; because many who gave occasion to them were persons of great esteem in their age, and others strove to follow their example more than the rule; because the state of the church did very much alter from itself in several ages, which altered men's apprehensions and judgments of things in regard of their suitableness and necessity; because those persons who

brought in and contended for these things were the persons chiefly in power then in the church, which hindered their being cast out of communion as others had been; because a long time most of these errors and corruptions were but the private opinions and practices of a faction, though then the more prevalent in the church, and therefore not so vehemently opposed in the first rise of them as when this imposthumated matter was grown to a head, and then there was a necessity of lancing it. These and several other reasons might be given, why the first originals of errors and corruptions in your church cannot with so much clearness be manifested as that they were errors and corruptions: although such who would take the pains to travel in an argument of that nature might with very great probability trace the most both of your errors and corruptions to the time and age when they were first publicly owned and received. But thus much may here suffice as to your demand, that if your church be not the same she was, we should mention the time when the change was made. As though chronical distempers could not be known, unless we could set down the punctual time of their first onset. The distempers of your church are hectic, I wish not in that respect that they are seldom fully discovered till they be incurable.

§. 3. 2. You answer, "that if your church hath erred, the catholic church hath done so too;" for which you say two things: "1. That in this dispute the Roman church and the catholic church are all one. 2. That then there was no one visible church untainted, uncorrupt, right, orthodox, throughout the whole world." 1. You learnedly tell us, that the Roman and catholic church are all one in this dispute, and most discreetly tell his lordship, that he begs the question in supposing the contrary; but you know whose arts those are to charge their neighbours with that they were sure to be told of themselves, if the other had spoke first. But very worthily you prove this from D. Stapleton, who offers to confirm his assertion by that which overthrows yours. He says, "that amongst the ancients, the Roman church and the catholic church were taken for the same;" and his reason is, "because the communion of the Roman church was most certainly and evidently with the whole catholic."

Lab. p. 142.
n. 1.

306

And can any thing then be more plain, than that the Roman and catholic church were not the same? For can any thing be the measure of itself? If it were therefore catholic because agreeing with the catholic church, then it was not causally the catholic church, but only by way of communion and participation. If I should say, that a man and a living creature are the same, and should give this reason for it, because man agrees in every thing with the nature of a living creature; doth this imply that the formal notion of man and a living creature are the same? or only that man partakes so much of the properties of a living creature, that he may well receive the denomination? So it is here with the Roman church; that might well be called catholic by the ancients, because it did partake of the properties of the catholic church, but not as though the formal reason of a church's being catholic came from partaking of communion with the Roman church, as you assert; wherein you are diametrically opposite to Stapleton, for he makes the reason why the Roman church was catholic to be, because it had communion with the catholic church. By which it is evident, that the notion of the catholic church was much larger than that of the Roman church. Besides, Stapleton only saith, that the ancients thought so, and surely they thought so only of the Roman church of their own time; which might then have certain communion with the catholic church, and yet not have so in the next age ensuing; therefore, though the catholic church continue ever the same and incorrupt, it will by no means follow that the Roman church must do so too. Whatever A. C. or you understand by the catholic church, is not, as you elsewhere phrase it, a straw's matter, unless you proved better than you have done, that the proper notion of the holy catholic church is the same with those who agree with the church of Rome in doctrine and communion. Which is your fundamental mistake, and a thing you would fain have taken for granted, without the least shadow of a solid proof.

§. 4. But there may be more force in your second answer, "that if the Roman church were wrong and corrupted, it fol- Lab. p. 143.
lows, that not only for some time, but for many ages before n. 1.
Luther, yea even up to the apostles' times, there was no one visible church untainted, uncorrupt, right, orthodox, through-

out the whole world." It were worth our while to know what you mean by "no one visible church;" do you think there are, or may be, more visible churches than one, taking *the visible church* in its proper sense for *the catholic visible church*? If this be your meaning in general, how unhappily soever it be expressed, viz. "that then it follows, there could be no visible church at all with whom we might have communion," I see not how it is proved by what you bring; but if this be all you aim at, (for no further your arguments will carry you,) that there was no one visible church untainted, i. e. no one church of a distinct communion from other churches altogether free from error, I see no such dangerous consequence in the owning it. But if it were so when Luther began to oppose the corruptions of the church of Rome, how doth it follow that it must be so even up to the apostles' times? But we ought to see how you prove your assertion: "for if in all those ages the Roman church were wrong, corrupted, and tainted; and all those likewise that disagreed
307 from her, viz. Hussites, Albigenses, Waldenses, Wicklevites, Greeks, Abyssins, Armenians, &c. had in them corrupt doctrine during those ages (as it is certain they had, neither could the relater deny it); I say, if the Roman church was thus corrupt, it follows, that not only for some time, but for many ages before Luther, yea even up to the apostles' times, there was no one visible church untainted, incorrupt, right, and orthodox, throughout the whole world. And consequently, that during the said ages every good Christian was in conscience obliged, in some point of Christian belief or other, to contradict the doctrine and desert the communion of all visible churches in the world, &c. Whence it would further follow, that schism or separation from the external communion of the whole church might be not only lawful, but even necessary; which is impossible, as being contrary to the very essential predicates of schism, which is defined to be a voluntary or wilful departure (such as no just cause or reason can be given of it) from the communion of the whole church." Three things this discourse of yours may be resolved into: 1. that if in Luther's time the Roman church was corrupt, then there was no one visible church uncorrupt; 2. that if so, it follows that there was none uncorrupt even up to the apo-

stles' times; 3. that if there were no one visible church uncorrupt, then it was necessary to separate from the external communion of the whole church. To every one of these I shall return a peculiar and distinct answer. To the first I say, that the utmost you can prove from hence is, that there was no one church of any distinct communion from others which was free from all errors. And what great absurdity is there in saying so, unless you could prove that there must be some one church in all ages of the world which must be free from all kind or possibility of error? And when you have done this, I shall acknowledge it absurd to say the contrary; but otherwise, that very supposition seems to have the greater absurdity in it, because it restrains the utmost supposable privileges of *the truly catholic church* to a *particular church of some one denomination*. What then if we grant that in Luther's time there was no one visible church free from errors and corruptions? What if we should say, in our own times? what if in elder times? For that which is possible to be, may be supposed actually in any time. If it be possible for one particular church to fall into errors and corruptions, why is it not for another? (unless some particular privilege of infallibility be pretended; but that is not our present question;) if it be possible for every particular church to fall into error, why may not that possibility come into act in one age as well as several? Is there any promise that there shall be a succession and course of erring in churches, that one church must err for one age, and another for the next, but that it shall never fall out that by any means whatsoever they shall err together? If there be no such promise to the contrary, the reason of the thing will hold, that they may all err at the same time. "No," say you; "for then it would follow that the catholic church might err." To that I answer, 1. either you mean by that, that all societies in the Christian world may concur in the same error, or else that several of them may have several errors: and this latter is it only which you prove, for you do not suppose that the Romanists, Hussites, Albigenses, &c. were all guilty of the same errors, but that these several societies were guilty of several errors; and therefore from hence it follows not, that they may all concur in the same error, which is the only way to prove that the

church as catholic may err, for otherwise you only prove that the several particular churches which make up the catholic may fall into error. 2. Supposing all these churches should agree in one error, (which is more than you have proved, or, it may be, can,) have you proved that they concur in such an error which destroys the being of the catholic church? for you would do well to evince that the church is secured from
308 any but such errors which destroy its being; for the means of proving that the catholic church cannot err, are built on the promises of its perpetuity; now those can only prove that the church is secured from fundamental errors, for those are such only which destroy its being. And so his lordship tells you, “that the whole church cannot universally err in the doctrine of faith, is most true, and granted by divers protestants (so you will but understand its not erring in absolute fundamental doctrines);” and this he proves, “from that promise of Christ, ‘that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.’” So that *the catholic church’s not erring*, and *the perpetuity of the catholic church*, do with us mean the same thing. For his lordship grants, “that she may err in superstructures and deductions, and other bye and unnecessary truths, if her curiosity, or other weakness, carry her beyond or cause her to fall short of her rule.” There is then a great difference between saying that the catholic church cannot err, which is no more than to say that there shall be always a catholic church, and saying that there must be always some one visible church which must be free from all error and corruption: for this we deny, and you produce no reason at all to prove it. Granting that all particular churches, whether of Romanists, Greeks, or others, are subject to errors and corruptions, we assert no more of them than you grant yourselves that any particular church is subject to; for the only ground why you would have your church exempt from error, is the supposing her not to be a particular, but the catholic church, which implies, that if she were only a particular church (as she is no more), she might be subject to errors as well as other churches. And what incongruity then there is in asserting, that there may be no one visible church of any particular denomination free from all error and corruption, I cannot understand.

Conf.p.114.
sect.21.n.5.

Matt. xvi.
18.

§. 5. But further, you say, “if there were no one visible church then free from error, it follows, not only for some time, but for many ages before Luther, yea even up to the apostles’ times, there was no one visible church untainted throughout the whole world.” Not to meddle with the truth of the thing, whether there were so or no, the consequence is that we are now to examine, that if it were so in Luther’s time, it must be so even up to the apostles’ times. The proof of which depends upon the impossibility of a church’s degeneracy in faith or manners, and so supposeth the thing in question, that there must be some one visible church absolutely exempt from all possibility of error: for otherwise that might be true in one age which might not in another; for although we say that particular churches may err and be corrupt, we do not say that it is necessary they should always be so. For in some ages particular churches may be free from error and corruption, and yet in another age be overspread with them. And thus we assert it to have been with the Roman church: for his lordship saith, “in the prime times it was a most right and orthodox church, but in the immediate times before Luther, or in some ages before, that it was a corrupt and tainted church:” and so in those times in which it was right, those might be heretical who did not communicate with it, not merely because they did not communicate with it, but because in not communicating with a right and orthodox church they shewed themselves guilty of some error or corruption. We see then, there is no connection in the world in the parts of your consequence, “that if it were so at one time, it must be so always; if in the time of Luther, it must be so even up to the apostles’ times.”

3. From hence you say it will follow, “that it will be necessary to separate from the external communion of the whole church.” I answer, there can be no separation from the whole church but in such things wherein the unity of the whole church lies; for separation is a violation of some union: now when men separate from the errors of all particular churches, they do not separate from the whole, because those 309 things which one separates from those particular churches for, are not such as make all them put together to be the

whole or catholic church. This must be somewhat further explained. There are two things considerable in all particular churches; those things which belong to it as *a church*, and those things which belong to it as *a particular church*. Those things which belong to it as *a church*, are the common ligaments or grounds of union between all particular churches, which taken together make up the catholic church: those things which belong to it as *a particular church*, are such as it may retain the essence of a church without. Now I say, whosoever separates from any particular church (much more from all) for such things without which that can be no church, separates from the communion of the catholic church: but he that separates only from particular churches as to such things which concern not their being, is only separated from the communion of those churches, and not the catholic. And therefore, supposing that all particular churches have some errors and corruptions in them, though I should separate from them all, I do not separate from the communion of the whole church, unless it be for something, without which those could be no churches: an evidence of which is, that by my declaring the grounds of my separation to be such errors and corruptions which are crept into the communion of such churches, and imposed on me in order to it, I withal declare my readiness to join with them again, if those errors and corruptions be left out. And where there is this readiness of communion, there is no absolute separation from the church as such, but only suspending communion till such abuses be reformed: which is therefore more properly a separation from the errors than the communion of such a church. Wherefore, if we suppose that there is no one visible church whose communion is not tainted with some corruptions, though if these corruptions be enjoined as conditions of communion I cannot communicate with any of those churches, yet it follows not that I am separated from the external communion of the catholic church, but that I only suspend communion with those particular churches till I may safely join with them: as, suppose all the particular men I can converse with were infected with leprosy, my not associating with them doth not imply that I am separated from the communion of all mankind, but that I am loth

to be infected as they are, and therefore withdraw myself till I can meet with such healthful persons with whom I may safely associate again: and if several other persons be of the same mind with me, and we therefore join together, do we therefore divide ourselves from the whole world by only taking care of our own safety? and especially if any company of such leprous persons should resolve that none should live among them but such as would eat of those meats which brought that distemper upon them, our withdrawing ourselves, and associating without them, will still appear more reasonable and commendable. Therefore we say, we do not necessarily separate from all churches that have errors or corruptions in them, supposing those errors and corruptions be not imposed on us as conditions of communion; and thence, though we should grant “no one visible church free from taint or corruption,” yet it is not necessary we should separate from them all; for we may lawfully join in communion with churches having errors and corruptions, if our joining be not an approbation of them. Thus though the Greeks, Armenians, Albigenses, Abyssins, may have some errors or corruptions, yet if they be not fundamental, and be not enjoined as necessary to be approved in order to their communion, notwithstanding them, we may lawfully communicate with them. It doth not then at all follow that if there may be “no one visible church free from error and corruption,” it would be necessary to separate from the communion of *the catholic* 310 *church*; because, 1. all those particular churches may not make those errors conditions of communion; 2. though they did, we separate not from them as *catholic*, but as corrupt and erroneous *particular churches*: and therefore you might have spared your labour in telling us from the holy fathers, and the reverend and learned Dr. Hammond, “that it can never be lawful to separate from the catholic church;” for we assert the same, but have made it appear that it follows not from the premises which were laid down.

§. 6. His lordship having said “that the Roman church before Luther was a corrupt and tainted church,” in his margin produceth a citation to that purpose of cardinal de Alliaco, who acknowledgeth “infinite abuses, schisms, and heresies to prevail over the Christian world; so that it is plain the church

of God stands in need of due reformation^a." From which his lordship saith, "that it will hardly sink into any man's judgment that so great a man as Petrus de Alliaco was in that church should speak thus if he did not see some errors in the doctrine of that church as well as the manners." To this you
 Lab. p. 143. answer, "that he speaks not of false doctrines taught by the Roman church, but of schisms and heresies raised against the church (not fostered by her) in all parts of Christendom." But I appeal to any indifferent reader of this testimony, whether he can conceive that the cardinal intended to acquit or accuse the Roman church in those words of his: for taking them in your sense, they must contain a high commendation of the Roman church, that in the midst of so many heresies and schisms raised against her, she preserved her faith entire; and think you that he that said the church of God needed reformation, thought there was nothing in the church which stood in need of it? And therefore this testimony doth sufficiently prove that the Roman church was a tainted and corrupted church.

If there be sufficient evidence "that there are tares sown in the church of Rome," it is not to much purpose to inquire whether they were sown while the bishops slept, or whether they themselves did not help to sow them: but it seems "in their private capacities they might sow them, as private doctors," and then it is not likely that in their public capacity they would pluck them up. If "the catholic faith only," as you tell us, "oblige us to maintain that the pope is infallible when he defines a general council," then there will be opportunity enough for errors to be sown and grow up in the interval of such definitions. But you further add, "that though this be all which men are obliged to maintain," (for no man can be bound to impossibilities,) "yet that it is a very pious opinion to hold, that no popes have personally erred as private doctors," i. e. you have a very good mind to maintain it, if you knew how; for that is the meaning of your *pious opinion*: for if you thought it had been defensible, no doubt

^a Cum infiniti abusus, schismata quoque et hæreses, per totum nunc Christianum orbem invalescant; ecclesiam Dei legitima indigere refor-

matione, nemini non apertum erit.— Petrus de Alliaco lib. de Reform. Eccles.

it had been *de fide* long ago. But it was hard thwarting the records of former ages, wherein the errors of popes, and their mutual contradictions, are so visible to all that search after them; and therefore it was wisely concluded that this should not be held *de fide*, but, if any would venture upon a thing so acceptable at Rome as personal infallibility is, it should be accounted a very pious undertaking. And accordingly Bellarmine hath with the greatest care and industry endeavoured it in several chapters; but, as his lordship truly saith, “all Bellarmine’s labour, though great and full of art, is not able to wash them clean.” And this (if you had undertaken the defence of Bellarmine) should have been made good; but since you are so cautious as not to think yourself obliged to do it, I commend your discretion in it, and proceed. I cannot see that his lordship is guilty of a false quotation of Bellarmine for that saying, *Et papas quosdam graves errores seminasse in ecclesia Christi, luce clarius est*, for he doth not seem at all to cite Bellarmine for it; but having cited the place just before, 311 where he endeavours to vindicate the popes from all errors, he adds this expression, as directly contrary to his design, that though he had endeavoured so much to clear them from errors, yet that they had sown some grievous errors in the church was as clear as the day; and, as it immediately follows, is proved by Jac. Almain, &c.: and therefore it was only your own oscitancy which made you set it in the contents of your chapter, “that cardinal Bellarmine was most falsely quoted by him.” But that falseness which with so much confidence you charge his lordship with, rebounds with greater force on yourself, when you say “that Almain speaks not of errors in faith at all, but only of errors, or rather abuses, in point of manners;” whereas he not only asserts, but largely proves, “that the pope may err, not only personally but judicially^b,” and in the same chapter brings that remarkable instance of the evident contradiction between the definitions of pope Nicholas III. and John XXII.^c And Platina tells us that John XXII. declared them to be heretics who held according

^b Papa potest errare, errore judiciali; de personali, omnibus notum est.—Jac. Almain. de Auctorit. Eccles. cap. 10.

^c Quorum unus determinavit, judicialiter, Christum et apostolos nihil habuisse in communi nec in proprio; alter, oppositum.—Id. ib.

to the former definition. And is this only concerning some abuses in point of manners, and not concerning errors in faith, that Almain speaks? You might as well say so of Lyra^d, who said, "that many popes have apostatized from the faith;" of Cusanus, who saith, "that both in a direct and collateral line several popes have fallen into heresy;" of Alphonsus à Castro, who saith, "that the best friends of the popes believe they may err in faith;" of Carranza, who says, "no one questions but the pope may be an heretic;" of Canus, who says, "it is not to be denied but that the chief bishop may be an heretic, and that there are examples of it:" you might as well, I say, affirm that all these spake only of abuses in manners, and not errors in faith, as you do of Almain. Neither will your other subterfuge serve your turn, "that they taught errors in doctrine as private men;" for Alphonsus à Castro expressly affirms in the case of pope Coelestine, about the dissolution of marriage in case of heresy, "that it cannot be said that he erred through negligence, and as a private person, and not as pope; for," saith he, "this definition is extant in the decretals, and he had seen it himself^e:" although the contrary to this were afterwards defined not only by pope Innocent III. but by the council of Trent. And hence it appears, whatever you pretend to the contrary, "that there may be tares sown in the church of Rome, not only by private persons, but by the public hands of the popes too," if they themselves may be believed, who else do most infallibly contradict each other. But whether these errors came in at first through negligence or public definitions is not so material to our purpose; for which it is sufficient to prove that the church of Rome may be tainted and corrupted, which may be done one way as well as the other; as corn-fields may be overrun with tares though no one went purposely to sow them there. And so much is acknowledged by Cassander^f, when he speaks of the superstitious practices used in your church, "that those who should have redressed those abuses were, if not the authors, yet the encouragers of them for their own advantage;" by which means errors and corruptions may soon grow to a great height

Lab. p. 144.
n. 2.

^d Lyra in Matth. 16. Cusan. Concord. l. 1. c. 14. Alphons. c. Hæres. l. 1. c. 2. Carranz. Controv. 4. Ca-

nus Loc. Com. l. 6. c. ult.

^e De Hæres. l. 1. c. 4.

^f Cassand. Consult. act. 21.

in a church, though they were never sown by public definitions. And when you disparage Cassander's testimony by telling us how little his credit is among catholics, you thereby let us see how much your church is overrun with corruptions, when none among you can speak against them but they presently forfeit their reputation.

The case of the schism at Rome between Cornelius and Novatianus, and the employment of Caldonius and Fortunatus from St. Cyprian thither, doth belong to the former chapter, where it hath been fully discoursed of already, and must not be repeated here: only thence we see that Rome is as capable of a schism within her own bowels as any other church is, which is abundantly attested by the multitudes of schisms which happened afterwards between the bishops of that see. But this being insisted on by his lordship in the former controversy of the catholic church, doth not refer to this chapter wherein the causes of our separation should be inquired into.

§. 7. Which at last you come to, and "passing by the verbal dispute between A. C. and his lordship about what was spoken at the conference," you tell us, "it more concerns you to see what could or can be said in this point." You draw up therefore a large and formal charge of schism against us in your following words. "Our assertion," say you, "is"—but, good sir, it is not what you *assert*, but what you *prove*. It were an easy matter for us to draw up a far larger bill against your church, and tell you *our* assertion is, that you are the greatest schismatics in the world. Would you look on it as sufficiently proved because we asserted it? I pray think the same of us, for we are not apt to think ourselves guilty of schism at all the more because you tell us what your *assertion* is; if this be your way of dealing with us, your first assertion had need be that you are infallible; but still that had need be more than asserted, for unless it be infallibly proved we should not believe it. But however, we must see what your assertion is, that we may at least understand from you the state of the present controversy. Your assertion therefore is, "that protestants made this rent or schism by their obstinate and pertinacious maintaining erroneous doctrines, contrary to the faith of the Roman or catholic church; by their rejecting the authority of their lawful ecclesiastical

superiors both immediate and mediate ; by aggregating themselves into a separate body or company of pretended Christians, independent of any pastors at all, that were in lawful and quiet possession of jurisdiction over them ; by making themselves pastors and teachers of others, and administering sacraments without authority given them by any that were lawfully empowered to give it ; by instituting new rites and ceremonies of their own in matter of religion, contrary to those anciently received throughout all Christendom ; by violently excluding and dispossessing other prelates and pastors of and from their respective sees, cures, and benefices, and intruding themselves into their places in every nation where they could get footing, the said prelates and pastors for the most part yet living." These are your assertions ; and because you seek not to prove them, it shall be sufficient to oppose ours to them. Our assertion therefore is, that the church and court of Rome are guilty of this schism, by obtruding erroneous doctrines and superstitious practices as the conditions of her communion ; by adding such articles of faith which are contrary to the plain rule of faith, and repugnant to the sense of the truly catholic and not the Roman church ; by her intolerable encroachments and usurpations upon the liberties and privileges of particular churches, under a vain pretence of universal pastorship ; by forcing men, if they would not damn their souls by sinning against their consciences in approving the errors and corruptions of the Roman church, to join together for the solemn worship of God according to the rule of scripture and practice of the primitive church, and suspending communion with that church till those abuses and corruptions be redressed. In which they neither deny obedience to any lawful authority over them, nor take to themselves any other power than the law of God hath given them, receiving their authority in a constant succession from the apostles : they institute no rites and ceremonies either contrary to or different from the practice of the primitive church ; they neither exclude or dispossess others of their lawful power, but in case others neglect their office, they may be notwithstanding obliged to perform theirs in order to the church's reformation ; leaving the supreme authority of the kingdom or nation to order and dispose of such things in the church

which of right appertain unto it. And this we assert to be the case of schism in reference to the church of England, which we shall make good in opposition to your assertions, where we meet with any thing that seems to contradict the whole or any part of it. "These and the like practices of yours" (to use your own words), "not any obstinate maintaining any erroneous doctrines," as you vainly pretend, we aver to have been the true and real causes of that separation which is made between your church and ours. And you truly say "that protestants were thrust out of your church;" which is an argument they did not voluntarily forsake the communion of it, and therefore are no schismatics; but your carriage and practices were such as forced them to join together in a distinct communion from you. And it was not we who left your church, but your church that left her primitive faith and purity in so high a manner as to declare all such excommunicate who will not approve of and join in her greatest corruptions, though it be sufficiently manifest that they are great recessions from the faith, piety, and purity of that Roman church which was planted by the apostles, and had so large a commendation from the apostolical men of those first ages. Since then such errors and corruptions are enforced upon us as conditions of communion with you, by the same reason that the orthodox did very well in departing from the Arians, because the Arians were already departed from the church by their false doctrine, will our separation from you be justified who first departed from the faith and purity of the primitive church, and not only so, but thrust out of your communion all such as would not depart from it as far as you.

§. 8. Having thus considered and retorted your assertions, Lab. p. 145. we come to your answers. "Nor," say you, "does the bishop^{n. 4.} vindicate the protestant party by saying the cause of schism was ours, and that we catholics thrust protestants from us, because they called for truth and redress of abuses: for, first, there can be no just cause of schism; this hath been granted already even by protestants." And so it is by us, and the reason is very evident for it, for if there be a *just cause* there can be no schism; and therefore what you intend by this I cannot imagine, unless it be to free protestants from the guilt of schism, because they put the main of their trial upon the

justice of the cause which moved them to forsake the communion of your church ; or else you would have it taken for granted that ours was a schism, and thence infer there could be no just cause of it : as if a man being accused for taking away the life of one who violently set upon him in the highway, with an intent both to rob and destroy him, should plead for himself that this could be no murder in him, because there was a sufficient and justifiable cause for what he did ; that he designed nothing but to go quietly on his road ; that this person and several others violently set upon him ; that he intreated them to desist, that he sought to avoid them as much as he could, but when he saw they were absolutely bent on his ruin, he was forced in his own necessary defence to take away the life of that person ; would not this, with any intelligent jury, be looked on as a just and reasonable vindication ? but if so wise a person as yourself had been among them, you would no doubt have better informed them ; for you would very gravely have told them, all his plea went on a false supposition that he had a *just cause* for what he did, but there could be *no just cause for murder*. Do you not see now how subtle and pertinent your answer is here, by this parallel to it ? for as in that case all men grant that there can be no just cause for murder, because all murder is committed without a just cause ; and if there be one, it ceaseth to be murder ;

314 so it is here in schism, which being a *causeless* separation from the church's unity, I wonder whoever imagined there could be *just cause* for it. But to rectify such gross mistakes as these are for the future, you would do well to understand that schism formally taken always imports something criminal in it, and there can be no just cause for a sin ; but besides that, there is that which (if you understand it) you would call the *materiality* of it, which is the separation of one part of the church from another. Now this, according to the different grounds and reasons of it, becomes lawful or unlawful, that is, as the reasons do make it necessary or unnecessary ; for separation is not lawful but when it is necessary : now this being capable of such a different nature that it may be good or evil according to its circumstances, there can be no absolute judgment passed upon it till all those reasons and circumstances be duly examined ; and if there be no sufficient grounds for

it, then it is formally schism, i. e. a culpable separation; if there be sufficient cause, then there may be a *separation*, but it can be no *schism*. And because the union of the catholic church lies in fundamental and necessary truths, therefore there can be no separation absolutely from the catholic church but what involves in it the formal guilt of schism; it being impossible any person should have just cause to disown the church's communion for any thing whose belief is necessary to salvation: and whosoever doth so, thereby makes himself no member of the church, because the church subsists on the belief of fundamental truths. But in all such cases wherein a division may be made, and yet the several persons divided retain the essentials of a Christian church, the separation which may be among any such must be determined according to the causes of it: for it being possible of one side that men may out of capricious humours and fancies renounce the communion of a church which requires nothing but what is just and reasonable; and it being possible on the other side that a church calling herself *catholic* may so far degenerate in faith and practice, as not only to be guilty of great errors and corruptions, but to impose them as conditions of communion with her, it is necessary, where there is a manifest separation, to inquire into the reasons and grounds of it, and to determine the nature of it according to the justice of the cause which is pleaded for it. And this I hope may help you a little better to understand what is meant by such who say "there can be no just cause of schism," and how little this makes for your purpose.

§. 9. But you go on, and I must follow. "And to his calling for truth, &c. I answer, what heretics ever yet forsook the church of God but pretended truth, and complained they were thrust out and hardly dealt with, merely because they called for truth and redress of abuses?" And, I pray, what church was ever so guilty of errors and corruptions, but would call those heretics and schismatics who found fault with her doctrine, or separated from her communion? It is true, "heretics pretend truth, and schismatics abuses," but is it possible there should be errors and corruptions in a church's communion, or is it not? If not, prove but that of your church, and the cause is at an end; if it be, we are to examine whether

the charge be true or no: for although heretics may pretend truth, and others be deceived in judging of it, yet doubtless there is a real difference between truth and error. If you would never have men quarrel with any doctrine of your church because heretics have pretended truth, would not the same reason hold why men should never inquire after truth, reason, or religion, because men have pretended to them all which have not had them? It is therefore a most senseless cavil to say we have no reason to call for truth because heretics have done so; and on the same grounds you must not be
315 called *catholics* because heretics have been called so. But those who have been heretics were first proved to be so by making it appear that was a certain truth which they denied: do you the same by us; prove those which we call errors in your church to be part of the catholic and apostolic faith; prove those we account corruptions to be parts of divine worship, and we will give you leave to call us heretics and schismatics, but not before. “But,” say you, “he should have reflected that the church of God is styled *a city of truth* by the prophet,” (and so it may be, and yet your church be a fortress of error,) “and *a pillar and foundation of truth* by the apostle,” (but what is this to the church of Rome’s being so?) “and by the fathers, a rich depository or treasury of all divine and heavenly doctrines,” (so it was in the sense the fathers took *the church* in, for *the truly catholic Christian church*.) And we may use the same expressions still of the church as the prophets, apostles, and fathers did, and nevertheless charge your church justly with the want of truth, and opposition to the preaching of it, and on that ground justly forsake her communion, which is so far from being inexcusable impiety and presumption, that it was only the performance of a necessary Christian duty. And therefore that *woe of scandal* his lordship mentioned still returns upon your party who gave such just cause of offence to the Christian world, and making it necessary for all such as aimed at the purity of the Christian church to leave your communion, when it could not be enjoyed without making shipwreck both of faith and a good conscience. “And this is so clear and undeniable” (to follow you still in your own language), “that we dare appeal for a trial of our cause to any assembly of learned divines, or what

judge and jury you please, provided they be not some of the parties accused; and because you are so willing to have learned divines, I hope you will believe the last pope Innocent so far as not to mention the pope and cardinals.

What follows in vindication of A. C. from interfering and shuffling in his words, because “timorous and tender consciences think they can never speak with caution enough, for fear of telling a lie,” will have the force of a demonstration (being spoken of and by a Jesuit) among all those who know what mortal haters they are of any thing that looks like a lie or equivocation; and what reason there is, that, of all persons in the world, they should be judged men of “timorous and tender consciences.” Lab. p. 146.
n. 4.

§. 10. But whatever the words were which passed, you justify A. C. in saying “that the protestants did depart from the church of Rome, and got the name of protestants by protesting against her.” “For this,” say you, “is so apparent, that the whole world acknowledgeth it.” If you mean that the communion of protestants is distinct from yours, whoever made scruple of confessing it? but because in those terms of *departing, leaving, forsaking* your communion, you would seem to imply that it was a voluntary act, and done without any necessary cause enforcing it, therefore his lordship denies that protestants *did* depart; “for,” saith he, “departure is voluntary, so was not theirs.” But because it is so hard a matter to explain the nature of that separation between your church and ours, especially in the beginning of it, without using those terms or some like them, as when his lordship saith “that Luther made a breach from it,” it is sufficient that we declare, that by none of these expressions we mean any causeless separation, but only such acts as were necessarily consequential to the imposing your errors and corruptions as conditions of communion with your church. To the latter part his lordship answers, “That the protestants did not get that name by protesting against the church of Rome, but by protesting (and that when nothing else would serve) against her errors and superstitions. Do you but remove them from the church of Rome, and our protestation is ended, and our separation too.” Conf. p. 111.
n. 3.
This, you think, will be answered with our old put off, “that 316 it is the common pretext of all heretics when they sever them-

selves from the Roman catholic church." If your church indeed were what she is not, *the catholic church*, we might be what we are not, *heretics*: but think it not enough to prove us heretics that you call us so, unless you will likewise take it for granted that the pope is *Antichrist*, and your church *the whore of Babylon*, because they are as often and as confidently called so. And if your church be truly so (as she is shrewdly suspected to be), do you think she and all her followers would not as confidently call such as dissented from her *heretics*, and the using those expressions of her *virulent execrations against her*, as you do now, supposing her not to be so? What therefore would belong to your church, supposing her as bad as any protestants imagine her to be, cannot certainly help to persuade us, that she is not so bad as she is. When you say still "that protestants did really depart from the Roman church, and in so doing remained separate from the whole church," you very fairly beg the thing in dispute, and think us uncivil for denying it. You know not what that passage means, "that the protestants did not voluntarily depart, taking their whole body and cause together;" since there is no obscurity in the expression, but a defect elsewhere, I can only say that his lordship was not bound to find you an understanding as oft as you want it. But it were an easy matter to help you; for it is plain that he speaks those words to distinguish the common cause of protestants from the heats and irregularities of some particular persons whom he did not intend to justify, such as, he saith, were either peevish or ignorantly zealous. And if you distinguish the sense of your church from the judgments of particular persons, I hope it may be as lawful for us to distinguish the body and cause of protestants from the inconsiderate actings of any particular men. All that which follows about the name of *protestants*, which his lordship saith "took its rise, not from protesting simply against the Roman church, but against the edict at Worms, which was for the restoring all things to their former state, without any reformation," is so plain and evident, that nothing but a mind to cavil, and to give us the same things over and over, could have made you stay longer upon it: for what else means your talk of "innovation in matters of religion" (which we say was caused by you), "and protesting

against the Roman church, and consequently against all particular visible churches in the world, and that which none but heretics and schismatics used to do?" Do you think these passages are so hard that we cannot know what they mean unless we have them so often over? but they are not so hard to be understood as to be believed, and that the rather, because we see you had rather say them often than prove them once. If "the popes professed reformation necessary as to many abuses," I hope they are not all schismatics who call for the redress of abuses in your church: but if all the reformation we are to expect of them be that which you say "was effectually ordained by the council of Trent," if there had not been an edict at Worms, there were the decrees of that council which would have made a protestation necessary. Although we think your church needs reformation in manners and discipline as much as any in the world, yet those are not the abuses mainly insisted on by the protestants as the grounds of their separation, and therefore his lordship ought to be understood of a reformation as to the errors and corruptions of the Roman church; and doubtless that edict of Worms, which was for the restoring all things to their former state, did cut off all hopes of any such reformation as was necessary for the protestants to return to the Roman communion: and whatever you say, till you have proved the contrary better than as yet it is done, it will appear that they are the "protestants who stand for the ancient and undefiled doctrine of 317 the catholic church, against the novel and corrupt tenets of the Roman church." And such kind of protestation no true Christian, who measures his being catholic by better grounds than communion with the church of Rome, will ever have cause to be ashamed of.

§. II. "But A. C.," saith his lordship, "goes on, and will needs Conf. p. 111. have it that the protestants were the cause of the schism." n. 4.

'For,' saith he, 'though the church of Rome did thrust them from her by excommunication, yet they had first divided themselves by obstinate holding and teaching opinions contrary to the Roman faith and practice of the church, which to do, St. Bernard thinks is pride, St. Austin, madness.'" At this his lordship takes many and just exceptions: 1. "that holding and teaching was not the prime cause neither, but the

Lab. p. 147.
n. 4.

corruptions and superstitions of Rome, which forced many men to hold and teach the contrary; so the prime cause was there still." Now to this your answer is very considerable: "That the bishop of Rome being St. Peter's successor in the government of the church, and infallible (at least with a general council), it is impossible that protestants, or other sectaries, should ever find such errors or corruptions definitively taught by him, or received by the church, as should either warrant them to preach against her doctrine, or lawfully to forsake her communion." We say your church hath erred; you say it is impossible she should: we offer you evident proofs of her errors; you say she is infallible: we say it is impossible that church should be infallible which we can make appear hath been deceived; you tell us again, it is impossible she should be deceived, for, let heretics say what they will, she is *infallible*. And if this be not a satisfactory way of answering, let the world judge. But having already pulled down that Babel of infallibility, this answer falls to the ground with it; and to use your phrase, the truth is, all that you have in effect to say for your church is, that she is *infallible*, and *the catholic church*, and by this means you think to cast the schism upon us: and these things are great enough indeed, if you could but make any show of proof for them; but not being able to do that, you do in effect as much as if a man in a high fever should go about to demonstrate it was impossible for him to be sick, which, the more he takes pains to do, the more evident his distemper is to all who hear him. And it is shrewdly to be suspected, if your errors had not been great and palpable, you would have contented yourselves with something short of infallibility: but as the case is with your church, I must confess it is your greatest wisdom to talk most of infallibility; for if you can but meet with any weak enough to swallow that, all other things go down without dispute; but if men are left at liberty to examine particulars, they would as soon believe it was impossible for that man to fall whom they see upon the ground, as your church to be infallible, which they find overspread with error and corruptions.

Much such another answer you return to his lordship's second exception, which is at his calling the Christian faith *the Roman faith*: for you say it is no incongruity so to call it,

“for the bishop of Rome being head of the whole Christian or catholic church, the faith approved and taught by him as head thereof, though it be *de facto* the general faith and profession of all Christians, may yet very well be called *the Roman faith*; why? because the root, origin, and chief foundation, under Christ, of its being practised and believed by Christians, is at Rome.” But if the bishop of Rome be no such thing as head of the Christian church, (and they must have a very wide faith which must swallow that universal headship, with all the appurtenances, upon your bare affirmation;) if it belongs no more to him to approve and teach the faith than to any other catholic bishop; if the coming from Rome affords no credibility at all to the Christian faith; then still there remains as great an incongruity as may be in calling the Christian faith *the Roman faith*. And as to all these my denial is as good as your affirmation; when you undertake to prove, I shall to answer.

If A. C. adds the practice of the church to the Roman faith, I see no advantage is gotten by it; for the first must limit the latter, and the faith being Roman, the church must be so too; and therefore all your cavils on that subject come to nothing.

§. 12. The third exception is against the places out of St. Bernard and St. Austin, which his lordship saith are misapplied; “for neither of them,” saith he, “spake of the Roman; and St. Bernard, perhaps, neither of the catholic nor the Roman, but of a particular church or congregation. His words are, ‘What greater pride than that one man should prefer his judgment before the whole congregation?’” which A. C., conveniently to his purpose, rendered *before the whole congregation of all the Christian churches in the world*; whereas no such thing is in him as *all the Christian churches in the world*.” And his lordship saith, “he thinks it is plain that he speaks both of and to the particular congregation to which he was then preaching.” This you deny not, but say, “the argument holds *a minori ad majus*, to shew the more exorbitant pride of those who prefer their private fanatic opinions

§ Quæ major superbia quam ut unus homo toti congregationi iudicium suum præferat, tanquam ipse

solus Spiritum Dei habeat?—S. Bern. Sermon. 3. de Resurrect.

Lab. p. 147.
n. 4.

Lab. p. 148.

Conf. p. 112.
sect. 21. n. 4.

Lab. p. 149.
n. 5.

before the judgment of the whole catholic church." *The Roman church* you should have said, for you own no catholic church but what is Roman, and therein the argument you mention will hold yet further against those who prefer the novel opinions of the Roman church before the ancient apostolical faith of the truly catholic church. His lordship adds, "that it is one thing to prefer a man's private judgment before the whole congregation, and another for an intelligent man in something unsatisfied modestly to propose his doubts even to the catholic church; and much more may a whole national church, nay, the whole body of protestants, do it." Now you very wisely leave out this last clause, that you might take an opportunity to declaim against Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, &c. for want of modesty. But what pretext could there have been for such virulency, had they been guilty of what you charge them, if you would but have given us all that his lordship said? And may not I now therefore more justly return you your own language in the same page upon a far less occasion: "that here is a manifest robbery of part of his lordship's words, for which you are bound to restitution: for his lordship, as it were foreseeing this cavil, warily adds that concerning a whole national church, and the whole body of protestants, which you, for reasons best known to yourself, craftily leave out. But we must excuse our adversary for this slip, though it be an unhandsome one; for the truth is, he had no other way to hide the guiltiness of his own pen," &c.? These are your own words, only applied, and that much more justly, to yourself, for a more palpable fault in the very same page wherein you had accused his lordship for one of that kind. But you go on further, and "supposing the doubts had been modestly proposed, yet this could not at all help the protestant cause, in regard their doubts were in points of faith already determined for such by authority of the catholic church; to question any of which, with what seeming modesty soever, is sinful, heretical, and damnable." Were it our present business, it were easy to make it appear, that the far greatest part of the matters in controversy were never determined as "points of faith" before the council of Trent; and I hope you will not say that was before the reformation, or any proposal of doubts? But if they had been defined by your

church for matters of faith, and our great doubt be, how your church comes to have this power of determining points of faith, to whom should this doubt be propounded? to your church? no doubt then we should hear from her, as now we do from you, “that to question it, with what seeming modesty soever, is sinful, heretical, and damnable.” And, is it not then likely that your church should ever yield to the proposal of doubts; and you do well to tell us so, for it will save protestants a great deal of labour, when they see your church so incurable that she makes it “sinful, heretical, and damnable” to question any thing she hath determined: although we do with much more reason assert it to be sinful, heretical, and damnable in your church to offer to obtrude erroneous doctrines on the faith of the Christian world as points necessary to be believed, and to urge superstitious practices as the conditions of communion with her.

To the place of St. Austin, wherein he saith, “that it is a part of most insolent madness for any man to dispute whether that be to be done which is usually done in and through the whole catholic church of Christ,” his lordship answers, 1. “Here is not a word of the Roman church, but of that which is all over the world, *catholic*, which Rome never yet was;” and for all your boast of having often shewed “that the Roman and the catholic are all one,” I dare leave it to the indifferent reader, whether you have not miserably failed in your attempts that way. 2. He answers, “that A. C. applies this to the Roman faith, whereas St. Austin speaks expressly of the rites and ceremonies of the church, and particularly about the manner of offering upon Maundy-Thursday, whether it be in the morning, or after supper, or both. 3. It is manifest by the words themselves that St. Austin speaks of no matter of faith there, Roman nor catholic, for he speaks of things done, and to be done, and not for things believed, or to be believed. 4. A right sober man may, without the least touch of insolency or madness, dispute a business of religion with the Roman either church or prelate, as all men know Irenæus did with Victor.” Now to all this you reply, “that the argument still holds *a minori ad majus*, and reaches to every person that in any matter whatsoever obstinately opposes himself against the church of God.” And is not this an

Conf. p. 113.
sect. 21. n. 4.

Lab. p. 149.
n. 5.

Conf. p. 113.
sect. 21. n. 4.

excellent way of arguing from the less to the greater, to argue from a rite or ceremony observed by *the universal church*, to a matter of faith determined by *the Roman church*? This is *a minori ad majus* with a witness. But your reason is as good as your answer, which is, "because there was always some point or matter of faith involved in every universally-practised right or ceremony of the church:" I pray sir, then, tell us what the matter of faith was which lay in the offering on Maundy-Thursaday in morning, or after supper; and by whom this point of faith was determined; and how far it is obligatory; and whether it be not "sinful, heretical, and damnable" so much as modestly to doubt of it? for all this, you told us, belongs to all matters of faith determined by the catholic church. What remains of this chapter need not hold us long, for A. C.'s illation from the catholic church's not erring, "that therefore it cannot be lawful to separate from the Roman church," is absurd and illogical, and depends on that gross mistake, that the Roman and catholic church are all one, which we have abundantly disproved in the precedent chapter.

Lab. p. 150,
151.

What follows concerning the catholic church's not erring, and how far that extends, concerning the catalogue of fundamentals, and any errors admitted in the church being destructive to its being, because derogatory to God's veracity, have been so amply discussed in their proper places, that I find no temptation, from any new arguments here suggested, to resume the debate of them. There being then nothing material which hath not been handled already, I here conclude this chapter.

OF KEEPING FAITH WITH HERETICS.

The occasion of this dispute.—The reason why this doctrine is not commonly defended : yet all own such principles from whence it necessarily follows.—The matter of fact as to the council of Constance and John Huss opened.—Of the nature of the safeconduct granted him by the emperor, that it was not a general one, *salva justitia*, but particular, *jure speciali*; which is largely proved.—The particulars concerning Hierome of Prague.—Of the safeconduct granted by the council of Trent.—Of the distinction of secular and ecclesiastical power, and that from thence it follows that faith is not to be kept with heretics.—Simancha and several others fully assert this doctrine.—Of the invitation to the council of Trent, and the good instructions there; and of public disputation.

§. 1. **A**. C.'s endeavour, not only to charge protestants with the guilt of schism, but to justify and clear the proceedings of the church of Rome towards them, hath led us into a new dispute,—how far she is to be trusted in the greatest promises which are made to such whom she accounts heretics: which is occasioned by these words of his, “That after this breach was made, the church of Rome was so kind and careful to seek the protestants, that she invited them publicly with safeconduct to Rome, to a general council, freely to speak what they could for themselves:” or if we take his words as you give them us, the sense is the same to our purpose (and therefore you impertinently cavil with his lordship for not keeping faith with A. C.), “which did at first seek to recall them from their novel opinions, and after their breach did permit, yea invite them publicly to Rome to a general council,” &c. Upon which his lordship says, “Indeed, I think the church of Rome did carefully seek the protestants, but I doubt it was to bring them within their net: and she invited

Conf. p. 117.
sect. 21. n. 7.

them to Rome!—a very safe place, if you mark it, for them to come to; just as the lion (in the apologue) invited the fox to his own den. Yea, but there was safeconduct offered too!—Yes, conduct perhaps, but not safe, or safe perhaps for going thither, but none for coming thence: *vestigia nulla retrorsum*. Yea, but it should have been to a general council!—Perhaps so. But was the conduct safe that was given for coming to a council, which they call *general*, to some others before them? No sure, John Huss and Jerome of Prague burnt, for all their safeconduct. And so long as the Jesuits write and maintain that ‘faith given is not to be kept with heretics,’ and the church of Rome leaves this lewd doctrine uncensured (as it hath hitherto done, and no exception put in of force and violence), A. C. shall pardon us that we come not to Rome, nor within the reach of Roman power, what freedom of speech soever be promised us. For to what end is freedom of speech on their part, since they are resolved to alter nothing? And to what end freedom of speech on our part, if after speech hath been free, life shall not?” This you call “a theme, which, for the most part, our adversaries love to dwell upon, as thinking they have some great advantage against us therein.” And can you blame them for insisting much on that which their lives are concerned in? And it will appear in the prosecution of this subject, that we have this great advantage against you, that we are come to understand your arts so well as not so easily to be caught by your perfidious subtilties: and as we understand your practices better than to rely on your promises of this nature, so we are not so ignorant of the intrigues

321 of your proceedings as to suppose that commonly and openly you should defend this position, That faith is not to be kept with heretics; for thereby you would lose the intent and design of it, for none would be so silly as to venture themselves into the hands of such, who openly profess they are not bound to keep faith with them: for do you think that father Fulgentio would ever have gone to Rome on the safeconduct most solemnly given by Paul V, if he had understood beforehand with what perfidiousness he should have been dealt with there; and all under this pretext, “that safeconduct was given for his coming thither, but not for his going thence?” Is this the faith of the apostolical see? is this the catholic

Lab. p. 152.
n. 1.

and Roman faith? If so, the Roman faith, before ever it was Christian, was much more infallible than this, that never was acquainted with such a perfidious infallibility. Well then might his lordship say, “the conduct might be safe for his going thither, but not for his coming thence: *vestigia nulla retrorsum*.” And so Fulgentio to his sorrow found it. We see, therefore, it is very necessary for you to disown this principle as much as possible till you have occasion to practise it, and then woe be to them to whose lot it falls to make the experiment. Though therefore both “publicly and privately, in word and writing,” as you tell us, you teach and profess that faith is to be kept as well with heretics as catholics, yet your adversaries have no great reason to rely on your promises, when they find your practices apparently to the contrary, and those practices built on such principles which you all own and contend for, and that, notwithstanding what you confidently say to the contrary, several of your writers have in terms asserted it: all which shall be made good in this chapter. And therefore, though you say it, and say it over again, those who know the ambiguity of your expressions, your many reservations and exceptions which you make, will not be very confident of the honesty of your meaning by the fairness of your expressions. These are therefore no clamorous accusations, but very sad truths, which the experience of the world and your dealings have too often taught us, that at last we are forced to distinguish between *a prince’s safeconduct*, and *an ecclesiastical trepan*; for no other will that appear to be which was granted by pope Paul to Fulgentio, or the emperor and council of Constance to John Huss and Hierome of Prague. If Christ, therefore, after he had said that they should “give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s,” had either denied the payment of tribute, or demanded it himself, Becanus might then say that was a fit parallel for you in this controversy, whose open actions do palpably contradict you, when you say that faith is to be kept with heretics.

§. 2. For the clearing of which, we must first relate the matter of fact in the case of the council of Constance, and then examine the several evasions you make in vindication of their proceedings, notwithstanding the safeconduct given by the emperor and council. The story then is briefly this:—A

council at Constance being called for redressing abuses in the church, and putting an end to that schism which was between the three antipopes Gregory XII, Benedict XIII, John XXIII, John Huss is summoned by the emperor Sigismund to appear before it; and, to take away all fears and suspicions of unhandsome dealing, the emperor grants him a safeconduct, in which it was expressed, *Omni prorsus impedimento remoto, transire, stare, morari, et redire libere permittatis*, "that without all manner of hinderance, he should be suffered to come, appear, stay, and return freely." That such a safeconduct was given by the emperor, and pleaded by Huss, is agreed on all sides: but notwithstanding this, he had not been above three weeks in Constance, but, contrary to his safeconduct, he is thrown into prison; which being done in the emperor's absence, he returns to the council, and argues the case with
 322 them, upon which they pass the decree contained in the 19th session of that council, in these words cited in the margin^a, which that you may not quarrel with my interpretation of, I will take your own: "This present sacred synod declareth, That by whatsoever safeconduct, granted by the emperor, kings, or other secular princes, to heretics, or such as are defamed for heresy, no prejudice can arise, no impediment can or ought to be put to the catholic faith, or other ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that (notwithstanding the said safeconduct) it may be lawful for any competent and ecclesiastical judge to inquire into the errors of such persons, and duly otherwise proceed against them, and punish them so far as justice shall require, if they shall pertinaciously refuse to revoke their errors; yea, though they come to the place of judgment relying upon such safeconduct, and would not other-

^a Præsens sancta synodus ex quo-
vis salvo-conductu per imperatorem,
reges, et alios seculi principes, hære-
ticiis, vel de hæresi diffamatis, pu-
tantes eosdem sic a suis erroribus
revocare, quocunque se vinculo ob-
strinxerint, concessio, nullum fidei
catholicæ vel jurisdictioni ecclesia-
sticæ præjudicium generari, vel im-
pedimentum præstari posse, seu de-
bere declarat, quo minus dicto salvo-
conductu non obstante, liceat judici
competenti et ecclesiastico, de hujus-

modi personarum erroribus inqui-
rere, et alias contra eos debite pro-
cedere, eosdemque punire, quantum
justitia suadebit, si suos errores
revocare pertinaciter recusaverint,
etiamsi de salvo-conductu confisi ad
locum venerint judicii alias non ven-
turi; nec sic promittentem, cum
fecerit quod in ipso est, ex aliquo re-
mansisse obligatum.—Concil. Con-
stant. sess. 19. p. 1075. tom. 7.
Concil. p. 2. ed. Binii.

wise come thither; nor doth he who so promiseth remain obliged in any thing, having done what lies in him." Upon this decree of the council, the emperor looks on himself as absolved from his obligation, and not only concurred in the sentence against Huss, but gave order himself about his execution. The question then is, whether the emperor did not break his faith with John Huss in so doing, and whether the council did not decree that neither he nor any else were bound to keep it with heretics. Although this case be so plain and clear to all persons who have any sense of justice and honesty, that we dare appeal to the most indifferent persons in the world, whether it be not a notorious violation of faith, after a most solemn promise of safe return, to proceed to judgment against the person who came merely relying on that promise, and the same person to be the instrument of his execution who gave the safeconduct on which he trusted; and whether the declaring that such a person is not obliged to keep his promise, because it is a matter of heresy he had promised in, be not to declare, That no faith is to be kept with heretics. Yet since no actions are so bad, if they tend to your advantage, but you will have something to blind the eyes of the simple with, we must consider what you have to plead in vindication of these proceedings. You tell us, then, "that the emperor did not break his faith with John Huss, and that notwithstanding the safeconduct given, he was justly burnt." Bold and daring assertions! But we must inquire into the reasons of them. Two things you seem most to rely on, and the strength of all your answer depends on them; which being the things Becanus and the rest of your party insist on in this case, I shall more closely examine. The first is from the nature of the safeconduct given, that it was not such as could hinder justice; the second is from the difference of the secular and ecclesiastical power, and that the emperor could make no promise in prejudice of the church's jurisdiction.

§. 3. First, you distinguish of "a safeconduct, which," you say, "may be granted two ways; first, *jure communi*, when it is given only against unjust violence, *salva semper justitia*, provided always that justice be not impeached: secondly, *jure speciali*, when it secures a man against all violence whatsoever, whether just or unjust, and chiefly in that cause for which it

Lab. p. 153.
n. 2.

Ibid.

is given. In the former manner only," you say, "a safe-conduct was granted by the emperor to John Huss, and by the council of Constance to Hierome of Prague: in the latter sort, the council of Trent offered safeconduct to the protestants in Germany, &c. No faith, therefore, was broken with John Huss; for a safeconduct was only given him *jure communi*, by which justice was to remain unimpeachable, since he
 323 was only promised to be defended against unjust violence; which was performed." I grant, a safeconduct may be given two ways; the first is to secure men from all unjust violence, in order to a legal trial; and this is granted in such cases when the person accused looks on the law as open for him as well as his adversaries, and puts himself on a fair trial before equal and indifferent judges: and in such cases the intent of the safeconduct is expressed, *damus tibi fidem publicam causam dicendi in judicio contra vim, non contra juris executionem*, as the formula of it is in the Roman empire; thence that imperial constitution, which prohibits that any safeconduct be given to the accuser or the guilty person *adversus publicum judicium, sed solum contra vim*, "against public justice, but only against violence:" but then, these are the safeconducts which subordinate officers can only grant; because these have no power over the life of persons, but they are only to see justice duly administered to all persons, in order to which they may give such safeconducts as may prevent such things as may hinder the due execution of justice. But then, further, a safeconduct may be given with respect to those who are to judge of the cause, i. e. in case a person avoids appearance upon fears that the persons he is summoned before will presently cast him into prison, or put him to death: now, if a safeconduct be granted by him who hath the absolute power of life and liberty, so as to hinder the execution of any sentence passed, in this case the safe-conduct is full and absolute, and admits of no restrictions or limitations. Now this latter is plainly our present case; for John Huss had been summoned before to appear at Rome, to vindicate himself in point of heresy, but suspecting foul dealing, he durst not go: and can we in reason think he would ever have gone to Constance if the emperor had not granted him such a conduct as might secure him from his fears as to his life and liberty? And

therefore, since the emperor, to whom it only belonged to dispose of both, had granted him so express a safeconduct, he thought he might securely go; for to what end or purpose is a safeconduct granted, if it be not to secure that which the person to whom it was given had most cause to fear? Now it is apparent John Huss was not afraid of any unjust violence by the way, for he was so secure as to that, that he left his safeconduct in the hands of his friends till he came at Constance, as appears by the unquestionable reports of that story on all hands; which is an evident argument that the intent of the safeconduct was to secure him at Constance from any injury being done him by the council; and although the council might take upon them not only to judge of heresy, but to condemn him for it, yet, as long as the execution of that sentence belonged to the secular power, he had reason to think that whatever the council might determine, yet the emperor's faith being solemnly given him, he need not fear the execution of it: for that being in the emperor's power, he was bound by his public faith not to give way to it. To make this clear by an instance; it is more evident by our laws, that one who hath taken orders at Rome, coming into the nation, and being convicted of it, is liable to death, than it was by the laws then in force, that such who were condemned for heresy should be burnt: suppose, now, that a priest be summoned by the king to appear before his courts of justice, with a safeconduct or promise given that he should come, appear, and return freely, without any hinderance; would not you, or any other Romish priest, think yourselves hardly dealt with, and that the king had broken his faith, if he should not only suffer you to be condemned, but give express order for your execution, and then tell you that the safeconduct was to be understood *salva justitia*, without any impeachment of justice, and that it was only to protect you from all *unjust* violence? And was not the case just the same here of the emperor Sigismund and John Huss? was John Huss so ignorant as not to know they would 324 condemn him for heresy, when a council at Rome had condemned him for it already? or did not he know what course was like to be taken with persons so condemned? What could he then imagine to be the intent of this safeconduct, but to secure him from all violence to be done to his person under a

pretence of execution of justice? And for all this, was not the emperor's faith violated, when he was not only imprisoned, but burnt, by the emperor's express order, notwithstanding his solemn promise that he should come, appear, and return freely, without any hinderance? If this be a safeconduct, it is only such a one as they that go to the gallows have, a safeconduct to execution. Besides, that this could not be such a safeconduct, *salva justitia*, as you speak of, is manifest from the tenor and words of it: for safeconducts, being granted in favour of persons, are to be taken in their largest sense, if no limitations be expressed in them; and it is a rule among those who should and do understand these things best, "that a safeconduct is of the nature of a covenant, and the words of it import a promise, and therefore, if they be general, are extended as far as the words will bear: and that all the doctors do unanimously concur, that a general safeconduct of coming to a judge, or appearing in a court of judicature, do import a freedom of departure and going thence^b." So that we see, if we take the emperor's safeconduct in the express words of it, it imports much more than such a one as is only *salva justitia*; because it ran in the most general and comprehensive terms, and was granted, not by any subordinate judge, but by the emperor himself, who was able, as well as bound, to make it good in the most large and extensive sense. But further, if this had been granted only *salva justitia*, so that the council had liberty to proceed on him as they saw good, what made the emperor take their imprisonment of him so ill, as Naucleus and others report he did, and that because of the safeconduct he had given him? It seems the emperor wanted Becanus and you to have told him that he never granted any safeconduct but what had the reservation of a *salva justitia*, and that such justice too as his greatest enemy must shew him: if he had known this, he needed not have been troubled at that which he made account of in granting the safeconduct. Lastly, what need the council have taken such pains to satisfy the emperor, by declaring in a decree that neither he nor any

^b Verba salvi-conductus sunt verba fidei datæ et sapiunt naturam pacti: quare, si generalia sint, extenduntur quatenus verba patiuntur. Omnes doctores uno ore asserunt,

generalem promissionem securitatis veniendi ad judicem seu comparendi in judicio, etiam libertatem recedendi abeundique complecti.—Pet. Premus de Securit. quæst. 6. p. 33, 36.

prince was bound by their safeconducts to hinder heretics from being punished, if he had not thought himself obliged to do it by the safeconduct he had given? and if he did think so before the decree of the council, then certainly there was no *salva justitia* understood by him in the safeconduct he had granted. Thus we see how on all hands it appears, from Huss's fears and desires, the emperor's power, the nature of safeconducts, the emperor's own sense of it, and the council's decree, that this first answer hath no ground at all, viz. that the safeconduct was granted *jure communi*, and that it was only to hinder unjust violence, and not the execution of justice.

But besides, you say John Huss was justly burnt, for two reasons: "the first is, for being obstinate in his heresy; the second, for having fled, which the emperor had prohibited in his safeconduct under pain of death." I answer, it is not whether a man obstinate in heresy may be burnt, which is now the question, although that may justly bear a dispute too, but whether one suspected for heresy, and coming to a council with safeconduct for coming and returning, may be burnt without violation of faith; your first reason, then, is nothing to the purpose, and your second as little: first, because there is no certain evidence at all of Huss's flying; it not being objected against him by the emperor, who only upbraided him³²⁵ with his obstinacy in his heresy as the cause of his execution: and withal, if Huss had fled, and had suffered death for that, as you say he ought to have done, he would not have suffered the death proper to heresy, and not to flying, nor been accounted (as by all your own authors he is) a sufferer on the account of heresy. But this being a groundless calumny, it needs no further confutation.

§. 4. But before we come to your second answer, the case of Hierome of Prague must be discussed so far as it is distinct from that of John Huss; who, it seems, was trepanned by a pretended safeconduct granted him by the council, and not by the emperor, wherein, you tell us, that express clause of *salva semper justitia* was inserted, (which is another argument that the safeconduct of the emperor to Huss was of another nature, because it ran in general terms, without any such clause;) but poor Hierome, who it seems was not acquainted



with the arts and subtilties of his enemies, but thought them as honest as himself, ventures to Constance upon this safe-conduct: but when he came thither, and began to understand the jugglings of his enemies, he thought to shift for himself by flight, but being taken, was burnt. So that Hierome suffered through his honest simplicity and credulity, not considering what that *salva justitia* would mean in his case, which, as they interpreted it, was such another safeconduct as known malefactors have to the place of justice: but to call it a safeconduct in the sense which Hierome apprehended it in, is as proper as to say a man that is to be executed shall have a *salvo* for his life. This was therefore intended, as appears by the event, as a mere trick to bring him within their power; and so all such safeconducts granted with those clauses (by such persons who are to interpret them themselves) are, and nothing else: for they are the sole judges what this justice shall be. Neither can you say then that faith was kept with Hierome of Prague: for no such thing as a safeconduct, truly so called, was intended him; and when the emperor was solicited to grant him one, he utterly denied it, because of the bad success he had in that of John Huss; and some of the council being then present with the emperor offered to give him a safeconduct, but they very honestly explained themselves, that it was a safeconduct for coming thither, but not for going thence again: and so it proved. So that faith was well given to Hierome of Prague, and as well kept to John Huss.

But, say you, "had the protestants gone to the council of Trent, upon the safeconduct granted them by that council *jure speciali*, in the second manner, they could not at all have been punished under any pretence of heresy, without manifest breach of faith; which all catholics hold to be unlawful. The like may be said of the safeconduct offered them for going to Rome." But you must better satisfy us that you look upon this as a breach of faith, than as yet you have done: for so many are your ambiguities in your expressions of this nature, that men who know your arts can hardly tell when they have your right meaning: for you may look on all breach of faith as unlawful, and yet not look on your acting contrary to your express words, in safeconducts offered to heretics, to be a

breach of faith: for you may say, faith is there only broken where men are bound to keep it; but you are not bound to keep it with heretics, and that because your obligation to the church is greater than it can be to heretics: when therefore you have heretics in your power, it is an easy matter for you to say, that were it in any thing else but in a matter so nearly concerning the interest of your holy mother the church, you could not but observe it, but your obligation to that is so great, as destroys all other which are contrary to it; and the obligation being destroyed, there is no breach of faith at all; 326 and therefore you may hold all breach of faith unlawful, and yet you may proceed against those whom you account heretics contrary to all engagements whatsoever, and then say, This is no breach of faith. And the truth is, by your doctrines of equivocations and mental reservations, you have made all manner of converse in the world so lubricous and uncertain, that he who hath to deal with you, especially in matters where the interest of your church is concerned, had need be wary, and remember to distrust, or else he may repent it afterwards. If you therefore account the protestants crafty foxes, in not coming to Rome or the council of Trent, it was because they would not venture too near the lion's den; but if you will not account them wise men for refusing so fair an offer, you will give us leave to think them so till they see better reason to trust your offers. And the council of Trent did very well to tell them, in their form of safeconduct, they would not do by them as the council of Constance did, for therein they shew how much the faith of councils was sunk by that, so that if that were not particularly excepted, no trust would ever be given to them more. But supposing the safeconduct of the council of Trent to have been never so free from suspicion, the protestants had sufficient reasons not to appear there, as will be manifested afterwards.

§. 5. We come therefore now to your second answer, in vindication of the council of Constance, which is this, "that Lab. p. 154. by that decree the council declares that no secular power, how^{n. 3.} sovereign soever, can hinder the proceedings of the ecclesiastical tribunal in causes of heresy; for which there is great reason; and consequently, if the emperor, or any other secular prince, grants a safeconduct, or makes promise of any

thing to the prejudice of that jurisdiction, it shall not hold. The reason is, because it is a promise made of a thing not pertaining to the jurisdiction of that prince, nor wholly in his power to see performed." To this I answer, 1. That if I understand any thing, this is expressly to say, That no prince is to keep faith with heretics; and that is it which you are charged with, and you made use of this distinction to free yourselves from. Now that this is the plain meaning of it thus appears: you say, in the words immediately after, "but the council nowhere teaches that faith or safeconduct given in temporal causes, properly pertaining to the prince's jurisdiction, is not to be kept by all and to all persons of what condition soever, so far as it is possible." Which is as much as to say, that in any other case but that of heresy they are to keep faith, but not in that: for this of heresy is that which you oppose to all temporal causes, and challenge it as belonging to an ecclesiastical tribunal; when therefore the council of Constance decrees, That no secular power is obliged by any safeconduct to any thing which may hinder the ecclesiastical tribunal's proceeding in causes of heresy, what doth it else but declare in express terms that faith is not to be kept with heretics, i. e. in any thing relating to their heresy? for this, you say, they have nothing to do with; and therefore let kings and princes make never so solemn promises and engagements to men suspected of heresy, to their peril be it who rely upon them, for they have nothing to do to promise in such matters, and though their faith be given never so publicly and solemnly, they are not bound to keep it; nay, they are bound not to keep it; for if they should, it would be to the apparent mischief and prejudice of the church: this necessarily follows from your own words, and the distinction here used by you: so that now we need seek no further than yourself and Becanus for the open avowing of this principle, That no prince is bound to keep faith with heretics; but if he doth promise safeconduct to them, though it be more than he can do, yet the church can make that good use of it, that by that means she may get the heretics under her power; and when she hath them, it is but then declaring this promise to
327 be null, and she may do with them as she pleases. Neither is it only Becanus and you who say this, but it is the received

principle among you, whatever you say or pretend to the contrary; I mean not that you say in express terms that faith is not to be kept with heretics, but by this distinction of the secular and ecclesiastical power, as you use it, you say that from whence it necessarily follows. But yet I answer, 2. Though this distinction should be granted, yet it cannot really excuse the emperor from violating his faith; for I say, he promised nothing but what was in his power, which was, to secure him as to life and liberty. Now, although the emperor had suffered the ecclesiastical tribunal to do what belonged to it, which was to inquire into the charge of heresy, and to give sentence upon the person, yet the execution belonged wholly to the secular power; as the council itself acknowledged, when after the sentence of heresy was pronounced against John Huss there was nothing of the executive part which was pleaded as belonging to the church, but only degradation, and that was performed in the presence of the council; upon which the sacred synod declares, "that they had no more to do with him but to deliver him over to the secular power, and accordingly decrees it to be done^c." Now when the synod declares this, is it not plain, that what concerns his life doth properly and only belong to the secular power? if therefore the emperor was bound to do all which lay in him to do, he was effectually bound to secure him as to life and liberty, for both those lay within his power: and therefore, when he gave order for his execution, he was highly guilty of the violation of his faith; and if the council of Constance declared him absolved as to this too, it is yet more evident that they not only decreed, that no faith was to be kept with heretics in matters concerning the ecclesiastical tribunal, but in such as concerned the secular power, which is as much as to say, not at all. And by this the vanity of this distinction of the secular and ecclesiastical power is sufficiently manifest, and that it evidently appears that the council of Constance did decree that no faith was to be kept with heretics. And thus I have proved that his lordship hath not, as you calumniate him,

^c Hæc sancta synodus Constantiensis Johannem Huss, attento quod ecclesia Dei non habeat ultra quod gerere valeat, iudicio seculari relin-

quere, et ipsum curiæ seculari relinquendum fore decernit.—Concil. Constant. sess. 15. p. 1056.

“ignorantly or maliciously wronged the council,” but that no other tolerable sense, besides that which his lordship saith, can be made of the decree then passed; and, notwithstanding your arts and distinctions, nothing can be more plain, than that John Huss was trepanned into his ruin by the faith of the emperor given to him. It can be therefore nothing but either palpable ignorance, or a deceit as gross as trusting your safeconduct in a matter of heresy, for you so confidently to assert, “that if the relater had not mangled the words of the council (to deceive his reader), but set down the decree fairly and fully as it is, the business had been so clear, that it would scarce have any dispute:” whereas his lordship only sets down the title of the decree, and so he tells you himself, and this he doth as faithfully as may be; and whereas nothing can more evidence the jugglings of the council than the decree itself doth, in which nothing is more plain, than that in case of heresy no prince is bound to keep faith with any persons whatsoever.

§. 6. From the council of Constance we proceed to other authors, to see whether they do not concur with it in this opinion. For this, his lordship cites Simancha, a Spanish bishop, and a canonist as well as civilian, who expressly saith, “that faith is not to be kept with heretics, as neither with tyrants, pirates, or other public robbers^d,” and plainly justifies the proceedings of the council of Constance in that respect, in that “heretics by their solemn judgment were burnt, although public security had been given them^e.” Let us now

328 see what answer you return to these clear citations. In general you say, “the bishop was insincere or unadvised in quoting this author.” I wonder wherein; I am sure, not so much as you are in your answers to him: for you say “Simancha holds not this absolutely and universally, but only in cases wherein that which is promised cannot be lawfully performed. Hence,” say you, “Simancha hath these words, *Veruntamen (ut Marius Salomonius ait) promissa contra Christum fides, si præstetur, perfidia est*, ‘if faith be given against Christ, that

^d Fides hæreticis data servanda non est, sicut nec tyrannis, piratis, et cæteris publicis prædonibus.—Simancha Instit. Cathol. tit. 46. sect. 51.

^e Jure igitur hæretici quidam gravissimo concilii Constantiensis judicio, legitima flamma concremati sunt, quamvis promissa illis securitas fuisset.—Instit. tit. 46. sect. 52.

is, to the dishonour of God, or contrary to the precepts of true religion, it were perfidiousness to observe it.'” But the answer to this is easy; for it appears from Simancha’s own grounds, that he supposeth it holds universally, because faith can never be given to heretics, so as that promise can be lawfully performed, because thereby he supposeth it given against Christ, and to the dishonour of God, and therefore concludes it would be perfidiousness to observe it. And this is evident from Simancha’s own grounds which he gives for it: “for,” saith he, “if faith be not to be kept with tyrants, pirates, and other robbers, which kill the body, much less with heretics, who destroy souls^f,” which reason being absolute and universal, his proposition must be so too; and very consonantly to his former assertions concludes, “that if faith be given them with an oath, against the public good, against the salvation of souls, against divine and human laws, it is not to be kept^g,” and it is well known that all heresies are accounted so by you, and therefore in no case faith is to be kept with heretics. Neither can this possibly be understood merely of private persons, for his words are general; and we see he vindicates the proceedings of the council at Constance upon these grounds; and he quotes Marius Salomonius and Placa, who likewise assert in terms, that faith given to heretics is not to be kept, and makes use of the instance of the council of Constance to prove it^h. And Menochius, whom Simancha likewise cites, who was an Italian canonist, and therefore might well know the practices of Rome in these cases, saith, “that Placa expressly holds that faith is not to be kept with heretics, which, he saith, he understands so, when faith is given to the injury of the catholic faithⁱ,” and cites Conradus Bru-

^f Si tyrannis, piratis, et cæteris prædonibus fides servanda non est, qui corpus occidunt; longe minus hæreticis pertinacibus, qui occidunt animas.—Instit. tit. 46. sect. 52.

^g Quamobrem fides illis data, etiam juramento firmata, contra publicum bonum, contra salutem animarum, contra jura divina et humana, nullo modo servanda est.—Instit. tit. 46. sect. 53.

^h Scribit etiam Salomonius in d. l. 2. exact. de orig. juris, et refert Pe-

trus Placa l. 1. epit. delict. c. 37. in fin. ita observatum fuisse contra hæreticos vocatos in concilio Constantiensi sub salvo-conductu, qui tamen contra datam fidem necati fuerunt. Non ergo salvo-conductui fidere debuit D. Scipio.—Menochius, lib. 1. Concil. 100. n. 193.

ⁱ Quod vero scribit Placa d. c. 37. in fin. hæreticis datam fidem servandam non esse, intelligo cum data fides est ad detrimentum fidei catholicæ.—Id. Concil. 100. n. 219.

nus to this purpose, “that it is not lawful to make such agreements with heretics, that they may enjoy the liberty of their own sect^k.” If therefore they must interpret how far the faith given tends to the prejudice of the catholic faith, we see how little security can be had from any solemn promise. And Menochius himself asserts the safeconduct granted by princes in case of heresy to be unlawful, “because the inferior” (as he supposes princes to be to the ecclesiastical tribunal) “cannot secure them who are condemned by the superior, and because kings and emperors ought rather to destroy heretics than to secure them: and therefore the council of Constance did well in nulling the safeconducts granted to heretics^l.” And what now is this but in plain terms to assert that faith is not to be kept with heretics? Neither can you say, as some do, that they are the canonists, and not the church of Rome, which assert this; for besides that the canonists understand well enough the intrigues and proceedings of the court of Rome, although it seems they do not conceal them so much as they should do, yet they are not only these who have
 329 asserted it, but some great men of your church have, upon occasion, expressly said it; for we are not to expect that this should be avowed as a public opinion of your church, for that were to make it unserviceable to you; but when you have those whom you call *heretics* at an advantage, then is the time to discover this. So there wanted not some to persuade Charles the Fifth, notwithstanding the safeconduct given to Luther at his coming to Worms, to deal by him as the council of Constance had done by John Huss, and that upon this very account, that no faith was to be kept with heretics: but the emperor and the princes about him were persons of too great honour and honesty to hearken to such perfidious counsels. And no meaner a person than cardinal Hosius

^k Ita enim loquitur Conradus Brunus in tract. de Hæret. c. 14. l. 3. cum scribit, Non licere pacisci cum hæreticis, ut libere possint in damnata eorum secta vivere.—Ib. n. 220.

^l Quod si objiciatur, concilium Constantiense non observasse salvos-conductos concessos ab imperatoribus et regibus; facile erit respondere, Non licuisse illis impera-

toribus et regibus, concedere tutos reddere hæreticos; tum quia inferior non potest salvum-conductum concedere damnato a majori, tum etiam quia imperatorum et regum est hæreticos expugnare, non autem securos et tutos reddere; quemadmodum abunde tradit Conrad. Brunus, lib. 3. de Hæret. c. 15. Recte a concilio salvi-conductus illi annullati fuerunt.—Ib. n. 227, 228.

admonishes Henry king of Poland, "that he ought not to keep the faith he had given to the protestants," and gives this reason for it, "that an oath ought not to be the bond of iniquity^m." And the Jesuit Possevin is reported to have given the same counsel afterwards to Stephen king of Poland. But these things are as much as possible kept from our view, and the books containing such doctrines in them are, like the golden legends, bought up by themselves, to prevent our discovery of their frauds and imposture; and therefore if we cannot instance in those Jesuits who have expressly taught this opinion in print, yet that only argues the greater fraud and subtilty of them who will own and practise such things which they dare not publicly avow to the world. And yet it appears, from the way used by Becanus and you in vindication of yourselves, that you cannot possibly avoid the asserting such things from whence it necessarily follows, that faith is not to be kept with heretics. But because the doctrine itself is grown a matter so odious to the world, being contrary to all principles of humanity and justice, and which, if practised by all those who call each other *heretics*, would overthrow all civil societies, therefore you dare not but in terms disown it, though it still remains among those *arcana societatis*, those hidden works of darkness, which want only a fair opportunity to discover themselves. But as much as you wipe your mouth, though it be foul enough in saying that neither the bishop nor all his gang are able to name one of them of that opinion, to make it appear how much you have abused yourself in these words, I shall make a short business of it, and name yourself for one, and Becanus your author for another, and refer the reader to what goes before, for an evidence that you own those principles from whence it unavoidably follows, that no faith is to be kept with heretics.

§. 7. But are the Jesuits indeed grown such honest men, that not one of their number can be named who assert this doctrine? A happy change! for sure they were not always so, if we believe that excellent person, of as great integrity as learning, and a Romanist too, Jac. Augustus Thuanus, in his

^m Nunquam patiaris ulla te ratione ad ea quæ, promisisti præstanda teneri; quia juramentum non debet esse vinculum iniquitatis.— Hosius Cardinal. Epist. 204.

elegy in Parricidasⁿ, wherewith he concludes his sacred poems, in which he speaks great and sad truths of that honest society, where he mentions those cruelties and assassinations which were brought into these parts of the world by the arts and opinions of a famous society, which makes nothing of laws, faith, honesty, religion, to advance that interest which it hath espoused; and expressly saith, that they deny faith to be kept, that by their distinctions and subtilties they enervate the force of divine commands, they deny obedience to authority, destroy religion under a pretence of piety, break engagements, teach the murdering kings, and what not. And
 330 yet, all this while, not one of all this society ever taught that faith was not to be kept with heretics. But whence came then the great disputes, whether an oath of allegiance might be taken to heretical princes? was it not from hence, that heresy was supposed to dissolve that obligation to obedience which otherwise men lay under? And if it doth destroy that faith which men owe to their sovereigns in case of heresy, will it not equally destroy that faith which princes promise to their subjects in case of heresy too? for what reason can be given for the one, which will not hold for the other also? And who were they, I pray, but those loyal persons the Jesuits, who broached, fomented, and propagated that doctrine? Was not

ⁿ Scilicet has artes nuper gens gnara nocendi
 Exitio invexit, Gallia, nata tuo.
 Hesperiae fuscis gens emissaria ab oris,
 Fucum affectata quæ gravitate tegit;
 Nata magistratum convellere, nata ministris
 Subtrahere obsequium, præsulibusque suum:
 Geryonæ quæ dum placeat, faveatque trifauci,
 Terrarum reliquos non facit assis heros.
 Et cœlo facinus dignum putat, omnia sævi
 In regis longas tradere sceptræ manus.
 Quæ disciplinam morum, quæ Gallica venit,
 Exuto, legum solvere jura, metu,
 Et vileis regnantum animas, ipsosque necandos
 Horrenda reges prodicione docet;
 Servandamque fidem negat, argutisque cavillis
 Detorquet magni jussa severa Dei.
 Nos patimur segnes, lentique sedemus ad iram,
 Et pietas ipsa religione perit.
 Protinus induciæ violantur patre Quiritum
 Auctore, et Martis nuncius urbe venit.
 Nos juvat antiquo vitam producere ritu,
 Nos juvat in prisca simplicitate mori.

Jac. Aug. Thuan. Eleg. in Parricidas.

father Creswell a Jesuit, who, under the name of Andreas Philopator, delivers this excellent doctrine, “That the whole school of divines teach, and it is a thing certain, and of faith, that any Christian prince, if he manifestly falls off from the religion of the catholic Roman church, and endeavours to draw others from it, doth by law of God and man fall from all power and authority, and that before the sentence of the pope and judge delivered against him; and that all his subjects are free from the obligation of any oath to him of obedience and loyalty, and that they may and ought to cast such a one out of his power, as an apostate and a heretic, lest he infect others^o.” I might mention many more, who write after the same nature, but I spare you; only this one may serve instead of many; for he delivers it not only as his own judgment, but the consent of the school, and as a thing most certain, as being of faith: and will you still say that no Jesuits own such principles as that faith is not to be kept with heretics? for if heresy doth thus destroy all obligation to obedience in subjects to heretical princes, will it not much more in princes toward heretical subjects? because certainly princes have a greater power and right to command over subjects, than subjects over them, even in your own case of heresy. Since this therefore is the avowed doctrine of the Jesuitical school, persuade whom you can to believe that you look on an obligation to faith remaining in a case of heresy: certainly none who understand your principles and practices will have much cause to rely on your faith in this particular. So much at present of the Jesuits’ integrity as to this principle of keeping faith with heretics. What you add further, about the council of Lab. p. 156. Constance, and John Huss, and Hierome of Prague, is only ^{n. 4.} serving up the very same matter in somewhat different words; for there is nothing contained in them but what hath been sufficiently disproved already: for it all depends on the nature

^o Universa theologorum schola tenet, et est certum ac de fide, Quemcunque principem Christianum, si a catholica Romana religione manifeste deflexerit, et alios advocare voluerit, excidere statim omni potestate, ac dignitate ex ipsa vi juris divini et humani: hocque et ante sententiam pontificis et judicis con-

tra ipsum prolatam; et subditos quoscunque liberos esse ab omni juramenti obligatione, quod de obedientia præstitissent, posseque et debere hujusmodi hominem tanquam apostatam et hæreticum ex dominatu ejicere, ne alios inficiat.—Andreas Philopator Resp. ad Edict. Regin. Angl. p. 149. n. 157.

of the safeconduct, and the difference of the secular and ecclesiastical power.

Lab. p. 157.
n. 4.

§. 8. His lordship very pertinently asks, "Supposing men might go safely to Rome, to what purpose is it to go to a general council thither, and use freedom of speech, since the church of Rome is resolved to alter nothing?" and you very pertinently answer, "That they were invited thither to be better instructed, and reclaimed from their errors." But will no place serve to reclaim them but Rome? can they not be as well instructed elsewhere, and by other means, than by being summoned to a general council? We had thought the intention of general councils had been to have had free debates concerning the matters which divide the church: but it seems the protestants must have been summoned as guilty persons, i. e. heretics, and their adversaries must have sat as their proper judges, and such who were accused as the great innovators must have believed themselves infallible, and, by your own saying, if an angel from heaven had come as a protestant thither, he would not have been believed; nay, it had been
331 well he had escaped so, if your power were as great over spirits as over our grosser bodies. So I suppose John Huss and Hierome of Prague were invited to Constance to be better instructed! and it is well we know by their example what you mean by your good instructions, and, out of a desire to avoid them, care not how little we appear where our adversaries not only intend to be judges, but resolve beforehand to condemn us, whatsoever we say: for so you tell us, "that Rome, and the fathers of Trent, were resolved to stick to their own doctrine," (which they call *catholic*,) "notwithstanding any pretended difficulties or objections brought against it, either by bishops or any other person." Your kind invitations then of the protestants were wonderful expressions of your church's civility towards them, that they might be present to hear themselves condemned, and then escape how they could themselves.

The offer of a public disputation, his lordship truly tells you, signifies nothing without an indifferent arbitration, and the impossibility of agreeing on that renders the other useless, and only becomes such Thrasonical persons as Campian was, who yet had as little reason as any man to boast of his

achievements in his disputations. When you therefore say, "his lordship would have some atheist, Turk, or Jew, to sit as indifferent persons," you shew only your scurrility and want of understanding: for his lordship only insists on the necessity of that, to shew the uselessness of public disputations where such cannot be agreed on, as in this case; and he truly saith, "This is a good answer to all such offers, That the kings and church of England had no reason to admit of a public dispute with the English Romish clergy, till they shall be able to shew it under the seal or powers of Rome, that that church will submit to a third, who may be an indifferent judge between us and them, or to such a general council as is after mentioned," (not such a one as you would have, wherein the pope should sit as head of the church, for that is to make the greatest criminal judge in his own cause.) "And this," saith he, "is an honest, and, I think, a full answer: and without this, all disputation must end in clamour; and therefore the more public the worse, because, as the clamour is the greater, so perhaps will be the schism too."

Conf.p.120.
sect.21.n.9.

Ibid.

THE REFORMATION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND JUSTIFIED.

The church of Rome guilty of schism by unjustly casting protestants out of communion.—The communion of the catholic and particular churches distinguished.—No separation of protestants from the catholic church.—The devotions of the church of England and Rome compared.—Particular churches' power to reform themselves, in case of general corruption, proved.—The instance from the church of Judah vindicated.—The church of Rome paralleled with the ten tribes.—General corruptions make reformation the more necessary.—Whether those things we condemn as errors were catholic tenets at the time of the reformation.—The contrary shewed, and the difference of the church of Rome before and since the reformation.—When things may be said to be received as catholic doctrines.—How far particular churches' power to reform themselves extends.—His lordship's instances for the power of provincial councils in matters of reformation vindicated.—The particular case of the church of England discussed.—The proceedings in our reformation defended.—The church of England a true church.—The national synod, 1562, a lawful synod.—The bishops no intruders in queen Elizabeth's time.—The justice and moderation of the church of England in her reformation.—The pope's power here a forcible fraudulent usurpation.

§. 1. **H**AVING thus far examined your doctrine of keeping faith with heretics, we now return to the main business concerning schism. And his lordship saying that Conf. p. 120. sect. 22. n. 1. "there is difference between departure out of the church, and causeless thrusting from you, and therefore denying that it is in your power to thrust us out of the church," you answer by Lab. p. 185. n. 1. a concession, "that we were thrust out from the church of Rome, but that it was not without cause:" which that you might not seem to say *gratis*, you pretend to assign the causes of our expulsion; so that by your own confession the present division or separation lies at the church of Rome's door, if it be not made evident that there were most just and sufficient reasons for her casting the protestants out of her communion.

If therefore the church of Rome did thrust the protestants from her communion for doing nothing but what became them as members of the catholic church, then that must be the schismatical party, and not the protestants: for, supposing any church (though pretending to be never so catholic) doth restrain her communion within such narrow and unjust bounds, that she declares such excommunicate who do not approve all such errors in doctrine and corruptions in practice which the communion of such a church may be liable to, the cause of that division which follows falls upon that church which exacts those conditions from the members of her communion; that is, when the errors and corruptions are such as are dangerous to salvation: for in this case, that church hath first divided herself from the catholic church; for the communion of that lying open and free to all, upon the necessary conditions of Christian communion, whatever church takes upon her to limit and enclose the bounds of the catholic, becomes thereby divided from the communion of the catholic church: and all such who disown such an unjust enclosure do not so much divide from the communion of that church so enclosing, as return to the communion of the primitive and universal church. The catholic church therefore lies open and free, like a common field to all inhabitants: now if any particular number of these inhabitants should agree together to enclose part of it without consent of the rest, and not to 333 admit any others to their right of common without consenting to it, which of these two parties, those who deny to yield their consent, or such who deny their rights if they will not, are guilty of the violation of the public and common rights of the place? Now this is plainly the case between the church of Rome and ours: the communion of the catholic church lies open to all such who own the fundamentals of Christian faith, and are willing to join in the profession of them: now to these your church adds many particular doctrines, which have no foundation in scripture or the consent of the primitive church; these, and many superstitious practices, are enjoined by her as conditions of her communion, so that all those are debarred any right of communion with her who will not approve of them: by which it appears your church is guilty of the first violation of the union of the catholic; and whatever number

of men are deprived of your communion for not consenting to your usurpations do not divide themselves from you any further than you have first separated yourselves from the catholic church: and when your church, by this act, is already separated from the communion of the catholic church, the disowning of those things wherein your church is become schismatical cannot certainly be any culpable separation; for whatever is so must be from a church so far as it is catholic; but in our case it is from a church so far only as it is not catholic, i. e. so far as it hath divided herself from the belief and communion of the universal church.

§. 2. But herein a great mistake is committed by you, when you measure the communion of the catholic church by the judgment of all or most of the particular churches of such an age, which supposes that the church of some one particular age must of necessity be preserved from all errors and corruptions, which there is no reason or necessity at all to assert; Lab. p. 159. and that is all the ground you have for saying, “that the separation of protestants was not only from the church of Rome, but (as Calvin confesseth) *a toto mundo*, ‘from the whole Christian world,’ and such a separation necessarily involves separation from the true catholic church.” Now to this we answer two things: 1. That we have not separated from the whole Christian world in any thing wherein the whole Christian world is agreed; but to disagree from the particular churches of the Christian world in such things wherein those churches differ among themselves, is not to separate from the Christian world, but to disagree in some things from such particular churches: as, I hope, you will not say that man is divided from all mankind who doth in some feature or other differ from any one particular man; but although he doth so, he doth not differ from any in those things which are common to all; for that were to differ from all; but when he only differs from one in the colour of his eyes, from another in his complexion, another in the air of his countenance, and so in other things; this man, though he should differ from every particular man in the world in something or other, yet is a man still, as well as any, because he agrees with them in that in which they all agree, which is, human nature, and differs only in those things wherein they

differ from each other. And therefore, from the disagreement of the protestants from any one particular church, it by no means follows that they separated from the whole Christian world, and therefore from the true catholic church. 2. The communion of the catholic church is not to be measured by the particular opinions and practices of all or any particular churches, but by such things which are the proper foundations of the catholic church; for there can be no separation from the true catholic church but in such things wherein it is catholic: now it is not catholic in any thing but what properly relates to its being and constitution; for whatever else there is, however universal it may be, is extrinsical to the nature and notion of the catholic church, and therefore supposing a 334 separation from the church in what is so extrinsical and accidental, it is no proper separation from the catholic church. As for instance; supposing all men were agreed that some particular habit should be worn all over the world, will you say that any number of men who found this habit extremely inconvenient for them, and therefore should disuse it, did on that account separate from human nature, and ceased to be men by it? Such is the case of any particular churches laying aside some customs or ceremonies, which, in some one age of the church, or more, the greatest part of Christian churches were agreed in the practice of; for although this general practice should make men more diligent in inquiry, and careful in what they did, yet if such a church, having power to govern itself, see reason to alter it, it doth not separate from the communion of the catholic church therein, and therefore doth not cease to be a church: for there is no culpable separation from the church catholic but what relates to it properly as catholic; now that doth not relate to it as catholic which it may be catholic without. Now certainly you cannot have so little reason as to assert that the church cannot be catholic without such extrinsical and accidental agreements: and from hence it follows, that no church can be charged with a separation from the true catholic church, but what may be proved to separate itself in something necessary to the being of the catholic church; and so long as it doth not separate as to these essentials, it cannot cease to be a true member of the catholic church. If you would therefore prove that the church

of England, upon the Reformation, is separated from the true catholic church, you must not think it enough to say, (which as weakly as commonly is said,) "that no one particular church can be named which in all things agreed with it;" for that only proves that she differed from particular churches in such things wherein they differed from each other; but that she is divided from all Christian churches in such things wherein they are all agreed, and which are essential to the being of the catholic church: when you have proved this, you may expect a further answer.

§. 3. This then can be no cause why your church should expel the protestants out of her communion, but it shews us sufficient cause to believe that your church had separated herself from the communion of the catholic. For which we must further consider, that although nothing separates a church properly from the catholic but what is contrary to the being of it, yet a church may separate herself from the communion of the catholic, by taking upon her to make such things the necessary conditions of her communion which never were the conditions of communion with the catholic church. As for instance, though we should grant *adoration of the eucharist*, *invocation of saints*, and *veneration of images*, to be only superstitious practices, taken up without sufficient grounds in the church, yet since it appears that the communion of the catholic church was free for many hundred years, without approving or using these things, that church which shall not only publicly use, but enjoin such things upon pain of excommunication from the church, doth, as much as in her lies, draw the bounds of catholic communion within herself, and so divides herself from the true catholic church: for whatever confines must likewise divide the church; for by that confinement a separation is made between the part confined and the other, which separation must be made by the party so limiting Christian communion; as it was in the case of the Donatists, who were therefore justly charged with schism, because they confined the catholic church within their own bounds: and if any other church doth the same which they did, it must be liable to the same charge which they were. The sum, then, 335 of this discourse is, That the being of the catholic church lies in essentials; that for a particular church to disagree from all

other particular churches in some extrinsical and accidental things, is not to separate from the catholic church so as to cease to be a church; but still, whatever church makes such extrinsical things the necessary conditions of communion, so as to cast men out of the church who yield not to them, is schismatical in so doing; for it thereby divides itself from the catholic church; and the separation from it is so far from being schism, that being cast out of that church on those terms only returns them to the communion of the catholic church: on which grounds it will appear that yours is the schismatical church, and not ours; for although, before this imposing humour came into particular churches, schism was defined by the fathers and others to be “a voluntary departure out of the church,” yet that cannot in reason be understood of any particular, but the true catholic church: for not only persons, but churches, may depart from the catholic church; and in such cases, not those who depart from the communion of such churches, but those churches which departed from the catholic, are guilty of the schism.

These things I thought necessary to be further explained, not only to shew how false that imputation is of our church's departing from the true catholic church, but with what great reason we charge your church with departing from the communion of it; and therefore not those whom you thrust out of communion, but your church so thrusting them out, is apparently guilty of the present schism.

But still you say “your church had sufficient cause for the Lab. p. 158. expulsion of protestants out of her communion;” and for this^{n. 1.} you barely repeat your former assertions, and offer not at the proof of one of them, as though you intended to carry your cause by the frequent repeating your declaration: but, sir, it is the proof of what you say that we expect from you, and not the bare telling us that protestants are schismatics because they are schismatics: when you will be at leisure to prove that the protestants were guilty of heretical doctrine or schismatical proceedings; that they raised “a new, separate, and mutinous faction of pretended Christians, distinct from the one catholic body of the church, by choosing new pastors, instituting new rites and ceremonies not in their power to do, by schismatical convening in several synods, and there broach-

ing new heretical confessions of faith ;” when, I say, you shall think good to prove all, or any one of these, you shall receive so full an answer as will make it evident that the protestants did not depart from the catholic church’s doctrine and communion, but that the church of Rome is departed thence, first by imposing erroneous doctrines and superstitious practices as conditions of communion, and then by thrusting out all such as would not consent to them.

§. 4. His lordship, disputing the terms on which a separation in the church may be lawful, saith, “That corruption in manners only is no sufficient cause to make a separation in the church. And,” saith he, “this is as ingenuously confessed for you, as by me: for if corruption in manners were a just cause of actual separation of one church from another in that catholic body of Christ, the church of Rome hath given as great cause as any, since (as Stapleton grants) there is scarce any sin that can be thought on by man (heresy only excepted) with which that see hath not been foully stained, especially from eight hundred years after Christ: and he need not except heresy, into which Biel grants it possible the bishops of the see may fall; and Stella and Almain grant it freely that some of them did fall, and so ceased to be heads of the church, and left Christ (God be thanked) at that time of his vicar’s defection, to look to his cure himself.” But you tell us, “the discovery of some few motes darkens not the brightness of the sunshine:” I wonder what you account
 336 *beams*, if the sins of your popes and others be but *motes* with you! We grant that the sun himself hath his *maculæ*, but they are such as do not eclipse his light: we find the *maculæ* in your church, but we are to seek for the bright sunshine; or doth it lie in the service of your religious votaries? for that is the great part of the conspicuous piety of your church which you instance in: but is this indeed the “bright sunshine” of your church, that there are “so many thousand of both sexes” (you do well to join them together) “who tie themselves by perpetual vows never to be dissolved by their own seeking,” (and therefore doubtless pleasing to God, whether they are able to keep them or no;) “and these pray” (if they understand what they say) “and sing divine hymns day and night,” (which makes the sunshine the brighter;) which

Conf. p. 121.
sect. 22. n. 9.

Lab. p. 159.
n. 1.

you say is “a strange and unheard-of thing among protestants?” What, that men and women (though not in cloisters) pray and sing hymns to God? No surely; for as the devotion of our churches is more grave and solemn, so it is likewise more pious and intelligible. You “pray and sing,” but how? Let Erasmus speak, who understood your praying and singing well: *Cantiuncularum, clamorum, murmurum ac bomborum ubique plus satis est, si quid ista delectant superos*^a. Do you think those prayers and hymns are pleasing to God which lie more in the throat than the heart? and such who have been wise and devout men among yourselves have been the least admirers of your mimical, uncouth, and superstitious devotions, but have rather condemned them as vain, ludicrous things, and wondered (as Erasmus^b said) what they thought of Christ, who imagined he could be pleased with them, (*Quid sentiunt obsecro de Christo qui putant eum ejusmodi cantiunculis delectari?*) Are these then the glorious parts of your devotions, your prayers and hymns?—but “they pray and sing divine hymns day and night!” If this be the only excellency of your devotion, how much are you outdone by the ancient Psalliani and Euchitæ, that spent all their time in prayer, and yet were accounted heretics for their pains! Still, you “pray and sing;” but to whom? to saints and angels often, to the virgin Mary with great devotion and most solemn invocations, but to God himself very sparingly in comparison. If this then be the warm sunshine of your devotions, we had rather use such wherein we may be sure of God’s blessing, which we cannot be in such prayers and hymns which attribute those honours to his creatures which belong wholly to himself. But you not only sing and pray, but can be very idle too; and the number of those men must be called *religious orders*, and the garment of the church is said by you to be embroidered

^a Erasm. in Matt. vi. 7.

^b Hodie videmus sacerdotes, nihil dicam qualibus sed certe nimium prolixis precibus, hisque præscriptis, aliquoties ineptis ac ridiculis, ne dicam impiis, oneratos.—Erasm. in Matt. vi. 7. Ad hæc qui modeste pii sunt, taciti secum ingemiscunt; qui populi malis aluntur et quorum interest Christi gregem, quem ille

suo sanguine liberum reddidit, quam maxime servum esse et obnoxium, adeo non reclamant ut modis omnibus exaggerent. Accedunt iis qui vel ambiunt præmium aliquod obsequii vel timent pœnam libertatis. Ita dum nemo succurrit, res paulatim eo prolabitur ut pene nihil jam pudeat.—Id. in Matt. xi. 30.

by the variety of them; and for this, Psal. xlv. 10. is very luckily quoted. And are those indeed the ornaments of your church, which were become such sinks of wickedness, that those of your church who had any modesty left were ashamed of them, and called loud for a reformation? Those were indeed such gardens wherein it were more worth looking for “useful or odoriferous flowers” (as you express it) than for Diogenes to find out an honest man in his crowd of citizens. Therefore, not to dispute with you the first institutions of monastic life, nor how commendable the nature of it is, nor the conveniences of it where there are no indispensable vows, the main things we blame in them are, the restraints of men’s liberties, whatever circumstances they are in; the great degeneracy of them in all respects from their primitive institutions; the great snares which the consciences of such as are engaged in them are almost continually exposed to; the un-

337 the general unserviceableness of the persons who live in them; the great debaucheries which they are subject to, and often overrun with; and if these then be the greatest ornaments of your church’s garments, it is an easy matter to espy the spots which she hath upon her. What you add concerning the good lives of papists, and bad of protestants, if taken universally, is as unjust as uncharitable; if indefinitely, it shews only that not the particular lives of men on either side, but the tendency of the doctrine to promote or hinder the sanctity of them, is here to be regarded: and to that you speak afterwards, but in a most false and virulent manner, when you say,

Lab. p. 160. “that though sins be committed among you, they are not defended or justified as good works; whereas, among protestants, darkness itself is called light, and the greatest of all sins, viz. heresy, schism, sacrilege, rebellion, &c., together with all the bad spawn they leave behind them, are cried up for perfect virtue, zeal, good reformation, and what not.” I doubt not but you would be ready to defend and justify this open raillery of yours, and call it a good work, notwithstanding what you said before. If we had a mind to follow you in such things, how easy a matter were it to rip up all the frauds, impostures, villanies of all sorts and kinds, which have been committed by those who have sat in your infallible chair, and

charge them all on your church with much more justice than you do the miscarriages of any under the name of protestants: for the protestant churches disown such persons, and condemn those practices with the greatest indignation; whereas you excuse, palliate, and plead for the lives of the popes, as much as you dare, and not outface the sun at noon, which hath laid open their villanies. Where do the principles of protestants encourage or plead for heresy, schism, sacrilege, rebellion, &c., much less cry them up as heroical actions? Doth not the church of England disown and disclaim such things to the uttermost? have not her sufferings made it appear how great a hater she is of heresies, schisms, sacrilege, and rebellion? did she ever cry up those for martyrs who died in gunpowder treasons? did she ever teach it lawful to disobey heretical princes, and to take away their lives? Yet these things have been done by you, and the doers of them not condemned, but rather fomented and encouraged as zealous promoters of the holy see, and most devout sons of the church of Rome. Cease therefore to charge the guilt of persons disowned by the church of England upon her, when you are unwilling to hear of the faults of those persons among yourselves, whom you dare not disown, I mean your popes and Jesuits.

§. 5. Leaving therefore these unbecoming railleries of yours, and that which occasioneth them, viz. "corruption of manners," we come to consider that which is more pertinent to our purpose, viz. "errors in doctrine," which his lordship truly assigned as the ground of the Reformation; and not only that there were doctrinal errors in your church, but "that some of the errors of the Roman church were dangerous to salvation: for it is not every light error in disputable doctrine, and points of curious speculation, that can be a just cause of separation in that admirable body of Christ, which is his church, or of one member of it from another:" but that there are errors in doctrine, and some of them such as most manifestly endanger salvation, in the church of Rome, is evident to them that will not shut their eyes. "The proof," his lordship saith, "runs through the particular points, and so is too long for this discourse." Now to this you manfully answer, "That in vain do they attempt to reform the church of what she can

Conf. pp.

121, 122.

sect. 23. n. 1.

Lab. p. 160.

never be guilty:" which, if it depends on your church's infallibility (which is largely disproved already), must needs fall to the ground with it. And it is an excellent answer, when a church is charged actually with erring, to say "she doth not err, because she cannot;" which is all that you give us here:
 338 but if you prove it no better than you have done, the heretical and schismatical obstinacy is like to be found in that church which in her errors challenges infallibility.

The question now comes to this, Whether, errors being supposed in the doctrine, and corruptions in the communion of a church, when the general church would not reform, it was not lawful for particular churches to reform themselves? To this
 Conf.p. 122. his lordship answers affirmatively in these words: "Is it then
 sect.24. n. 1. such a strange thing, that a particular church may reform itself, if the general will not? I had thought, and do so still, that in point of reformation of either manners or doctrine, it is lawful for the church, since Christ, to do as the church before Christ did, and might do. The church before Christ consisted of Jews and proselytes: this church came to have a separation upon a most ungodly policy of Jeroboam's, so that it never pieced together again; to a common council, to reform all, they would not come; was it not lawful for Judah to reform herself when Israel would not join? Sure it was, or else
 Hos. iv. 15. the prophet deceives me, that says expressly, 'Though Israel transgress, yet let not Judah sin;' and St. Hierome expounds it of this very particular sin of heresy and error in religion." After which he proves, that Israel, during this separation, was a true church; which we shall insist on, when we have considered what answer you return to his lordship's argument; which lies in these two things: first, That Judah did not reform herself; secondly, That Judah is not the protestant party, as his lordship supposeth it to be. First you say,
 Lab. p. 160. n. 2. "Judah did not reform herself: for Judah being the orthodox church, united with her head the high priest, and not tainted with any doctrinal errors, what need was there of her reformation? And so the meaning of that place, 'Though Israel transgress, yet let not Judah sin,' is rather against than for him, because the sense is rather, Let not Judah fall into schism, though Israel does, than, Let Judah reform herself." But if it appears that Judah had corruptions crept into her

as well as Israel had, though not so great and universal, then it follows that by these words Judah had power to reform herself. And the antecedent is clear to any one who takes the pains to read the scripture, and compare the places in it, more than it seems you do: for doth not this very prophet Hos. vi. 47. check Judah as well as Israel for transgressing God's covenant? Doth he not say that God had "a controversy with Hos. xii. 2. Judah," and would "punish Jacob according to his ways?" And for all this, was there no need of reformation in the church of Judah? Indeed, in one place it is said that "Judah Hos. xi. 12. ruleth with God, and is faithful with his saints;" but then that is to be understood of Judah when she had reformed herself in the days of Hezekiah: for surely you will not say that Judah did not stand in need of reformation when Hezekiah began his reign; for it is said of him, that "he removed the 2 Kings xviii. 4. high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves;" and were not these things which wanted reformation, think you? If we consider the times of those three kings before Hezekiah in which Hosea prophesied, we shall see what need there was Hos. i. 1. of reformation among them; and those were Uzziah, Jotham, and Ahaz: of the time of Uzziah, called Azariah in the book of Kings, it is said, that "the high places were not removed, 2 Kings xv. but the people sacrificed and burnt incense still on the high ⁴ places;" the same is affirmed of the time of Jotham in the ver. 35. same chapter: so that though these princes were good themselves, yet there were many corruptions still among the people. But of Ahaz it is said expressly, that "he walked in the way 2 Kings xvi. of the kings of Israel; and he sacrificed and burnt incense in ^{3, 4.} the high places, and on the hills, and under every green tree." Choose now which of these three you please, (for it is most improbable those words, considering the long time of Hosea's prophecy, should be spoken in the time of Hezekiah, the last of the four kings he prophesied under,) and will you tell us again that the church of Judah needed no reformation? But 339 you offer at a reason for it, "because she was united with her head the high priest at Hierusalem." So then, belike, as long as Judah and the high priest were united, she could be guilty of no doctrinal errors; no, not although she should pronounce Christ a blasphemer, and condemn him to be crucified as a malefactor; for then certainly Judah and the high

2 Kings
xvi. 10, 11.

2 Kings
xvii. 19.

Lab. p. 160.
n. 2.

priest were united. But I know you will say you spake this of the time before the Messias was come. And was it then true, that “as long as Judah was united with her head the high priest, there was no need of reformation?” What think you then of the time of Ahaz, when Uzziah the priest built an altar at the command of Ahaz, according to the pattern of the altar of Damascus, contrary to God’s express law? yet, according to you, as long as Judah was united with her head the high priest, there was nothing which needed reformation; and although it be plainly affirmed, that “Judah kept not the commands of the Lord their God, but walked in the statutes of Israel which they had made,” yet you, who it seems knew Judah’s innocency better than God or the prophets did, say very magisterially, “that as long as she was united with her head the high priest, what need, I pray, was there of her reformation?” And this being the case of Judah, I may easily grant you that Judah is not the protestant party, but that of the Roman church, i. e. while Judah was under her corruptions; and yet you say she needed no reformation; she is the fittest parallel you could think of for your church: but we pretend to no parallel between Judah and the protestant party in not needing a reformation, but in her power to reform herself; which we say still that she had, though Israel would not join with her, by virtue of these words of the prophet, “Though Israel transgress, yet let not Judah sin;” thereby manifesting, that though the greatest part was degenerated in the ten tribes, yet Judah might prevent the same in herself by reforming those abuses which were crept among them; and therefore the sense of those words, “let not Judah sin,” must in this case imply a power to reform herself. If therefore we speak of Judah degenerated, we grant the parallel lies wholly between Judah and the church of Rome; for although there were great corruptions in Judah, and as great in your church, yet with the same reason you say that neither needed reformation: but if we speak of Judah reforming herself under Hezekiah, then we say the parallel lies between Judah and the protestant party, whatever you say to the contrary. But you shrewdly ask, “If you be Judah, who, I pray, are the revolted ten tribes? who are of Jeroboam’s cabal?” Even they who set up the calves at Dan and Bethel; such who worship

images instead of the true God, though they intend them only as symbols of the divine presence; for no more did Jeroboam and the Israelites intend by their calves; and there is no pretence which you use to justify yourselves from idolatry but will excuse Jeroboam and the ten tribes from it. If the protestant party then be Judah, it is easy finding out the revolted ten tribes, and Jeroboam's cabal, the court of Rome answering to this, as the church of Rome doth to the other. But we cannot be Judah, because we "left the catholic Jerusalem, that is, Rome, the city of peace:" by whom, I pray, was Rome christened *the catholic Jerusalem*? for if we consider the worship there used, and the politic ends of it, it much more looks like Samaria, or Dan and Bethel: if Rome be our catholic Jerusalem, shew us when God made choice of that for the peculiar place of his worship; where we are commanded to resort thither for divine worship; when God placed his name there, as he did of old in Jerusalem: when you have shewed us these things, we may think the worse of ourselves for leaving Rome, but not before. And let the world judge whether it be more likely one should meet with the worship of golden calves at Rome or among the protestants? It is you who have 340 found out new sacrifices, new objects of worship, new rites and ceremonies in it, new altars, and consequently new priests too; and yet for all this you must be orthodox Judah, which needed no reformation! And who, I pray, do in point of obedience most resemble the ten tribes? Have not you set up a spiritual Jeroboam as a new head of the church, in opposition to the Son of David? and that you may advance the interest of this *spiritual head*, you raise his authority far above that of kings and temporal princes, whom you ought to be subject to, declaring it in his power to excommunicate, depose, and absolve subjects from obedience to them: and therefore is not the parallel between the ten tribes and the church of Rome very pat, and much to the purpose? but when you would seem to return this upon us by a false and scurrilous parallel between Jeroboam and that excellent princess queen Elizabeth, ^{Lab. p. 161. n. 2.} in the reformation of the church of England, you only betray the badness of your cause, which makes detractions so necessary to maintain it: for as her title to the crown was undoubted, so her proceedings in the reformation were such as

are warranted by the law of God and the nation; and her carriage in her reign towards Jesuits and priests, no other than what the apparent necessity of her own and her kingdom's preservation put her upon. But if she must be accounted like Jeroboam, for banishing priests and Jesuits often convicted of treasonable practices, upon pain of death if they were found in England; what must we think of the catholic Jerusalem, the city of peace, that sweet and gentle mother the church of Rome, that hath carried herself so peaceably towards those who have dissented from her? Witness the blood of so many hundred thousands which she hath imbrued her hands in, merely for opposing her doctrines and superstitions; witness that excellent school of humanity the inquisition, and the easy lessons she teaches those who come under her discipline there; witness the proceedings in England in the days of queen Mary; and then let any judge, if the parallel must be carried by cruelty towards dissenters, which of their two reigns came the nearest that of Jeroboam. The only true words then that you say are, "but enough of this parallel;" and more than enough too of such impudent slanders against the memory of that famous queen: but your church would have been more unlike the ten tribes, if there had not been a lying prophet there.

Lab. p. 161.
n. 2.

You dispute very manfully against his lordship for asserting, that Israel remained a church after the separation between Judah and the ten tribes; and yet, after you have spent many words about it, you yield all that he asserts,

Lab. p. 162.
n. 2.

when you say, "that in a general sense they were called the people of God, as they were Abraham's seed, according to the flesh, by reason of the promise made to Abraham, 'I will be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee.'" And what is there more than this that his lordship contends for? for he never dreamt that the ten tribes were Abraham's seed according to the Spirit; but only says, "that there was salvation for those thousands that had not bowed their knees to Baal, which cannot be in the ordinary way where there is no church." And if, as you say, Abraham's seed only according to the Spirit, i. e. the faithful, make the true church, then it follows, where there were so many faithful there must needs be a true church. And thus, for any thing you have said to

the contrary, his lordship's argument from the case of Judah holds for every particular church's power to reform itself, when the general will not reform.

§. 6. His lordship further argues, "that to reform what is Conf. p. 123. sect. 24. n. 2. amiss in doctrine or manners, is as lawful for a particular church, as it is to publish and promulgate any thing that is catholic in either. And your question, *Quo judice?* lies alike against both. And yet I think," saith he, "it may be proved, that 341 the church of Rome, and that as a particular church, did promulgate an orthodox truth, which was not then catholicly admitted in the church; namely, the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. If she erred in this fact, confess her error; if she erred not, why may not another particular church do as she did?" From whence he infers, "that if a Conf. p. 124. sect. 24. n. 2. particular church may publish any thing that is catholic, where the whole church is silent; it may reform any thing that is not catholic, where the whole church is negligent, or will not." Now to this you answer, 1. That this procession Lab. p. 164. from the Son was a truth always acknowledged in the church; but what concerns that and the time of this article being inserted into the Creed, have been so amply discussed already, that I shall not cloy the reader with any repetition, having fully considered whatever you here say concerning the article itself, or its addition to the Creed. 2. You answer, "That Lab. p. 163. the consequence will not hold, that if a particular church may ^{n. 3.} in some case promulgate an orthodox truth, not as yet catholicly received by the church, then a particular church may repeal or reverse any thing that the whole church hath already catholicly and definitively received? Surely no. Yet this," say you, "is his lordship's and the protestants' case." You do well to mention an "egregious fallacy" presently after these words, for surely this is so. For doth his lordship parallel the promulgating something catholic and repealing something catholic together? Surely no; but the promulgating something true, but not catholicly received, with the reforming something not catholic. Either therefore you had a mind to abuse his lordship's words, or to deceive the reader by begging the thing in question, viz. that all those which we call for a reformation of, were things catholicly and definitively received by the whole church; which you know we

utterly deny. But you go on, and say, “that thence it follows not, that a particular church may reform any thing that is not catholic, where the whole church is negligent, or will not, because this would suppose error, or something uncatholic, to be taught or admitted by the whole church.” To put this case a little more plainly by the former instance; suppose then that the worship of God under the symbols of the calves at Dan and Bethel had been received generally as the visible worship of the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, as well as the rest; doth not this answer of yours make it impossible that ever they should return to the true worship of God? for this were to call in question the truth of God’s promise to his church, and to suppose something not catholic to be received by the whole church. And so the greater the corruptions are, the more impossible it is to cure them; and in case they spread generally, no attempts of reformation can be lawful: which is a more false and paradoxical doctrine than either of those which you call so. And the truth is, such pretences as these are, are fit only for a church that hateth to be reformed; for if something not good in itself should happen in any one age to overspread the visible communion of all particular churches, this only makes a reformation the more necessary; so far is it from making it the more disputable. For thereby those corruptions grow more dangerous, and every particular church is bound the more to regard its own security in a time of general infection. And if any other churches neglect themselves, what reason is it that the rest should? For any or all other particular churches neglecting their duty, is no more an argument that no particular church should reform itself, than that if all other men in a town neglect preserving themselves from a plague, then I am bound to neglect it too. But you answer, 3, “that all this doth not justify the protestants’ proceedings, because they promulged only new and unheard of doctrines, directly contrary to what the catholic church universally held and taught before them for catholic truths.”

342 This is the great thing in question; but I see, you love best the lazy trade of begging things, which are impossible to be rationally proved.

Lab. p. 163.
n. 4.

§. 7. But yet you would seem here to do something towards it in the subsequent words; “For about the year of our Lord

1517, when their pretended reformations began, was not the real presence of our Saviour's body and blood in the eucharist by a true substantial change of bread and wine, generally held by the whole church? was not the real sacrifice of the mass then generally believed? was not veneration of holy images, invocation of saints, purgatory, praying for the dead, that they might be eased of their pains and receive the full remission of their sins, generally used and practised by all Christians? was not freewill, merit of good works, and justification by charity, or inherent grace, and not by faith only, universally taught and believed in all churches of Christendom? yea even among those who in some few other points dissented from the pope and the Latin church? To what purpose then doth the bishop urge, that a particular church may publish any thing that is catholic? this doth not justify at all his reformation; he should prove that it may not only add, but take away something that is catholic from the doctrine of the church; for this the pretended reformers did, as well in England as elsewhere." His lordship never pretends, much less disputes, that any particular church hath a power to take away any thing that is truly catholic; but the ground why he supposeth such things as those mentioned by you might be taken away is, because they are not catholic: the question then is between us, whether they were catholic doctrines or not? this you attempt to prove by this medium, Because they were generally held by the whole church at the time of the Reformation. To which I answer, 1, If this be a certain measure to judge by, what was catholic and what not, then what doth not appear to have been catholic in this sense, it was in our church's power to reject, and so it was lawful to reform ourselves as to all such things which were not at the time of the Reformation received by the whole church. And what think you now of the pope's supremacy, your church's infallibility, the necessity of celibate in the clergy, communion in one kind, prayer in an unknown tongue, indulgences, &c.? Will you say, that those were generally received by the church at the time of the reformation? If you could have said so, no doubt you would not have omitted such necessary points, and some of which gave the first occasion to the Reformation. If then these were not catholicly received, a

particular church might without schism reject them, and so the church of England is sufficiently vindicated from schism by yourself, as to these points here mentioned; which you willingly omitted, because you could not but know how far they were from being universally received in all churches in Christendom.

2. As to those things which you insist on, you give no sufficient evidence at all that they were received by the whole church as catholic doctrines. For so far it is from appearing that these were held as catholic doctrines by all churches in the Christian world, (for then you do most unreasonably condemn the Greek and Abyssine churches, &c. for heresy or schism, if they owned all catholic doctrines; and they must do so, if they agreed with your church in all these things, which are the only doctrines you mention as catholic, in opposition to such whom you condemn for heresy or schism; and if the agreement of all churches be the measure of what is catholic, then those doctrines cannot be so, which those great churches differ from you in, by your own argument;) but so far is it, I say, from appearing that these were held so by all churches in Christendom, that you cannot prove they were so held in the church of Rome herself before the Reformation. The church of Rome I take here in the largest sense, as it takes in all such who were the visible members of
343 her communion. Now I hope you will not say, that such doctrines are received as catholic doctrines which are embraced only by a party in your church, another party opposing it, both which still remain members of your communion; for whatever is received as a catholic doctrine, (according to you,) is so received, that those who deny or doubt of it do thereby become no members of the visible communion of that church; which is by the church's so declaring herself in those points, that she admits none to her communion but upon the acknowledgment of them. Now will you say, this was the case of your church as to these doctrines at the beginning of the Reformation? Were transubstantiation, real sacrifice of the mass, veneration of images, invocation of saints, purgatory, &c., so defined then by your church to be articles of faith, that whoever did not assent to them was declared excommunicate, and cast out of your church? if not, it is

impossible, upon your own grounds, to prove that these were universally held and believed as catholic doctrines of your church. I do not say, as truly catholic doctrines in themselves; for whatever your church defines concerning them, they are not more or less so in themselves for your church's definition; but I say, you cannot assert that these were held by your church to be catholic doctrines till they were defined to be such. For, according to your principles, that which differenceth a catholic doctrine from a particular opinion is the church's definition; before, then, the church had passed a definition in these points, they could not be held as catholic doctrines. To make this somewhat clearer, because it is necessary for undeceiving those who are told, as you tell us here, that at the Reformation we rejected such things which were universally owned for catholic doctrines; which is so far from being true, that it is impossible they should be owned for such by the church of Rome upon your own principles. For, I pray, tell us, are there not several sorts of opinions among you at this day, none of which are pretended to be catholic doctrines? and this you constantly tell us, when we object to you your dissensions about them. As for instance, the pope's personal infallibility—the superiority of pope over general councils—the immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin—the disputes about predestination, &c. When we tell you of your differences in these points, you answer, that these hinder not the unity of the church, because these are only in matters of opinion; and that it is not *de fide* that men should hold either way. When we demand the reason of this difference concerning these things, your answer is, “That the church hath defined some things to be believed, and not others; that what the church hath defined is to be looked on as catholic doctrine, and the deniers of it are guilty of heresy; but where the church hath not defined, those are not catholic doctrines, but only at best but pious opinions, and men may be good catholics and yet differ about them.” I pray tell me, is this your doctrine, or is it not? if not, there may be heretics within your church as well as without; if it be your doctrine, apply it to the matters in hand. Were these things defined by the church at the beginning of the Reformation? If they were, produce those definitions for all those things which you

say were owned as catholic doctrines then ; that we may see, that at least in the judgment of your church they were accounted so. Tell us, when and where those doctrines were defined before the council of Trent ; and I hope you will not say that was before the beginning of the Reformation. If then there were no such definitions concerning them, they could not by your church be accounted as catholic doctrines ; at the most they could be but only pious opinions, as that of the pope's infallibility among you is, and consequently men might be catholics still, though they disputed or denied them.

344 And how then come the protestants to be accounted heretics in their reformation, if upon your own principles those things which they denied were then no catholic doctrines ? Though you should therefore prove more than you have done, that these points of doctrine were generally received at the time of the Reformation, yet that by no means proves that they were catholic doctrines, unless you make it impossible that mere opinions should be generally received in your church. For if any thing may be generally received in the nature of an opinion, you cannot prove from the bare general reception, that it was a catholic doctrine : unless you would attempt to prove it by the notion under which it was received, whether as an opinion or a catholic doctrine.

§. 8. But then you must remember to prove these things :
1. that all those who did receive it received it under that notion ; as for instance, in any one of those articles by you mentioned, transubstantiation, invocation of saints, &c., you must first prove, that all who were in your church's communion did believe those things ; which it is impossible for you to do, unless you could prove, that none could be of your church unless they believed them ; which is again impossible to be done, unless your church had so defined those things, that they ceased to be members of it who did not believe them. Thus, we see, your first task is rendered impossible, viz. to know whether all in your church held these doctrines or no ; but suppose you knew this, it falls short of your purpose, unless you can prove, that all those who held these things did not hold them as bare opinions, but as catholic doctrines ; and this is again as impossible as the former ; for how can you tell whether they judged these things to be so,

unless you knew what their rule was whereby they judged of catholic doctrines? If you knew their rule, how can you tell whether they made a right use of it or no? or whether they made any use at all of it? or whether they did not take up such opinions by prejudice, education, the judgment of others, and several other ways, without examining of what nature or importance the things were? If you think you have a certain rule to judge of catholic doctrines by, you must prove that they had the same rule, and looked upon it as such too: otherwise they might not use it for those ends, nor be governed at all by it. When you will therefore prove any doctrines to be catholic by being generally received, you must remember what brave impossibilities you have undertaken. But suppose you could master this too, and prove that men generally received these as catholic doctrines; yet before you can prove that these are catholic doctrines from thence, you have a further task yet upon you, which is, to prove it impossible that these men should be out in their judgment concerning the nature of an opinion, and that they could not look on any thing as a catholic doctrine but what was really so. For if they may be mistaken in their judgment, we are as far to seek as ever for knowing what are catholic doctrines and what not. You must therefore prove the judgment of all these persons infallible concerning what are catholic doctrines, and what not: and by that time, the pope will return you little thanks for your pains, in making every member of your church as infallible as himself. If it be then so impossible to prove that these were received as catholic doctrines, either from any definition of your church, or from the general reception of them among the members of it, you see what little reason you had to say, that the protestants at the beginning of the Reformation did take away something that was catholic from the doctrine of the church. Which is notoriously false, and inconsistent with your own principles. If we should therefore grant, that transubstantiation, purgatory, &c., were generally owned in your church at the time of the Reformation, the utmost you can prove is only that they were owned as particular doctrines by particular men, but not that they were³⁴⁵ owned as the catholic doctrines of your church. And therefore we deny not but that party and faction in your church

which owned and contended for these had got the upper hand of the other before the time of the Reformation, so that those who doubted of or denied them durst not appear so publicly as their adversaries did ; but they were but a party and a faction still, and there were many outward members of your church who groaned under the abuses and tyrannies of the prevailing faction, and called loud for a reformation. As appeared not only by the open testimonies of some against such doctrines, the sad complaint of others for want of reformation, but by the general sense of the necessity of it at the time when it was set upon, the great applause it met with among all persons who allowed themselves liberty to inquire into things, the general consent of the main bodies of those who set about reforming themselves in the main articles of Christian doctrine, and unanimous opposition to those erroneous opinions which you call *catholic doctrines*. So that these were not at the time of the Reformation so much as the owned catholic doctrines of the Roman church, but the opinions of a prevailing faction in it : and therefore the disowning them is no rejecting any thing catholic, but rejecting the opinions and practices of a tyrannical and usurping faction. There must be then a great deal of difference put between the state and doctrine of the church of Rome before the beginning of the Reformation and since, especially since the council of Trent. For then these doctrines were owned by a faction, but yet there might have been communion with that church, without believing them to be catholic doctrines ; and no doubt many pious souls went to heaven without believing any of these things, (viz. such who believed and improved the common principles of Christianity, without regarding the erroneous doctrines or superstitious practices of those among whom they lived ;) but upon the first stirrings towards a reformation, the court of Rome was so far from reforming the abuses which were complained of, that they sought to enforce them with the greatest severity upon all persons, thundering out excommunications against all such who should question or dispute them. By which means those who might have lived peaceably before within the external communion of that church, without consenting to the errors of it, are now forced out of it, unless they would approve of such things which their

consciences detested ; in comparison with the peace of which they accounted not their lives to be dear to them, as many thousands of them made it appear in several countries. This is the true and just account of the state of things at the beginning of the Reformation ; but afterwards, when through the necessity of the pope's affairs, a council was summoned, and all the arts imaginable were made use of to steer that grand affair for the interest of the court of Rome, a new scene of affairs appears in the Christian world : those doctrines which before were owned only by particular men are defined by pope and council to be the catholic doctrines of the Roman church, and all those anathematized who will not own them. By which means the Roman church is become itself that party and faction, which only prevailed in it before but with reluctancy and opposition ; and now none are looked on as members of that church, but such as own the definitions of that council in point of doctrine. Which makes it vastly to differ from what it was before, as to the terms of its communion, and the state of the persons who remain in it ; who can neither enjoy that freedom in judgment which they might use before, nor yet can pretend those excuses for not knowing the errors and corruptions of that church, which might have prevented obstinacy in them before. So that upon the whole it 346 appears, that the protestants in the beginning of the Reformation were so far from taking away any thing that was received as a catholic doctrine by all Christian churches, that they did not reject any thing which could be looked on as the catholic doctrine of the church of Rome ; and consequently, that the protestants were so far from a wilful separation from the church of Rome, that they were driven out by a prevalent faction, which imposed those things which had been before only the errors of particular persons as the catholic doctrines of that church, and the necessary conditions of communion with her.

3. I may answer yet further, that it is not enough to prove any doctrine to be catholic, that it was generally received by Christian churches in any one age ; but it must be made appear to have been so received from the apostles' times. So that if we should grant that these doctrines were owned for catholic, not only by the church of Rome, but all other Chris-

tian churches (so far as it can be discerned by their communion), yet this doth not prove these doctrines so owned to be truly catholic, unless you can first prove that all the Christian churches of one age can never believe a doctrine to be catholic which is not so. You see therefore your task increases further upon you : for it is not enough to say, that A. D. 1517 such and such doctrines were looked on as catholic, and therefore they were so ; but that for 1517 years, successively from the apostles to that time, they were judged to be so ; and then we shall more easily believe you. When you will therefore prove transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, image worship, invocation of saints, or any other of the good doctrines mentioned by you, in a constant tradition from the apostles' times to have been looked on as catholic doctrines, you may then say, that protestants in denying these did take away something catholic from the doctrine of the church ; but till that time, these answers may abundantly suffice.

Lab. p. 164.
n. 6.

§. 9. We now come closer to the business of the Reformation ; but before we examine the particulars of it, the general grounds on which it proceeded must somewhat further be cleared, which his lordship tells you are built upon the power of particular churches reforming themselves, in case the whole church is negligent, or will not : to which you say, “ that you grant in effect as great power as the bishop himself does to particular churches, to national and provincial councils, in reforming errors and abuses either of doctrine or practice : only we require that they proceed with due respect to the chief pastor of the church, and have recourse to him in all matters and decrees of faith, especially when they define or declare points not generally known and acknowledged to be catholic truths.” What you grant in effect at first, you in effect deny again afterwards. For the question is about reformation of such errors and abuses as may come from the church of Rome ; and when you grant a power to reform only in case the pope consent, you grant no power to reform at all. For the experience of the world hath sufficiently taught us how little his consent is to be expected in any thing of reformation. For his lordship truly saith, in answer to Capellus, who denies particular churches any power of making canons of faith without consulting the Roman see, that “ as Capellus

Conf. p. 125.
sect. 24. n. 3.

can never prove that the Roman see must be consulted with before any reformation be made; so it is as certain, that, were it proved and practised, we should have no reformation. For it would be long enough before the church should be cured, if that see alone should be her physician which in truth is her disease." Now to this you say, that even Capellus himself requires this: as though Capellus were not the man whom his lordship answers as to this very thing. But besides, you say, "the practice of the church is evident for it, in the examples of the Milevitan and Carthaginian councils, which, as St. Austin witnesseth, sent their decrees touching grace, original sin 347 in infants, and other matters against Pelagius, to be confirmed by the pope:" but what is all this to the business of reformation, that nothing of that nature is to be attempted without the pope's consent? That these councils did by Julius an African bishop communicate their decrees to pope Innocent, who denies? but what is it you would thence infer to your purpose? for the utmost which can be drawn hence is, that they desired the pope to contribute his assistance in condemning Pelagius and Cœlestius, by adding the authority of the apostolical see to their decrees; that so by the consent of the church that growing heresy might the more easily be suppressed. And who denies but at that time the Roman church had great reputation, (which is all that *authority* implies,) and by that means might be more serviceable in preventing the growth of Pelagianism, if it did concur with the African councils in condemning that doctrine? But because they communicated their decrees to pope Innocent, desiring his consent with them, that therefore no reformation should be attempted in the church without the consent of the pope, is a very far-fetched inference; and unhappily drawn from those African fathers who so stoutly opposed Zosimus, Innocent's successor, in the case of appeals about the business of Apiarius. Did they, think you, look on themselves as obliged to do nothing in the reforming the church without the pope's authority, who would by no means yield to those encroachments of power which Zosimus would have usurped over them? Nay, it appears that, till the African fathers had better informed him, Zosimus did not a little favour Cœlestius himself, and in case he had gone on so to do, do you think

they would have thought themselves ever the less obliged to reform their churches from the Pelagian heresy which began to spread among them? And in this time of the controversy between Zosimus and them, though they carried it with all fairness towards the Roman see, yet they were still careful to preserve and defend their own privileges; and in case the pope should then have challenged that power over them which he hath done since, no doubt they would not have stuck at calling such encroachments *the disease of the church* (without any unhandsomeness or incivility), and would have been far from looking on him as the only physician of it.

§. 10. To that pretence, that things should have been borne with till the time of a general council, his lordship answers :

Conf.p.125. “ First, it is true, a general council, free and entire, would
sect.24.n.4.

have been the best remedy, and most able for a gangrene that had spread so far, and eaten so deep into Christianity. But what ! should we have suffered this gangrene to endanger life and all, rather than be cured in time by a physician of weaker knowledge and a less able hand? Secondly, we live to see since, if we had stayed and expected a general council, what manner of one we should have had, if any. For that at Trent was neither general nor free. And for the errors which Rome had contracted, it confirmed them, it cured them not. And yet I much doubt, whether ever that council (such as it was) would have been called, if some provincial and national synods under supreme and regal power had not first set upon this great work of reformation; which I heartily wish had been as orderly and happily pursued, as the work was right Christian and good in itself. But human frailty, and the heats and distempers of men, as well as the cunning of the devil, would not suffer that. For even in this sense also the wrath of man doth not accomplish the will of God, St. James i. 20; but I have learnt not to reject the good which God hath wrought, for any evil which men may fasten upon it.” Now to this you

Lab. p.165. answer, 1. by a fair concession again, “ that a provincial
n. 6.

council is the next chirurgeon when a gangrene endangers life, but still the pope’s assistance is required :” for fear the
348 chirurgeon should do too much good of himself, you would be sure to have the pope as physician to stand by, whom you know too much concerned in the maladies of the church to

give way to an effectual cure. But you say further, "that the most proper expedient is an œcumenical council;" and this you spoil again, with saying, "such as the council of Trent was." For what you say in vindication of that being general and free, we shall consider in the chapter designed for that purpose. What you object against our national synod 1562 will be fully answered before the end of this: which that we may make way for, we must proceed to the remainder of these general grounds; in which his lordship proves, "that when the universal church will not, or for the iniquity of the times cannot, obtain and settle a free general council, it is lawful, nay sometimes necessary, to reform gross abuses by a national or a provincial." To this you answer in general, "That you deny not but matters of less moment, as concerning rites and ceremonies, abuses in manners and discipline, may be reformed by particular councils, without express leave of the pope; but that in matters of great moment concerning the faith and public doctrine of the church, sacraments, and whatever else is of divine institution or universal obligation, particular councils (if they duly proceed) attempt nothing without recourse to the see apostolic, and the pope's consent either expressly granted or justly presumed." Fair hopes then there are of a cure when the imposthume gathers in the head! We are indeed by this put into a very good condition; for if a small matter hurts a church, she hath her hands at liberty to help herself; but if one comes to ravish her, her hands are tied, and by no means must she defend herself. For in case, say you, it be any matter of great moment, it must be left to the pope, and nothing to be done without his consent; no not although the main of the distempers come through him. But thanks be to God, our church is not committed to the hands of such a merciless physician, who first causeth the malady and then forbids the cure: we know of no such obligation we have to sleep in St. Peter's church, as of old they did in the temple of Æsculapius, in hopes of a cure. God hath intrusted every national church with the care of her own safety, and will require of her an account of that power he hath given to that end. It will be little comfort to a church whose members rot for want of a remedy, to say, The pope will not give leave, or else it might have been cured.

Conf. p. 126.
sect. 24. n. 5.

Lab. p. 166.
n. 8.

I wonder where it is that any Christian church is commanded to wait the pope's good leisure for reforming herself? whence doth he derive this authority and sole power of reforming churches? But that must be afterwards examined. But is it reasonable to suppose that there should be Christian magistrates and Christian bishops in churches, and yet these so tied up that they can do nothing in order to the church's recovery, though the distempers be never so great and dangerous? Do we not read in the apostolical churches, that the government of them was in themselves, without any the least mention of any œcumenical pastor over all? If any abuses were among them, the particular governors of those churches are checked and rebuked for it, and commanded to exercise their power over offenders: and must the encroachments of an usurped and arbitrary power in the church hinder particular churches from the exercise of that full power which is committed to the governors of them? Neither is this only a right granted to a church as such, but we find this power practised and asserted in the history of the Christian churches from the apostles' times: for no sooner did the bishops of Rome begin to encroach, but other bishops were so mindful of their own privileges and the interests of their churches, that they did not yield themselves his vassals, but disputed their rights and withstood his usurpations; as hath partly appeared already, and will do more afterwards.

- 349 §. 11. And that particular churches may reform themselves, his lordship produceth several testimonies: the first is of Conf. p. 126. Gerson, who tells us plainly, "That he will not deny but that sect. 24. n. 5. the church may be reformed by parts; and that this is necessary; and that to effect it provincial councils may suffice, and in some things diocesan." And again, "Either you should reform all estates of the church in a general council, or com- Lab. p. 167. mand them to be reformed in provincial councils." "But all n. 8. this," you say, "doth not concern matters of faith, but only personal abuses;" but, I pray, what ground is there that one should be reformed, and not the other? is it not the reason why any reformation is necessary, that the church's purity and safety should be preserved? and is not that as much or more endangered by erroneous doctrines than by personal abuses? Will not then the parity of reason hold proportion-

ably for one as well as the other, That if the church may be reformed by parts as to lesser abuses, then much more certainly as to greater? “Besides,” you say, “Gerson allowed no schismatical reformations against the church’s head:” neither do we plead for any such; but then you must shew who the church’s head is, and by what right he comes to be so; otherwise the cause of the schism will fall upon him who pretends to be the head to direct others, and is as corrupt a member as any in the body. But his lordship adds, “This *Ibid.* right of provincial synods, that they might decree in causes of faith, and in cases of reformation where corruptions had crept into the sacraments of Christ, was practised much above a thousand years ago by many both national and provincial synods:” for which he first instanceth in the council at Rome under pope Sylvester, anno 324, condemning Photinus and Sabellius, whose heresies were of a high nature against the faith; but here you say, “the very title confutes his pretence, *Ibid.* for it was held under the pope, and therefore not against him.” But however, whether with the pope or against him, it was no more than a provincial synod; and this decreed something in matters of faith, though, according to your own doctrine, the pope could not be infallible there; for you restrain his infallibility to a general council, and do not assert that it belongs to the particular church of Rome. As well then may any other provincial synod determine matters of faith as that of Rome, since that hath no more infallibility belonging to it, as such, than any other particular church hath; and the pope himself, you say, may err, when he doth not define matters of faith in a general council. To his lordship’s second instance of the council of Gangra about the same time condemning Eustathius for his condemning marriage as unlawful, you answer to the same purpose, “That Osius was there pope Sylvester’s legate:” but what then? if the pope had been there himself, he had not been infallible, much less certainly his legate, who could have only a second-hand infallibility. To the third, of the council of Carthage condemning rebaptization, about 348, you grant, “That it was assembled by Gratus bishop of Carthage, but that no new article was defined in it, but only the perpetual tradition of the church was confirmed therein.” Neither do we plead

for any power in provincial councils to define any new articles of faith, but only to revive the old, and to confirm them in opposition to any innovations in point of doctrine; and as to this, we profess to be guided by the sense of scripture as interpreted by the unanimous consent of the fathers, and the four first general councils. To the fourth, of the council of Aquileia, A. D. 381, condemning Palladius and Secundinus for embracing the Arian heresy, St. Ambrose being present, you answer, "That they only condemned those who had been condemned already by the Nicene council; and St. Ambrose and other bishops of Italy being present, who can doubt but every thing was done there by the pope's authority and consent?" But if they only enforced the decrees of the council of
350 Nice, what need of the pope's authority to do that? and do you think that there were no provincial councils in that part of Italy which was particularly distinguished from the suburbicarian churches under the bishop of Rome, wherein the pope was not present either by himself or legates? If you think so, your thoughts have more of your will than understanding in them. But if this council proceeded according to that of Nice, will it not be as lawful for other provincial councils to reform particular churches, as long as they keep to the decrees, not barely of Nice, but of the four general councils, which the church of England looks on as her duty to do? In the two following instances, of the second council of Carthage declaring in behalf of the Trinity, and the Milevitan council about the Pelagian heresy, you say "the bishops of Rome were consulted;" but what then? were they consulted as the heads of the church, or only as eminent members of it in regard of their faith and piety? Prove the former when you are able; and as to the latter, it depends upon the continuance of that faith and piety in them; and when once the reason is taken away, there can be no necessity of continuing the same resort. The same answer will serve for what you say concerning the second council of Aurange determining the controversies about grace and freewill, supposing we grant it assembled by the means of Felix IV. bishop of Rome; as likewise to the third of Toledo. We come therefore to that which you call "his lordship's reserve, and master-
Conf.p. 127.
sect. 24. n. 5. allegation," the fourth council of Toledo; which, saith he, "did

not only handle matters of faith for the reformation of that people, but even added also some things to the Creed which were not expressly delivered in former creeds: nay, the bishops did not only practise this, to condemn heresies in national and provincial synods, and so to reform those several places, and the church itself by parts, but they did openly challenge this as their right and due, and that without any leave asked of the see of Rome; for in this fourth council of Toledo they decree, That if there happen a cause of faith to be settled, a general, that is, a national synod of all Spain and Gallicia shall be held thereon^c; and this in the year 643, where you see it was then catholic doctrine in all Spain, that a national synod might be a competent judge in a cause of faith." But here still we meet with the same answer, "That all this might Lab. p. 168. n. 8. be done with a due subordination to the see apostolic, but that it doth not hence follow that any thing may be done in provincial councils against the authority of it." Neither do we plead that any thing may be done against the *just* authority of the bishop of Rome, or any other bishop; but then you must prove that he had a just authority over the church of England, and that he exercised no power here at the reformation but what did of right belong to him. But the fuller debate of these things must be left to that place where you designedly assert and vindicate the pope's authority.

§. 12. These things being thus in the general cleared, we come to the particular application of them to the case of the church of England: as to which his lordship says, "And if Conf. p. 127. sect. 24. n. 5. this were practised so often, and in so many places, why may not a national council of the church of England do the like? as she did; for she cast off the pope's usurpation, and, as much as in her lay, restored the king to his right: that appears by a book^d subscribed by the bishops in Henry the Eighth's time, and by the records^e in the archbishop's office, orderly kept, and to be seen. In the reformation which came after, our princes had their parts, and the clergy theirs; and to these two principally the power and direction for reformation belongs. That our princes had their parts is manifest by

^c Concil. Tolet. 4. can. 3.

^e In Synodo Londin. sess. 8. die

^d The Institution of a Christian Veneris Jan. an. 1562.
Man. An. 1534.

their calling together of the bishops, and others of the clergy, to consider of that which might seem worthy reformation; and the clergy did their part, for, being thus called together by regal power, they met in the national synod of sixty-two: and 351 the articles there agreed on were afterwards confirmed by acts of state, and the royal assent. In this synod, the positive truths which are delivered are more than the polemics; so that a mere calumny it is, that we profess only a negative religion. True it is, and we must thank Rome for it, our confession must needs contain some negatives: for we cannot but deny that images are to be adored; nor can we admit maimed sacraments, nor grant prayers in an unknown tongue; and in a corrupt time or place, it is as necessary in religion to deny falsehood as to assert and vindicate truth: indeed this latter can hardly be well and sufficiently done but by the former, an affirmative verity being ever included in the negative to a falsehood. As for any error which might fall into this (as any other reformation), if any such can be found, then I say, and it is most true, reformation, especially in cases of religion, is so difficult a work, and subject to so many pretensions, that it is almost impossible but the reformers should step too far, or fall too short, in some smaller things or other, which, in regard of the far greater benefit coming by the reformation itself, may well be passed over, and borne withal: but if there have been any wilful and gross errors, not so much in opinion as in fact, (sacrilege too often pretending to reform superstition,) that is the crime of the reformers, not of the reformation; and they are long since gone to God to answer it; to whom I leave them."

This is his lordship's full and just account of the proceedings of the reformation in the church of England; to which we must consider what answer you return. To his lordship's question, Why may not a national council of the church of England do the like? you give this answer, "Truly I know no reason why it may not, provided it be a true national council, and a true church of England, (as those recited were true churches and councils,) and provided also that it do no more." We are contented to put the issue of this business upon these three things, viz. That our church is a true church; that the power which reformed it was sufficient for that purpose; and,

that no more was done by them than was in their power to do. But for the first you tell us, "That seeing by the church ^{Ibid.} of England he means the present protestant church there, you must crave leave of his lordship to deny his supposition, and tell him the church of England, in that sense, signifies no true church." Were it not an easy matter to requite you by telling you it is impossible we should be guilty of schism in any separation from your communion, because we must crave leave of you to say that the church of Rome is no true church; and where there is schism, that must be a true church which men are guilty of it in separating from? Not as though I sought only to return a blow on you which I could not defend our church from, but to let you see that by whatever way you would prove your church to be true, by the same we may prove ours to be so too. If you own and believe the Christian doctrine to be the way to salvation, so do we; if you embrace the ancient creeds, so do we; if you acknowledge the scriptures to be God's word, so do we; if you join together in participation of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper, so do we; if you have a constant succession of bishops, so have we: name then what it is which is fundamental to the being of a church, which our protestant church doth want. You grant the church of England was a true church before the Reformation; wherein was it altered from itself by it, that it ceased to be a true church? was it in denying the pope's supremacy in Henry the Eighth's time? That cannot be; for you very remarkably grant afterwards, "That the bishops, ^{Lab. p. 169.} and the king too, left the pope in possession of all that he ^{n. 9.} could rightly challenge," (which is a concession we shall make more use of afterwards;) surely then this could not unchurch them: or was it the proceedings of the Reformation in queen Elizabeth's time? The supremacy could not be it neither now, for that was asserted under a more moderate title in her time ³⁵² than in her father's. Was it the use of the liturgy in the English tongue? Surely not, when Pius the Fourth offered to confirm it, as is credibly reported from Vincentius Parpalia, whom that pope employed on a message to queen Elizabeth with terms of accommodation. But what was it which did unchurch us? were they the Articles of Religion agreed on in the convocation, 1562? If they were these, were they either

the positive or negative articles? If the positive, were they the asserting the articles contained in the three creeds—the sufficiency of scriptures—the necessity of divine grace; or what else? If the negative, was it the denying purgatory—invocation of saints—unlawfulness of priests' marriage—communion in one kind? or which of them else was it which made the protestant church to be no true church? Or is it, lastly, the asserting, that “as the church of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch, have erred; so also the church of Rome hath erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith^f?” is this it which hath done us all the mischief to unchurch us, viz. the denying your church's infallibility? If this be it, it is our comfort yet that our church will remain a true church till yours be proved to be infallible, which I dare say will be long enough: but, as though it were in your absolute power to church and unchurch whom and when you please, you offer at no proof at all of this assertion, but only very fairly “crave his lordship's leave to call the protestant church no true church;” which indeed is a more civil way of begging the question: and if it will not be granted, you cannot help it; for you have done your utmost in craving his leave for it, and you have no more to say to it.

§. 13. But you seem to say much more to the second, “That the Reformation was not managed by a lawful power, nor carried on in a due manner;” for you offer to prove that the national synod, 1562, was no lawful synod, in these words: Lab. p. 168, “For is it not notorious, that that pretended synod, A. D. 169. n. 9. 1562, were all manifest usurpers? is it not manifest that they all by force intruded themselves both into the sees of other lawful bishops, and into the cures of other lawful pastors, quietly and canonically possessed of them before the said intrusion? Can those be accounted a lawful national council of England, or lawfully to represent the English church, who never had any lawful, that is, canonical and just vocation, mission, or jurisdiction given them to and over the English nation?” Two things you object as the great reasons why those persons who sat in the convocation A. D. 1562. could make no lawful synod, and those are *intrusion* and *want of a lawful mission*; which shall be particularly examined. The

^f Art. XIX.

first charge is of *intrusion*, which you would seem to aggravate by several circumstances, “that they intruded themselves,” and that *by force*; and not some, but *all*; and that “into the sees of other lawful bishops, and cures of lawful pastors.” But how true these circumstances are, must appear by a true account of the matters of fact relating to these things in the beginning of queen Elizabeth’s reign. How false that is, “that all intruded themselves,” is notorious to any one who understands any thing of those times: for this convocation was held in the fifth year of queen Elizabeth; and in the first of her reign, of twenty-six cathedral churches, there were but fourteen or fifteen bishops then living in England: for the sees of Salisbury and Oxford fell vacant A. D. 1557, and were not supplied in the time of Queen Mary; Hereford, Bristol, Bangor, were vacant by the death of the several bishops some weeks before queen Mary; Canterbury by the death of cardinal Pole the same day with the queen; Norwich and Gloucester a few weeks after her; and so likewise Rochester, Worcester, and St. Asaph became vacant by the voluntary exile of Pates and Goldwell, the bishops thereof: so that but fifteen bishops were then living and remaining in England; and were all those who supplied these vacant sees intruders? 353

A strange kind of intrusion into dead men’s places! So then this circumstance is notoriously false, “that they *all* by force intruded themselves into the sees of other lawful bishops.” But let us see whether the other are more justly charged with a forcible intrusion into the sees of the other bishops: for which we must consider what the proceedings were in reference to them. It appears, then, that in the first year of the queen the oath of supremacy, formed and enjoined in the time of Henry VIII, was, in the first parliament of queen Elizabeth, revived, for the better securing the queen of the fidelity of her subjects; but yet it was so revived, that several considerable passages in the act concerning it were upon mature deliberation mitigated, both as to the queen’s title, which was not supreme *head*, but supreme *governor*; a title which queen Mary had used before, as appears by an act passed in the third session of parliament in her time; and likewise as to the penalty; for whereas the stat. 28 Hen. VIII. c. 10. was so very severe, “that whosoever did extol the authority of

the bishop of Rome was for the first offence within the compass of a *præmunire*, and for refusing to take the oath was guilty of treason," it passed now, in queen Elizabeth's time, only with this penalty, "that such who refused it should be excluded such places of honour and profit as they held in the church or commonwealth; and that such as should maintain or defend the authority, preeminence, power, or jurisdiction, spiritual or ecclesiastical, of any foreign prince, prelate, person, state, or potentate whatsoever, should be three times convicted before he suffered the pains of death." Upon the expiring of the parliament, commissioners were appointed to require the bishops to take the oath of supremacy according to the law made to that purpose, which being tendered to them, they all (Kitchin of Landaff only excepted) unanimously refused it, although they had taken it before as priests or bishops in the reign of Henry VIII. or Edward VI: but whether by some secret intimations from Rome, or their own obstinacy, they were resolved rather to undergo the penalty of the law than to take it now; and accordingly before the end of that year they were deprived of their bishoprics. So that the question about the intrusion of those bishops who came into their sees depends upon the legality of the deprivation of these^s: and certainly, whosoever considers their former carriage towards the queen in refusing to assist at her coronation, and some of them threatening to excommunicate her, instead of disputing at Westminster, as they had solemnly engaged to do, joined with this contumacy in refusing the oath, will find that these persons did not unjustly suffer this deprivation: for which I need not run out into the prince's power over ecclesiastical persons; for you have given a sufficient reason for it yourself in that acknowledgment of yours, "that the bishops, and the king too," (meaning king Henry,) "left the pope in possession of all he could rightly challenge." If this be true, that notwithstanding the stat. 28 Hen. VIII, notwithstanding the oath of supremacy then taken, the pope might enjoy all that belonged to him of divine right, he might then do the same, notwithstanding this oath in queen Elizabeth's time, which was only reviving the former with some mitigation; and what could it be then else but obstinacy and

^s White and Watson.

contumacy in them to refuse it? And therefore the plea which you make for those whom you call the *Henry-bishops*, will sufficiently condemn these present bishops whom we now speak of: for if those bishops only renounced the pope's canonical and acquired jurisdiction here in England, as you say, i. e. that authority and jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, which the pope exercised here by virtue of the canons, prescription, and other titles of human right, and gave it to the king; yet they never renounced or deprived him of that part of his authority which is far more intrinsical to his office, and of ³⁵⁴ divine right; they never denied the pope's sovereign power to teach the universal church, and determine all controversies of faith whatsoever in a general council." If these things, I say, be true, which you confidently assert, the more inexcusable were these bishops for refusing that oath of supremacy, which they had not only taken in king Henry's time, but which, by your own confession, takes away nothing of the pope's authority in relation to the whole catholic church. And by this means their obstinacy appeared so great as might justly deserve a deprivation; it being certainly in the power of the king and bishops to assert their own rights in opposition to any canons or prescriptions whatsoever of merely human right: so that, by your own confession, the more excusable the *Henry-bishops* were, as you call them, the less excusable the *Mary-bishops* were (as, to follow you, we must call them) in refusing the oath of supremacy when tendered to them. Was it lawful then in king Henry's time to take this oath or not? if not, then king Henry's bishops are infinitely to blame for taking it, and you for defending them: if it was lawful then, why not in queen Elizabeth's time? had she not as much reason to impose it as her father? had she not as much power to do it, when one of the chief refusers, Heath archbishop of York, and then lord chancellor of England, did, upon the first notice of the death of queen Mary, declare to the house of commons, "that the succession of the crown did of right belong to the princess Elizabeth, whose title they conceived to be free from all legal questions?" this could be then no plea at all for them. So that if any persons, through the greatest obstinacy, might be deprived by a prince of their ecclesiastical preferments, these might; and when you can

prove that in no case a prince hath power to deprive ecclesiastical persons, you will say more to your purpose than yet you have done: but till you have done that, it remains clear that these bishops were justly deprived; and if so, what was to be done with their vacant sees? must they be kept vacant still, or such be put into them who were guilty of the same fault with themselves in refusing the oath when tendered to them? if not such, then it was necessary that other fit persons should be legally consecrated and invested in them: and so they were, the places being supplied by worthy persons, the archbishop of Canterbury being consecrated by a canonical number of Edward-bishops, and the rest duly consecrated by other hands. And for all this, must all these persons be "intruders, and intrude themselves by force, and that into the places of other lawful bishops," when so many sees were actually vacant, and the rest by due form of law, into which other bishops were elected, and legally consecrated, notwithstanding the putid fable of the Nag's-head ordination? which hath so often and so evidently been disproved, that I am glad to find you have so much modesty as not to mention it. These bishops being thus legally invested in their places, to whom did the care and government of the English church belong? to these, or to those who were justly deprived? if to these, were not they then the due representatives of the English church in a national synod, who, with those of the lower house of convocation, make up a true national council? and if so, it belonged to them as such to consider what appertained to the faith and government of the church of England: for they undertook not to prescribe to the whole world, that they leave to the bishop and church of Rome, (not as legally belonging to them, but arrogantly usurped by them,) but to draw up articles of religion, which should be owned by all such who enjoyed any place of trust in the church of England. So that in all this they were neither intruders, neither did they act any thing beyond their place and authority. But you would seem to quarrel with their vocation, mission, and jurisdiction, 355 as though it were not lawful, i. e. canonical and just: all these are your own words, and they are but words; for not one syllable like a proof is suggested. I tell you then, (not to spend time in a needless vindication of the vocation of the

bishops and pastors of the church of England, when you give us no reason to question it,) that by the same arguments that you can prove that you have any lawful bishops and pastors in your church, it will appear that we have too; and that our vocation and mission is far more consonant to the apostolical and primitive church than yours is.

§. 14. But the main quarrel is still behind, which is, that “supposing they had been true bishops and pastors of the English church, and their assembly a lawful national council, yet,” you say, “they were so far from doing the like (that other provincial councils had done), that they acted directly contrary to them; which charge lies in these things: 1. condemning points of faith that had been generally believed and practised in the church before them.” This you know we deny, and you barely affirm it; and I have shewed some reason of our denial already, and shall do more when we come to particulars. 2. “In contradicting the doctrine of the Roman church;” a great heresy indeed, but never yet condemned in any general council. 3. “In convening against the express will of the church of Rome:” we shall then think that a fault, when you prove it belongs to that only to summon all councils, general, national, and provincial. 4. “In denying the pope’s authority, or attempting to deprive him of it:” if you speak of his *usurped authority*, you must prove it a fault to deprive him of it, i. e. to withdraw ourselves from obedience to it, for that is all the deprivation can be here understood: if you mean *just authority*, shew wherein it lies, whence he had it, by what means he came into it in the church of England; and if you can make it appear that he had a just claim, it will be easy proving them guilty of a fault who disowned it: but whether it were a fault in them or no, I am sure it is one in you, to lay such things and so many to our charge, and not offering to give evidence for one of them; but I must consider the infallibility of your church lies in dictating, and not proving. Thus then, for any thing which you so much as seem to say to the contrary, the proceedings of the Reformation were very regular and just, being built on sufficient grounds, managed in a legal manner, and carried on with due moderation; which are the highest commendations can be given to a work of reformation, and do with the

greatest right belong to the church of England of any church in the Christian world. There remains nothing now which you object against our Reformation but some faults of the
 Lab. p. 170. reformers; as to which, his lordship had already said, “If any such be found, they are the crimes of the persons, and not of the Reformation, and they are long since gone to God to answer it, to whom I leave them;” which answer, so full of justice and modesty, one would have thought should have been sufficient for any reasonable man: but you are not satisfied with it; for you will have those faults to come from the principles of the Reformation, and that they did not belong to the persons of the reformers, but are entailed on their successors. But a short answer will suffice for both these: shew us what avowed principles of the church of England tend to any real sacrilege, before you charge any thing of that nature as flowing from the maxims of the Reformation: and if you can prove the successors of the reformers to continue in any sacrilegious actions, let those plead for them who will; I shall not, but leave them, as his lordship did, to answer such things to God.

As to the memorandum which his lordship concludes this
 Conf. p. 128. discourse with, “That he spake at that time of the general
 sect. 24. n. 6. church, as it was for the most part forced under the govern-
 356 ment of the Roman see; not doubting but that as the uni-
 versal catholic church would have reformed herself, had she
 been in all parts freed of the Roman yoke; so, while she was
 for the most in these western parts under that yoke, the
 church of Rome was, if not the only, yet the chief hinderance
 of reformation;” you answer with some stomach, “By what
 Lab. p. 170. force, I pray? is it possible, or can it enter into the judgment
 n. 9. of any reasonable man, that a single bishop, of no very large
 diocese, should be able by force to bring into subjection so
 many large provinces of Christendom as confessedly did ac-
 knowledge the pope’s power when the pretended reformation
 began?” But what reasonable man can imagine that a single
 bishop, indeed, of no very large diocese (if kept within his
 bounds), should, in progress of time, extend his power so far
 as the pope did, but by one of these two means, force or
 fraud? and since you seem to be so much displeased at the
 former, I pray take the latter, or rather the conjunction of

both together: for that there was force used appears by the manifold resistance which was made to the encroachments of the pope's power, and the sad complaints of the usurpations and abuses which were in it; and these abundantly delivered "by classical authors of both the present and precedent times;" and (to use more of your own words) "all ecclesiastical monuments are full of them:" so that this is no false calumny, or *bitter pasquil* (as you call it), but a very plain and evident truth. But that there was likewise a great deal of art, subtilty, and fraud used in the getting, keeping, and managing the pope's power, he hath but a small measure of wit who doth not understand, and they as little of honesty who dare not confess it.

OF THE ROMAN CHURCH'S AUTHORITY.

The question concerning the church of Rome's authority entered upon.—How far our church, in reforming herself, condemns the church of Rome.—The pope's equality with other patriarchs asserted.—The Arabic canons of the Nicene council proved to be supposititious.—The polity of the ancient church discovered from the sixth canon of the council of Nice.—The rights of primates and metropolitans settled by it.—The suitableness of the ecclesiastical to the civil government.—That the bishop of Rome had then a limited jurisdiction within the suburbicary churches, as primate of the Roman diocese.—Of the Cyprian privilege; that it was not peculiar, but common to all primates of dioceses.—Of the pope's primacy according to the canons; how far pertinent to our dispute.—How far the pope's confirmation requisite to new elected patriarchs.—Of the synodical and communicatory letters.—The testimonies of Petrus de Marca concerning the pope's power of confirming and deposing bishops.—The instances brought for it considered.—The case of Athanasius being restored by Julius, truly stated.—The proceedings of Constantine in the case of the Donatists cleared, and the evidence thence against the pope's supremacy.—Of the appeals of bishops to Rome, how far allowed by the canons of the church.—The great case of appeals between the Roman and African bishops discussed.—That the appeals of bishops were prohibited, as well as those of the inferior clergy.—T. C.'s fraud in citing the epistle of the African bishops, for acknowledging appeals to Rome.—The contrary manifested from the same epistle to Boniface, and the other to Cœlestine.—The exemption of the ancient Britannie church from any subjection to the see of Rome asserted.—The case of Wilfrid's appeal answered.—The primacy of England not derived from Gregory's grant to Augustin the monk.—The ancient primacy of the Britannie church not lost upon the Saxon conversion.—Of the state of the African churches, after their denying appeals to Rome.—The rise of the pope's greatness under Christian emperors.—Of the decree of the Sardican synod, in case of appeals: whether ever received by the church: no evidence thence of the pope's supremacy.—Zosimus his forgery in sending the Sardican canons instead of the Nicene.—The weakness of the pleas for it manifested.

§. 1. **T**HAT which now remains to be discussed in the question of schism, is concerning the authority of the church and bishop of Rome, whether that be so large and extensive as to bind us to an universal submission, so that by renouncing of it we violate the unity of the church, and are

thereby guilty of schism? But before we come to a particular discussion of that, we must cast our eyes back on the precedent chapter, in which the title promiseth us, that protestants Chap. 14. should be further convinced of schism; but upon examination of it, there appears not so much as the shadow of any new matter, but it wholly depends upon principles already refuted, and so contains a bare repetition of what hath been abundantly answered in the first part. So your first section hath no more of strength than what lies in your church's infallibility: for when you would plead, "that though the church of Lab. p. 171, Rome be the accused party, yet she may judge in her own 172. n. 1. cause," you do it upon this ground, "that you had already proved the Roman church to be infallible, and therefore your church might as well condemn her accusers, as the apostles theirs; and that protestants, not pretending infallibility, cannot rationally be permitted to be accusers and witnesses against the Roman church. Now what doth all this come to 358 in case your church be not infallible, as we have evidently proved she is not in the first part, and that she is so far from it that she hath most grossly erred, as we shall prove in the third part? Your second section supposes the matter of fact evident, Lab. p. 173. that protestants did contradict the public doctrine and belief^{n. 2.} of all Christians generally throughout the world, which we have lately proved to be an egregious falsity, and shall do more afterwards. The cause of the separatists and the church of England is vastly different, whether we look on the authority, cause, or manner of their proceedings; and in your other instances you still beg the question, that your church is our mother church, and therefore we are bound to submit to her judgment, though she be the accused party. But as to this whole business of *Quo judice?* nothing can be spoken with more solidity and satisfaction than what his lordship saith. P. 157. "If it be a cause common to both, as certain it is here, (between the protestant and Roman church,) then neither part alone may be judge; if neither alone may judge, then either they must be judged by a third, which stands indifferent to both, and that is the scripture: or if there be a jealousy or a doubt of the sense of the scripture, they must either both repair to the exposition of the primitive church, and submit to that; or both call and submit to a general council, which

Lab. ad p.
181.

shall be lawfully called, and fairly and freely held with indifferency to all parties; and that must judge the difference according to scripture, which must be their rule as well as private men's." When you either attempt to shew the unreasonableness of this, or substitute any thing more reasonable instead of it, you may expect a further answer to the question, *Quo judice?* as far as it concerns the difference between your church and ours. The remainder of this whole chapter is only a repetition of somewhat concerning fundamentals, and a further expatiating in words, without the addition of any more strength from reason or authority, upon the church's infallibility being proved from scripture; which having been thoroughly considered already, and an account given, not only of the meaning of those places, (one excepted, which we shall meet with again,) but of the reason why the sense of them as to infallibility should be restrained to the apostles, I find no sufficient motive inducing me to follow you, in distrusting the reader's memory and trespassing on his patience, so much as to inculcate the same things over and over, as you do. Passing by therefore the things already handled, and leaving the rest (if any such thing appear) to a more convenient place, where these very places of scripture are again brought upon the stage in the questions of the pope's authority, and infallibility of general councils, I come to your following chapter, in which you enter upon the vindication of the Roman church's authority.

Conf.p.137.
sect.25.n.7.

§. 2. 2. That which his lordship hath long insisted on and evidently proved is, the right which particular churches have to reform themselves, when the general church cannot for impediments, or will not for negligence do it. And your answers to his proofs have had their weakness sufficiently laid open; the only thing here objected further is, whether in so doing particular churches do not condemn others of errors in faith? To which his lordship answers, "that to reform themselves and to condemn others are two different works, unless it fall out so, that by reforming themselves they do by consequence condemn any other that is guilty in that point in which they reform themselves; and so far to judge and condemn others is not only lawful, but necessary. A man that lives religiously doth not by and by sit in judgment, and con-

demn with his mouth all profane livers ; but yet, while he is silent, his very life condemns them." To what end his lordship produceth this instance, any one may easily understand ; but you abuse it, as though his lordship had said, that protestants only by their religious lives do condemn your church ; and 359 upon this run out into a strange declamation about " who the men are that live so religiously ? they who, to propagate the gospel the better, marry wives contrary to the canons, and bring scripture for it ?" Yes surely, much more than they who, to propagate your church, enjoy concubines ; for which if they can bring some canons of your church, I am sure they can bring no scripture for it. " They who pull down monasteries both of religious men and women ?" I see, you are still as loath to part them, as they are to be parted themselves ; but if all their lives be no more religious than the most of them have been, the pulling of them down might be a greater act of religion than living in them. " They who cast altars to the ground ?" More certainly than they who worshipped them. " They who partly banish priests, and partly put them to death ?" Or they who commit treasons, and do things worthy of death ? But you are doubtless very religious and tenderhearted men, whose consciences would never suffer you to banish or put any to death for the sake of religion ; no, not in queen Mary's time here in England ! " They who deface the very tombs of saints, and will not permit them to rest even when they are dead ?" Or they who profess to worship dead saints, and martyr living ones with fire and fagot ? If this be your religious living, none who know what religion means will be much taken with it. I shall easily grant that you stick close to the pope, but are therein far enough from the doctrine or life of St. Peter. If any of you " have endured sequestrations, imprisonments, death itself," I am sure it was not for any good you did ; not for the catholic faith, but, if you will, for some catholic treasons, such as would have inwrapt a whole nation in misery. If this be your suffering persecution for righteousness' sake, you will have little cause to rejoice in your fellow-sufferers. But if you had not a mind to calumniate us, and provoke us to speak sad truths of you, all this might have been spared ; for his lordship only chose this instance, to shew that a church or person may be con-

Lab. p. 182.
n. 1.

demned consequentially, which was not intentionally. But you say, "Our church hath formally condemned yours, by public and solemn censures, in the Thirty-nine Articles." Doth his lordship deny that our church, in order to our own reformation, hath condemned many things which your church holds? No, but that our church's main intention was to reform itself; but, considering the corruption and degeneracy of your church, she could not do it without consequentially condemning yours: and that she did justly in so doing, we are ready on all occasions to justify.

Conf.p.137.
sect.25.n.8.

§. 3. But his lordship asks, "If one particular church may not judge or condemn another, what must then be done where particulars need reformation?" To which his adversary gives a plain answer, "That particular churches must in that case (as Irenæus intimateth) have recourse to the church of Rome, which hath more powerful principality; and to her bishop, who is the chief pastor of the whole church, as being St. Peter's successor," &c. This is the rise and occasion of the present controversy. To this his lordship answers, "that it is most true indeed, the church of Rome hath had, and hath yet, more powerful principality than any other particular church. But she hath not this power from Christ. The Roman patriarch by ecclesiastical constitutions might perhaps have a primacy of order: but for principality of power the patriarchs were as even, as equal, as the apostles were before them. The truth is, this more powerful principality the Roman bishops got under the emperors, after they became Christian; and they used the matter so, that they grew big enough to oppose, nay to depose the emperors, by the same power which they had given them. And after this, other particular churches, especially here in the west, submitted themselves to them for succour and protection's sake. And this was one main cause that swelled Rome into this more powerful principality, and not any right given by Christ to
360 make that prelate pastor of the whole church." To this you
Lab.p.183.
n. 2. answer, "that to say that the Roman church's principality is not from Christ, is contrary to St. Austin and the whole Milevitan council, who in their epistle to Innocent the First profess that the pope's authority is grounded upon scripture, and consequently proceeds from Christ." But whoever seriously

reads and thoroughly considers that epistle^a, will find no such thing as that you aim at there. For the scope of the epistle is to persuade pope Innocent to appear against Cœlestius and Pelagius; to that end they give first an account of their doctrine, shewing how pernicious and contrary to scripture it was; after which they tell him that Pelagius being at Jerusalem was like to do a great deal of mischief there, but that many of the brethren opposed him, and especially St. Hierom. "But we," say they, "do suppose, that through the mercy of our Lord Christ assisting you, those which hold such perverse and pernicious principles may more easily yield by your authority drawn out of scripture." Where they do not in the least dream of his authority as universal pastor being grounded on scripture, but of his appearing against the Pelagians with his authority drawn out of scripture, that is, to that authority which he had in the church, by the reputation of the Roman see, the authority of the scripture being added, which was so clear against the Pelagians, or both these going together were the most probable way to suppress their doctrine. And it hath been sufficiently proved by others, by very many instances of the writers about that age, that *authoritas* was no more than *rescriptum*; as particularly appears by many passages in Leo's epistles, in which sense no more is expressed by this, than that by the pope's answer to the council drawn out of the authority of scripture, the Pelagians might more probably be suppressed. But what is this to an universal pastorage given by Christ to him, any otherwise than to those who sat in any other apostolical sees?

But your great quarrel is against his lordship for making all the patriarchs even and equal as to principality of power: and when he saith, "equal as the apostles were," you say "that is equivocal; for though the apostles had equal jurisdiction over the whole church, yet St. Peter alone had jurisdiction over the apostles;" but this is neither proved from John xxi. nor is it at all clear in antiquity, as will appear when we come to that subject.

^a Arbitramur adjuvante misericordia Domini nostri Jesu Christi—authoritati sanctitatis tuæ de sanctarum scripturarum autoritate

depromptæ, facilius eos qui tam perversa et perniciosam sentiunt, esse cessuros.—Aug. ep. 92.

Lab. p. 184.
n. 2.

§. 4. But this assertion of the equality of patriarchs is so destructive to your pretensions in behalf of the church of Rome, that you set yourself more particularly to disprove it ; which you offer to do by two things : 1. by a canon of the Nicene council ; 2. by the practice of the ancient church. You begin with the first of them, and tell us, “ that it is contrary to the council of Nice, in the third canon whereof, which concerns the jurisdiction of patriarchs, the authority (or principality if you will) of the bishop of Rome is made the pattern and model of that authority and jurisdiction which patriarchs were to exercise over the provincial bishops. The words of the canon are these : *Sicque præest patriarcha iis omnibus, qui sub ejus potestate sunt, sicut ille qui tenet sedem Romæ, caput est et princeps omnium patriarcharum* : ‘ The patriarch,’ say they, ‘ is in the same manner over all those that are under his authority, as he who holds the see of Rome is head and prince of all the patriarchs.’ And in the same canon the pope is afterwards styled, *Petro similis et autoritate par*, ‘ resembling St. Peter and his equal in authority.’ ” These are big words indeed, and to your purpose, if ever any such thing had been decreed by the council of Nice ; but I shall evidently prove that this canon is supposititious, and a notorious piece of forgery. Which forgery is much increased by you when you tell us, these words are contained in the third
361 canon of the council of Nice : which in the Greek editions of the canons by du Tillet, and the Codex Canonum by Justellus, and all other extant, in the Latin versions of Dionysius Exiguus and Isidore Mercator, is wholly against the *συνέλακτοι*, i. e. such kind of women which clergymen took into their houses, neither as wives or concubines, but under a pretext of piety. In the Arabic edition of the Nicene canons, set out by Alphonsus Pisanus, the third canon is against the ordination either of *neophyti* or criminal persons, and so likewise in that of Turrianus. So that in no edition, whether Arabic or other, is this the third canon of the council of Nice ; and therefore you were guilty either of great ignorance and negligence in saying so, or of notorious fraud and imposture if you knew it to be otherwise, and yet said it that the unwary reader might believe this canon to be within the twenty which are the only genuine canons of the council of Nice. Indeed

such a canon there is in these Arabic editions, but it is so far from being the third, that in the editions both of Pisanus and Turrianus it is the thirty-ninth, and in it I grant those words are; but yet you will have little reason to rejoice in them, when I have proved, as I doubt not to do, that this whole farrago of Arabic canons is a mere forgery; and that I shall prove both from the true number of the Nicene canons, and the incongruity of many things in the Arabic canons with the state and polity of the church at that time.

In those editions set out by Pisanus and Turrianus from the copy which they say was brought by Baptista Romanus from the patriarch of Alexandria, there are no fewer than eighty canons; whereas the Nicene council never passed above twenty. Which if it appear true, that will sufficiently discover the forgery and supposititiousness of these Arabic canons. Now that there were no more than twenty genuine canons of the council of Nice, I thus prove, first from Theodoret, who after he had given an account of the proceedings in the council against the Arians, he saith, "That the fathers met in council again, and passed twenty canons relating to the church's polity^b:" and Gelasius Cyzicenus^c, whom Alphonsus Pisanus set forth with his Latin version, recounts no more than twenty canons; the same number is asserted by Nicephorus Callistus^d; and we need not trouble ourselves with reciting the testimonies of more Greek authors, since Binius^e himself confesseth that all the Greeks say there were no more than twenty canons then determined. But although certainly the Greeks were the most competent judges in this case, yet the Latins themselves did not allow of more. For although Ruffinus makes twenty-two, yet that is not by the addition of any more canons, but by splitting two into four. And if we believe pope Stephen in Gratian^f, the Roman church did

^b Αὐθις δὲ συνελθόντες εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, περὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς πολιτείας νόμους ἔγραψαν εἴκοσι.—Theodoret. Hist. Eccles. lib. 1. cap. 7. ed. Sirmond. 1642.

^c Ἐξέθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς κανόνας εἴκοσιν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐν Νικαίᾳ.—Gelas. Acta Concil. Nicen. lib. 2.

^d Τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ νόμους ἐκτίθουσιν εἴκοσιν οὓς κανόνας εἰωθὸς ὀνομά-

ζειν.—Niceph. Eccles. Hist. l. 8. c. 19.

^e Quanquam Græci omnes asserant et tueantur, Nicæni concilii canones viginti tantum fuisse, &c.—Bin. not. in Concil. Nicæn. p. 366. tom. 1. Ruffin. Eccles. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 19.

^f Viginti tantum capitula Nicænæ synodi in sancta Romana ecclesia haberi.—Gratian. distinct. 16. c. 20.

allow of no more than twenty. And in that epitome of the canons which pope Hadrian^g sent to Charles the Great for the government of the western churches, A. D. 773, the same number of the Nicene canons appears still. And in a MS. of Hincmarus Rhemensis^h against Hincmarus Laudunensis, this is not only asserted but at large contended for, that there were no more canons determined at Nice than those twenty which we now have, from the testimonies of the Tripartite history, Ruffinus, the Carthaginian council, the epistles of Cyril of Alexandria and Atticus of Constantinople, and the twelfth action of the council of Chalcedon. So that if both
 362 Greeks and Latins say true, there could be no more than twenty genuine canons of the council of Nice; which may be yet further proved by two things, viz. the proceedings of the African fathers in the case of Zosimus about the Nicene canons and the Codex Canonum Ecclesiæ Universæ, both which yield an abundant testimony to our purpose. If ever there was a just occasion given for an early and exact search into the authentic canons of the council of Nice, it was certainly in that grand debate between the African fathers and the Roman bishops in the case of appeals. For Zosimus challenging not only a right of appeals to himself, but a power of dispatching legates unto the African churches to hear causes there, and all this by virtue of a canon in the Nicene council, and this being delivered to them in council by Faustinus, Philippus and Asellus, whom Zosimus sent into Africa to negotiate this affair; no sooner did they hear this, but they were startled and amazed at it, that such a thing should be challenged by virtue of a canon in the council of Nice which they had never heard of before. Upon this they declare themselves willing to yield to what should appear to be determined by the Nicene canons; thence they propound that a more exact search might be made into the authentical copies of them: for they profess no such thing at all to appear in all the Greek copies which they had among them; although Cæcilianus the bishop of Carthage were present in

^g Deinde etiam viginti capitulis Nicæni concilii recitatis, communi decreto statuerunt capita triginta septem (legendum triginta novem) quæ subsequuntur.—Justell. not. in

Cod. Eccles. African. p. 13.

^h Quod nonnisi viginti capitula quæ habemus in Nicæno concilio fuerint constituta.—Hincm. cap. 21. apud Justell. ibid.

the council of Nice, and brought home those copies which were preserved in the church of Africa. For in all the subscriptions of the Nicene council, whether Arabic or others, the name of Cæcilian appears; now Cæcilian was immediate predecessor in Carthage to Aurelius, who presided in that councilⁱ wherein these things were debated. And there it is expressly said, there were but twenty canons. But in order to further satisfaction, they decree that a message should be sent on purpose to Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria, to find out the authentic copies of the Nicene canons; and after a most diligent search no more canons could be found than what the African fathers had before. And thence in the epistle of Anticas of Constantinople written to the council of Carthage, he acquaints them that he according to their desire had sent them the true and complete canons^k (ἐν ὁλοκλήρῳ) of the Nicene council. And to the same purpose Cyril^l the patriarch of Alexandria mentioning their desires of having ἀληθέστατα ἴσα, the most true and authentic copies, out of the archives of that church, so he tells them he had sent τὰ πιστότατα ἴσα τὰ τῆς αὐθεντικῆς συνόδου τῆς ἐν τῇ Νικαέων πόλει, “the most faithful copies of the authentic synod of Nice.” Now if there had been any ground in the world for Turrianus^m his conjecture, that the Nicene canons were translated into Arabic by Alexander who was present at the council, for the benefit of those in Pentapolis or Egypt who only understood that language, (and that before the Nicene canons were burnt, of which Athanasius complains,) who was more likely to have found out these Arabic canons than Cyril the patriarch of Alexandria, upon this occasion especially, when the full and authentic copies were so extremely desired? And since no such thing at all appeared then, upon the most diligent inquiry, what can be more evident than that these eighty Arabic canons are the imposture of some later age? Besides, if these canons had been genuine and authentic, what imaginable reason can be given why they were not inserted in the Codex Canonum as the other twenty were? For, as Jacobus Leschasseriusⁿ well observes, we are not to imagine that the

ⁱ Codex Can. Eccles. Afric. p. 58.^k Cod. Can. p. 363. ^l Id. p. 360.^m Turrian. Præf. in Canon. Arab.ⁿ Consultatio de Controvers. inter Paul. V. et rempubl. Venet. apud Goldast. Monarch. Rom. t. 3. p. 444.

ancient church was governed at random by loose and dispersed canons, whereby it had been an easy matter to have foisted in false and supposititious canons; but that there was a certain body and collection of them digested into an exact order; so that none could add to or take away any thing from it: and whatever canons were not contained in this body
363 had no power or force at all in the church. And that there was such a *codex canonum*, that learned person hath abundantly proved from the council of Chalcedon, which hath many passages referring to it; so that there is now no question made, but that which Justellus published is the true collection of those canons of the universal church which were inserted into the Codex; in which we find but only the twenty canons of the Nicene council; and that there could possibly be no more, appears by the number of the canons as they are reckoned in the council of Chalcedon. From whence it follows, that only these twenty canons were ever owned by the universal church; for had the fathers of the church known of so many other canons of the Nicene council, (as surely at least the patriarchs of Alexandria could not be ignorant of them, if there had been any such,) can we possibly think that those who had so great a veneration for the Nicene council should have left the far greater part of the canons of it out of the code of the church's canons? I am not ignorant of what is objected by Binius, Bellarmine, and others, to prove that there were more than twenty canons of the council of Nice; but those proofs either depend upon things as supposititious as the Arabic canons themselves, such as the epistles of Julius and Athanasius ad Marcum; or else they only prove that several other things were determined by the Nicene council, as, concerning the celebration of Easter, rebaptizing heretics, and such like, which might be by the acts of the council without putting them into the canons, as Baronius confesseth; but there cannot be any evidence brought of any canon which concerned the church's polity (for about that Theodoret and Nicephorus tell us the canons were made), which was not among these twenty. So that it appears that these Arabic canons are a mere forgery of later times, there being no evidence at all that they were known to the church in all the time of the four general councils: and therefore Baro-

nus^o, (notwithstanding the pretences of Pisanus and Turrianus from the Alexandrian copy, and that out of Marcellus his library, yet) since these canons were unknown in the controversy of the African church about the Nicene canons, leaves the patronage of them to such as might be able to defend them. And Spondanus in his contraction of him, (though in his marginal note he saith^p Baronius was sometimes more inclinable to the enlarged number of the Nicene canons,) yet he relates it as his positive opinion, that he rejected all but the twenty, whether Arabic or other, as spurious and supposititious. You see then what a fair choice you have made of the third canon of the council of Nice to prove the superiority of the pope over other patriarchs by; when neither is it the third canon, nor any canon at all of the council of Nice, but a spurious figment, like those of Isidore Mercator, who thought all would pass for gold which made for the interest of the church of Rome.

§. 5. But were there not such a strong and pregnant evidence from authority to make it appear that these canons were supposititious, yet the incongruity of them with the state of the church at that time would abundantly manifest it, if we had time to compare many of those canons with it. But that which is most material to our purpose, concerning the equality of the patriarchs, your following words will put us upon a further inquiry into. “This also,” say you, (viz. that ^{Lab. p. 184.} the pope was head and prince of all the patriarchs,) “the ^{n. 2.} practice of the church shews, which is always the best expositor and assertor of the canons. For not only the pope’s confirmation was required to all new elected patriarchs, but it ³⁶⁴ belonged likewise to him to depose unworthy ones, and restore the unjustly deposed by others. We read of no less

^o Quoniam hæc ignorasse majores visi sunt, quando oborta controversia in ecclesia Africana, de iis mentio necessaria incubuisset; hæc libentius aliis disserenda relinqueamus.—Baron. ad an. 325. parag. 180.

^p Quamobrem quod in epistola quadam Marcinomine septuaginta recensentur—quodque Turrianus profiteatur octoginta inventos Arabica

lingua scriptos, se Latinitate donasse—quoniam hæc omnia scripta quibus ingens ille numerus canonum stabilitur, prorsus incertæ vel potius nullius sunt fidei; nec aliquis unquam probatus antiquitatis auctor amplius quam viginti canones Nicænæ synodi agnovisse reperiatur, cæteros ab aliis assertos libentius rejicimus.—Spondan. Epitom. Baron. ad an. 325. n. 42.

than eight several patriarchs^q of Constantinople deposed by the bishop of Rome. Sixtus the Third deposed also Polycronius bishop of Hierusalem, as his acts set down in the first tome of the councils testify. On the contrary, Athanasius patriarch of Alexandria, and Paulus^r bishop of Constantinople, were by Julius the First restored to their respective sees, having been unjustly expelled by heretics. The same might be said of divers others, over whom the pope did exercise the like authority; which he could never have done upon any other ground than that of divine right, and as being generally acknowledged St. Peter's successor in the government of the whole church." Three things I shall return you in answer to this discourse: 1. that the practice of the church doth not shew any such inequality as you contend for between the pope and other patriarchs; 2. that no such practice of the church can be proved from the instances by you brought; and therefore, lastly, it by no means follows that the pope exercised any such authority by divine right, or was acknowledged to be St. Peter's successor in the government of the whole church. I begin with the practice of the ancient church, which is so far from being an evidence of such an inequality of patriarchs as that you contend for, that nothing doth more confirm that which his lordship saith concerning the equality of them than that doth. For which we appeal to that famous testimony to this purpose in the sixth canon of the Nicene council: "Let ancient customs prevail; according to which, let the bishop of Alexandria have power over them who are in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis; because this was likewise the custom for the bishop of Rome. And accordingly in Antioch and other provinces, let the privileges be preserved to the churches^s." Which canon is the more remarkable, because it is the first that ever was made by the ancient church for regulating the rights and privileges of churches over each other; which there was like to be now more contest about, not only by reason of the church's liberty

^q Nicol. Pap. Ep. ad Michael. Imperat.

^r Sozom. l. 3. c. 7.

^s Τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθνη κρατεῖτω· τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Λιβύῃ καὶ Πενταπόλει, ὥστε τὸν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ἐπίσκοπον

πάντων τούτων ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐπισκόπῳ τοῦτο σύνηθές ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπαρχίαις, τὰ πρεσβεία σώζεσθαι ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις.—Conc. Nicen. c. 6.

under Constantine, but because of the new disposition of the empire by him, which was made not long before the sitting of the council of Nice. But the particular occasion of this canon is generally supposed to be this. Meletius, an ambitious bishop in Egypt, much about the time that Arius broached his heresy at Alexandria, takes upon him to ordain bishops and others in Egypt, without the consent of the bishop of Alexandria. This case being brought before the Nicene fathers, they pronounce these ordinations null, depose Meletius, and, to prevent the like practices for the future, do by this canon confirm the ancient customs of that nature in the church; so that the bishop of Alexandria should enjoy as full right and power over the provinces of Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, as the bishop of Rome had over those subject to him, as likewise Antioch and other churches should enjoy their former privileges. Where we plainly see that the ground of this extent of power is not attributed to any divine right of the bishop of Rome, or any other metropolitan, but to the ancient custom of the church; whereby it had obtained that such churches that were deduced (as it were so many colonies) from the mother church, should retain so much respect to and dependence upon her, as not to receive any bishop into them without the consent of that bishop who governed in the metropolis. Which was the prime reason of the subordination of those lesser churches to the metropolis: and this custom being drawn down from the first plantation of churches, and likewise much conducing to the preserving of unity in them, these Nicene fathers saw no reason to alter it, but much to confirm it. For otherwise there might have been continual bandying and opposition of lesser bishops and churches against the greater; and therefore the discipline and unity of the 365 church did call for this subordination; which could not be better determined than by the ancient custom which had obtained in the several churches. It being found most convenient that the churches in their subordination should be most agreeable to the civil disposition of the empire. And therefore for our better understanding the force and effect of this Nicene canon, we must cast our eye a little upon the civil disposition of the Roman empire by Constantine, then lately altered from the former disposition of it under Augustus and Adrian. He

therefore distributed the administration of the government of the Roman empire under four *præfecti prætorio*; but for the more convenient management of it, the whole body of the empire was cast into several jurisdictions containing many provinces within them which were in the law called *dioceses*; over every one of which there was appointed a *vicarius*, or lieutenant, to one of the *præfecti prætorio*, whose residence was in the chief city of the diocese, where the prætorium was, and justice was administered to all within that diocese, and thither appeals were made. Under these were those proconsuls or *correctores* who ruled in the particular provinces, and had their residence in the metropolis of it, under whom were the particular magistrates of every city; now according to this disposition of the empire, the western part of it contained in it seven of these dioceses; as, under the *præfectus prætorio Galliarum* was the diocese of Gaul, which contained seventeen provinces; the diocese of Britain, which contained five (afterwards but three in Constantine's time); the diocese of Spain, seven. Under the *præfectus prætorio Italiæ* was the diocese of Africa, which had six provinces; the diocese of Italy, whose seat was Milan, seven; the diocese of Rome, ten. Under the *præfectus prætorio Illyrici* was the diocese of Illyricum, in which were seventeen provinces. In the eastern division were the diocese of Thrace, which had six provinces; the diocese of Pontus, eleven; and so the diocese of Asia, the *oriental* (properly so called), wherein Antioch was, fifteen; all which were under the *præfectus prætorio Orientis*: the Egyptian diocese, which had six provinces, was under the *præfectus augustalis*: in the time of Theodosius the elder, Illyricum was divided into two dioceses; the eastern, whose metropolis was Thessalonica, and had eleven provinces; the western, whose metropolis was Sirmium, and had six provinces. According to this division of the empire, we may better understand the affairs and government of the church, which was modelled much after the same way, unless where ancient custom or the emperor's edict did cause any variation. For as the cities had their bishops, so the provinces had their archbishops, and the dioceses their primates, whose jurisdiction extended as far as the diocese did; and as the *conventus juridici* were kept in the chief city of the diocese for matters of civil judicature, so

the chief ecclesiastical councils for the affairs of the church were to be kept there too; for which there is an express passage in the Codex of Theodosius, whereby care is taken "that the same course should be used in ecclesiastical which was in civil matters; so that such things which concerned them should be heard in the synods of the diocese^t:" where the word *diocese* is not used in the sense the African fathers used it in, for that which belonged to one bishop, (as it is now used,) but as it is generally used in the Codex of Theodosius and Justinian, and the Novels and Greek canons; for that which comprehends in it many provinces, as a province takes in several dioceses of particular bishops.

§. 5. These things being premised, we may the better understand the scope of the canon of the council of Nice; in which three things are to our purpose considerable: 1. That it supposeth particular bounds and limits set to the jurisdiction 366 of those who are mentioned in it. 2. That what churches did enjoy privileges before this council, had them confirmed by this canon, as not to be altered. 3. That the churches enjoying these privileges were not subordinate to each other.

1. That particular bounds and limits were supposed to the power of those churches therein mentioned: for although we grant that this canon doth not fix or determine what the bounds were of the Roman bishop's power, yet that it doth suppose that it had its bounds is apparent from the example being drawn from thence for the limits of other churches; for what an unlikely thing is it that the church of Rome should be made the pattern for assigning the limits of other metropolitan churches, if that had not its known limits at that time. And can any thing be more absurd or unreasonable than the answer which Bellarmine^u gives to this place, "That the bishop of Alexandria ought to govern those provinces, because the Roman bishop hath so accustomed, i. e." saith he, "to let the Alexandrian bishop govern them." Here is an *id est* with

^t Qui mos est causarum civilium, iidem in negotiis ecclesiasticis obtinendi sunt, si qua sunt—ad religionis observantiam pertinentia, locis suis et a suæ diœceseos synodis audiantur. Codex Theodos. de Episcop. lib. 16.

^u Quarta igitur et vera expositio

est, Alexandrinum debere gubernare illas provincias, quia Romanus episcopus ita consuevit, id est, quia Romanus episcopus ante omnem conciliorum definitionem consuevit permittere episcopo Alexandrino regimen Ægypti, Libyæ et Pentapolis. —Bellarm. de Rom. Pont. l. 2. c. 13.

a witness: what will not these men break through, that can so confidently obtrude such monstrous interpretations upon the credulous world! Is it possible to conceive—when the canon makes use of the parallel of the Roman bishop, and makes that the ground why the bishop of Alexandria should enjoy full power over those provinces, because the bishop of Rome did so—that the meaning should be, That he gave the bishop of Alexandria power to govern those provinces? They who can believe such things may easily find arguments for the pope's unlimited supremacy every where. I make no scruple to grant what Bellarmine contends for, from the epistle of Nicolaus I, That the council did not herein assign limits to the church of Rome, but made that a pattern whereby to order the government of other churches. And from thence it is sufficiently clear to any reasonable man, that the limits of her government were, though not assigned, yet supposed by the council; for otherwise, how absurd were it to say, "Let the bishop of Alexandria govern Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, because the bishop of the church of Rome hath no limits at all, but governs the whole church!" Doth not *τοῦτο συνηθές* import some parallel custom in the church of Rome, and name therefore what that is, supposing he hath no limits set to his jurisdiction? "Yes," it may be you will reply, "he had limits as a metropolitan, but not as head of the church." Grant me then that he had limits as metropolitan, and then prove you that ever he had any unlimited power acknowledged as head of the church. Would they ever have made such an instance in him, without any discrimination of his several capacities, if they had known any other power that he had, but only as a metropolitan? nay, might not the bishops of Antioch and Alexandria be rather supposed to have the greater power, because their provinces were much larger here than his. And although Bellarmine useth that as his great argument why Ruffinus his exposition cannot hold, "because the bishop of Rome would have a lesser diocese assigned him than either the bishops of Antioch or Alexandria," yet when we consider what hath been said already of the agreement of the civil and ecclesiastical government, a sufficient account may thence be given of it: for as the *præfectus augustalis* had all the provinces of Egypt for his diocese, so had the bishop of Alexan-

dria; and as the lieutenant of Antioch had that which was properly called *the Orient*, containing fifteen provinces under him, so had the bishop of Antioch; and by the same proportion the power of the bishop of Rome did correspond to the diocese of the Roman lieutenant, which was over those ten provinces which were subject to his jurisdiction, as it was distinct from the diocese of Italy, which was under that lieutenant, whose residence was at Milan. Here we see then a parity of reason in all of them; and therefore I cannot but think that the true account of the suburbicary churches in Ruffinus his exposition of this canon, is that which we have now set down, viz those churches which lay within the ten provinces subject to the Roman lieutenant. But of them more afterwards. That which I now insist on is, that the bishop of Rome had then a limited jurisdiction, as other metropolitans and primates had: nay, if we should grant that the title produced by Paschasinus, in the council of Chalcedon, to this canon, were not such a forgery as that of Zosimus, yet the most that could prove was only this, that the Roman church had always the primacy within her diocese, i. e. all metropolitical power, but not that it had an unlimited primacy in the whole church; which was a thing none of those fathers who lived in the time of the four councils did ever acknowledge, but always opposed any thing tending to it, as appears by those very proceedings of Paschasinus at the council of Chalcedon, and by the canons of that council, and of the council of Constantinople: and it is a rare answer to say that those canons are not allowed by the Roman church; for by that very answer it appears that they did oppose the pope's supremacy, or else doubtless they would have been allowed there. But that the pope's metropolitical power was confined within the Roman diocese, so as not to extend to the Italic, we have this pregnant evidence, that it appears by the occasion of the Nicene canon that the main power contested for was that of ordination; and it is evident by Theodoret and Synesius his epistles^x, that the bishop of Alexandria did retain it as his due, by virtue of this canon, to ordain the bishops of Pentapolis as well as Egypt. But now the bishop

^x Theodoret. l. i. c. 9. Synes. Ep. ad Theophil. Alexand.

of Rome did not ordain the bishop of Milan, who was in the Italic diocese; for S. Ambrose was ordained bishop by a synod of Italy at the appointment of the emperor Valentinian: and by an epistle of Pelagius I, A. D. 555, it appears that the bishops of Aquileia and Milan were wont to ordain each other; which though he would have believed was only to save charges in going to Rome, yet, as that learned and ingenuous person Petrus de Marca observes, “the true reason of it was, because Milan was the head of the Italic diocese, as appears by the council of Aquileia; and therefore the ordination of the bishop of Aquileia did of right belong to the bishop of Milan, and the ordination of the bishop of Milan did belong to him of Aquileia, as the chief metropolitan of the general synod of the Italic diocese^y.” Although afterwards the bishops of Rome got it so far into their hands, that their consent was necessary for such an ordination, yet that was only when they began more openly to encroach upon the liberties of other churches. But, as the same learned author^z goes on, those provinces which lay out of Italy did undoubtedly ordain their own metropolitans, without the authority or consent of the bishop of Rome, which he there largely proves of the African, Spanish, and French churches. It follows then, from the scope of the Nicene canon and the practice of the church, that the bishop of Rome had a limited jurisdiction, as the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, and other primates had.

§. 6. 2. That what churches did enjoy privileges before had them confirmed by this canon, as not to be altered; for it makes provision against any such alteration by ordaining that the ancient customs should be in force still: and accordingly we find it decreed in the second canon of the Constantinopolitan council, “That the same limits of dioceses should be
368 observed which were decreed in the council of Nice, and that none should intrude to do any thing in the dioceses of others.” And by the earnest and vehement epistles of pope Leo to

^y Cum vera hujus instituti ratio in eo consistat, quod cum Mediolanum esset caput diœceseos Italicæ, ut constat ex concilio Aquileiensi, ordinatio metropolitæ Aquileiensis ad episcopum Mediolanensem optimo jure pertinebat; primatis vero

Mediolanensis ordinatio ad Aquileiensem episcopum, quod primus esset inter metropolitanos synodi generalis diœceseos Italicæ.—Petrus de Marca de Concord. Sacerdot. et Imp. l. 6. c. 4. sect. 7.

^z Ibid. sect. 8.

Anatolius, we see the main thing he had to plead against the advancement of the patriarch of Constantinople was, that by this means “the most sacred decrees of the council of Nice would be violated.” We see then that those privileges which belonged to churches then ought still to be inviolably observed; so that those churches which then had primates and metropolitans of their own might plead their own right by virtue of the Nicene canon. So we find it decreed in that council of Ephesus^a, in the famous case of the Cyprian bishops; for their metropolitan being dead, (Troilus the bishop of Constance,) the bishop of Antioch pretended that it belonged to him to ordain their metropolitan, because Cyprus was within the civil jurisdiction of the diocese of Antioch: upon this, the Cyprian bishops make their complaint to the general council at Ephesus, and ground it upon that ancient custom which the Nicene canon insists on, viz. that their metropolitan had been exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishop of Antioch, and was ordained by a synod of Cyprian bishops; which privilege was not only confirmed to them by the Ephesine council^b, but a general decree passed, “that the rights of every province should be preserved whole and inviolate which it had of old according to ancient custom;” which was not a decree made merely in favour of the Cyprian bishops, but a common asserting the rights of metropolitans, that they should be held inviolate. Now therefore it appears that all the churches then were far from being under one of the three patriarchs, of Rome, Antioch, or Alexandria; for not only the three dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thracia were exempt, (although afterwards they voluntarily submitted to the patriarch of Constantinople,) but likewise all those churches which were in distinct dioceses from these had primates of their own, who were independent upon any other. Upon which account it hath not only been justly pleaded in behalf of the Britannie churches, that they are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Roman bishop, but it is ingenuously confessed by father Barns, “that the Britannie church might

^a Concil. Ephes. act. 7. part. 2. p. 424.

^b “Ἐδοξε τοίνυν τῇ ἀγίᾳ καὶ οἰκου-
μενικῇ συνόδῳ σώζεσθαι ἐκάστη ἐπαρ-
χία, καθαρὰ καὶ ἀβίαστα τὰ αὐτῇ προσ-

όντα δίκαια ἐξαρχῆς ἄνωθεν κατὰ τὸ
πάλαι κρατῆσαν ἔθος.—Concil. Ephes.
can. 8. in edit. vero Binii ante Ca-
nones habetur, tom. 2. Concil. part.
2. act. 7. p. 426.

plead the Cyprian privilege, that it was subject to no patriarch: and although this privilege was taken away by force and tumult, yet being restored by the consent of the kingdom in Henry VIIIth's time, and quietly enjoyed since, it ought to be retained for peace sake, without prejudice of catholicism and the brand of schism^c." If so, certainly it can be no schism to withdraw from the usurped authority of the Roman church. But these things have been more largely insisted on by others, and therefore I pass them over.

3. From thence it follows, that there was an equality, not only among the patriarchs, (whose name came not up till some time after the council of Nice,) but among the several primates of dioceses, all enjoying equal power and authority over their respective dioceses, without subordination to each other. But here it is vehemently pleaded by some who yet are no friends to the unlimited power of the Roman bishop, "That it is hardly conceivable that he should have no other power in the church but merely as head of the Roman diocese; and that it appears by the acts of the church he had a regular preeminence above others in ordering the affairs of the church." To which I answer, 1. If this be granted, it is nothing at all to that universal pastorship over the church, which our adversaries contend for as "due by divine right, and acknowledged
369 to be so by consent of the church." Let the bishop of Rome then quit his former plea, and insist only on this, and we shall speedily return an answer, and shew how far this canonical primacy did extend; but as long as he challengeth a supremacy upon other grounds, he forfeits this right, whatever it is, which comes by the canons of the church. 2. What merely comes by the canons of the church cannot bind the church to an absolute submission, in case that authority be abused to the church's apparent prejudice: for the church can never give away her power to secure herself against whatever encroachments tend to the injury of it. This power then may

^c Insula autem Britanniae gavisæ est olim privilegio Cyprio ut nullius patriarchæ legibus subderetur. Hoc autem privilegium etsi abolitum olim fuit bellorum tumultibus et vi, tamen cum tempore Henrici VIII. totius regni consensu fuerit repeti-

tum, et ab eo tempore pacifice præscriptum: videtur pacis ergo retineri debere, sine dispendio catholicismi, et absque schismatis ullius nota. — Barns Catholico-Romanus Pacificus MS. sect. 3.

be rescinded by the parts of the church, when it tends to the mischief of it. 3. This canonical preeminence is not the main thing we dispute with the church of Rome: let her reform herself from all those errors and corruptions which are in her communion, and reduce the church to the primitive purity and simplicity of faith and worship, and then see if we will quarrel with the primacy of the bishop of Rome, according to the canons, or any regular preeminence in him merely in order to the church's peace and unity. But this is not the case between us and them; they challenge an unlimited power, and that by divine right, and nothing else will satisfy them but this, although there be neither any ground in scripture for it, nor any evidence of it in the practice of the ancient church.

But, however, we must see what you produce for it. First you say the pope's confirmation was required to all new elected patriarchs. To that I shall return the full and satisfactory answer of the late renowned archbishop of Paris, Petrus de Marca, where he propounds this as an objection out of Baronius, and thus solves it; "That the confirmation of patriarchs by the bishop of Rome was no token of jurisdiction, but only of receiving into communion, and a testimony of his consent to the consecration already performed^d." And this was no more than was done by other bishops in reference to the bishop of Rome himself; for St. Cyprian writing to Antonianus about the election of Cornelius, saith, "that he was not only chosen by the suffrage of the people and testimony of the clergy, but that his election was confirmed by all their consent^e." May not you then as well say that the bishop of Carthage had power over the bishop of Rome, because his ordination was confirmed by him and other African bishops: but any one, who had understood better than you seem to do the proceedings of the church in those

^d Quod ad patriarchas attinet, responderi potest, confirmationem illam non esse signum jurisdictionis, sed tantum susceptionis in communionem, et testimonium quo constabat, summum pontificem consentire consecrationi jam peractæ.—Petrus de Marca de Concord. Sacerdot. et Imper. l. 6. c. 5. sect. 2.

^e Factus est autem Cornelius epi-

scopus de Dei et Christi ejus judicio, de clericorum pene omnium testimonio, de plebis quæ tunc affuit suffragio, et de sacerdotum antiquorum et bonorum virorum collegio—cum Fabiani locus vacaret, quo occupato de Dei voluntate atque omnium nostrum consentione firmato.—Cyprian. ep. 52. p. 75. ed. Rigalt.

ages, would never have made this an argument of the pope's authority over other patriarchs, since, as the same Petrus de Marca observes, "it was the custom in those times, that not only the patriarchs, but the Roman bishop himself, upon their election were wont to send abroad letters testifying their ordination; to which was added a profession of faith contained in their synodical epistles^f:" upon the receipt of which, communicatory letters were sent to the person newly ordained, to testify their communion with him, in case there were no just impediment produced. So that this was only a matter of fraternal communion, and importing nothing at all of jurisdiction; but the bishops of Rome, who were ready to make use of all occasions to advance their own grandeur, did in time make use of this for quite other ends than it was primarily intended; for in case of any suspicions and jealousies of any thing that might tend to the disservice of their see, they would then deny their communicatory letters, as Simplicius did in the case of the patriarch of Alexandria. And in that
 370 confirmation of Anatolius by Leo I, which Baronius so much insists on, Leo himself gives a sufficient account of it, viz. "to manifest that there was but one entire communion among them throughout the world^g:" so that if the pope's own judgment may be taken, this confirmation of new-elected patriarchs imported nothing of jurisdiction; but in case the popes did deny their communicatory letters, that did not presently hinder them from the execution of their office: as appears by the instance of Flavianus the patriarch of Antioch; for although three Roman bishops successively opposed him, Damasus, Syricius, and Anastasius^h, and used great importunity with the emperor that he might not continue in his place, yet because the churches of the Orient, Asia, Pontus, and Thracia, did approve of him, and communicate with him, he opposed their consent against the bishops of Rome: upon which, and

^f Quippe usu receptum erat per illas tempestates ut patriarchæ, et ipse etiam Romanus pontifex recens electus, literas de sua ordinatione mitterent; quibus addebatur professio fidei in synodicis eorum epistolis conscripta.—Petrus de Marca, ib.

^g Ut per totum mundum una no-

bis sit unius communionis integritas, in qua societatem tuæ dilectionis amplectimur, et gestorum quæ sumpsimus seriem, necessariis munitam subscriptionibus approbamus.

—Leo I. ep. 38.

^h Theodoret. l. 5. c. 23.

the emperor's severe checking them for their pride and contention, they at last promised the emperor that they would lay aside their enmity and acknowledge him; so that notwithstanding whatever the Roman bishops could do against him, he was acknowledged for a true patriarch, and at last their consent was given only by renewing communion with him; which certainly is far from being an instance of the pope's power over the other patriarchs.

§. 8. Whereby we also see what little power he had in deposing them; although you tell us "that it belonged likewise to him to depose unworthy ones, and restore the unjustly deposed by others." But that the power of deposing bishops was anciently in provincial councils appears sufficiently by the fifth canon of the Nicene council, and by the practice of the church both before and after it; and it is acknowledged by Petrus de Marcaⁱ, that the sole power of deposing bishops was not in the hands of the bishop of Rome till about eight hundred years since, and refutes the cardinal Perron for saying otherwise; and afterwards largely proves that the supreme authority of deposing bishops was still in provincial councils, and that the pope had nothing to do in it till the decree of the Sardican synod in the case of Athanasius; which yet, he saith, did not (as is commonly said) decree appeals to be made to Rome, but only gave the bishop of Rome power to review their actions, but still reserving to provincial councils that authority which the Nicene council had established them in. All the power which he then had was only this, that he might decree that the matters might be handled over again, but not that he had the power himself of deposing or restoring bishops; which is proved with that clearness and evidence by that excellent author, that I shall refer you to him for it, and consider the instances produced by you to the contrary. "We read," say you, "of no less than eight several patriarchs of Constantinople deposed by the bishop of Rome." Surely if you had read this yourself you would have quoted the place with more care and accuracy than you do; for you give us only a blind citation of an epistle of pope Nicolaus to the emperor Michael, neither citing the words nor telling us which

Lab. p. 184.
n. 2.

ⁱ De Concord. l. 7. c. 1. sect. 6.

it is, when there are several, and those no very short ones neither. But however it is well chosen to have a pope's testimony in his own cause, and that such a pope who was then in contest with the patriarch of Constantinople, and that too so long after the encroachments of the bishops of Rome, it being in the ninth century: and yet for all this, this pope doth not say those words which you would fasten upon him; that which he saith is, "That none of the bishops of Constantinople, or scarce any of them, were ejected without the consent of the bishop of Rome^k;" and then instanceth in Maximus, Nestorius, Accacius, Anthimus, Sergius, Pyrrhus, Paulus, Petrus: but his design in this is only to shew that Ignatius the
 371 patriarch ought not to have been deposed without his consent. But what is all this to the pope's sole power of deposing, when even at that time the pope did not challenge it? But supposing the popes had done it before, it doth not follow that it was in their power to do it, and that the canons had given them right to do it, but least of all certainly that they had a *divine* right for it, which never was in the least acknowledged by the church as to a deposition of patriarchs, which you contend for. But besides this, you say Sixtus the Third deposed Polychronius bishop of Hierusalem; whereas Sixtus only sent eight persons from a synod at Rome to Hierusalem, who when they came there did not offer to depose Polychronius by virtue of the pope's power, but a synod of seventy or more neighbour-bishops were called, by whom he was deposed; and yet, after all this, Binius¹ himself condemns those acts which report this story for spurious, there being a manifest repugnancy in the time of them, and no such person as Polychronius ever mentioned by the ecclesiastical historians of that time, and other fabulous narrations inserted in them: yet these are your goodly proofs of the pope's power to depose patriarchs.

But we must see whether you have any better success in proving his power to restore such as were deposed; for which you only instance in Athanasius and Paulus, restored by Julius, whose case must be further examined; which, in short,

^k Aut nunquam omnino, aut certe vix, horum aliquis sine consensu Romani pontificis reperitur ejectus. —Nicol. I. epist. 8. Michael. Imp. tom. 6. Concil. Binii, p. 506.
¹ Tom. 2. Concil. p. 685.

is this: Athanasius being condemned by the synods of Tyre and Antioch, goes to Rome, where he and Paulus are received into communion by Julius, who would not accept of the decree of the eastern bishops, which was sent after him to Rome: for pope Julius did not formally offer to restore Athanasius to his church, but only owned and received him into communion as bishop of Alexandria, and that because he looked on the proceedings as unjust in his condemnation. And all that Julius^m himself pleads for is, not a power to depose or restore patriarchs himself, but only that such things ought not to have been done without communicating those proceedings to him which the unity of the church might require. And therefore Petrus de Marca saith, that Baronius, Bellarmine, and Perron are all strangely out in this story, when they would infer that the causes of the eastern bishops upon appeal were to be judged by the bishop of Rome; whereas all that Julius pleads for is, that such things should not be done by the eastern bishops alone, which concerned the deposition of so great a person in the church as the patriarch of Alexandria, but that there ought to be a council both of the eastern and western bishops; on which account afterwards the Sardican synod was called. But when we consider with what heat and stomach this was received by the eastern bishops; how they absolutely deny that the western bishops had any more to do with their proceedings than they had with theirs; when they say that the pope by this usurpation was the cause of all the mischief that followed; we see what an excellent instance you have made choice of to prove the pope's power of restoring bishops by divine right, and that this was acknowledged by the whole church.

§. 9. The next thing to be considered is that speech of St. Augustine, "that in the church of Rome there did always flourish the principality of an apostolic chairⁿ." As to which his lordship saith, "that neither was the word *principatus* so great, nor the bishops of those times so little, as that *principes* and *principatus* are not commonly given them both by the Greek and Latin fathers of this great and learnedest age of the church made up of the fourth and fifth hundred years,

^m Lib. 7. c. 4. sect. 6.

ⁿ In Romana ecclesia semper apo-

VIND., VOL. II.

stolicæ cathedræ viguit principatus.

—S. Aug. epist. 162.

always understanding *principatus* of their spiritual power, and within the limits of their several jurisdictions, which perhaps now and then they did occasionally exceed. And there is not one word in St. Augustine that this principality of the apostolic chair in the church of Rome was then or ought to be
 372 now exercised over the whole church of Christ, as Bellarmine insinuates there, and as A. C. would have it here." To all
 Lab. p. 184. this you say nothing to purpose, but only tell us, "that the
 n. 2. bishop by this makes way to some other *pretty perversions*" (as you call them) "of the same father; for we must know," say you, "that he is entering upon that main question concerning the Donatists of Afric:" and he is so indeed; and that not only for clearing the meaning of St. Augustine in the present epistle, but of the whole controversy, to which a great light will be given by a true account of those proceedings.
 Conf. p. 140. Thus then his lordship goes on: "And to prove that St. Au-
 sect. 25. gustine did not intend by *principatus* here to give the Roman
 n. 10. bishop any power out of his own limits (which God knows were far short of the whole church), I shall make it most manifest out of the same epistle: for afterwards (saith St. Augustine), when the pertinacy of the Donatists could not be restrained by the African bishops, only 'they gave them leave to be heard by foreign bishops^o.' And after that he hath these words: 'And yet peradventure Melchiades, the bishop of the Roman church, with his colleagues the transmarine bishops, *non debuit*, ought not to usurp to himself this judgment, which was determined by seventy African bishops, Tigisitanus sitting primate. And what will you say if he did not usurp this power? for the emperor, being desired, sent bishops judges, which should sit with him, and determine what was just upon the whole cause^p.' In which passage," saith his lordship, "there are very many things observable: as, first, that the Roman prelate came not in till there was leave for them to go to transmarine bishops: secondly, that if the pope had come

^o Pergant ad fratres et collegas nostros transmarinarum ecclesiarum episcopos.—S. Aug. epist. 162.

^p An forte non debuit Romanæ ecclesiæ Melchiades episcopus cum collegis transmarinis episcopis illud sibi usurpare iudicium, quod ab Afris

septuaginta, ubi primas Tigisitanus præsedet, fuerat terminatum. Quid quod nec ipse usurpaverit? Rogatus quippe imperator, iudices misit episcopos, qui cum eo sederent, et de tota illa causa, quod justum videretur, statuerent.—S. Aug. ib.

in without this leave, it had been an usurpation: thirdly, that when he did thus come in, not by his own authority, but by leave, there were other bishops made judges with him: fourthly, that these other bishops were appointed and sent by the emperor and his power—that which the pope least of all will endure: lastly, lest the pope and his adherents should say this was an usurpation in the emperor, St. Austin tells us a little before, in the same epistle still, ‘that this doth chiefly belong *ad curam ejus*, to the emperor’s care and charge, and that he is to give an account to God for it^a.’ And Melchiades did sit and judge the business with all Christian prudence and moderation. So at this time the Roman prelate was not received as pastor of the whole church, say A. C. what he please; nor had he supremacy over the other patriarchs.” In order to the better shaping your answer to this discourse, you pretend to give us a true narrative of the Donatists’ proceedings, by the same figure that Lucian’s book is inscribed *De vera historia*. There are several things, therefore, to be taken notice of in your narrative, before we come to your particular answers, whose strength depends upon the matters of fact.

First, you give no satisfactory account at all, why, if the pope’s universal pastorship had been then owned, the first appeal on both sides was not made to the bishop of Rome; for in so great a schism as that was between the different parties of Cæcilian and Majorinus, to whom should they have directly gone but to Melchiades, then bishop of Rome? How comes it to pass that there is no mention at all of his judgment by either party till Constantine had appointed him to be one of the judges? St. Austin^r indeed pleads in behalf of Cæcilian, why he would not be judged by the African synod of seventy bishops, “that there were thousands of his colleagues on the other side the sea whom he might be tried by.” But why not by the bishop of Rome alone, if the universal pastorship did belong to him? But your narrative gives us a rare account why the Donatists did not go to the pope before 373 they went to the emperor, viz. “that they durst not appear there, or else knew it would be to little purpose.” But by what arguments do you prove they durst not appear there

^a Ad cujus curam, de qua rationem Deo redditurus est, res illa maxime pertinebat.—Id. ib.

^r Id. ib.

before, when we see they went readily thither after the emperor had appointed Rome for the place where their cause was to be heard, if they thought it were to so little purpose? for we see the Donatists never except against the place at all, or the person of the bishop of Rome; but upon the command of Constantine, made known to them by Anulinus the proconsul of Africa, ten of their party go to Rome to negotiate their affairs before the delegates. This is but therefore a very lame account why the first appeal should be to the emperor, and not to the pope, if he had been then known to be the universal pastor of the church. But, say you further, "the emperor disliked their proceedings, and told them expressly that it belonged not to him, neither durst he act the part of a judge in a cause of bishops:" but on what grounds he durst not do it we may easily judge by his undertaking it at last, and passing a final judgment in this cause himself after the councils at Rome, at Arles, could not put an end to it. If Constantine had judged it unlawful, could their importunity have excused it? and could it be any other than unlawful, if the pope were the universal pastor of the church? Do you think it would be accounted a sufficient plea among you now for any prince to assume to himself the judgment of any cause already determined by the pope, because of the importunity of the persons concerned in it? Indeed Constantine did at first prudently wave the business himself; and that, I suppose, the rather, because the Donatists in their petition had intreated that some of the bishops of Gaul might umpire the business, either because that was then the place of the emperor's residence, or else that Gaul under Constantius had escaped the late persecution, and therefore were not liable to the suspicion of those crimes whereof Cæcilian and Felix of Aptung were accused. But, however, though Constantine did not sit as judge himself, he appointed Marinus, Rheticius, and Maternus to join with Melchiades the bishop of Rome in the determining this case. "But this he did," you say, "to comply with the Donatists." What, to join other bishops with the head of the church in equal power for deciding controversies, and all this merely to comply with the schismatical Donatists? was this, think you, becoming one who believed the pope's universal pastorage by divine right? Well fare then the

answer of others who love to speak plain truths, and impute all these proceedings to Constantine's ignorance of his duty, being yet but a catechumen in Christian religion, and therefore did he knew not what: but methinks the universal pastor, or some of those nineteen bishops who sat at Rome in this business, or of those two hundred who you say met afterwards at Arles about it, should have a little better instructed him in his duty, and not let him go so far on in it, as from delegating judges to hear it, and among them the head of the church, to resume it afterwards himself, both to hear and determine it. "If the emperor had" (as you say) "protested Lab. p. 180. against this as in itself unlawful," would none of the bishops n. 3. hinder him from doing it? But where doth Constantine profess against it as in itself unlawful? if so, no circumstances, no importunities could ever make it lawful; unless you think the importunity of Joseph's mistress would have made adultery no sin in him. If Constantine said he would ask the bishops' pardon in it, that might be as looking on them as the more competent judges, but not thinking it unlawful in itself for him to do as you say.

§. 10. Well, but you tell us, "It was rather the justice and moderation of the Roman prelate that he came not in before it was due time, and the matter orderly brought before him." I am very much of your mind in this; and if all popes since Melchiades had used the same justice and moderation, to have staid till things had been orderly brought to them, and not 374 usurped upon the privileges of other churches, things had been in a far better condition in the Christian world than they are: had there been none but such as Melchiades, who shewed so much Christian prudence and moderation in the management of this business, that great schism, which your church hath caused by her arrogant pretences, might have been prevented. But how come you to know that this case did properly belong to the pope's cognizance? who told you this? to be sure not the emperor Constantine, who in his epistle to Miltiades, extant in Eusebius^s, intimates no such thing, but only writes to him as one delegated to hear that cause with the other bishops, and gives him instructions in order to it. Do the Donatists

^s Euseb. lib. 10. c. 5.

or their adversaries mention any such thing? doth the pope himself ever express or intimate it? it seems he wanted your information much at that time; or, it may be, like the late pope Innocent in the case of the five propositions, he might say he was bred no divine, and therefore might the less understand his duty. But can it possibly enter into your head that this case came to the pope at last by way of regular appeal, as you seem to assert afterwards? is this the way of appeals, to go to the emperor and petition him to appoint judges to hear the case? If the case of appeals must be determined from these proceedings, to be sure the last resort will be to the emperor himself, as well as the first appeal.

Whether the African bishops gave leave to the Donatists to be heard by foreign bishops, or they took it themselves, is not much material, because the schism was so great at home, that there was no likelihood of any ending the controversy by standing to a fair arbitration among themselves; and therefore there seemed a necessity on both sides of referring the business to some unconcerned persons, who might hear the allegations, and judge indifferently between them. And no other way did the nineteen bishops at Rome proceed with them but as indifferent arbitrators; and therefore the witnesses and allegations on both sides were brought before them; but we read of no power at all challenged absolutely to bind the persons to the judgment of the church of Rome as the final judgment in the case. The question, whether the pope had usurped this power or no, depends not upon the Donatists' question, whether Melchiades ought to have undertaken the judgment of that cause which had been already determined by a synod of seventy bishops in Afric, but upon St. Augustine's answer, who justifies the lawfulness of his doing it because he was thereto appointed by the emperor. But when you say St. Austin gives this answer only *per ἐπιείκειαν*, by way of condescension to his adversaries' way of speaking, you would do well to prove elsewhere from St. Austin, that, when he lays aside his rhetoric, he ever speaks otherwise, but that it would have been an usurpation in the pope to challenge to himself the hearing of those causes which had been determined by African bishops. But what St. Augustine's judgment, as well as the other African fathers', was in this point, abundantly

appears from the controversies between them and the bishop of Rome in the case of appeals. It sufficiently appears already, that neither our Saviour nor the canons of the universal church gave the pope leave to hear and judge the causes of St. Athanasius, and other patriarchs and bishops of the church; and therefore you were put to your shifts when you run thither for security. But that which follows is notoriously false, "that when he did so interpose, no man (no, not the persons themselves who were interested, and suffered by his judgment) complained or accused him of usurpation," when in the case of Athanasius it is so vehemently pleaded by the eastern bishops that the pope had nothing at all to do in it; but they might as well call in question what was done at Rome, as he what was done at Antioch. Nay, name us any one cause in that age of the church where the pope did offer 375 to meddle in matters determined by other bishops, which he was not opposed in, and the persons concerned did not complain, and accuse him of meddling with what he had no right to, which are but other words for *usurpation*.

§. 11. You say, "the bishops whom the emperor sent as judges with the pope were an inconsiderable number to sway the sentence." It seems three to one are with you an inconsiderable number. But, say you, "the pope, to shew his authority, added fifteen other bishops of Italy to be his colleagues and assistants in the business." Either these fifteen bishops were properly judges in the cause, or only assistants for better management and speedier dispatch; if they were judges, how prove you that Constantine did not appoint them? if they were only assistants and suffragans to the bishop of Rome, as is most probable, (except Merocles bishop of Milan,) what authority did the pope shew in calling his suffragans to his assistance in a matter of that nature, which required so much examination of witnesses? But the pope had more effectually shewn his authority if he had refused the bishops whom Constantine sent, and told him he meddled with that which did not concern him, to appoint any judges at all in a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance, and that it was an insufferable presumption in him to offer to send three underling bishops to sit with him in deciding controversies, as though he were not the universal pastor of the church himself, to

whom alone, by divine right, all such things did belong. Such language as this would have become the head of the church, and in that indeed he had shewn his authority; but for him sneakingly to admit other bishops as joint-commissioners, forsooth, with him, and that by the emperor's appointment too, what did he else but betray the rights of his see, and expose his infallible headship to great contempt? Do you think that pope Hildebrand or any of his successors would have done this? no, they understood their power far better than so; and the emperor should have known his own, for offering such an affront to his holiness: and if his bay-leaves did not secure him, the thunderbolts of excommunication might have lighted on him to his prejudice. For shame then never say that pope Miltiades shewed his authority, but rather give him over among those good bishops of Rome, but bad popes, who knew better how to suffer martyrdom than assert the authority of the Roman see. I pray imagine but Paul V. or any other of our stout-spirited popes in Miltiades his place, would they have taken such things at Constantine's hands as poor Miltiades did, and, for all that we see, was very well contented too, and thought he did but his duty in doing what the emperor bid him? Would they have been contented to have had a cause once passed the infallible judgment of the Roman see to be resumed again, and handled in another council, as though there could be any suspicion that all things were not rightly carried there; and that after all this, too, the emperor should undertake to give the final decision to it? would these things have been borne with by any of our infallible heads of the church? But good Miltiades must be excused; he went as far as his knowledge carried him, and thought he might do good service to the church in what he did; and that was it he looked at, more than the grandeur of his see. The good bishops then were just crept out of the flames of persecution, and they thought it a great matter that they had liberty themselves, and did not much concern themselves about those usurpations which the pride and ease of the following ages gave occasion for: they were sorry to see a church, that had survived the cruel flames of Dioclesian's persecution, so suddenly to feel new ones in her own bowels; that a church whose constitution was so strong as to endure martyrdoms,

should no sooner be at ease, but she begins to putrefy, and to be fly-blown with heats and divisions among her members, 376 and that her own children should rake in those wounds which the violence of her professed enemies had caused in her; and therefore these good bishops used their care and industry to close them up, and rather rejoiced they had so good an emperor, who would concern himself so much in healing the church's breaches, than dispute his authority, or disobey his commands: and if Constantine doth express himself unwilling to engage himself to meddle in a business concerning the bishops of the church, it was out of his tender respect to those bishops who had manifested their piety and sincerity so much in their late persecutions, and not from any question of his own authority in it: for that he after sufficiently asserted, not only in his own actions, but when the case of Felix of Aptung was thought not sufficiently scanned at Rome, in appointing (about four months after the judgment at Rome) Ælianus, the proconsul of Africa, to examine the case of Felix the bishop of Aptung, who had ordained Cæcilian^t. To this the Donatists pleaded, "that a bishop ought not to be tried by proconsular judgment:" to which St. Austin answers, "that it was not his own seeking, but the emperor's appointing, to whose care and charge that business did chiefly belong, of which he must give an account to God^u." And can it now enter into any head but yours, that, for all this, the emperor looked on the judgment of this cause as a thing not belonging to his authority? They who can believe such things as these, and notwithstanding all the circumstances of this story can think the pope's universal pastorship was then owned, the most I can say of them is, that they are in a fair way to believe *transubstantiation*; there being nothing so improbable but upon equal grounds they may judge it true.

§. 12. That the pope had no supremacy over other patriarchs, his lordship saith, "that were all other records of antiquity silent, the civil law is proof enough, and that is a monument of the primitive church; the text there is, *A pa-*

^t Valesius de Schismate Donatist. cap. 11.

^u Ait quidam, Non debuit episcopus proconsulari judicio purgari: quasi vero ipse sibi hoc comparave-

rit, ac non imperator ita quæri jussit, ad cujus curam de qua rationem Deo redditurus esset, res illa maxime pertinebat.—Augustin. ep. 162.

Conf. p. 141.
sect. 25.
n. 10.

triarcha non datur appellatio^x, ‘From a patriarch there lies no appeal.’ No appeal; therefore every patriarch was alike supreme in his own patriarchate; therefore the pope then had no supremacy over the whole church; therefore certainly not then received as universal pastor.” Two things you answer

Lab. p. 188. to this: 1. “That this reacheth not the difference between
n. 4. patriarchs themselves, who must have some higher ordinary tribunal, where such causes may be heard and determined.”

Very well argued against the pope’s power of judging; for, in case of a difference between him and the other patriarchs, who must decide the difference? Himself, no doubt! But still it is your way to beg that you can never prove; for you herein suppose the pope to be above all patriarchs, which you know is the thing in dispute: or do you suppose it very possible that other patriarchs may quarrel and fall out among themselves, but that the popes are always such mild and good men, that it is impossible any should fall out with them, or they with others; that still they must stand by as unconcerned in all the quarrels of the Christian world, and be ready to receive complaints from all places? If therefore a general council must not be the judge in this case, I pray name somewhat else more agreeable to reason and the practice of the church. But you answer, 2. “What the law saith is rightly understood, and must be explicated of inferior clerks only, who were not (of ordinary course) to appeal further than the patriarch, or the primate of their province; for so the council of Afric determines; but it is even there acknowledged that bishops had power in their own causes to appeal to Rome^y.” This answer of yours necessarily leads us to the debates of the great case of appeals to Rome, as it was managed between the
377 African bishops and the bishops of Rome, by which we shall easily discover the weakness of your answer, and the most palpable fraud of your citation; by which we may see what an excellent cause you have to manage, which cannot be defended but by such frauds as here you make use of, and hope to impose upon your reader by. Your answer therefore in the general is, “That the laws concerning appeals did only concern inferior clergymen, but that bishops were allowed to

^x Cod. 1. 1. tit. 4. l. 29. Au-
thent. Collat. 9. tit. 15. c. 22.

^y Concil. Afric. can. 101. Epist.
ad Bonifac.

appeal to Rome even by the council of Afric, which not only decreed it, but acknowledged it in an epistle to pope Boniface ;” and therefore, for our through understanding the truth in this case, those proceedings of the African church must be briefly explained, and truly represented. Two occasions the churches of Africa had to determine in the case of appeals to Rome ; the first in the Milevitan, the second in the Carthaginian councils ; in both which we have several things very considerable to our purpose. In the Milevitan council they decree, that whosoever would appeal beyond the sea should not be received into communion by any in Africa ; which decree is supposed by some to be occasioned by Coelestius having recourse to pope Zosimus after he had been condemned in Africa. No doubt those prudent bishops began to be quickly sensible of the monstrous inconvenience which would speedily follow upon the permission of such appeals to Rome ; for by that means they should never preserve any discipline in their churches, but every person who was called in question for any crimes would slight the bishops of those churches, and presently appeal to Rome : to prevent which mischief, they make that excellent canon, which allows only liberty of appealing to the councils of Africa, or to the primates of their province, but absolutely forbids all foreign appeals. All the difficulty is, whether this canon only concerned the inferior clergy, as you say, (and which is all that the greatest of your side have said in it,) or whether it doth not take away all appeals of bishops too : for which we need no more than produce the canon itself, as it is extant in the authentic collection of the canons of the African church^z ; in which is an express clause, declaring that the same thing had been often determined in the case of bishops ; which, because it strikes home, therefore Perron and others have no other shift but to say that this clause was not in the original Milevitan canons, but was inserted afterwards. But why do not they who assert

^z Item placuit ut presbyteri, diaconi, vel cæteri inferiores clerici, in causis quas habuerint, si de judiciis episcoporum suorum questi fuerint, vicini episcopi eos cum consensu episcopi sui audiant, et inter eos definiant, adhibiti ab eis episcopi : quod si et ab iis provocandum putaverint, non provocent ad transmarina judi-

cia ; sed ad primates suarum provinciarum, aut ad universale concilium ; *Sicut et de episcopis sæpe constitutum est.* Ad transmarina autem qui putaverit appellandum, a nullo intra Africam ad communionem suscipiatur.—Codex Canon. Eccles. African. can. 28.

such bold things produce the true authentic copy of these Milevitan canons, that we may see what is genuine and what not? But suppose we should grant that this clause was inserted afterwards, it will be rather for the advantage than prejudice of our cause. For which we must consider, that in the time of Aurelius bishop of Carthage there had been very many councils celebrated there: no fewer than seventeen Justellus and others reckon. But a general council meeting at Carthage A. D. 419, (which was about three years after that Milevitan council which was held 416, as appears by the answer of Innocentius to it, A. D. 417,) at the end of the first session they reviewed the canons of those lesser councils, and out of them all composed that Codex Canonum Ecclesiæ Africanæ, as Justellus at large proves in the preface to his edition of it. So that if this clause were inserted, it must be inserted then, for it is well known that the case of appeals was then at large debated; and by that means it received a more general authority by passing in this African council. And hence it was that this canon passed with this clause into the Greek churches; for Balsamon and Zonaras both acknowledge it; and not only they, but many ancient Latin copies had it too, and is so received and pleaded by the council of Rhemes; as Hincmarus and others have already proved. But Gratian hath helped it well out, for he hath added a brave antidote at
 378 the end of it, by putting to it a very useful clause, *Nisi forte Romanam sedem appellaverit*; by which the canon makes excellent sense, that none shall appeal to Rome unless they do appeal to Rome; for none who have any understanding of the state of those churches at that time, do make the least question but the intent of the canon was to prohibit appeals to Rome; but then, say they, they were only the appeals of the inferior clergy, which were to be ended by the bishops of their own province.

§. 13. But this answer is very unreasonable on these accounts: 1. If appeals do of right belong to the bishop of Rome, as universal pastor of the church, then why not the appeals of the inferior clergy as well as bishops? Indeed, if appeals were challenged only by virtue of the canons, and those canons limit one and not the other, (as the most eager pleaders for appeals in that age pleaded only the canons of the church for them,) then there might be some reason why

one should be restrained, and not the other ; but if they belong to him by divine right, then all appeals must necessarily belong to him. 2. If appeals belong to the pope, as universal pastor, then no council or persons had any thing to do to determine who should appeal and who not. For this were an usurping of the pope's privilege, for he to whom only the right of appeals belongs can determine who should appeal and who not, and where and by whom those controversies should be ended. So that the very act of the council, in offering to limit appeals, implies that they did not believe any such universal pastorship in the pope ; for had they done so, they would have waited his judgment, and not offered to have determined such things themselves. 3. The appeals of the upper and inferior clergy cannot be supposed to be separate from each other. For the appeal of a presbyter doth suppose the impeachment of the bishop for some wrong done to him, as in the case of Apiarius accusing Urban the bishop of Sicca for excommunicating him. So that the bishop becomes a party in the appeal of a presbyter. And if appeals be allowed to the bishop, it is supposed to be in his favour, for clearing of his right the better ; and if it be denied to the presbyter, it would savour too much of injustice and partiality. 4. The reason of the canon extends to one as well as the other, which must be supposed to prevent all those troubles and inconveniences which would arise from the liberty of appeals to Rome ; and would not these come as well by the appeals of bishops as of inferior clergy ? Nay, doth not the canon insist on that, that no appeals should be made from the council of bishops or the primates of Africa ? but in case of bishops' appeals this would be done as well as the other : and therefore they are equally against the reason and design of the canon. 5. The case of presbyters may be as great and considerable as that of bishops, and as much requiring the judgment of the universal pastor of the church. As for instance, that very case which probably gave occasion to the Milevitan canon, viz. the going of Cœlestius to Rome, being condemned of heresy in Africa : now what greater cause could there be made an appeal to Rome in, than in so great a matter of faith as that was, about the necessity of grace ? And therefore Petrus de Marca^a proves at large against

^a De Concord. Sacerd. et Imp. l. 7. c. 13. sect. 6, 7, 9.

Perron, that in the epistle of Innocent to Victricius, where it is said, "that the greater causes must be referred to the apostolic see," is not to be understood only of the causes of bishops, but may refer to the causes of presbyters too, i. e. when they either concern matter of faith, or some doubtful piece of church discipline. 6. The pope, notwithstanding this canon, looked on himself as no more hindered from receiving the appeals of presbyters than those of bishops. If therefore any difference had been made by any act of the church, surely the pope would have remanded presbyters back to their own provinces again; but instead of that, we see, he received the appeal of Apiarius. But for this a rare answer is given, viz. that though the presbyters were forbidden to appeal, yet the pope was not forbidden to receive them if they did appeal.

379 But to what purpose then were such prohibitions made, if the pope might, by his open encouragement of them upon their appeals to him, make them not value such canons at all? for they knew, if they could but get to Rome, they should be received for all them.

§. 14. Notwithstanding all which hath been said, you tell us, "that in the council of Afric it was acknowledged, that bishops had power in their own cause to appeal to Rome;" for which you cite in your margent part of an epistle of the council to Boniface. But with what honesty and integrity you do this, will appear by the story. Apiarius then appealing to Zosimus, he sends over Faustinus to Africa, to negotiate the business of appeals, and to restore Apiarius, for which he pleads the Nicene canons (an account of which will be given afterwards): the fathers all protest they could find no such thing there, but they agree to send deputies into the East, to fetch the true canons thence (as hath been related already); in the mean time Zosimus dies, and Boniface succeeds him; but for the better satisfaction of the pope, the council of Carthage dispatch away a letter to Boniface, to give him an account of their proceedings; in which epistle, (extant in the African Code of Canons,) after they have given an account of the business of Apiarius, they proceed to the instructions which Faustinus brought with him to Africa, the chief of which is that concerning appeals to be made to Rome, and then follow those words which you quote, in which they

say^b, that in a letter written the year before to Zosimus, they had granted liberty to bishops to appeal to Rome; and that therein they had intimated so much to him. Thus far you are right; but there is usually some mystery couched in your “&c.,” for you know very well where to cut off sentences; for had you added but the next words, they had spoiled all your foregoing, there being contained in them the full reason of what went before, viz. that because the pope pretended that the appeals of bishops were contained in the Nicene canons, they were contented to yield that it should be so, till the true canons were produced. And is this now all their acknowledgment, that bishops might in their own causes appeal to Rome, when they made only a provisional decree, what should be done till the matter came to a resolution? But if you will thoroughly understand what their final judgment was in this business, I pray read their excellent epistle to pope Celestine, who succeeded Boniface, after they had received the Nicene canons out of the East. Which being so excellent a monument of antiquity, and giving so great light to our present controversy, I shall at large recite and render it, so far as concerns this business. “After our bounden duty of salutation, we earnestly beseech you, that hereafter you admit not so easily to your ears those that come from hence, and that you admit no more into communion those whom we 380 have cast out: for your reverence will easily perceive that this is forbid by the council of Nice. For if this be taken care for as to the inferior clergy and laity, how much more would it have it to be observed in bishops! that so they who are in their own province suspended from communion be not hastily or unduly admitted by your holiness. Let your holiness also reject the wicked refuges of priests and inferior clerks; for no canon of the fathers hath taken that from the church of Afric; and the decrees of Nice have subjected both the inferior clergy and bishops to their metropolitans. For they have most wisely and justly provided, that every business be

^b Ut Romam liceat episcopis provocare, et ut clericorum causæ apud suarum provinciarum episcopos finiantur, jam priore anno etiam literis nostris ad eundem venerabilis memoriæ Zosimum episcopum datis,

insinuare curavimus, ut ea servare sine ulla ejus injuria paulisper sine-remus, usque ad inquisitionem statutorum concilii Nicæni.—Codex Canon. Eccl. African. p. 346.

determined in the place where it begun: and that the grace of the Holy Spirit will not be wanting to every province, that so equity may be prudently discovered and constantly held by Christ's priests. Especially seeing that it is lawful to every one, if he be offended, to appeal to the council of the province, or even to an universal council. Unless perhaps that somebody believe that God can inspire to every one of us the justice of examination of a cause, and refuse it to a multitude of bishops assembled in council. Or how can a judgment made beyond the sea be valid, to which the persons of necessary witnesses cannot be brought, by reason of the infirmity of their sex and age, or of many other intervening impediments? For this sending of men to us from your holiness, we do not find commanded by any synod of the fathers. And as for that which you did long since send to us by Faustinus our fellow-bishop, as belonging to the council of Nice, we could not find it in the truest copies of the council, sent by holy Cyril our colleague, bishop of Alexandria, and by the venerable Atticus bishop of Constantinople: which also we sent to your predecessor Boniface, of happy memory, by Innocent a presbyter and Marcellus a deacon. Take heed also of sending to us any of your clerks for executors to those who desire it, lest we seem to bring the swelling pride of the world into the church of Christ, which beareth the light of simplicity and the brightness of humility before them that desire to see God. And concerning our brother Faustinus, (Apiarius being now for his wickedness cast out of the church of Christ,) we are confident, that our brotherly love continuing through the goodness and moderation of your holiness, Africa shall no more be troubled with him^c." Thus I have at large produced

^c Præfato itaque debitæ salutatio-
nis officio, impendio deprecamur, ut
deinceps ad vestras aures hinc veni-
entes non facilius admittatis, nec a
nobis excommunicatos in communi-
onem ultra velitis excipere; quia
hoc etiam Nicæno concilio definitum
facile advertet venerabilitas tua. Nam
etsi de inferioribus clericis vel de
laicis videtur ibi præcaveri, quanto
magis hoc de episcopis voluit obser-
vari, ne in sua provincia a commu-
nionem suspensi a tua sanctitate præ-

propere, vel indebite videantur com-
munioni restitui. Presbyterorum
quoque et sequentium clericorum
improba refugia, sicut te dignum
est, repellat sanctitas tua, quia et
nulla patrum definitione hoc eccle-
siæ derogatum est Africanæ, et de-
creta Nicæna, sive inferioris gradus
clericos, sive ipsos episcopos suis
metropolitanis apertissime commi-
serunt. Prudentissime enim justis-
simeque viderunt, quæcunque ne-
gotia, in suis locis, ubi orta sunt,

this noble monument of the prudence, courage, and simplicity of the African fathers; enough to put any reasonable man out of the fond conceit of an universal pastorship of the bishop of Rome. I wonder not that Baronius saith there are some hard things in this epistle, that Perron sweats and toils so much to so little purpose to enervate the force of it; for as long as the records of it last, we have an impregnable bulwark against the usurpations of the church of Rome. And methinks you might blush for shame to produce those African fathers as determining the appeals of bishops to Rome, who, with as much evidence and reason as courage and resolution, did finally oppose it. What can be said more convincingly against these appeals than is here urged by them, that they have neither authority from councils, nor any foundation in justice and equity; that God's presence was as well in Africa as Rome; (no doubt then they never imagined any infallibility there;) that the proceedings of the Roman bishop were so far from the simplicity and humility of the gospel, that they tended only to nourish swelling pride and secular ambition in the church; that the pope had no authority to send legates to hear causes, and they hoped they should be no more

finienda; nec unicuique providentiæ gratiam Sancti Spiritus defuturam: quæ æquitas a Christi sacerdotibus, et prudenter videatur, et constantissime teneatur: maxime quia unicuique concessum est, si iudicio offensus fuerit cognitorum, ad concilia suæ provinciæ, vel etiam universale provocare. Nisi forte quisquam est qui credat, unicuique posse Deum nostrum examinis inspirare justitiam; et innumerabilibus congregatis in concilium sacerdotibus denegare. Aut quomodo ipsum transmarinum iudicium ratum erit, ad quod testium necessariæ personæ vel propter sexus, vel propter senectutis infirmitatem, vel multis aliis impedimentis adduci non poterunt? Nam ut aliqui tanquam a tuæ sanctitatis latere mittantur, nulla invenimus patrum synodo constitutum. Quia illud quod pridem per eundem coepiscopum nostrum Faustinum, tanquam ex parte Nicæni concilii exinde transmisistis, in conciliis verioribus, quæ

accipiuntur Nicæni, a S. Cyrillo coepiscopo nostro Alexandrinæ ecclesiæ, et a venerabili Attico Constantino-politano antistite, ex authentico missis, quæ etiam ante hoc per Innocentium presbyterum et Marcellum subdiaconum, per quos ad nos ab iis directa sunt, venerabilis memoriæ Bonifacio episcopo decessori vestro a nobis transmissa sunt, in quibus tale aliquid non potuimus invenire. Executores etiam clericos vestros quibusque petentibus nolite mittere, ne fumosum typhum seculi in ecclesiam Christi, quæ lucem simplicitatis et humilitatis diem Deum videre cupientibus præfert, videamur inducere. Nam de fratre nostro Faustino (amato jam, pro suis nefandis nequitias, de Christi ecclesia dolendo Apiario) securi sumus, quod eum probitate ac moderatione tuæ sanctitatis, salva fraterna charitate ulterius Africa minime patiatur.—Concil. Carthag. Epist. ad Cœlestinum.

troubled with such as Faustinus was. All these things are so evident in this testimony, that it were a disparagement to it to offer more at large to explain them. I hope then this will make you sensible of the injury you have done the African fathers, by saying that they determined the causes of bishops might be heard at Rome.

§. 15. Your answer to the place of St. Gregory^d which his lordship produceth concerning appeals, viz. that the patriarch
381 is to put a final end to those causes which come before him by appeal from bishops and archbishops, is the very same, that it speaks only of the inferior clergy, and therefore is taken off already. But you wonder his lordship should expose to view the following words of St. Gregory, where there is neither metropolitan nor patriarch of that diocese, there they are to have recourse to the see apostolic, as being the head of all churches. “Then surely it follows,” say you, “the bishop of Rome’s jurisdiction is not only over the western and southern provinces, but over the whole church, whither the jurisdiction of patriarchs and metropolitans never extended.” See how well you make good the common saying, that ignorance is the cause of admiration; for, wherefore should you wonder at his lordship’s producing these words, if you had either understood or considered the abundant answers which he gives to them?

Conf.p.141. 1. “That if there be a metropolitan or a patriarch in those
sect. 25. churches, his judgment is final, and there ought to be no
n. 10. appeal to Rome. 2. It is as plain, that in those ancient times of church government, Britain was never subject to the see of Rome” (of which afterwards). “3. It will be hard for any man to prove that there were any churches then in the world which were not under some either patriarch or metropolitan. 4. If any such were, it is *gratis dictum*, and impossible to be proved, that all such churches, wherever seated in the world, were obliged to depend on Rome.” And do you still wonder why his lordship produces these words? I may more justly wonder why you return no answer to what his lordship here says. But still the *caput omnium ecclesiarum* sticks with you; if his lordship hath not particularly spoken to that, it was because his whole discourse was sufficient to a man of ordi-

^d Greg. l. 11. indict. 6. ep. 54.

nary capacity, to let him see, that no more could be meant by it, but some preeminence of that church above others in regard of order and dignity, but no such thing as universal power and jurisdiction was to be deduced from it. And if Gregory understood more by it, as his lordship saith, it is *gratis dictum*, and Gregory himself was not a person to be believed in his own cause. But now, as you express it, “his lordship takes a leap from the church of Rome to the church of England.” No, neither his lordship nor we take a leap from thence hither; but you are the men who leap over the Alps, from the church of England to that of Rome. We plead, as his lordship doth truly, that in the ancient times of the church Britain was never subject to the see of Rome, but being one of the western dioceses of the empire, it had a primate of its own. This, you say, his lordship should have proved, and not merely said. But what an unreasonable man are you, who would put his lordship to prove negatives; if you challenge a right which the pope hath over us, it is your business to prove it; his lordship gave a sufficient reason for what he said, in saying that Britain was one of the dioceses of the empire, and therefore had a primate of her own. This you deny not, but say, this only proves, that the inferior clergy could not appeal to Rome. What again? but this subterfuge hath been prevented already. But to pass by what without any shadow of proof you say of the patriarch of Constantinople's being subject to the pope, and pope Urban's calling Anselm the patriarch of the other world, which we are far from making the least ground to make Canterbury a patriarchal see, which, as far as concerns the rights of primacy, was so long before the synod of Bar in Apulia; we come to that which is more material, viz. your attempt to prove that Britain was anciently subject to the see of Rome; for which you instance in Wilfrid archbishop of York appealing to Rome, about A. D. 673, who was restored to his bishopric by virtue of the sentence passed in his behalf at Rome; and so being a second time expelled, appealed as formerly, and was again restored^e. To which I shall return you a clear and full answer in the words of another archbishop, the late learned

Lab. p. 188.

n. 4.

Lab. p. 189.

n. 5.

Ibid. n. 5.

^e Bed. l. 5. c. 20.

lord primate of Ireland^f. “The most famous,” saith he, “I
382 had almost said the only, appellant from England to Rome
that we read of before the Conquest, was Wilfrid archbishop
of York, who, notwithstanding that he gained sentence upon
sentence at Rome in his favour, and notwithstanding that the
pope did send express nuncios into England on purpose to see
his sentence executed, yet he could not obtain his restitution
or the benefit of his sentence for six years during the reigns
of king Egbert and Alfred his son. Yea king Alfred told
the pope’s nuncios expressly^g, ‘that he honoured them as his
parents for their grave lives and honourable aspects; but he
could not give any assent to their legation, because it was
against reason that a person twice condemned by the whole
council of the English should be restored upon the pope’s
letter.’ If they had believed the pope to be their competent
judge, either as universal monarch, or so much as patriarch
of Britain, or any more than an honourable arbitrator, (which
all the patriarchs were, even without the bounds of their
proper jurisdictions,) how comes it to pass that two kings
successively, and the great councils of the kingdom, and the
other archbishop Theodore with all the prime ecclesiastics,
and the flower of the English clergy, did so long and so reso-
lutely oppose so many sentences and messages from Rome,
and condemn him twice whom the pope had absolved? Con-
sider that Wilfrid was an archbishop, not an inferior clerk;
and if an appeal from England to Rome had been proper or
lawful in any case, it had been so in this case. But it was
otherwise determined by those who were most concerned.
Malmsbury supposeth, either by inspiration or upon his own
head, that the king and the archbishop Theodore were smitten
with remorse before their deaths for the injury done to Wil-
frid, and the slighting the pope’s sentence, letter, and legates.
But the contrary is most apparently true; for first, it was not
king Alfred alone, but the great council of the kingdom also;
not Theodore alone, but the main body of the clergy, that
opposed the pope’s letter and the restitution of Wilfrid in
that manner as it was decreed at Rome. Secondly, after
Alfred and Theodore were both dead, we find the pope’s

^f Bramhall, *Just Vindication*, c. 4. p. 60.^g Spelman. *Concil. an. 705.*

sentence and Wilfrid's restitution still opposed by the surviving bishops in the reign of Alfred's son. To clear the matter past contradiction, let us consider the ground of this long and bitter contention; Wilfrid the archbishop was become a great pluralist, and had engrossed into his hands too many ecclesiastical dignities. The king and the church of England thought fit to deprive him of some of them, and to confer them upon others. Wilfrid appealed from their sentence to Rome. The pope gave sentence after sentence in favour of Wilfrid. But for all his sentences he was not, he could not be restored, until he had quitted two of his monasteries which were in question, Hongestilldean and Ripon, which of all others he loved most dearly, and where he was afterwards interred. This was not a conquest, but a plain waving of his sentences from Rome, and yielding of the question; for those had been the chief causes of the controversy. So the king and the church after Alfred's death still made good his conclusion, That it was against reason, that a person twice condemned by the whole council of the English should be restored upon the pope's bull. And as he did not, so neither did they give any assent to the pope's legation." This I hope may suffice as a most sufficient answer to your objection from Wilfrid's appeal.

§. 16. But you would seem to urge yet further for the ancient subjection of Britain to the church of Rome in these words: "Again, is it not manifest out of him (Bede^h) that even the primitive original institution of our English bishops is from Rome?" And for this you cite a letter of pope Gregory I. to Augustine the monk, whom you call our English apostle; in which Gregory grants to him the use of the pall, the proper badge or sign of archiepiscopal dignity, and that 383 he condescended that he should ordain twelve bishops under his jurisdiction, &c. "Behold here," say you, "the original Lab. p. 190. charter, as I may say, of the primacy of Canterbury; in this ^{n. 5.} letter and mandate of the pope it is founded; nor can it with any colour of reason be drawn from other origin. And by virtue of this grant have all the succeeding bishops of that see enjoyed the dignity and authority of primates of this nation." From whence you very civilly charge his lordship "either with

^h Bed. l. i. c. 29.

gross ignorance, if he knew it not, or with great ingratitude, if he knew it." To which I answer, that his lordship knowing this no doubt very well, that Gregory sent Austin into England, &c., could not from thence think himself bound to submit to the Roman bishop; and it had been more pertinent to your purpose, not to charge him with ingratitude, but with disobedience. For that was it which you ought to prove hence, that the archbishop of Canterbury ought still to be subject to the bishop of Rome, because Gregory I. made Augustine the first archbishop of Canterbury. A wonderful strong argument no doubt! which, out of charity to you, we must further examine; for you tell us, the original charter of the primacy of Canterbury is contained in that grant. To satisfy you as to this, two things are to be considered, the primacy itself, and the exercise of it by a particular person in some particular place. If you speak of the primacy itself, i. e. the independent right of governing the churches within the provinces of Britain, then we utterly deny that this was contained in that grant. For Britain having been a province before, in which bishops did govern independently on any foreign bishop, no foreign bishops could take away that privilege from it. I will not stand here to deduce the history of the bishops of Britain before Augustine's coming into England; but it is as certain that there were such, as it is that St. Augustine ever came hither. For not only all our own historians and Bede himself confess it, but it is most evident from the subscriptions of three of them to the first council of Arles, Eborius of York, Restitutus of London, and Adelfius *de civitate colonia Londinensium*, (which some will have to be a mistake for *colonia Camaloduni*, whether by that Colchester, Maldon, or Winchester be meant, as it is differently thought;) from the presence of some of them at the Sardican synod and the council of Ariminum, as appears by Athanasius and others; but this I suppose you will not deny, that there were bishops in England before Austin came. And that these bishops had then no dependence on the see of Rome, if it were not sufficiently evident from other arguments, the relation of the proceedings in Bede himself between Austin and them about submission would abundantly discover, as likewise that there was then an archbishop with metropolitical power

over them, whose ancient seat had been Caerleon. But I consider not this primacy now as in any particular place, but in general as belonging to the provinces of Britain, which I say had a primacy belonging to it (whether at York or London is not material) at the time of the council of Nice (according to what hath been formerly said about the state of churches then). Now the council of Nice takes care that the privileges of all churches should be preserved, i. e. that where there had been a primacy it should so continue. Now therefore I ask, how came this privilege of Britain to be lost, which was not only confirmed with others by the Nicene council, but by that of Chalcedon and Ephesus, in which the ancient privileges of churches are secured? What right had Austin the monk to cassate the ancient metropolitcal power of the Britannie church, and to require absolute subjection to himself? If the pope made him archbishop of Canterbury, by what right was he primate over the Britain church? How came the archbishop then in being to lose his primacy by Austin's coming into England? was it because the Britannie church was then overrun with pagan Saxons, and the visible power of it confined to a narrow compass? yet I doubt not³⁸⁴ but there were many British Christians living here among the Saxons, though oppressed by them, as they were after by the Normans, (for where is it that any conquest hath carried away all the inhabitants?) and that these did many of them retain their Christianity, though not daring publicly to own it, there are many not improbable circumstances to lead us to suppose. But we will grant that the face of the Britannie church was only in Wales; what follows thence? that the whole province had lost its right? Let us suppose a case like this; as that the church of Rome should be overrun with a barbarous people, (as it was by the Goths and Vandals,) and the inhabitants destroyed; these barbarous people continuing in possession of it; and that a bishop should have been sent from Britain to convert them to the faith, and upon their conversion to govern those churches, and should be made bishop of that place by the British bishops; whether would he be bound to continue always in subjection to them or no? If not; but you say, "by his succession in the see of Rome he enjoys the privileges of that see, though the inhabitants be

altered ;” the same I say of the Britannie churches, though the inhabitants were altered, and Saxons succeeded the Britons, yet the privilege of the church remains still as to its primacy and independency. And therefore the pope’s making Augustine archbishop, so as to give him withal the primacy over the churches in the province of Britain, was an usurpation upon the rights of our church, which had an absolute and independent primacy within itself ; as it was in the case of the Cyprian bishop. As supposing those ancient sects of churches which are overrun with Turks should again be converted to Christianity, the bishops of those churches, as of Ephesus or the like, would enjoy the same rights which the ancient bishops had ; so we say it was in our case, though the nation was then overspread with paganism, yet Christianity returning, the privileges of our churches did return with it ; and whosoever were rightly consecrated bishops of them would enjoy the same rights which they did before. So that Gregory might make Austin a bishop and send him to convert this nation, by which he was capable to govern the churches here which he did convert, but he could not give to him the right over these churches, which Gregory had no power over himself ; neither could Austin or any other archbishop of Canterbury give away the primacy of England by submitting himself to the Roman see. What therefore is Gregory’s grant to Austin, to the primacy of England ? If you ask then, how the archbishops of Canterbury come to be primates of England ; I answer, 1. This primacy must be lodged somewhere ; and it is not unalterably fixed to any certain place, because the primacy belongs to the church, and not to a particular see. 2. It is in the power of princes to fix the metropolitan see in what place is judged most convenient ; thence have been the frequent removes of episcopal and archiepiscopal sees ; as is evident in many examples in ecclesiastical history, particularly in Justiniana Prima made a metropolis by Justinian. 3. Wherever the primacy is lodged, it retains its ancient privileges ; so that there is no need of a succession of our archbishops from the British archbishops of Caerleon to preserve the British primacy ; but that see being removed by the power of princes, the primacy still remains the same that it was in the British metropolitans. And thus I hope I have shewn

you, that the original charter of the archbishop of Canterbury's primacy was not contained in the pope's grant to Austin.

§. 17. From hence we proceed again to the case of the African churches; for (as his lordship saith) "the African Conf. p. 142. prelates finding that all succeeding popes were not of Melchi- sect. 25. n. 11. ades his temper, set themselves to assert their own liberties, and held it out stoutly against Zosimus, Boniface I, and Cœlestine I, who were successively bishops of Rome. At last it was concluded in the sixth council of Carthage, (wherein were 385 assembled two hundred and seventeen bishops, of which St. Augustine himself was one,) that they would not give way to such a manifest encroachment upon their rights and liberties; and thereupon gave present notice to Cœlestine to forbear sending his officers amongst them, lest he should seem to induce the swelling pride of the world into the church of Christ. And this is said to have amounted into a formal separation from the church of Rome; and to have continued for the space of somewhat more than one hundred years. For which his lordship produceth two public instruments extant among the ancient councils; the one an epistle from Boniface II, in whose time the reconciliation to Rome is said to be made by Eulalius then bishop of Carthage; but the separation, *instigante diabolo*, by the temptation of the devil. The other is an *exemplar precum*, or copy of the petition of the same Eulalius, in which he damns and curses all those his predecessors which went against the church of Rome." Now his lordship urges from hence; "Either these instruments are Conf. pp. 144, 145. true or false. If they be false, then Boniface II. and his sect. 25. n. 11. accomplices at Rome, or some for them, are notorious forgers, and that of records of great consequence to the government and peace of the whole church of Christ, and to the perpetual infamy of that see, and all this foolishly, and to no purpose:" on the other side, if these instruments be true, then "it is manifest that the church of Afric separated from the church of Rome;" which separation was either unjust or just; if unjust, then "St. Austin, Eugenius, Fulgentius, and all those bishops and other martyrs which suffered in the Vandælic persecution, died in actual and unrepented schism, and out of the church; if it were just, then is it far more lawful for the

church of England by a national council to cast off the pope's usurpation as she did, than it was for the African church to separate; because then the African church excepted only against the pride of Rome in case of appeals, and two other canons less material; but the church of England excepts (besides this grievance) against many corruptions in doctrine, with which Rome at that time was not tainted. And St. Austin and those other famous men durst not thus have separated from Rome, had the pope had that powerful principality over the whole church of Christ, and that by Christ's own ordinance and institution, as A. C. pretends he had." This is the substance of his lordship's discourse, to which we must consider what answer you return. Which in short is, that you dare not assert the credit of those two instruments, but are very willing to think them forgeries; but you say,

Lab. p. 191.
n. 6. "the schismatical separation of the African church from the Roman is inconsistent with the truth of story, and confuted by many pregnant and undeniable instances, which prove that the Africans, notwithstanding the contest in the sixth council of Carthage touching matter of appeals, were always in true catholic communion with the Roman church, even during the term of this pretended separation." For which you produce the testimony of pope Coelestine concerning St. Austin, the proceeding of pope Leo in the case of Lupicinus, the testimonies of Eugenius, Fulgentius, Gregory, and the presence of some African bishops at Rome. To all which I answer, that either the African fathers did persist in the decree of the council of Carthage, or they did not: if they did persist in it, and no separation followed, then the casting off the usurpations of the Roman see cannot incur the guilt of schism; for these African bishops did that, and it seems continued still in the Roman communion; by which it is evident that the Roman church was not so far degenerated then as afterwards, or that the authority of those persons was so great in the church, that the Roman bishops durst not openly break with them, which is a sufficient account of what Coelestine saith concerning St. Austin, that he lived and died in the communion of the Roman church. If you say the reason why they were in communion with the Roman church was because they did not persist, you must prove it by better instances than

you have here brought ; for some of them are sufficient proofs of the contrary. As appears by the case of Lupicinus an African bishop appealing to Leoⁱ, who indeed was willing 386 enough to receive him ; but what of that ? Did not the African bishops of Mauritania Cæsariensis excommunicate him notwithstanding that appeal, and ordained another in his place ? and therefore the pope very fairly sends him back to be tried by the bishops of his province. Which instance, as it argues the pope's willingness to have brought up appeals among them, so it shews the continuance of their stoutness in opposing them. And even pope Gregory^k so long after, though in his time the business of appeals was much promoted at Rome, yet he dares not challenge them from the bishops of Africa, but yields to them the enjoyment of those privileges which they said they had enjoyed from the apostles' times. And the testimonies of Eugenius and Fulgentius imply nothing of subjection to Rome, but a preeminence which that church had above all others, which it might have without the other ; as London may, I hope, be the head city of England, and yet all other cities not express subjection to it. But if after that council of Carthage the bishops of Rome did by degrees encroach upon the liberties of the African churches, there is this sufficient account to be given of it, that as the Roman bishops were always watchful to take advantages to enhance their power, and that especially when other churches were in a suffering condition, so a fit opportunity fell out for them to do it in Africa ; for not long after that council of Carthage, fell out that dismal persecution of the African churches by the irruption of the Vandals ; in which all the catholic bishops were banished out of Africa, or lived under great sufferings ; and by a strict edict of Gensericus, no new bishops were suffered to be ordained in the places of the former. This now was a fair opportunity for the bishop of Rome to advance his authority among the suffering bishops, St. Peter's pretended successor loving to fish in troubled waters, and it being fatal to Rome from the first foundation of it, to advance herself by the ruins of other places.

§. 18. But we are called off from the ruins of other churches

ⁱ Leo. ep. 87. c. 2.

^k Greg. l. 1. ep. 75.

Conf. pp.
145, 146.
sect. 25.
n. 12.

to observe the methods whereby the popes grew great under the emperors, which his lordship gives an account of from Constantine's time to Charles the Great, about five hundred years, which begins thus: "So soon as the emperors became Christian, the church began to be put in better order; for the calling and authority of bishops over the inferior clergy, that was a thing of known use and benefit for preservation of unity and peace in the church. Which was confessed by St. Hierom himself, and so settled in men's minds from the very infancy of the church, that it had not been to that time contradicted by any. The only difficulty then was to accommodate the places and precedencies of bishops among themselves, for the very necessity of order and government. To do this, the most equal and impartial way was, that as the church is in the commonwealth, not the commonwealth in it, (as Optatus tells us,) so the honours of the church should follow the honours of the state; and so it was insinuated, if not ordered, (as appears,) by the canons of the councils of Chalcedon and Antioch. And this was the very fountain of the papal greatness; the pope having his residence in the great imperial city. But precedence is one thing, and authority another; it was thought fit therefore that among bishops there should be a certain subordination and subjection. The empire therefore being cast into several divisions, (which they called *dioceses*,) every diocese contained several provinces, every province several bishoprics; the chief of a diocese was called *ἐξάρχος*, and sometimes *a patriarch*; the chief of a province, *a metropolitan*; next, the bishops in their several dioceses, (as we now use that word;) among these there was effectual subjection respectively, grounded upon canon and positive law, in their several quarters; but over them none at all: all the difference there was but honorary, not authoritative." To all this part of his lordship's discourse you only say, That it is founded upon
387 his own conjectural presumptions more than upon any thing
P. 192. else; and that you have shewed a far different fountain of the pope's authority from *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram* &c. The meaning of what you say is, that his lordship's discourse hath too much truth and reason to be answered solidly; but because it is against the pope's interest you defy him, and cross yourself, and cry, *Tu es Petrus*, &c., and think this will

prevent its doing you any harm. For if we look for one dram of reason against it, we must look somewhere else than in your book, though you tell us, you have often evidenced the contrary; but when and where, I must profess myself to seek, and I doubt shall continue so to the end of your book. But his lordship proceeds. "If the ambition of some particular persons did attempt now and then to break these bounds, it is no marvel; for no calling can sanctify all that have it. And Socrates tells us that in this way the bishops of Alexandria and Rome advanced themselves to a great height, *πέρα τῆς ἱερωσύνης*, even beyond the quality of bishops. Now upon view of story it will appear, that what advantage accrued to Alexandria was gotten by the violence of Theophilus patriarch there. A man of exceeding great learning, and no less violence; and he made no little advantage out of this, that the empress Eudoxia used his help for the casting of St. Chrysostom out of Constantinople. But the Roman prelates grew by a steady and constant watchfulness upon all occasions to increase the honour of that see. Interposing and assuming to themselves to be *vindices canonum*, (as Greg. Naz. speaks,) defenders and restorers of the canons of the church, which was a fair pretence, and took extremely well. But yet the world took notice of this their aim. For in all contestations between the East and West, which were not small nor few, the western bishops objected levity to the eastern, and they again arrogancy to the bishops of the West, as Bilius observes, and upon very warrantable testimonies. For all this, the bishop of Rome continued in good obedience to the emperor, enduring his censures and judgments: and being chosen by the clergy and people of Rome, he accepted from the emperor the ratification of that choice. Insomuch that about the year 579, when all Italy was on fire with the Lombards, and Pelagius the Second constrained through the necessity of the times, contrary to the example of his predecessors, to enter upon the popedom without the emperor's leave, St. Gregory, then a deacon, was shortly after sent on embassy to excuse it." To all these things you give one general answer, by calling them *impertinencies*, which is a general name for all that you cannot answer. The popes' obedience to the emperors, you say, was constrained, their ratifications

Conf. pp.

146, 147.
sect. 25.

n. 12.

Lab. p. 193.
n. 8.

of popes' elections only declaring them canonical; Socrates was a heretic; the eastern bishops partial: this is the substance of all you say; whereof the two former are manifestly contrary to the truth of stories, (as, when you desire it, may at large be manifested,) and the two latter the pitiful shifts of such who have nothing else to say.

§. 19. But though you cannot answer particulars, you can overthrow his whole design, (though you cannot fiddle, it seems you can conquer cities, but they must be very weak then.)
 Lab. p. 193. n. 9. "His main design," you tell us, "is to overthrow the pope's supremacy, by shewing it was not lawful to appeal to Rome; but catholic authors" (to be sure you are in the number) "frame an unanswerable argument for his supremacy even from the contrary; thus: it was ever held lawful to appeal to Rome in ecclesiastical affairs, from all the parts of Christendom; therefore, say they, the pope must needs be supreme judge in ecclesiastical matters. This is evidenced out of the fourth and seventh canons of the council of Sardica, accounted anciently an appendix of the council of Nice, and often cited as the same with it."

Will you give us leave to come near, and handle this unanswerable argument a little? for persons of your profession use to be very shy of that. But however, since it is exposed to common view, we may take leave to do it. And seriously, upon consideration of all the parts and circumstances of it, I
 388 am of your mind, without flattering you, that it is an unanswerable argument; but quite to another purpose than you brought it for, even against the pope's supremacy, as I shall presently discover; so that those catholic authors have served you just as Lazarillo did his blind master, in bidding him leap over the water, that he might run his head full butt against the tree. For that which your best authors shun as much as may be, and use their best arts to get besides it, you run blindly, and therefore boldly upon it, as though it were an excellent argument to your purpose. You say, the evidence for appeals is from the canons of the Sardican synod; but if this be an unanswerable argument for the pope's supremacy, 1. how come these appeals to be pleaded from the Sardican synod? 2. How come these appeals to be denied, notwithstanding the canons of it? The former will prove that the

supremacy, if granted from hence, was not acknowledged from divine right; the latter, that it was not universally acknowledged by the church after; and therefore both of them will make an unanswerable argument against that which you would prove, viz. the pope's supremacy. First, if the pope's supremacy be evidenced from hence, 1. how comes it at all to depend on the canons? 2. why no sooner than the canons of Sardica? 3. why not at all mentioned in them? 1. How comes the pope's supremacy, if of divine right, to depend at all upon the canons of the church? We had thought it had been much more to your purpose not to have mentioned any canons at all of the church about it, but to have produced evidences that this was constantly acknowledged as of divine institution. But we must bear with you in not producing that which is not to be found. For nothing can be more apparent than that when the popes began to perk up, they pleaded nothing but some canons of the church for what they did, as Julius to the oriental bishops, Zosimus to the African, and so others. If it had been ever thought then that this supremacy was of divine right, what senseless men were these, to make use of the worst pleas, and never mention the best! For supposing they had such a supremacy granted them by the canons of the church, doth not this imply that their authority did depend upon the church's grant? and what the church might give for her own conveniency, she might take it away when she saw it abused to her apparent prejudice. And therefore if they had thought that God had commanded all churches to be subject to them, it was weakly done of them to plead nothing but the canons of the church for it. 2. Why no sooner than the canons of Sardica? Was the church of Rome without her supremacy till that time? Will no canons of the church evidence it before them, when this council was not held till eleven years after the death of Constantine? Had the pope no right of appeals till it was decreed here? Yes, Zosimus pleads the Nicene canons for it, but upon what grounds will appear suddenly. 3. Why is not the pope's supremacy mentioned as the ground of these appeals then? Certainly those western bishops who made those canons should have only recognised the divine right of the pope's supremacy, and not made a canon in such a manner as they do, that would make

any one be confident they never knew the pope's supremacy. For their decree runs thus; "That in case any bishop thought himself unjustly condemned; if it seem good to you, let us honour the memory of Peter the apostle, that it be written by those who have judged the cause, to Julius the bishop of Rome; and if it seem good, let the judgment be renewed, and let them appoint such as may take cognizance of it¹." Were these men mad to make such a canon as this, if they believed the pope's supremacy of divine institution? What a dwindling expression is that for the head of the church, to call him
 389 *bishop of Rome* only, when a matter concerning his supremacy is decreeing. And why to *Julius bishop of Rome*, I pray? had it not been better to St. Peter's *successor*, whosoever he be? so it would have been, no doubt, if they had intended a divine or universal right. And why *for the honour of St. Peter's memory*? Had it not been more becoming them to have said, *out of obedience to Christ's commands* which made him head of the church? And all this come in with an *εἰ δοκεῖ*, *if it please you*! What, *if it please you*, whether the pope should be universal pastor or no? *if it please you*, whether the church should be built *super hanc petram* or no? *if it please you*, whether the bishop of Rome succeeds St. Peter or no? Are these the men that give such evidence for the pope's supremacy? You had better by far never mention them; for if that was the lesson they had to say, never any boys at school said their lesson worse than they do. They wanted such as you among them, to have penned their canon for them; and no doubt it had run in a better strain; 'Forasmuch as our Lord and Saviour did appoint St. Peter head of the church, and the bishop of Rome to succeed him as Christ's vicar upon earth; these are to let you know that he hath an absolute power by divine right over all persons and causes, and that men are bound to obey him upon pain of eternal damnation.' This had been something like, if you could have found it in some canons of the church; but to produce a poor sneaking *if it please you*, what do you else but betray the majesty and grandeur of

¹ Εἰ δὲ ἄρα τις ἐπισκόπων ἐν τινι πράγματι δόξῃ κατακρίνεσθαι—εἰ δοκεῖ ὑμῶν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, Πέτρου τοῦ ἀποστόλου τὴν μνήμην τιμήσωμεν, καὶ γραφῆναι παρὰ τούτων τῶν κρινάντων

Ἰουλίῳ τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ Ῥώμης, ὥστε διὰ τῶν γειτνιώντων τῇ ἐπαρχίᾳ ἐπισκόπων, εἰ δέοι, ἀνανεωθῆναι τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ἐπιγνώμονας αὐτὸς παράσχοι.—Concil. Sardic. c. 3.

your church? And yet, after all this, no such thing as absolute appeals to Rome are decreed here neither, but only that the bishop of Rome should have power to review the case, and, in case it was thought necessary, that other persons should be appointed to examine it. But how much a review differs from an appeal, and that nothing but a power to review cases is here given to the bishop of Rome, are fully manifested by Petrus de Marca^m, to whom I again refer you. So that we see from hence you have very comfortable evidence for the pope's supremacy.

§. 20. 2. Suppose it had been decreed here, you had not gained much by it, because, notwithstanding this decree, it was far from being acknowledged by the universal church; which I prove from hence, that the Sardican canons were not received by the church. Nothing can be more evident than that these canons were not so much as known by the African bishops when pope Zosimus fraudulently sent them under the name of the Nicene canons; insomuch that Cusanus questions whether ever any such thing were determined by the Sardican synod or noⁿ: and it appears by St. Austin^o, that the council of Sardica was of no great credit in Africa; for when Fortunius, the Donatist bishop, would prove that the Sardican synod had written to some of their party, because one Donatus was mentioned in it, St. Austin tells him it was a synod of Arians; by which it seems very improbable that they had ever received the decrees of the western, but only of the eastern part of it, which adjourned to Philippopolis^p. Neither was this ever acknowledged for an œcumenical council, for although it was intended for such by the emperors Constans and Constantius, yet but 70 of the eastern bishops appeared to 300 of the western; and those eastern bishops soon withdrew from the other, and decreed things directly contrary to the other. So that Balsamon and Zonaras, as well as the elder Greeks, say the decrees of it can at most only bind the western churches; and the arrogating of this power of reviewing causes decided by the eastern churches by western bishops

^m De Concord. Sacerd. et Imp.
l. 7. c. 3. sectt. 6, 7, &c. et c. 4. sect. 2.
ⁿ Concord. Cathol. l. 2. c. 15.

^o Aug. ep. 163.
^p Contra Cresc. l. 3. c. 34. l. 4.
c. 44.

was apparently the cause of the divisions between them; the eastern and western churches being after this divided by the *Alpes Succiæ*, between Illyricum and Thracia: and although Hilary and Epiphanius expressly call this a western council, yet it was a long time before the canons of it were received in
 390 the western church; which is supposed to be the reason why Zosimus would not mention the Sardican, but called them the Nicene canons; which forgery was sufficiently detected by the African bishops; and it is the worst of all excuses to lay the blame of it (as you do) on the pope's secretary; for do you think pope Zosimus was so careless of his business as not to look over the *commonitorium* which Faustinus carried with him? do you think Faustinus would not have corrected the fault, when the African bishops boggled so at it? what made him so unwilling that they should send into the east to examine the Nicene canons, but intreated them to leave the business wholly with the pope, if he were not conscious of some forgery in the business? But you say, as a further plea in
 Lab. p. 195. Zosimus his excuse, "that the council of Sardica was an
 n. 9. appendix to the Nicene council rather than otherwise." An excellent appendix, made at two and twenty years distance from the other, and called by other emperors, consisting of many other persons, and assembled upon a quite different occasion. If this had been an appendix to the Nicene council, how comes that to have but twenty canons? how came Atticus and Cyrillus not to send these with the other? how come all the copies of councils and canons to distinguish them? how came they not to be contained in the code of canons produced in the council of Chalcedon in the cause of Bassianus and Stephanus? If this were the same council, because some of the same things were determined, how comes that in Trullo not to be the same with the sixth œcumenical? how comes the council of Antioch not to be an appendix to the council of Nice, if this was, when it was celebrated before this, and the canons of it inserted in the code of canons owned by the council of Chalcedon? So that by all the shifts and arts you can use, you cannot excuse Zosimus from imposture in sending these Sardican under the name of the Nicene canons. And on what account the pope falsified the canons, then, is appa-

rent enough, viz. for the advancing the interest of his see ; and this the African fathers did as easily discern afterwards as we do now. But by this we see what good foundations the pope's claim of supremacy had then, and what arts (not to say frauds) they were beholding to for setting it up, even as great as they have since made use of to maintain it.

OF THE TITLE OF UNIVERSAL BISHOP.

In what sense the title of “universal bishop” was taken in antiquity.—A three-fold acceptation of it, as importing, 1. A general care over the Christian churches, which is attributed to other catholic bishops by antiquity besides the bishop of Rome, as is largely proved: 2. A peculiar dignity over the churches within the Roman empire: this accounted then œcumenical, thence the bishops of the seat of the empire called œcumenical bishops; and sometimes of other patriarchal churches: 3. Noting universal jurisdiction over the whole church, as head of it; so never given in antiquity to the bishop of Rome.—The ground of the contest about this title between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople.—Of the proceedings of the council of Chalcedon about the pope’s supremacy.—Of the grammatical and metaphorical sense of this title.—Many arguments to prove it impossible that St. Gregory should understand it in the grammatical sense.—The great absurdities consequent upon it.—St. Gregory’s reasons proved to hold against that sense of it which is admitted in the church of Rome.—Of Irenæus his opposition to Victor.—Victor’s excommunicating the Asian bishops argues no authority he had over them.—What the more powerful principality in Irenæus is.—Ruffinus his interpretation of the 6th Nicene canon vindicated.—The suburbicary churches cannot be understood of all the churches in the Roman empire.—The pope no infallible successor of St. Peter, nor so acknowledged to be by Epiphanius.—St. Peter had no supremacy of power over the apostles.

§. 1. **H**IS lordship having undertaken to give an account how the popes rose by degrees to their greatness under the Christian emperors, in prosecution of that necessarily falls upon the title of “universal bishop” affected by John the patriarch of Constantinople, and condemned by Pelagius II. and Gregory I. This you call “a trite and beaten way,” because, I suppose, the truth is so plain and evident in it; but withal you tell us, “this objection hath been satisfied a hundred times over:” if you had said the same answer had been repeated so often over, you had said true; but if you say that it hath been satisfied *once*, you say more than you are

able to defend, as will evidently appear by your very unsatisfactory answer which at last you give to it: so that if none of your party have been any wiser than yourself in this matter, I am so far from being satisfied with what they say, that I can only pity those persons whose interest sways their understandings so much (or at least their expressions) as to make them say any thing that seems to be for their purpose, though in itself never so senseless or unreasonable. And I can scarce hold myself from saying with the orator, when a like objection to this was offered him, because multitudes had said so, *Quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nihil sapere, vulgare*, that truth and reason are the greatest novelties in the world: for seriously, were it possible for men of common understanding to rest satisfied with such pitiful shifts as you are fain to make, if they would but use any freedom in inquiring, and any liberty of judging when they had done? But when once men have given (not to say sold away) the exercise of their free reason, by addicting themselves to a particular interest, there can scarce any thing be imagined so absurd but it passeth currently from one to another, because they are bound to receive all blindfold, and in the same manner to deliver it to others; by which means it is an easy matter for the greatest nonsense and contradictions to be said a hundred times over: 392 and whether it be not so in the present case, is that we are now to inquire into. And for the same ends which you propose to yourself, viz. "that all obscurity may be taken away, and the truth clearly appear," I shall in the first place set down what his lordship saith, and then distinctly examine what you reply in answer to it. Thus then his lordship proceeds: "About this time brake out the ambition of John, patriarch of Constantinople, affecting to be universal bishop. He was countenanced in this by Mauricius the emperor, but sourly opposed by Pelagius and St. Gregory^a; insomuch that St. Gregory plainly says that this pride of his shews that the times of Antichrist were near: so as yet (and this was near upon the point of six hundred years after Christ) there was no universal bishop, no one monarch over the whole militant church. But Mauricius being deposed and murdered by

Conf. p. 147.
sect. 25.
n. 12.

^a S. Greg. l. 4. ep. 78.

Phocas, Phocas conferred upon Boniface the Third that very honour which two of his predecessors had declaimed against as monstrous and blasphemous, if not antichristian: where, by the way, either these two popes, Pelagius and St. Gregory, erred in this weighty business about an universal bishop over the whole church, or if they did not err, Boniface and the rest, which after him took it upon them, were in their very predecessors' judgment antichristian." Before you come to a particular answer, you think it necessary to make a way for it by premising two things: 1. "That the title of universal bishop was anciently attributed to the bishops of Rome, but they never made use of it;" 2. "That the ancient bishops of Constantinople never intended by this usurped title to deny the pope's universal authority, even over themselves." These two things I shall therefore consider, because they tend much to the clearing the main controversy. I begin therefore with the title of *universal bishop* attributed to the bishop of Rome; and before I answer your particular allegations, we must more fully consider in what sense that title of *universal bishop* was taken in antiquity, and in what manner it was attributed to him: for when titles have different senses, and those senses evidently made use of by the ancient writers, it is a most unreasonable thing merely from the title to infer one determinate sense, which is the most contrary to the current of antiquity. The title then of *universal bishop* may be conceived to import one of these three things: 1. a general care and solicitude over all the churches of the Christian world; 2. a peculiar dignity over the churches within the empire; 3. universal jurisdiction over all churches, so that all exercise of it in the church is derivative from him as universal pastor and head of the church. This last is that which you attribute to the pope; and though you find the name of *universal bishop* a hundred times over in the records of the church, yet if it be taken in either of the two former senses, it makes nothing at all to your purpose. Our business is therefore now to shew that this title was used in the church in the two former senses, and that nothing from hence can be inferred for that oecumenical pastorship which you say doth of divine right belong to the bishop of Rome.

§. 2. I begin with the first, as this title may import a general

care and solicitude over all the Christian churches: and I deny not but in this sense this title might be attributed in antiquity to the bishop of Rome; but then I assert that nothing peculiar to him can be inferred from hence, because expressions importing the same care are attributed to other bishops, especially such who were placed in the greater sees, or were active in promoting the church's interest. For which we must consider, that power and authority in the bishops of the church is given with an immediate respect to the good of the whole church; so that if it were possible that every particular bishop could take care of the whole church, they have authority enough by their function to do it: but it not only being impossible that every bishop should do it, but it being inconsistent with peace and order that all should undertake it, therefore it was necessary that there should be some re- 393
straints and bounds set, for the more convenient management of that authority which they had. From hence came the original of particular dioceses, that within such a compass they might better exercise that power which they enjoyed: as if many lights be placed in a great room, though the intention of every one of these is to give light to the whole room, yet that this might the better be done, these lights are conveniently placed in the several parts of it. And this is that which St. Cyprian means in that famous expression of his, "that there is but one bishopric in the whole world, a part of which is held by every bishop;" for the church in common is designed as the diocese of all bishops, which is set out into several apartments for the more advantageous governing of it: as a flock of many thousand sheep being committed to the care of many shepherds, these all have an eye to the good of the whole flock, but do not therefore sit all together in one place to oversee it, but every one hath his share to look after for the benefit of the whole; but yet so, that upon occasion one of them may extend his care beyond his own division, and may be very useful for the whole by counsel and direction. Thus we shall find it was in the primitive church; though every bishop had his particular charge, yet still they regarded the common good of the whole church, and upon occasion did extend their counsel and advice far beyond their particular churches, and exercised their functions in other places besides

those which the church's convenience had allotted to them. Hence it was that dissensions arising between the Asian and Roman churches, Polycarp comes to Rome, and there, as Eusebius^b from Irenæus tells us, he exercised with Anicetus his consent his episcopal function: for, as Valesius observes, it cannot be understood, as Franciscus Florens would have it, of his receiving the eucharist from Anicetus, but something of honour is implied in the word *παρεχώρησεν*, whereas there was nothing but what was common in the other. Hence the several epistles of Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, and others, for the advising, confirming, and settling churches; hence Irenæus^c concerned himself so much in the business between Victor and the Asian churches, either to prevent or repeal his sentence of excommunication against them; hence St. Cyprian^d writes into Spain about the deposing Basilides and Martialis, two apostatizing bishops, and checks Stephen, bishop of Rome, for his inconsiderate restoring them; hence Faustus, bishop of Lyons, writes to St. Cyprian^e in the case of Martianus of Arles, and he writes to Stephen as being nearer and more concerned in the business of Novatianism (for the honour of his predecessors) in order to his deposition, yet so as he looks on it as a common cause belonging to them all, (*cui rei nostrum est consulere et subvenire, frater charissime,*) in which they were all bound to advise and help. Hence St. Cyprian writes to the bishop of Rome, as his brother and colleague, without the least intimation of deriving any jurisdiction from him, but often expressing that charge which was committed to every bishop, which he must look to as mindful of the account he must give to God. Hence Nazianzen saith of St. Cyprian, "that he not only governed the churches of Carthage and Africa, but all the western parts, and even almost all the eastern, southern, and northern too, as far as his fame went^f." Hence Arsenius writes to Athanasius, "We embrace peace and unity with the catholic church, over which thou, through the grace of God, dost preside^g." Hence Gregory Nazianzen saith of Athanasius, "that he made laws

^b Euseb. l. 5. c. 24. not. in l.

^c Euseb. l. 4. c. 25.

^d Cyprian. ep. 68.

^e Id. ep. 67.

^f Nazianz. Orat. 18. p. 281.

^g Athanas. Ap. ad Imp. Const. p. 786. tom. 1.

for the whole earth^h.” Hence St. Basil writes to him, “that he had care of all the churches, as of his own;” and in the same epistle calls him “the head and chief over allⁱ.” Hence St. Chrysostom, in the praise of Eustathius the patriarch of Antioch, saith “that he was instructed by the divine Spirit that he was not only to have care of that church over which he was set, but of the whole church throughout the world^k.” Hence came the great endeavours of Theophilus and Cyril, 394 patriarchs of Alexandria; of Eusebius Vercellensis, Hilarius Pictaviensis^l, and several others, for rooting out of heresies; not confining themselves to those provinces allotted to them, but extending their care over other churches. Hence came frequent ordinations of persons out of their own dioceses^m, as of Paulinus at Antioch by Lucifer Caralitanus, of many bishops in Syria and Mesopotamia by Eusebius Samosatenus, and of a presbyter at Bethlehem by Epiphaniusⁿ, who, when he was quarrelled at by John of Hierusalem for it, he defends his action by this saying, that *in sacerdotio Dei nulla est diversitas*, i. e. wherever a bishop was, he might exercise his power as such, although the church’s prudence had set limits to their ordinary jurisdiction. From these things then we see that a general care and solicitude of the universal church doth belong to every bishop, and that some of them have been expressly said to have had the care of the whole church, which in other terms is to say they were universal bishops: so that from this sense of the title you gain nothing to your purpose; though the care of the universal church be attributed to the bishop of Rome, though he acts and calls councils, and orders other things out of his own province, yet all this proves not the supremacy you intend; for this is no more than other bishops did, whom you will not acknowledge to be heads of the church, or universal bishops in that sense.

§. 3. 2. A *universal bishop* denotes a peculiar dignity over the churches within the Roman empire; for which two things will be sufficient to manifest it: 1. that the Roman empire was then accounted universal; 2. that some bishops in the

^h Nazianz. Orat. 21. p. 392.

ⁱ Basil. ep. 52. tom. 3. p. 79.

^k Chrysost. tom. 5. p. 631. ed. Savil.

^l Hieron. ep. 71. Ruffin. l. 11.

^c 27, 30, 31.

^m Theodoret. l. 5. c. 4.

ⁿ Hieron. ep. 60.

great churches were on that account called *œcumenical* or *universal bishops*. 1. That the Roman empire was then accounted universal; for which multitudes of testimonies might be cited, in which *orbis Romanus* and *orbis humanus* were looked on as synonymous; thence Trebellius Pollio in Macrianus, *qui ex diversis partibus orbis Romani restituant*: and, as Salmasius^o witnesseth in those writers of the imperial history, most of the ancient MSS. for *orbis Romanus* have *orbis humanus*; for, as he saith, *Ea gloria fuerunt Romani, ut totum orbem suum vocarent*; *hinc orbis Romanus passim apud auctores reperitur pro universo orbe*: thence they called the Roman people *omnium gentium victorem*; and from hence Ammianus Marcellinus^p calls Rome *caput mundi*, “the head of the world,” and the Roman senate *asylum mundi totius*, “the sanctuary for the whole world;” thence Spartianus^q saith of Severus, *orbem terrarum Romanque despexit*, when, as Casaubon observes, he speaks only of the Roman provinces: and from hence whatever was out of the Roman empire was called *barbaria*; thence the *rura vicina barbariæ* in Lampridius^r, for the marches which lay next to the enemy’s country; thence Marcellinus, *visus est in barbarico miles*, and in the Imperial Constitutions, as Justellus observes, *barbari vocantur, quicunque imperio Romano non parebant*, “all were called *barbarous* out of the Roman empire:” and in the same sense *barbaricum* is used in the 58th canon of the African code, and in the 206th canon of the code of the universal church^s, that the bishops ἐν τοῖς βαρβαρικοῖς, i. e. out of the Roman empire, should be ordained by the patriarch of Constantinople. Now since the Roman empire was called *orbis Romanus*, and in Greek ἡ οἰκουμένη, (as appears in that Augustus, Luke ii. 1, is said to tax πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, “the whole world,” which could be only the Roman empire; and the famine in the same is said to be ἐφ’ ὅλην τὴν οἰκουμένην, Acts xi. 28.) it is no wonder if those bishops who enjoyed the greatest dignity in the Roman empire were called *œcumenical*, and those councils so too, which consisted of the bishops within those bounds. I come therefore to the second

^o Not. in Hist. August. p. 306.

^p Amm. Marcel. l. 14. c. 16.

^q Spartian. in Severo.

^r Lamprid. in Alex. Sev. Marcel.

l. 18. Justel. not. in Cod. Afric. can. 58.

^s Cod. Eccles. Univ. can. 206. et

ibi Justel.

thing, That some bishops in the great churches in the Roman empire were called *œcumenical*, as that relates to the ἡ οἰκουμένη, viz. the Roman empire. For which we may consider the primary ground of the advancement of the patriarch of 395 Constantinople was the greatness of the city, as is undeniably manifest by the proceedings of the councils of Constantinople and Chalcedon about him; wherein it was decreed, since that was new Rome, that it should enjoy equal privileges with the old: and, in all probability, the ground of the patriarch of Constantinople's usurping the title of *œcumenical patriarch* was but to correspond with the greatness of his city, which, at the time of the contest between pope Gregory and him, was in a better condition than Rome itself, being the seat of the empire; and therefore he thought it suitable thereto to be called *œcumenical patriarch*. But besides this peculiarity of Constantinople, it was no unusual thing for the bishop of the patriarchal churches to have expressions given them tantamount to the title of *universal bishop* in any sense but that of *universal jurisdiction*; which I shall prove as to the three patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople. First, of Alexandria: so Greg. Nazianzen saith of Athanasius being made bishop there, "he had the government of that people committed to him, which is as much as to say, of the whole world^t;" and John of Hierusalem, writing to Theophilus patriarch of Alexandria, saith "that he had the care of all the churches^u." And St. Basil writes to Athanasius about the establishing of Meletius as patriarch of Antioch, "that so he might govern as it were the whole body of the church^x." But most clear and full to that purpose is the testimony of Theodoret concerning Nestorius being made patriarch of Constantinople: "he was intrusted with the government of the catholic church of the orthodox at Constantinople, and thereby of the whole world^y." What work would you make with so

^t Τὴν τοῦ λαοῦ προεδρίαν πιστεύεται, ταυτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν τῆς οἰκουμένης πάσης ἐπιστάσιαν.—Nazianz. Orat. 21. p. 377.

^u Tu quidem ut homo Dei et apostolica ornatus gratia curam omnium ecclesiarum sustines.—Apud Hieronym. ad Pammach. tom. 2. ep. 61. c. 15.

^x Καὶ τῷ τοῦ παντός, ὡς εἰπεῖν, σώματος τῆς ἐκκλησίας αὐτὸν προεστάναι.—Basil. ep. 50.

^y Τῆς κατὰ Κωνσταντινούπολιν τῶν ὀρθοδόξων καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας τὴν προεδρίαν πιστεύεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀπάσης.—Theodoret. Hæret. Fabul. l. 4. c. 12. p. 245. tom. 4. oper.

illustrious a testimony in antiquity for the bishop of Rome as this is for the patriarch of Constantinople? Use therefore and interpret but these testimonies as kindly as you do any for the Roman see, and will you not find as large a power over the church attributed to the other patriarchs as you do to the bishop of Rome? What is it then you would infer from the title of *universal bishop* being attributed to him? will the very title do more than what is signified by it? or must it of necessity import something more when given to the bishop of Rome than it doth when given to other bishops? if it doth, you must prove it from some other arguments, and not barely from the title being attributed to them. Thus you see, though the title were granted to be attributed to him, there is nothing new, nothing peculiar in it.

Lab. p. 190.
n. 1.

§. 4. But we must further examine who they are that attribute this title to him, and what the account is of their doing it. For this you cite "the council of Chalcedon, in a letter inserted in the acts of it, the council of Constantinople sub Menna, John bishop of Nicopolis, Constantinus Pogonatus the emperor, Basil the younger, and Balsamon himself." To the first I answer, 1. That this title was not given by the council of Chalcedon; 2. If it had, no more was given to the bishop of Rome than to the bishops of other patriarchal churches. 1. That this title was not given by the general council of Chalcedon: this I know Gregory I, in his epistles about this subject, repeats *usque ad nauseam*, that the title of *universal bishop* was offered to the bishop of Rome by the council of Chalcedon, and that he refused it; but there is as little evidence for the one as the other. That the title of *œcumenical patriarch* was attributed to the bishop of Rome by some papers read and received in that council, I deny not, but we must
396 consider the persons who did it, and the occasion of it: the persons were such who came to inform the council^z against Dioscorus the patriarch of Alexandria; and they were no other than Athanasius a presbyter, Theodorus and Ischyron, two deacons, and Sophronius, a laic of Alexandria: now these persons, not in a letter (as you relate it), but in their bills exhibited to the council against Dioscorus, give that title of

^z Concil. Chalced. act. 3. part. 3. p. 243.

œcumenical patriarch, or *archbishop*, to Leo the bishop of Rome. And is this now the offer made of the title of *universal bishop* by the council of Chalcedon? But you say, “this was inserted into the acts of the council;” I grant it was, but on what account? not with any respect to the title, but as containing the accusations against Dioscorus. But where do any of the bishops of that council attribute that title to Leo? which of them mentions it in their subscriptions to the deposition of Dioscorus, though many of them speak expressly of Leo and Anatolius together with the same titles of honour to them both? why did not the council superscribe their synodical epistle to pope Leo with that title? so indeed Binius^a rather supposes they should have done than proves they ever did it; and that only from Gregory’s epistle (not Leo’s, as he mistakes it) to Eulogius, where he mentions this offer, but upon what grounds we have seen already. But suppose, 2. we should grant that the council of Chalcedon should have offered the title of *œcumenical patriarch* or *bishop* to the bishop of Rome, there are none who understand any thing of the nature of that title, or the proceedings of that council, who can imagine they should intend any acknowledgment of the pope’s supremacy by it; for the title itself, as to the importance of it, was common to other bishops, especially of the patriarchal sees, as I have proved by some instances already, and might do yet by more; but I shall content myself with the ingenuous confession of Sim. Vigorius, “that when the western fathers call the Roman bishops *bishops of the universal church*, they do it from the custom of their churches, not that they look on them as universal bishops of the whole church, but in the same sense that the patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem, are called so; or as they are universal over the churches under their patriarchate, or that in *œcumenical councils* they preside over the whole church^b,” and after

^a Bin. not. in Chalced. Con. tom. 3. Concil. p. 562.

^b Et harum rerum ignari andabatae nostri non advertunt, cum occidentales patres pontifices Romanos vocant universalis ecclesiæ episcopos, id more suarum ecclesiarum facere, et ea notione, non quod putent totius orbis universalis, univer-

sales esse episcopos, sed eadem qua Constantinopolitanus, Alexandrinus, Antiochenus, Hierosolymitanus, dicuntur universales: aut ut universales ecclesiarum quæ sunt sub eorum patriarchatu: aut quod in conciliis œcumenicis toti ecclesiæ præsent.—Vigorius Comment. ad Resp. Synodal. Concil. Basil. p. 37.

acknowledgeth that the title of *universal* or *œcumenical* bishop makes nothing for the pope's monarchy in the church. And if it doth not so when given by the western fathers, much less certainly when given by the eastern, especially those who met in the council of Chalcedon; for it is evident by their 16th session, the 28th canon, and their synodical epistle to pope Leo, they designed the advancement of the see of Constantinople to equal privileges with that of Rome; and therefore if they gave the pope the title of *œcumenical patriarch* or *bishop*, it was that he might be willing that the patriarch of Constantinople might be called so too: and if, as Gregory saith, the bishops of Rome would not accept the title of *universal bishop*, the truest account I know of it is, lest the patriarch of Constantinople should share with him in it; but we see when the great benefactor to your church, the benign Phocas, as Gregory himself styles him, gave it to the bishop of Rome alone, then hands and heart and all were ready to receive it: and I much fear Leo I. and St. Gregory himself would have been shrewdly tempted to receive it, if it had been offered them upon those terms, that no one else should have it besides them; but they scorned it till they could have it alone; and for all their declamations against the pride of Anatolius and John, patriarchs of Constantinople, they must look very favourably on the actions of those two popes that discern not their own pride in condemning of them for it; for usually men shew it as much in suspecting or condemning others for it as in any other way whatsoever. Thus it was in these persons; they thought the patriarchs of Constantinople proud and arrogant because they sought to be equal with them: but was it not their own greater pride, that they were able to bear no equals? And it is to be feared it was their desire to advance their own supremacy which made them quarrel so much with Anatolius, and John, and Cyriacus; for would they but have been contented to truckle under the Roman bishops, they had been accounted very meek and humble men; and St. Gregory himself would not sure have thought much to have called them so, who most abominably flatters that monster Phocas after the murder of Mauricius and his children; for he begins his epistle to him with *Gloria in excelsis Deo*, "Glory to God on high, who, according to what is written, changes times and

transfers kingdoms^c;" and after, in such notorious, flattering expressions, congratulates his coming to the throne, that any one who reads them would think Phocas the greater saint, he rejoices "that the benignity of his piety was advanced to the imperial throne, nay, (*lætentur cœli et exultet terra*,) let the heavens rejoice and the earth be glad, and all the people which hath been hitherto in much affliction revive at the benignity of your actions." O rare Phocas! Could he do any less than pronounce the bishop of Rome *universal bishop* after this, when poor Cyriacus at Constantinople suffered for his opposing him for the execrable murder of his master? Therefore these proceedings of Leo and Gregory yield shrewd matter of suspicion what the main ground of their quarrel against the patriarchs of Constantinople was: for before, the emperors stood up for the honour of Constantinople, as being the seat of their empire, and Rome began to sink, the empire decaying there; but now there was a fit time to do something for the honour of the Roman see; Cyriacus was in disgrace with the tyrant Phocas, and no such time as now to fall in with him and caress him: and we see Gregory did it pretty well for a saint, but he lived not to enjoy the benefit of it; but Boniface did however.

§. 5. After the patriarchate of Constantinople was erected, the popes had a double game to play—to advance themselves, and depress that; which it was very hard for them to do, because all the eastern bishops, as well as the emperor, favoured it: but after equal privileges were decreed to the patriarch of Constantinople with the bishop of Rome by the council of Constantinople, they could no longer dissemble their choler, but had no such occasion ministered to them to express it as after the canon of the council of Chalcedon, (wherein were present 630 bishops,) which confirmed the former; for then Leo fumes and frets, and writes to Martianus, and Pulcheria to Anatolius and the bishops of the east, but still pretends that he stood up for the privileges of the other patriarchs, and the Nicene canons, and what not: but one might easily discern what it was that pinched him, viz. the equalling the patriarch of Constantinople with himself; which,

^c Greg. l. 11. ep. 36. ind. 6.

it is apparent, he suspected before, by the instructions he gave his legates, Paschasinus and Lucentius, to be sure to oppose whatever was proposed in the council concerning the primacy of that see. And accordingly they did, and complained that the canon was surreptitiously made; which they were hugely overseen in doing while the council sat; for upon this the whole matter is reviewed, the judges scan the business, the bishops protest there were no practices used, that they all voluntarily consented to it; and all this in the presence of the Roman legates. How comes it then to pass that this should not be a regular and conciliar action? were not the
 398 bishops at age to understand their own privileges? did not the bishop of Antioch know his own interest as well as pope Leo? must he be supposed more able to understand the Nicene canons than these 630 bishops? why then was not this canon as regular as any other? Why, forsooth, the pope did not consent to it. So true is that sharp censure of Ludovicus Vives, that “those are accounted lawful canons and councils which make for their interest, but others are no more esteemed than a company of tattling gossips^d.” But what made the pope so angry at this canon of the council of Chalcedon? he pretends the honour of the Nicene canons, the preserving the privileges of other patriarchs; but Binius^e hath told us the true reason of it, “because they say that the primacy of Rome came by its being the seat of the empire, and therefore not by divine right; and since Constantinople was become the seat of the empire too, therefore the patriarch there should enjoy equal privileges with the bishop of Rome.” If Rome had continued still the sole seat of the empire, this reason would not have been quarrelled at; but now Rome sinking, and Constantinople rising, this must not be endured, but all the arts and devices possible must be used to keep it under. And this is the true account of the pique which the bishops of Rome had to the patriarchs of Constantinople: from whence we may easily guess how probable it is that this council of Chalcedon did acknowledge the pope œcumenical bishop in any other

^d Itaque illa demum eis videntur edicta et concilia quæ in rem suam faciunt, reliqua non pluris æstimanda quam conventum muliercularum

in textrina vel thermis.—Lud. Vives in Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 20. c. 26.

^e Bin. not. in Chalced. Con. p. 561.

sense than they contended the patriarch of Constantinople was so too. And the same answer will serve for all your following instances; for as you pretend that the council of Constantinople sub Menna did call pope Agapetus *œcumenical patriarch*; so it is most certain that it called Mennas the patriarch of Constantinople so too; and, which is more, Adrian I., in his epistle to Tharasius of Constantinople, in the second Nicene council, calls him *universal bishop*. If therefore the Greek emperors and Balsamon call the pope so, they import nothing peculiar to him in it, because it is most evident they called their own patriarch so likewise; so that you find little advantage to your cause from this first thing which you premise, viz. that the pope was anciently called *universal bishop*. But you say further, 2. “that the bishops of Constantinople never intended to deny by this usurped title the pope’s universal authority even over themselves.” This is ambiguous, unless it be further explained what you mean by *universal authority*; for it may either note some kind of preeminence and dignity which the bishop of Rome had as the chief patriarch, and who on that account had great authority in the church; and this your instances prove that the patriarchs of Constantinople did acknowledge to belong to the pope; but if by *universal authority* be meant *universal jurisdiction over the church as appointed the head of it by Christ*, then not one of your instances comes near the shadow of a proof for it.

§. 6. Thus having considered what you premise, we come to your answer itself: for which you tell us “we are to take notice that the term *universal bishop* is capable of two senses, the one grammatical, the other metaphorical. In the grammatical sense it signifies *bishop of the universal church*, and of all churches in particular, even to the exclusion of all others from being properly bishops, and consequently displaceable at his pleasure, as being only his, not Christ’s officers, and receiving authority from him, and not from Christ. In the metaphorical sense, it signifies only so high and eminent a dignity above all other bishops throughout the whole church, that though he who is styled *universal bishop* hath a true and real superintendency, jurisdiction, and authority over all other bishops, yet that they be as truly and properly bishops in their respective provinces and dioceses as he himself.” “This

being cleared," say you, "it is evident that St. Gregory, when
 399 he inveighs against the title of *universal bishop*, takes it in the
 literal and grammatical sense;" which you very faintly endeavour
 to prove out of him, as I shall make it presently appear. This
 being then the substance of that answer which you say hath been
 given a hundred times over, must now, once for all, pass a strict
 and severe examination; which it shall receive in these two inquiries:
 1. Whether it be possible to conceive that St. Gregory should take
universal bishop in the literal and grammatical sense? 2. Whether
 all the arguments which he useth against that title do not hold
 against that universal jurisdiction which you attribute to the pope
 as head of the church?

1. Whether it be possible to conceive that St. Gregory should take
universal bishop in the literal and grammatical sense which you give
 of it? And he which can think so must have some other way of
 understanding his meaning than by his words and arguments, which
 I confess I do not pretend to. But if we examine them, we shall find
 how impossible it is that St. Gregory should ever think that John
 pretended to be the sole bishop of this world; 1. Because Gregory
 saith, "that same title which John had usurped was offered to the
 Roman bishops by the council of Chalcedon, but none of them would
 ever use it, because it seemed to diminish the honour of other
 bishops^f." Now I pray think with yourself whether ever 630
 bishops would consent together to give away all their power and
 authority in the church; for you say, "the literal sense of
universal bishop doth suppose him to be bishop of all particular
 churches, to the exclusion of all others from being properly
 bishops, and are all displaceable at his pleasure." Can it now
 enter into your mind that Gregory should ever think that these
 bishops should all make themselves the pope's vassals of their own
 free choice? We see even under the great usurpations of the
 bishop of Rome since, though they pretend (for all that I can see)
 to be œcumenical bishops in a higher sense than ever John
 pretended to, that yet the bishops of the Roman communion are
 not willing to submit their office wholly to the papal jurisdiction;
 witness the stout and eager con-

^f Greg. Ep. 1. 4. ep. 32.

tests of the Spanish bishops in the council of Trent about the divine institution of the episcopal office, against the pretences of the Italian party. And shall we then think, when the pope was far from that power which he hath since usurped, that such a multitude of grave and resolute bishops should throw their mitres down at the pope's feet, and offer him, in your literal sense, to be sole bishop of the world? that they would relinquish their power, which they made no question they had from Christ, and take it up again at the pope's hands? But whether you can imagine this of so many bishops or no, can you conceive that Gregory should think so of them? and he must do it, if he took the title of *universal bishop* in your literal sense; and yet this Gregory saith, *Hoc universitatis nomen oblatum est*^g, "that very name of *universal bishop* was offered to the pope by the council of Chalcedon;" *sed nullus unquam decessorum meorum hoc tam profano vocabulo uti consensit*. Nothing then can be more plain than that John took that which the pope refused; and he that can believe that this title should ever be offered in this literal sense, I despair, without the help of physic, to make him believe any thing.

2. This very title was not usurped wholly by John himself, but was given him in a council at Constantinople^h. This Gregory confesseth in his epistle to Eulogius and Anastasius the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria, "that about eight years before, in the time of Pelagius his predecessor, John called a council at Constantinople, in which he endeavours to be called *universal bishop*:" so Gregoryⁱ; but he confesseth elsewhere that he effected it. And it appears by the epistle of Pelagius^k himself, writ on that occasion, that it was more than a mere endeavour, and that they did consent to it; else why doth Pelagius say, *Quicquid in vestro conventiculo statuistis*, "whatever they had determined in their *conventicle*" (as on 400 this account Pelagius calls it, because it wanted his approbation)? And it is evident, from Gregory's zealous writing to the other patriarchs about it, that they did not look on themselves as so much concerned about it. Now in this council^l which met at Constantinople, which was called together in the

^g Greg. 1. 4. ep. 36.^h Ibid.ⁱ Id. 1. 4. ep. 34.^k Pelag. 2. ep. 8. apud Bin. tom. 4. Concil.^l Evagr. Hist. 1. 6. c. 7.

case of Gregory the patriarch of Antioch, all the patriarchs either by themselves or substitutes were present, as Evagrius tells us; and not only they, but several metropolitans too: now if they had taken this in the literal sense, can you think they would have yielded to it? Were not they much more concerned about it than either Pelagius or Gregory were? for they were near him, and were sure to live under this usurped power of his, and to smart by it, if it were so great as you suppose it to be. But it is apparent by their yielding to it, they looked on it, to be sure, not in the literal sense, and it may be as no more than the honorary title of œcumenical patriarch.

§. 7. 3. How comes it to pass that none of the successors of John and Cyriacus did ever challenge this title in the literal sense of it? For we do not see that they quitted it for all Phocas gave it to pope Boniface, since by your own confession in the Greek canon law Sisinnius, German, Constantine Alexius, and others are called *œcumenical patriarchs*; and it appears by the epistles of Pelagius and Gregory, that was the title which John had then given him^m. *Si summus patriarcha universalis dicitur, patriarcharum nomen cæteris denegatur*, saith Pelagius. *Si enim hoc dici licenter permittitur, honor patriarcharum omnium negatur*, saith Gregory. From which words I think it most probable, that the main ambition of the patriarchs of Constantinople was not merely that they would be called œcumenical patriarchs, but that title should properly belong to them as excluding others from it, which was it that touched the bishops of Rome to the quick; because then Constantinople flourished as much as Rome decayed by the oppressions of the Lombards; and Gregoryⁿ complained of this to Constantia the empress, that for seven and twenty years together they had lived in Rome *inter Longobardorum gladios*, “among the swords of the Lombards,” and this made them so jealous that the honour of the Roman see was then sinking, and therefore they stickle so much against this title, and draw all the invidious consequences from it possible, the better to set the other patriarchs against it; and because that would not extend far beyond the patriarchs themselves, they pretend

^m Evagr. Hist. l. 6. c. 7.

ⁿ S. Greg. l. 4. ep. 34.

likewise, that this was to make himself universal bishop. But not certainly in your literal sense; for then Gregory would have objected some actions consequent upon this title; in depriving bishops of their jurisdiction, and displacing some and putting in others at his pleasure; which, you say, is the natural effect of this literal sense of universal bishop. But we read of nothing of this nature done either by John or Cyriacus; they acted no more than they did, only enjoyed a higher title. And this is proved further,

4. By the carriage of the emperor Mauricius in this business. Gregory writes a pitiful moaning letter to him about it, and uses all the rhetoric he had to persuade the emperor that he would either *flectere* or *coercere*, incline or force him to lay aside that arrogant title: but for all this it appears by Gregory's letter to the empress^o, that the emperor had checked him for meddling in it, and was so far from opposing the patriarch's title, that in effect he bid him trouble himself no more about it; which poor St. Gregory took very ill. And afterwards, when Cyriacus succeeded John in Constantinople, the emperor being somewhat fearful lest Gregory, at the coming in of a new patriarch, might, on the account of this new title, deny his communicatory letters, he dispatches a letter to him to quicken him about it. And he takes it very unkindly that the emperor should suspect his indiscretion so much, that for the sake of this title, which, he saith, had sorely wounded him, he should deny communion in the faith with him; and yet in the same epistle saith, that whosoever took the title of universal bishop upon him was a forerunner of Antichrist^p. But if this name had been apprehended in that which you call *the literal and grammatical sense*, would not the emperor (being commended by Gregory too for his piety) have rather encouraged him in it? whereas he plainly tells him, "it was a contest about a frivolous name, and nothing else; and that there ought to be no scandal among them about it^q." Upon which Gregory is put to his distinctions of

^o Triste mihi aliquid serenissimus dominus innuit, quod non eum corripuit qui superbit, sed me magis ab intentione mea declinare studuit.—Greg. l. 4. ep. 34.

^p Greg. l. 6. ep. 30.

^q De qua re mihi in suis jussionibus dominorum pietas præcepit dicens, ut pro appellatione frivoli nominis inter nos scandalum generari non debeat.—Greg. ibid.

two sorts of “frivolous things, some that are very harmless, and some that are very hurtful^r ;” i. e. frivolous things are either such as are frivolous or such as are not ; for who ever imagined that such things as are very hurtful are frivolous ? But however St. Gregory speaks excellent sense ; for his meaning is, that the title itself may be frivolous, but the consequences of it may be dreadful ; and so we have found it since his time. So that this appears to be the true state of the business between them ; the patriarch of Constantinople he challengeth the title of œcumenical patriarch or bishop as belonging of right to him, being patriarch of the chief seat of the empire, but in the mean time challengeth no universal jurisdiction by virtue of this title ; on which account the emperor and eastern bishops admit of it : on the other side, the bishops of Rome, partly looking at their own interest in it, (for so it appears by one of Gregory’s epistles^s to the emperor, that he suspected it to be his own interest which he stood so much up for,) and partly foreseeing the dangerous consequence of this, if universal jurisdiction were challenged with it, they resolutely oppose it, not merely for the title sake, but for that which might follow upon that title, taking it not in your literal but in your metaphorical sense, as I shall shew presently. But neither party was so weak and silly as to apprehend it in your literal sense ; for then neither would the emperor have slighted it nor the popes opposed it on those terms which they do, and on such grounds which reach your metaphorical sense.

5. The same title, in the same sense which Gregory opposed it, did Boniface accept of from the emperor Phocas. This you Lab. p. 199. confess yourself, when you say, “that all that Phocas did was n. 5. but to declare that the title in contest did of right belong to the bishop of Rome only ;” therefore the same title which the patriarch of Constantinople took to himself before, was both given by Phocas and taken by pope Boniface. This then being confessed by you, let me now seriously ask you, whether the title of universal bishop, which pope Gregory opposed, was

^r Sed rogo ut imperialis pietas penset, quia alia sunt frivola valde innoxia, atque alia vehementer nociva.—Ibid.

^s Nunquid ego hac in re piissime domine propriam causam defendo ? nunquid specialem injuriam vindico ? —Id. l. 4. ep. 32.

to be taken in the grammatical or metaphorical sense? Take now whether of them you please; if in the metaphorical, all his arguments hold against the pope's present universal jurisdiction by your own confession; if in the literal and grammatical, then pope Boniface had all those things belonging to him which Gregory condemns that title for. Then by your own confession pope Boniface must be the forerunner of Antichrist, he must equal himself to Lucifer in pride, he must have that name of blasphemy upon him, and all those dreadful consequences must attend him and all his followers, who own that title of universal bishop in that which you call the literal or grammatical sense of it.

6. Lastly, it appears from St. Gregory himself, that the reasons which he urgeth against the title of universal bishop are such as hold against that which you call *the metaphorical sense* of it; which in short is, an universal pastor exercising authority and jurisdiction over the whole church. And it is 402 scarce possible to imagine that he should speak more clearly against such an universal headship than he doth; and urges such arguments against it which properly belong to that metaphorical sense of it. As when he saith to John the patriarch, "What wilt thou answer to Christ the Head of the universal church in the day of judgment, who dost endeavour to subject all his members to thee, under the name of universal bishop^t?" What is there in these words which doth not fully belong to your metaphorical sense of head of the church? Doth he not subject all Christ's members to him? doth he not challenge to himself proper jurisdiction over them? what then will he be able to answer to Christ the Head of the universal church, as St. Gregory understands it *exclusivè* of any other? Doth not he "arise to that height of singularity, that he is subject to none, but rules over all^u?" yet these are the very words he uses; and can any more expressly describe your head of the church than these do? Yet herein he saith, he imitates the pride of Lucifer, who, according to St. Gregory,

^t Tu quid Christo universalis sanctæ ecclesiæ capiti, in extremi judicii dicturus es examine, qui cuncta ejus membra tibimet conaris universalis appellatione supponere?—Greg. l. 4.

ep. 38.

^u Ad culmen conatus est singulartatis erumpere, ut et nulli subesse et solus omnibus præesse videretur.—Id. ib.

endeavoured to be the head of the church triumphant, as the pope of the church militant. And follows that parallel close, that an universal bishop imitates Lucifer in exalting his throne above the stars of God: for, saith he, “what are all the brethren the bishops of the universal church but the stars of heaven^x?” and after parallels them with the clouds, and so this terrestrial Lucifer ascends above the heights of the clouds. And again saith he, “Surely the apostle Peter was the first member” (not the head) “of the holy and universal church. Paul, Andrew, and John, what are they else but the heads of particular churches? and yet they are all members of the church under one Head^y.” Can any thing be more clear against any head of the universal church but Christ himself? When St. Peter is acknowledged to be only a prime member of the church, how then come his successors to be the heads of it? And as he goes on, “The saints before the law, under the law, and under grace, who all make up the body of our Lord, they were all but members of the church, and none of them would be called universal.” And, I pray, let his holiness consider his following words: “Let your holiness acknowledge what pride it is to be called by that name, which none that was truly holy was ever called by^z.” And do you think now that these expressions do not as properly reach your head of the church, as if they had been spoken by a protestant against that doctrine which you all own? What is there in all this that implies that others should be no bishops, but only titular? yes, they may be as much bishops as you acknowledge them to be, i. e. as to their power of order, but not as to their jurisdiction. For this, you say and defend, comes from the head of the church; or else your monarchical government in the church signifies nothing. Do not you make the pope universal pastor of the church in as high a sense as any of these expressions carry it? And when

^x Quid enim fratres tui omnes universalis ecclesiæ episcopi, nisi astra cœli sunt?—Ibid.

^y Certe Petrus apostolus primum membrum sanctæ et universalis ecclesiæ est. Paulus, Andreas, Johannes, quid aliud quam singularem sunt plebium capita? Et tamen

sub uno capite omnes membra sunt ecclesiæ.—Ibid.

^z Vestra autem sanctitas agnoscat, quantum apud se tumeat, quæ illo nomine vocari appetit, quo vocari nullus præsumpsit, qui veraciter sanctus fuit.—Ibid.

St. Gregory urges so often, that if there be such an universal bishop, if he fails, the church would fail too; do you deny the consequence as to the pope? Doth not Bellarmine tell us, when he writes of the pope he writes *de summa rei Christianæ*, “of the main of all Christianity?” and surely then the church must fail if the pope’s supremacy doth. And I pray now consider with yourself, whether this answer, which you say hath been given a hundred times over, can satisfy any reasonable man? nay, doth it not appear to be so absurd and incongruous, that it is matter of just admiration that ever it should have been given once; and yet you are wonderfully displeased 403 that his lordship should bring this objection upon the stage again. But do you think your answers, like your prayers, will do you good by being said so often over? Indeed therein they are alike, that they are both in an unknown tongue. Your literal sense of *universal bishop* being in this case no more intelligible than your Latin prayers to a country congregation.

§. 9. These things being thus clear, I have prevented myself in the second inquiry, in that I have proved already, that the reasons which St. Gregory produceth hold against that sense of *universal bishop* which you own and contend for, as of right belonging to the bishop of Rome. Although it were no difficult matter to prove, that, according to the most received opinion in your church, viz. that all jurisdiction in bishops is derived from the pope, (which opinion you cannot but know is most acceptable at Rome, and was so at the council of Trent,) that that which you call *the literal sense* doth follow your metaphorical, i. e. if the pope hath universal jurisdiction as head of the church, then other bishops are not properly bishops, nor Christ’s officers, but his. For what doth their power of order signify as to the church without the power of jurisdiction? And therefore if they be taken only *in partem sollicitudinis*, and not *in plenitudinem potestatis*, according to the known distinction of the court of Rome, it necessarily follows, that they are but the pope’s officers, and are taken just into so much authority as he commits to them, and no more. And this Bellarmine^a proves from the very form of the

^a Bellarm. de Pontif. lib. 4. cap. 24.

pope's consecration of bishops, whereby he commits the power of governing the church to him, and the administration of it in spirituals and temporals. And you may see by the speech of father Laynez in the council of Trent^b, how stoutly he proves that the power of jurisdiction was given wholly to the bishop of Rome, and that none in the church besides hath any spark of it but from him; that the bishop of Rome is true and absolute monarch, with full and total power and jurisdiction, and the church is subject unto him as it was to Christ. And as when his divine Majesty did govern it, it could not be said that any of the faithful had any the least power or jurisdiction, but mere pure and total subjection; so it must be said in all perpetuity of time, and so understood, that the church is a sheepfold and a kingdom. And that he is the only pastor is plainly proved by the words of Christ when he said, he hath other sheep which he will gather together, and so one sheepfold should be made, and one shepherd." What think you now of the literal sense of *universal bishop* for *the only bishop*? Are not *the only bishop* and *the only pastor* all one? Will not all those words of St. Gregory reach this, which any of you make use of to prove that he takes it in the worst and literal sense? Nay, it goes higher. For Gregory^c only argues, that from the title of universal bishop he must be sole bishop, and others could not be any true bishops; but here it is asserted in plain terms, that the bishop of Rome is the only pastor, and that as much as if Christ himself were here upon earth; and therefore if your literal sense hath any sense at all in it, it is much more true of the bishop of Rome than ever it could be of the patriarch of Constantinople. And therefore I pray think more seriously of what he saith, "that to agree in that profane word is to lose the faith^d;" that "such a blasphemous name should be far from the hearts of Christians, in which by the arrogance of one bishop the honour of all is taken away^e." Neither will it serve your turn to say (which is all that you have to say) that this is not the definitive sentence of your church, but that many in your church hold

^b Hist. Concil. Trid. l. 7. p. 611.

^c Greg. l. 4. ep. 34. l. 7. ep. 69.

^d Consentire in isto scelesto vocabulo, nihil est aliud quam fidem perdere.—Greg. l. 4. ep. 39.

^e Absit a cordibus Christianorum nomen istud blasphemiae, in quo omnium sacerdotum honor adimitur, dum ab uno sibi dementer arrogatur.—l. 4. ep. 32.

otherwise, that there is power of jurisdiction properly in bishops. For although these latter are not near the number of the other, nor so much in favour with your church, but are 404 looked on as a discontented party, as appears by the proceedings in the council of Trent; yet that is not it we are to look after, what all in your church are agreed on, but what the pope challengeth as belonging to himself. Was not father Laynez his doctrine highly approved at Rome, as well as by the cardinal legates at Trent, and all the Italian party? Were not the other party discountenanced and disgraced as much as might be? Doth not the pope arrogate this to himself, to be œcumenical pastor, and the sole fountain of all jurisdiction in the church? If so, all that ever St. Gregory said against that title falls most heavily upon the pope. For St. Gregory doth not stand upon what others attributed to him, but what he arrogated to himself, that therein “he was the prince of pride, the forerunner of Antichrist, using a vain, new, rash, foolish, proud, profane, erroneous, wicked, hypocritical, singular, presumptuous, blasphemous name^f.” For all these goodly epithets doth St. Gregory bestow upon it; and, I believe, if he could have thought of more and worse, he would as freely have bestowed them. If therefore John the patriarch was said by him to transgress God’s laws, violate the canons, dishonour the church, despise his brethren, imitate Lucifer, how much more doth this belong to him that not only challengeth to be œcumenical patriarch, but the sole pastor of the church, and that all jurisdiction is derived from him! And by this time I hope you see, that the answer you say hath been given a hundred times over is so pitifully weak, absurd, and ridiculous, that you might have been ashamed to have produced it once, and much more to repeat it without saying any more for it than you do. For your other discourse depends wholly upon it, and all that being taken away, the rest doth fall to the ground with it.

§. 10. We must now therefore return to his lordship’s discourse, in which he goes on to give an account of the rise of the pope’s greatness. “As yet,” saith he, “the right of election or ratification of the pope continued in the emperor:”

Conf. p. 148.
sect. 25.
n. 12.

^f Greg. l. 4. epp. 32, 34, 38, 39. l. 6. epp. 2, 24.

but then the Lombards grew so great in Italy, and the empire was so infested with Saracens, and such changes happened in all parts of the world, as that neither for the present the homage of the pope was useful for the emperor, nor the protection of the emperor available for the pope. By this means the bishop of Rome was left to play his own game by himself. A thing which as it pleased him well enough, so both he and his successors made great advantage by it. For being grown to that eminence by the emperor, and the greatness of that city and place of his abode, he found himself the more free, the greater the tempest was that beat upon the other. And then first he set himself to alienate the hearts of the Italians from the emperor. Next he opposed himself against him. And about A. D. 710 pope Constantine I. did also first of all openly confront Philippicus the emperor in defence of images, as Onuphrius tells us. After him Gregory II. and III. did the same by Leo Isaurus. By this time the Lombards began to pinch very close, and to vex on all sides, not Italy only, but Rome also. This drives the pope to seek a new patron. And very fitly he meets with Charles Martel in France, that famous warrior against the Saracens. Him he implores in defence of the church against the Lombards. This address seems very advisedly taken, at least it proves very fortunate to them both. For in short time it dissolved the kingdom of the Lombards in Italy, which had then stood two hundred and four years, which was the pope's security. And it brought the crown of France into the house of Charles, and shortly after the western empire: and now began the pope to be great indeed. For by the bounty of Pepin son of Charles, that which was taken from the Lombards was given to the pope. So that now of a bishop he became a temporal prince. But when Charles the Great had set up the western empire, then he resumed the ancient and original power of the emperor to
405 govern the church, to call councils, to order papal elections. And this power continued in his posterity. For this right of the emperor was in force and use in Gregory the Seventh's time, who was confirmed in the popedom by Henry the Fourth, whom he afterward deposed. And it might have continued longer if the succeeding emperors had had abilities enough to secure or vindicate their own right. But the pope keeping a

strong council about him, and meeting with some weak princes, and they oftentimes distracted with great and dangerous wars, grew stronger till he got the better. So this is enough to shew how the popes climbed up by the emperors till they overtopped them, which is all I said before, and have now proved. And this was about the year 1073. Yet was it carried in succeeding times with great changes of fortune and different success. The emperor sometimes plucking from the pope, and the pope from the emperor, winning and losing ground as their spirits, abilities, aids, and opportunities were, till at the last the pope settled himself upon the grounds laid by Gregory VII. in the great power which he now uses in and over these parts of the Christian world." To all this you return a short answer, in these words: "We deny not but Lab. p. 200. n. 5. that in temporal power and authority the popes grew great by the patronage of Christian emperors. But what is this to the purpose? If he would have said any thing material, he should have proved that the popes rose by the emperors' means to their spiritual authority and jurisdiction over all other bishops throughout the whole catholic church; which is the only thing they claim *jure divino*, and which is so annexed to the dignity of their office by Christ's institution, that were the pope deprived of all his temporalities, yet could not his spiritual authority suffer the least diminution by it." But, 1. doth his lordship's discourse only contain an account of the pope's temporal greatness by the patronage of Christian emperors? Doth he not plainly shew how the popes got their power by rebelling, and contesting with the emperors themselves; how they assumed to themselves a power to depose emperors? and do they claim these things *jure divino* too? 2. What you say of the pope's spiritual authority will then hold good when it is well proved; but bare asserting it will never do it. We must therefore have patience till you have leisure to attempt it.

§. 11. But in the mean time we must consider how you vindicate the famous place of Irenæus, concerning, as you say, the pope's supreme pastoral authority, from his lordship's interpretation. Yet before we come to the authority itself, there are *some light skirmishes* (as you call them) to be passed through; and those are concerning Irenæus himself. For his

Conf. p. 150. lordship saith, that his adversary “is much scanted of ancient
 sect. 25.
 n. 13. proof, if Irenæus stand alone; besides, Irenæus was a bishop
 of the Gallican church, and a very unlikely man to captivate
 the liberty of that church under the more powerful principality
 of Rome. And how can we have better evidence of his judg-
 ment touching that principality than the actions of his life?
 When pope Victor excommunicated the Asian churches
 ἀθρόως, all at a blow, was not Irenæus the chief man that
 reprehended him for it? A very unmeet and undutiful thing
 sure it had been in Irenæus, in deeds to tax him of rashness
 and inconsiderateness, whom in words A. C. would have to be
 acknowledged by him the supreme and infallible pastor of the
 universal church.” To which you answer, 1. to the liberty of
 Lab. p. 201. the Gallican church: “As if, forsooth, the so much talked of
 n. 6. liberties of the Gallican church had been things known or
 heard of in St. Irenæus his time;” as though there were no
 difference between not captivating the liberty of that church
 to Rome, and asserting the liberties of the Gallican church in
 her obedience to Rome; yet these two must be confounded
 by you to render his lordship’s answer ridiculous; which yet
 is as sound and rational as your cavil is vain and imperti-
 nent. But this you pass over, and fix, 2. upon his reprehend-
 406 ing pope Victor, where you say, “that Eusebius hath not a
 word importing reprehension, but rather a friendly and sea-
 sonable persuasion: his words are, *προσηκόντως παραινεῖ*, &c.,
 he exhorts him after a handsome manner, as reflecting on the
 pope’s dignity, and clearly shews that the pope had of right
 some authority over the Asian bishops, and by consequence
 over the whole church. For otherwise it had been very absurd
 in St. Irenæus to persuade pope Victor not to cut off from the
 church so many Christian provinces, had he believed (as pro-
 testants contend he did) that the pope had no power at all to
 cut them off. Just as if a man should entreat the bishop of
 Rochester not to excommunicate the archbishop of York and
 all the bishops of his province, over whom he hath not any
 the least pretence of jurisdiction.” I answer, that if you say,
 that “Eusebius hath not a word importing reprehension,” it
 is a sign you have not read what Eusebius saith. For doth
 not he expressly say, “that the epistles of some of the bishops
 are yet remaining, in which they do severely rebuke him?”

among whom," saith he, "Irenæus was one^ε," &c. It seems, Irenæus was one of those bishops who did so sharply reprehend him; but it may be you would render πληκτικώτερον καθαπτομένων, "kissing his holiness' feet," or, "exhorting him after a handsome manner;" and indeed if they did it sharply they did it προσηκόντως, "suitably" enough to what Victor deserved for his rash and inconsiderate proceedings in this business. But withal to let you see how well these proceedings of his were resented in the Christian world, Eusebius tells us before, that Victor by his letters did declare those of the eastern churches to be excommunicate: and he presently adds, "but this did no ways please all the bishops;" wherefore (ἀντιπαρακελεύονται) "they countermanded him, that he might mind the things of peace and unity and brotherly love^h." And will you still render that word too by "exhorting him after a handsome manner," when even Christopherson renders it by *magnopere adhortabantur*, Valesius by *ex adverso hortati sunt*? and although these seem not to come up to the full emphasis of the word, yet surely they imply somewhat of vehemency and earnestness in their persuading him, as well as their being hugely dissatisfied with what Victor did. I grant that these persons did reflect, as you say, on the pope; but not, as you would have it, on his dignity, but on his rashness and indiscretion, that should go about to cast the Asian churches out of communion for such a trifle as that was in controversy between them. But you are the happiest man at making inferences that I have met with: for because Irenæus in the name of the Gallican bishops writes to Victor not to proceed so rashly in this action, thence you infer, that the pope had of right some authority over the Asian bishops, and by consequence over the whole church. Might you not every jot as well infer, that when a man in passion is ready to kill those that stand about him, whoever persuades him not to do it doth suppose he might lawfully have done it if he would? But if those bishops had so venerable an esteem (as you would persuade us they had) then of the bishop of Rome,

ε Φέρονται δὲ καὶ αἱ τούτων φωναὶ πληκτικώτερον καθαπτομένων τοῦ Βί-
κτορος· ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ Εἰρηναῖος, &c.—
Euseb. l. 5. c. 24.

^h Ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσί γε τοῖς ἐπισκόποις

ταῦτ' ἠρέσκετο, ἀντιπαρακελεύονται
δῆτα αὐτῷ τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τῆς πρὸς
τοὺς πλησίον ἐνώσεως καὶ ἀγάπης
φρονεῖν.—Euseb. ibid.

how come they to dispute his actions in so high a manner as they did? If they had looked on him as universal pastor of the church, it had more become them to sit still and be quiet, than severely to reprehend him who was alone able to judge what was fit to be done and what not in those cases. If the pope had called them to council to have known their advice, it might have been their duty to have given it him in the most humble and submissive manner that might be. But for them to intrude themselves into such an office as to advise the head of the church what to do in a matter peculiarly concerning him, as though he did not know what was fit to be done himself; methinks you should not imagine that these men did act *προσηκόντως*, as became them, in doing it. Could they possibly in any thing more declare how little they thought it
407 necessary for all churches to conform to that of Rome, when they plead for dissenters in such a matter which the pope had absolutely declared himself about? And how durst any of them slight the thunderbolts which the pope threatened them with? Yet not only Polycrates and the Asian bishops who joined with him profess themselves not at all affrighted at them, but the other churches looked not on themselves as obliged to forsake their communion on that account. If this be such an evidence of the pope's power in one sense, I am sure it is a greater evidence of his weakness in another: it seems the head of the church began by times to be troubled with the fumes of passion; and it is a little unhappy, that the first instance of his authority should meet with so little regard in the Christian world. If the pope did begin to assume so early, you see it was not very well liked of by the bishops of other churches. But it seems he had a mind to try his power and the weight of his arm; but for all his haste, he was fain to withdraw it very patiently again. Valesiusⁱ thinks that he never went so far as to excommunicate the Asian bishops at all, but the noise of his threatening to do it being heard by them, (it seems the very preparing of his thunderbolts amazed the world,) Irenæus having called a synod of the bishops of Gaul together, doth in their name write that letter in Eusebius to Victor to dissuade him from it, and that

ⁱ Vales. not. in Euseb. l. 5. c. 24.

it wrought so effectually with him that he gave it over. And this he endeavours to prove, 1. because Eusebius saith he only endeavoured to do it. But cardinal Perron supposeth Eusebius had a worse meaning than so in it, i. e. that though the pope did declare them excommunicate, yet it took no effect, because other bishops continued still in communion with them; and therefore he calls Eusebius an Arian, and an enemy to the church of Rome, when yet all the records of this story are derived from him. 2. Because the epistles of Irenæus tend to persuade him not to cut them off; whereas, if they had been excommunicate, it would have been rather to have restored them to communion; and that Photius saith, that Irenæus writ many letters to Victor to prevent their excommunication. But because Eusebius^k saith expressly, “that he did by letters pronounce them out of the communion of the church,” the common opinion seems more probable, and so Socrates^l understands it; but still I am to seek for such an argument of the acknowledgment of the pope’s authority then as you would draw from it. “Yes,” say you, “because they do not tell him he had no authority to do what he did; which they would have done if they could without proclaiming themselves schismatics *ipso facto*, and shaking the very foundation of the church’s discipline and unity.” But all this proceeds from want of understanding the discipline of the church at that time; for excommunication did not imply any such authoritative act of throwing men out of the communion of the whole church, but only a declaring that they would not admit such persons to communion with themselves. And therefore might be done by equals to equals, and sometimes by inferiors to superiors. In equals it is apparent by Johannes Antiochenus in the Ephesine council excommunicating Cyril patriarch of Alexandria; and I suppose you will not acknowledge it may be done by inferiors, if we can produce any examples of popes being excommunicated; and what say you then to the African bishops excommunicating pope Vigilius, as Victor Tununensis^m, an African bishop, himself relates it?

^k Euseb. ibid.^l Socrat. l. 5. c. 22.^m Africani antistites Vigilium Romanum episcopum damnatorem

trium capitulorum synodaliter a catholica communione, reservato ei pœnitentiæ loco, recludunt.—Victor Tununens. Chronic. p. 10.

will you say now that Victor's excommunicating the Asian churches argued his authority over them, when another Victor tells us that the African bishops solemnly excommunicated the pope himself? And I hope you will not deny but the bishop of Rochester might as well excommunicate the archbishop of York, as these Africans excommunicate the bishop
 408 of Rome. What say you to the expunging the name of Felix bishop of Rome out of the diptychs of the church by Acacius the patriarch of Constantinople? What say you to Hilary's anathema against pope Liberius? If these excommunications did not argue just power and authority over the persons excommunicated, neither could pope Victor's do it: for it is apparent by the practice of the church that excommunication argued no such superiority in the persons who did it, but all the force of it lay in the sense of the church; for by whomsoever the sentence was pronounced, if all other churches observed it, (as most commonly they did while the unity of the church continued,) then they were out of the communion of the catholic church; if not, then it was only the particular declaration of those persons or churches who did it. And in this case the validity of the pope's excommunication of the Asian bishops depended upon the acceptance of it by other churches, which not consenting to it, he could not throw them out of the communion of the whole church, but only declare that if they came to Rome he would not admit them to communion with him. And therefore Ruffinus well renders that place in Eusebius out of Irenæus his epistle to Victor, οὐδέποτε διὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἀπεβλήθησαν τινές, by these words, *Nunquam tamen ob hoc repulsi sunt ab ecclesiæ societate, aut venientes ab illis partibus non sunt suscepti*; so that ἀποβάλλειν may as well signify *not to receive* as *to cast out*; for the church's not receiving is her casting out. Thus, I hope, it is evident that his lordship hath received no injury by these lighter skirmishes.

§. 12. We now follow you into hotter service; for you say,
 Lab. p. 201. "he ventures at last to grapple with the authority itself alleged by A. C. out of St. Irenæus;" where, in the first place, you wink and strike, and let your blows fall besides him, for fear he should return them, or some one for him. You quarrel with his translation of the authority cited by him; but

that the ground of this quarrel may be understood, we must first inquire what his lordship hath to say for himself. The place of Irenæus is, "To this church," (he speaks of Rome,) "*propter potentioorem principalitatem*, 'for the more powerful principality of it,' it is necessary that every church, that is, the faithful, *undique*, round about, should have recourseⁿ." "Now Conf.p.151. sect. 25. n. 13. for this," his lordship saith, "there was very great reason in Irenæus his time, that upon any difference arising in the faith, *omnes undique fideles*, all the faithful, or, if you will, all the churches round about, should have recourse, that is, resort to Rome, being the imperial city, and so a church of more powerful principality than any other at that time in those parts of the world. But this," his lordship saith, "will not exalt Rome to be head of the church universal." Here your blood rises, and you begin a most furious encounter with his lordship for translating *undique* 'round about,' "as if," say you, "St. Irenæus spake only of those neighbouring churches round about Rome, and not the churches throughout the world; whereas *undique* as naturally signifies 'every where,' and 'from all parts:' witness Thomas Thomasius, where the word *undique* is thus Englished, 'from all parts, places, and corners every where.'" Can you blame me now if I seek for a retreat into some stronghold, or, if you will, some more powerful principality, when I see so dreadful a charge begun, with Thomas Thomasius in the front? You had routed us once before with Rider, and other English Lexicons; but it seems Rider had done service enough that time, now that venerable person Thomas Thomasius must be upon duty, and do his share for the catholic cause. You somewhere complain how much catholics are straitened for want of books; would any one believe you that find you so well stored with Thomas Thomasius, Rider, and other English lexicons? You would sure give us some cause of suspicion that there is some Jesuit's school taught in England, and that you are the learned 409 master of it, by your being so conversant in these worthy authors. But although the authority of T. Thomasius signify

ⁿ Ad hanc ecclesiam propter potentioorem principalitatem, necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles: in

qua semper ab his qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quæ est ab apostolis traditio.—Iren. l. 3. c. 3.

very little with us, yet that of the Greek lexicons might do much more, if we had the original Greek of Irenæus instead of his barbarous Latin interpreter; for now it is uncertain what word Irenæus used, and so it is but a very uncertain conjecture which can be drawn from the signification of πάντοθεν, πανταχόθεν, ἀπαντῇ, unless we knew which of them was the genuine word in the Greek of Irenæus. But you say all of them undeniably signify “from all parts universally,” and that because they are rendered by the word *undique*. So that this will make an excellent proof; *undique* must signify “from all parts,” because πάντοθεν, πανταχόθεν, ἀπαντῇ do signify so in Greek; and that these do undeniably signify so much, appears because they are rendered by *undique*. And I grant they are so; for in the old glossary, which goes under the name of Cyril, *undique* is rendered by πανταχόθεν, and Tully (than whom we cannot possibly desire a better author in this case) renders πάντοθεν by *undique*; for in his book *De finibus*^o he translates that of Epicurus, πάντοθεν εἰσπληρωμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν, by *undique complerentur voluptatibus*; and so he renders that passage in Plato’s *Timæus*, πανταχῇ τε ἐκ μέσου ἴσον, by *undique æquabilem*, although, as Hen. Stephanus^p notes, that be rather the signification of πανταχόθεν than πανταχῇ; but still there is some difference between πανταχόθεν and ἀπανταχόθεν; and so ἀπανταχόθεν γῆς, in Greek authors, notes *ex omni parte terræ*, but πανταχόθεν only *ex quavis parte*: so that the one signifies *universally*, the other *indefinitely*; *undique* relating properly to the circumference, as, *undique æqualis*, “on all sides it is equal;” so that *qui sunt undique fideles* are those which lie upon “all quarters round about.” And so it doth not imply that all persons were bound to come, but that from all quarters some did come; as Herodian speaks of Rome, πολυανθρώπη τε οὔσῃ, καὶ τοὺς πανταχόθεν ὑποδεχομένην, “that it was very populous, and did receive them which came from all parts^q,” which doth very fitly explain the sense of Irenæus, that to Rome, being the imperial city, men came from all quarters. But the sense of this will be more fully understood by a parallel expression in the ninth canon of the

^o De Finib. l. 2.^p Vid. Hen. Steph. Lexicon Ciceron. p. 55.^q Herod. Hist. l. 1. p. 18.

council of Antioch^r, in which it is decreed that the metropolitan should have the care of all the bishops in his province, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει πανταχόθεν συντρέχειν πάντας τοὺς τὰ πράγματα ἔχοντας, “because all persons who have business from all parts resort to the metropolis:” here πανταχόθεν συντρέχειν is the very same with the *undique convenire* in Irenæus; so that it relates not to any obligation on churches to resort thither, but that being the seat of the empire, all believers from all parts did make their recourse thither: which is most fully expressed by Leo, speaking of St. Peter’s coming to Rome; *Cujus nationis homines in hac urbe non essent? aut quæ uspiam gentes ignorarent, quod Roma didicisset?* And so, if I grant you that it extends to all parts, I know not what advantages you will get by it; for Irenæus his design is to shew that there was no such secret tradition left by the apostles as the Valentinians pretended: and for this he appeals to the church of Rome, which being seated in the imperial city, to which believers from all parts did resort, it is impossible to conceive that the apostles should have left such a tradition, and it not to be heard of there; which is the plain, genuine meaning of Irenæus his words; not, as you weakly imagine, “that all churches, in all doubts of faith, were bound to have their recourse thither, as to their constant guide therein:”^{n. 6.} Lab. p. 202. for Irenæus was not disputing what was to be done by Christians in doubts of faith, but was inquiring into a matter of fact, viz. whether any such tradition were ever left in the church or no; and therefore nothing could be more pertinent or convincing than appealing to that church to which Christians resorted from all parts; for it could not be conceived but if the apostles had left such a tradition anywhere, it would be heard of at Rome. And you most notoriously pervert the meaning of Irenæus, when you would make the force of his argument to lie in the necessity of all Christians resorting to Rome, “because the doctrine or tradition of the Roman church was, as it were, the touchstone of all apostolical doctrine;” but I suppose you deal in some English logicians as well as English lexicons, and therefore I must submit both to your grammar and logic: but your ingenuity is as great as your reason; for

^r Concil. Antioch. can. 9.^s Leon. Serm. de S. Petro et Paulo.

you first pervert his lordship's meaning, and then make him dispute ridiculously, that you might come out with your triumphant language—"Is not this fine meandric logic, well beseeeming so noble a *labyrinth*?" whereas his lordship's reasoning is so plain and clear, that none but such a one as had a labyrinth in his brains could have imagined any meanders in it; as appears by what I have said already in the explication of the meaning of Irenæus.

§. 13. But that I may see the strength of your logic out of this place of Irenæus, I will translate *undique* and *semper* as fully as you would have me, and give you the words at large, "in which, by those who come from all places, the apostolical tradition is always conserved." What is it you infer hence?

Lab. p. 203.
n. 6.

From the premises you argue thus: "All the faithful every where must of necessity have recourse to the church of Rome, by reason of her more powerful principality. This is St. Irenæus his proposition; but there could be no necessity they all should have recourse to that church by reason of her more powerful principality, if her said power extended not to them all: this is evident to reason. *Ergo*, this 'more powerful principality' of the Roman church must needs extend to all the faithful every where, and not only to those of the suburbicary churches, or patriarchal diocese of Rome, as the bishop pleads." Now I see you are a man-at-arms, and know not only how to grapple with his lordship, but with Irenæus to boot. But we must first see how Irenæus himself argues, that we may the better understand the force of what you deduce from him. The question, as I have told you already, was, whether the apostles left any such tradition in the church as the Valentinians pretended: Irenæus proves they did not, because, if there had been any such, the apostolical churches would certainly have preserved the memory of it; but because it would be too tedious to insist on the succession of all churches, he therefore makes choice of the most famous, the church of Rome, in which the apostolical tradition had been derived by a succession of bishops down to his own time; "and by this," saith he, "we confound all those who through vainglory or blindness do gather any such thing; for," saith he, "to this church, for the more powerful principality, all churches do make resort, i. e. the believers from all parts, in

which, by those who come from all parts, the apostolical tradition is always preserved." We must now see how Irenæus argues, according to your sense of his words. If all the faithful every where must of necessity have recourse to the church of Rome, for her more powerful principality, then there is no secret tradition left by the apostles: but where lies the connection between these two? what had the Valentinians to do with the power of the church of Rome over other churches? That was not the business they disputed; their question was, whether there were no such tradition as they pretended? And Rome might have never so great power over all churches, and yet have this secret tradition too; for now we see, when she pretends to the greatest power, nay, to infallibility, she pretends the highest to traditions. Where then lies the force of Irenæus his argument? was it in this, that the Valentinians did acknowledge the infallibility of the church of Rome then in traditions? this were indeed to the purpose, if it could be proved; or doth Irenæus go about to prove this first? But by 411 what argument doth he prove it so that the Valentinians might be convinced by it? "Yes," say you, "he saith that all the faithful must of necessity have recourse to the church of Rome." This is your way of proving indeed, to take things for granted; but how doth this *necessity* appear? Because, say you, "she hath the more powerful principality:" but what principality do you mean? over all churches? But that was the thing in question. So that if you will make Irenæus speak sense, and argue pertinently, his meaning can be no other than this: If there be such a tradition left, it must be left somewhere among Christians; if it be left among them, it may be known by inquiry whether they own any such or no. But because it would be troublesome searching of all churches, we may know their judgment more compendiously: there is the church of Rome near us, a famous and ancient church, seated in the chief city of the empire, to which all persons have necessities to go; and among them you cannot but suppose but that out of every church some faithful persons should come; and therefore it is very unreasonable to think that the apostolical tradition hath not always been preserved there, when persons come from all places thither. Is not every thing in this account of Irenæus his words very clear

and pertinent to his present dispute? But in the sense you give of them they are little to the purpose, and very precarious and inconsequent. And therefore, since the “more powerful principality” is not that of the church, but of the city; since the necessity of recourse thither is not for doubts of faith, but other occasions; therefore it by no means follows thence that this church’s power did extend over the faithful every where. Thus, by explaining your proposition, your conclusion is ashamed of itself, and runs away: for your argument comes to this; If Englishmen from all parts be forced to resort to London, then London hath the power over all England; or if one should say, If some from all churches in England must resort to London, then the church at London hath power over all the churches in England: and if this consequence be good, yours is, for it is of the same nature of it, the necessity of the resort not lying in the authority of the church, but in the dignity of the city; the words, in all probability, in the Greek, being διὰ τὴν ἰκανωτέραν ἀρχὴν, and so relate to the dignity of Rome, as the imperial city.

Conf. p. 151.
sect. 25.
n. 13.

§. 14. From whence we proceed to the vindication of Ruffinus, in his translation of the 6th canon of the council of Nice. The occasion of which is this: his lordship saith, “Supposing that the *powerful principality* be ascribed to the church of Rome, yet it follows not that it should have power over all churches; for this power was confined within its own patriarchate and jurisdiction, and that,” saith he, “was very large, containing all the provinces in the diocese of Italy, (in the old sense of the word *diocese*,) which provinces the lawyers and others term *suburbicaries*. There were ten of them—the three islands, Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, and the other seven upon the firm land of Italy. And this, I take it, is plain in Ruffinus; for he living shortly after the Nicene council, as he did, and being of Italy, as he was, he might very well know the bounds of the patriarch’s jurisdiction, as it was then practised; and he says expressly, that according to the old custom the Roman patriarch’s charge was confined within the limits of the suburbican churches^t. To avoid the

^t Apud Alexandriam ut in urbe rum ecclesiarum solitudinem gerat.—Ruffin. Eccles. Hist. l. 1. c. 6. ut ille Ægypti ut hic suburbicaria-

force of this testimony, cardinal Perron lays load upon Ruffinus; for he charges him with passion, ignorance, and rashness; and one piece of his ignorance is, that he hath ill translated the canon of the council of Nice." Now although his lordship doth not approve of it as a translation, yet he saith Ruffinus, living in that time and place, was very like well to know and understand the limits and bounds of that patriarchate of Rome in which he lived. "This," you say, "is very little to his lordship's advantage, since it is inconsistent with the vote of all antiquity, and gives St. Irenæus the lie;" but if the former be no truer than the latter, it may be very much to his advantage, notwithstanding what you have produced to the contrary. What the ground is why the Roman patriarchate was confined within the Roman diocese, I have already shewed in the precedent chapter, in explication of the Nicene canon. We must now, therefore, examine the reasons you bring, why the notion of the suburbicary churches must be extended beyond the limits his lordship assigns; that of the smallness of jurisdiction compared with other patriarchs, I have given an account of already, viz. from the correspondency of the ecclesiastical and civil government; for the civil dioceses of the eastern part of the empire did extend much further than the western did, and that was the reason why the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria had a larger metropolitan jurisdiction than the bishop of Rome had. But you tell us, "that suburbicary churches must be taken as generally all churches and cities any ways subordinate to the city of Rome, which was at that time known by the name of *urbs*, or *city*, κατ' ἐξοχήν, by way of excellency; not as it related to the prefect or governor of Rome, in regard of whose ordinary jurisdiction, we confess it commanded only those few places about it in Italy, but as it related to the emperor himself; in which sense the word *suburbicary* rightly signifies all cities or churches whatsoever within the Roman empire, as the word *Romania* also anciently signified the whole imperial territory; as card. Perron clearly proves upon this subject." But this is one instance of what men's wits will do, when they are resolved to break through any thing; for whoever, that had read of the suburbicary regions and provinces in the Code

Lab. p. 203.

n. 7.
412

of Theodosius^u, or other parts of the civil law, as distinguished from other provinces under the Roman empire, and those in Italy too, could ever have imagined that the notion of *suburbicary churches* had been any other than what was correspondent to those regions and provinces?^x But let that be granted which Sirmondus so much contends for—that the notion of *suburbicary* may have different respects, and so sometimes be taken for the churches within the Roman diocese, sometimes for those within the Roman patriarchate, and sometimes for those which are under the pope as universal pastor; yet how doth it appear that ever Ruffinus took it in any other than the first sense? no other provinces being called *suburbicary* but such as were under the jurisdiction either of the Roman prefect, within a hundred miles of the city, (within which compass references and appeals were made to him,) or at the most, to the lieutenant of the Roman diocese, whose jurisdiction extended to those ten provinces which his lordship mentions. It is not, therefore, in what sense words may be taken, but in what sense they were taken, and what evidence there is that ever they were so understood. Never was any controversy more ridiculous than that concerning the extent of the suburbicary regions or provinces, if *suburbicary* were taken in your sense, for all the cities within the Roman empire. But this extending to the suburbicary churches as far as the Roman empire, is like the art of those Jesuits, who, in their setting forth *Anastasius de vitis pontificum*, in Stephanus V, turned *papa urbis* into *papa orbis*; for that being so mean and contemptible a title, they thought much it should remain as it did; but *papa orbis* was magnificent and glorious. I wonder, therefore, that instead of extending the signification of *suburbicary churches*, you do not rather pretend that it ought to be read *suborbicary*, and so to suit exactly with the *papa orbis*, as importing all those churches which are under the power of the universal pastor: for why should you stop at the confines of the Roman empire? how comes his juris-

413 diction to be confined within that? by what right did he govern the churches within the empire, and not those with-

^u Cod. Theodos. l. 11. tit. 1. c. 9.
tit. 16. c. 12. tit. 28. c. 12.

^x Adventor. p. 2. de Eccles. suburbic. c. 1.

out? Surely not as primate, metropolitan, or patriarch of the Roman empire, for those are titles yet unheard of in antiquity: if as head of the church, how comes the jurisdiction of that to be at all limited? Were there no churches without the empire then? I hope you will not deny that: if there were, to whom did the jurisdiction over them belong? to the pope, or not? If not, how comes he to be head of the church, and universal pastor? if they did, why were not these suburbicary churches as well as those within the empire? Besides, it is confessed by the learnedest among you, that when the notion of *suburbicary* is extended beyond the suburbicary provinces, it is not out of any relation to the city, but to the power of the bishop of the city, and therefore the suburbicary churches may be larger than the suburbicary provinces. But if this be true, (as it is the only probable evasion,) then it is impossible for you to confine the suburbicary churches within the Roman empire, without confining the jurisdiction of the Roman bishop within those bounds too: for if the enlarging the notion of *suburbicary churches* depends upon the extent of his power, the fixing the limits of those churches determines the bounds of his power too; which is utterly destructive to your pretences of the pope's being head of the universal church, and not barely of the churches within the Roman empire. But if it had been Ruffinus his design to express by *suburbicary churches* all those within the Roman empire, surely he made choice of the most unhappy expression to do it by which he could well have thought of. For it being then so well known what the suburbicary provinces were, that in the Code of Theodosius, where they are so often mentioned, they are not distinctly enumerated, because they were then as well understood as the African, Gallican, or Britannie provinces; how absurd were it for him to take a word in common use, and so well known, and apply it to such a sense as no example besides can be produced for it! for if any one at that time should have spoken of the African, Gallican, or Britannie churches, no one would have imagined any other than those which were contained in the several provinces under those names. What reason is there, then, that any thing else should be apprehended by *the suburbicary churches*? I know the last refuge of most of your side, instead of explaining these *suburbicary*

churches, hath been to rail at Ruffinus, and call him dunce and blockhead, and enemy to the Roman church; (instances were easy to be given, if it were at all necessary;) but besides that, it were easy to make it appear that Ruffinus was no such fool as some have taken him for: (and if they think so because St. Hierom gives him such hard words, they must think so of all whom St. Hierom opposed:) he is sufficiently vindicated in this translation by the ancient Vatican copy^y of the Nicene canons, out of which this very canon is produced by Sirmondus, and the very same word of *suburbicary* therein used; and that in such a manner as utterly destroys your sense of the *suburbicary churches*, for such as are within the Roman empire; for that copy calls them *loca suburbicaria*; and will you say those are the provinces within the Roman empire too? Can any one rationally think that any other places should be called *suburbicary* but such as lie about the city? And, by the same interpretation which you here use, you may call all England the suburbs of London, because London is *the city* κατ' ἐξοχὴν, as you speak; and therefore all the churches of England must be suburbicary to London. But if you think this incongruous, you may on the same account judge the other to be so too. It appears, then, that

414 the *suburbicary places* in the Vatican copy (and in that very ancient copy which Justellus had, which agrees with the Vatican) are the same with the *suburbicary churches* in Ruffinus; and if you will explain these latter of the Roman empire, you must do the former too. But not only the Vatican copy, but all other different versions of the Nicene canon, utterly overthrow this opinion of cardinal Perron, that the *suburbicary churches* must be taken for those within the Roman empire; for in the Arabic version, published by Turrianus, it is thus rendered, *Siquidem similiter episcopus Romæ, i. e. successor Petri apostoli, potestatem habet omnium civitatum, et locorum quæ sunt circa eam*. Are all the cities and places in the Roman empire *circa eam*, about the city of Rome? if not, neither can the churches be. And in that Arabic paraphrase, which Salmasius had of the famous Peireskios, it is translated much more

^y De primatu ecclesiæ Romanæ et aliarum civitatum episcopis. Antiqui moris est, ut episcopus urbis Romæ habeat principatum; ut sub-

urbicaria loca, et omnem provinciam suam sollicitudine gubernet.—Codex Vaticanus apud Sirmond. de Region. et Eccles. Suburb.

agreeably to the Nicene canon in these words; *Propterea quod episcopus Romanus etiam hunc morem obtinet, et hoc ei adjunctum est, ut potestatem habeat supra civitates, et loca quæ prope eam sunt*; which is yet more full to shew the absurdity of your exposition, for these suburbicary churches must be then in places near the city of Rome. And agreeably to these, Aristinus, the Greek collector of the canons, hath it, καὶ ὁ Ῥώμης τῶν ὑπὸ Ῥώμην, which Ruffinus his *suburbicary* doth exactly render. By whom, now, must we be judged what is meant by these suburbicary churches? by you, who make a forced and strained interpretation of the word *suburbicary* to such a sense, of which there is no evidence in antiquity or reason, and is withal manifestly repugnant to the design of the canon, which is to proportion the dioceses of the bishops of Antioch and Alexandria by the example of Rome, (which had been very absurd if these suburbicary churches did comprehend the dioceses of Alexandria and Antioch, and all other provinces, as you make them?) or else must we be judged by the ancient versions of the Nicene canon, Latin and Arabic, and by other Greek paraphrases, all which unanimously concur to overthrow that figment, that the suburbicary churches are all those within the Roman empire. And this the learned Petrus de Marca^z was so sensible of, that he saith Ruffinus did *rectissime et ex usu recepto*, “very agreeably both to reason and custom,” compare the Alexandrian and Roman bishop in this, that he should have the power over the diocese of Egypt, by the same right that the bishop of Rome had over the urbicary diocese; or, saith he, *ut Ruffinus elegantissime loquitur, In ecclesiis suburbicariis, id est, in iis ecclesiis quæ decem provinciis suburbicariis continebantur*, “as Ruffinus most elegantly speaks,” (sure then he thought him no such ignorant person as Perron, and others from him, have reproached him to be,) “In the suburbicary churches, that is, in those churches which are contained in the ten suburbicary provinces——For,” as he goes on, “the calling of synods, the ordination of bishops, the full administration of the churches in those provinces, did belong to the bishop of Rome, as to the bishop of Alexandria in the Egyptian diocese, and to the bishop of

^z De Concordia Sacerdot. et Imp. l. I. c. 7. sect. 6.

Antioch in the Oriental:" which he likewise confirms by the ancient Latin interpreter of the Nicene canons, who, he saith, was elder than Dionysius Exiguus; in whose interpretation he makes the *suburbicaria loca* to contain the four regions about Rome, which made the proper metropolitan province of the Roman bishop, comprehending sixty-nine bishoprics, and that which he calls his province, to be the urbicary diocese contained in those ten provinces which his lordship mentions.

§. 15. But the pope's being universal bishop having so little evidence elsewhere, his lordship's adversary at last hath recourse to this, "that the bishop of Rome is St. Peter's successor, and therefore to him we must have recourse." To which his lordship answers: "The fathers, I deny not, ascribe very much to St. Peter, but it is to St. Peter in his own person; and among them Epiphanius is as free and as frequent in extolling St. Peter as any of them, and yet did he never intend to give an absolute principality to Rome in St. Peter's right; which he at large manifests by a place particularly insisted on, in which he proves that the building of the church on St. Peter, in Epiphanius his sense, is not as if he and his successors were to be monarchs over it for ever, but it is the edifying and establishing the church in the true faith of Christ by the confession which St. Peter made. And so," saith he, "he expresses himself elsewhere most plainly, that Christ's building his church upon this rock was upon the confession of St. Peter, and the solid faith contained therein; and that Epiphanius could not mean that St. Peter was any rock or foundation of the church, so as that he and his successors must be relied on in all matters of faith, and govern the church like princes and monarchs, he proves, not only by the context, but because he makes St. James to succeed our Lord in the principality of the church. And Epiphanius," saith he, "was too full of learning and industry to speak contrary to himself in a point of this moment." This is the sum of his lordship's discourse: to which you answer, "that it is clear, even by the texts of Epiphanius, that this promise by Christ to St. Peter is derived to his successors;" which you prove from hence, because he saith "that by the gates of hell here-
sies and heretics are understood." "Now this," say you, "cannot be understood of St. Peter's person alone, for then

Conf. p. 153.
sect. 25.
n. 14.

415

Lab. p. 204.
n. 9.

why not heresies and heretics prevail against the church after St. Peter's death, yea, so far as utterly to extinguish the true faith?" But cannot God preserve the church from being extinguished by heresies, though St. Peter hath no infallible successor? Is not the promise that "the gates of hell shall not prevail against the church?" It doth not say that the gates of hell shall not prevail against any that shall pretend to be his successors at Rome; for if heresies be those gates, they have too often prevailed against them. And is this your way indeed to secure the church, by providing St. Peter such successors which may be heretics themselves? But much more wisely did St. Gregory say, if one pretends to be universal bishop, then upon his falling the church must fall too; much more wisely the council of Basil, in their synodal epistle, object this as the necessary consequent of the doctrine of the pope's supremacy, that, *errante pontifice, quod sæpe contigit et contingere potest, tota erraret ecclesia*, "that, in case the pope err, which often hath happened, and often may, the whole church must err too." And yet this is your way to secure the church from errors and heresies. If you designed to ruin it, you could not do it in a more compendious way than to oblige the whole church to believe the dictates of one who is so far from that infallibility which St. Peter had, that he follows him in nothing more than his falls: I wish he would in his repentance too, and that would be the best way to secure the church from errors and heresies; which she can never be secured from, as long as one pretends to be her head who may not only err himself, but propound that to be believed infallibly which is notoriously false: for that popes *as popes* may err, and propound false doctrine to the church, not only protestants, but some of your own communion, have abundantly proved; particularly Sim. Vigorius^a, in his defence of Richerius, in his commentary on the forecited synodal epistle of the council of Basil; and calls that opinion, that the pope may err as a private doctor, but not as pope, *ineptissimam opinionem*, "a most foolish opinion:" for otherwise, as he saith, it would be most absurd to say that the pope might be deposed for heresy, for he is not deposed as a private doctor, but as pope. And this he proves by the contradictory decrees of Adrian III. to

^a Vigorius Com. in Ep. Synod. Concil. Basil. c. 7. p. 63.

Adrian I. and Leo VII; and so of Formosus, Martinus, Romanus, to Johannes, Stephanus, and Sergius; nay, he instanceth in that famous decree of Boniface VIII. in pronouncing so definitively that it was *de necessitate salutis, sub-*
 416 *esse Romano pontifici*, (“necessary to salvation to be subject to the pope:”) and that he decreed this as pope appears by those words, *Declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus, omnino esse de necessitate salutis*; than which words nothing can be more express and definitive, and yet pope Innocent III. asserts that the king of France hath no superior upon earth. Is not the church like then to be well secured from heresies, when her infallible heads may so apparently contradict each other, and this acknowledged by men of your own communion? Nothing, then, can be more absurd or unreasonable than to say, that the church cannot be preserved from being extinguished by heresy unless the pope be St. Peter’s successor as head of the church. To his lordship’s testimonies out of Epiphanius, “that St. James succeeded our Lord in the principality of the church,” you answer, 1. “that in the places he
 Lab. p. 205. alleges there is not a word of the church’s principality;”
 n. 9. 2. “that he only implies that he was the first of the apostles made bishop of any particular place, viz. at Hierusalem, which is called Christ’s throne, as any episcopal chair is in ancient ecclesiastical writers.” But whosoever will examine the places in Epiphanius^b, will find much more intended by him than what you will allow; for not only he saith that he first had an episcopal chair, but that our Lord committed to him τὸν θρόνον αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, “his throne upon earth,” which surely is much more than can be said of any mere episcopal chair; and I believe you will be much to seek where Hierusalem was ever called *Christ’s throne upon earth* after his ascension to heaven: besides, if it were, it is the strongest prejudice that may be against the principality of the Roman see, if Jerusalem was made by Christ his throne here. And that a principality over the whole church is intended by Epiphanius^c seems more clear by that other place which his lordship cites, wherein he not only saith that James was first made bishop, but gives this reason for it, “because he was the brother of our Lord;” and if you observe how Epiphanius brings it in, you will say,

^b Epiph. Hæres. 78. p. 1039.

^c Hæres. 29. p. 119.

he intended more by it than to make him the first bishop. For he was disputing before, how the kingdom and the priesthood did both belong to Christ, and that Christ had transfused both into his church, ἰδρυται δὲ ὁ θρόνος ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκλησίᾳ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, “but his throne is established for ever in his holy church;” consisting both of his kingdom and priesthood, both which he communicated to his church; *quare Jacobus primus omnium est episcopus constitutus*, as Petavius renders it; so that he seems to settle James in that principality of the church which he had given to it; and what reason can you have to think, but that Christ’s throne, in which Epiphanius saith James was settled, in the other place, is the same with his throne in the church which he mentions here? And what would you give for so clear a testimony in antiquity for Christ’s settling St. Peter in his throne at Rome, as here is for his placing St. James in it at Jerusalem?

§. 16. His lordship goes on. “And he still tells us, the bishop of Rome is St. Peter’s successor. Well, suppose that, what then? What! why then he succeeded in all St. Peter’s prerogatives which are ordinary, and belonged to him as a bishop, though not in the extraordinary, which belonged to him as an apostle. For that is it which you all say, but no man proves.” Yes, you say, Bellarmine hath done it in his disputations on that subject. For this you produce a saying of his, that when the apostles were dead, the apostolical authority remained alone in St. Peter’s successor. I see with you still, saying and proving are all one. But since you refer the reader to Bellarmine for proofs, I shall likewise refer him to the many sufficient answers which have been given him.

You argue stoutly afterwards, “that because primacy in the modern sense of it implies supremacy, therefore wherever the fathers attribute a primacy to Peter among the apostles, they mean his authority and power over them.” I see you are resolved to believe that there cannot be one, two, and three, but the first must be head over all the rest. “A primacy of order,” his lordship truly saith, “was never denied him by protestants, and an universal supremacy of power was never granted him by the primitive Christians.” Prove but in the first place that St. Peter had such a supremacy of power over the apostles and all Christian churches, and that

this power is conveyed to the pope, you will do something. In the mean time we acknowledge as much primacy, authority, and principality in St. Peter, as D. Reynolds^d proves in the place you cite, none of which come near that supremacy of power which you contend for, and we must deny till we see it better proved than it is by you. But you offer it from St. Hierom, because he saith, “the primacy was given to Peter for preventing schism, but a mere precedency of order is not sufficient for that^e.” But doth not St. Hierom in the words immediately before say, that the church is equally built on all the apostles, and that they all receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and that the firmness of the church is equally grounded on them; and can he possibly then mean in the following words any other primacy but such as is among equals, and not any supremacy of power over them? And certainly you think the apostles very unruly, who would not be kept in order by such a primacy as this is, unless St. Peter had full jurisdiction over them. And since it is so evident that St. Hierom can mean no other but such a preeminence as this for preventing schism, you had need have a good art, that can deduce from thence a necessity of a supremacy of power in the church for that end. For, say you, “whatsoever power or jurisdiction was necessary in the apostles’ time for preventing schisms, must, *a fortiori*, be necessary in all succeeding ages;” but still be sure to hold to that power or jurisdiction which was in the apostles’ times, and we grant you all you can prove from it. You still dispute gallantly, when you beg the question, and argue as formally as I have met with one, when you have supposed that which it most concerned you to prove; which is, that God hath appointed a supremacy of power in one particular person, always to continue in the church for preservation of faith and unity in it. For if you suppose the church cannot be governed, or schism prevented without this, you may well save yourself a labour of proving any further. But so far are we from seeing such a supremacy of power as you challenge to the pope to be necessary for preventing schisms, that we are sufficiently convinced that the usurping of it hath caused one of the greatest ever was in the Christian world.

^d Reynolds against Hart, c. 5. div. 3.

^e Hieron. l. 1. Jovin. c. 14.

THE POPE'S AUTHORITY NOT PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE OR REASON.

The insufficiency of the proofs from scripture acknowledged by Romanists themselves.—The impertinency of Luke xxii. 32. to that purpose.—No proofs offered for it but the suspected testimonies of popes in their own cause.—That no infallibility can thence come to the pope as St. Peter's successor confessed and proved by Vigorius and Mr. White.—The weakness of the evasion of the pope's erring as a private doctor, but not as pope, acknowledged by them.—John xxi. 15. proves nothing towards the pope's supremacy.—How far the pope's authority is owned by the Romanists over kings.—T. C.'s beggings of the question and tedious repetitions passed over.—The argument from the necessity of a living judge considered.—The government of the church not monarchical, but aristocratical.—The inconveniencies of monarchical government in the church manifested from reason.—No evidence that Christ intended to institute such government in his church, but much against it.—The communicatory letters in the primitive church argued an aristocracy.—Gerson's testimony from his book *De Auferribilitate Papæ*, explained and vindicated.—St. Hierom's testimony full against a monarchy in the church.—The inconsistency of the pope's monarchy with that of temporal princes.—The supremacy of princes in ecclesiastical matters asserted by the scripture and antiquity, as well as the church of England.

§. 1. **W**E are now come to the places of scripture insisted on for the proof of the pope's authority; which you have been so often and successfully beaten out of, by so many powerful assaults of our writers, that it is matter of admiration that you should yet think to find any shelter there. For those which you yet account fortresses and bulwarks for your cause, have not only been triumphed over by your adversaries, but have been slighted by the wisest of your party, and deserted as most untenable places. As I shall make it appear to you in the progress of this dispute: in which I shall not barely shew the palpable weakness of your pretended proofs, but bring unanswerable arguments against them from persons of your own communion. For the force of that reason by

which the protestants have prevailed over you in this dispute hath been so great, that it hath brought over some of the learnedest of your party, not only to an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of these proofs, but to a zealous opposition against that very doctrine which you attempt to prove by them. But such is the fate of a sinking cause, that it catcheth hold of any thing to save itself, though it be the anchor of the ship which makes it sink the sooner. Thus it will appear to be in these baffled proofs, which you only bring into the field to shew what straits you are in for help; and no sooner appear there, but they fall off to the conquering side, and help only to promote your ruin. But since they are in the place where arguments should be, we must in civility consider them as if they were so. The first place then is, Luke xxii. 32, "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not." What would a philosopher think, were he chosen as umpire between us, (as once one was between Origen and his adversaries,) to hear this place produced to prove the pope's authority and infallibility? and when a reason is demanded of so strange an inference, (from a promise of recovery to St. Peter to an impossibility of falling in the pope,) nothing else produced but the forged epistles of some popes and the partial testimonies of others in their own cause? Could he think
419 otherwise, but that these men loved their cause dearly, and would fain prove it, if they could tell how; but since there was neither evidence in reason or more indifferent writers in it, yet to let them see how confident they were of the pope's infallibility, they would produce their infallible testimonies to prove they were infallible? For we ask, what evidence is there that the privilege obtained for St. Peter, whatever it is, must descend to his successors; if to his successors, whether to all his successors, or only to some; if only to some, why to those at Rome more than at Antioch or any other place; if to them at Rome, why it must be understood of a doctrinal and not a saving faith, as it was in St. Peter; if of doctrinal, why not absolutely, but only conditionally, if they teach the church? For all these and several other inquiries of this nature we are told, it must be so understood; but if you ask why, all the answer we can get is, Because seven popes at one time or other said so.

§. 2. But at this you grow very angry, and tell us, 1. that Bellarmine, besides these, gives several pregnant reasons from the text itself. What were it worth to have a sight of them! If you had thought them so pregnant, you are not so sparing of taking out of Bellarmine but you would have given them us over again. Bellarmine's excellent proofs are two or three *sine dubios*. *Sine dubio*, saith he, *hic Dominus speciale aliquid Petro impetravit*^a. And who denies it? but we grant, it was so special to him that it never came to his successors. And again, *Sine dubio, ipsis præcipue debeat esse nota suæ sedis auctoritas*, speaking of the popes' testimonies for themselves, "Without all doubt they knew best their own authority." They were wonderfully to blame else; but all the difficulty is, to persuade others to believe them *sine dubio* when they speak in their own cause. And for that I can find no pregnant reason in him at all. Well, but we have a third *sine dubio* yet, which may be more to the purpose than either of the other two. For Bellarmine distinguishes of two privileges which Christ obtained for St. Peter; the first is, "that himself should never lose the true faith though he were tempted of the devil;" and this his lordship grants, that it was the special grace which Christ's prayer obtained, that, notwithstanding Satan's sifting him, and his threefold denial of his Master, he should not fall into a final apostasy. The second privilege is, "that he as bishop should not be able to teach any thing against the faith, *sive, ut in sede ejus nunquam inveniretur qui doceret contra veram fidem*, or, that there should be none found in his see who should do it." Is not here an excellent conjunction disjunctive in this *sive*, "or?" that he should not do it himself, or, that his successors should not do it! Doth not this want pregnant proofs? and we have them in the next words. "The first of these, it may be," (very modestly!) "did not descend to his successors; but *secundum, sine dubio, manavit ad posteros sive successores*, the second, without all doubt, did descend to his successors." Are not these pregnant reasons, three *sine dubios* given us by cardinal Bellarmine! For when he comes to confirm this last *sine dubio*, he produces nothing but those testimonies which his lordship excepts against as

^a Bellarm. de Pontif. l. 4. c. 3.

not fit to be judges in their own cause. If these then be Bellarmine's pregnant reasons out of the text, no wonder that his lordship was not pleased to answer them. But yet you are displeased that his lordship should think that popes were interested persons in their own cause. No, no; all that ever sat in that see were such holy, meek, humble, self-denying men, that they would not for a world let a word fall to exalt their own authority in the church. And we are mightily to blame to think otherwise of them. Is it possible to think that Felix I. and Lucius I. should speak for their own interest; though the epistles under their names be such notorious coun-
420 terfeits that all sober men among you are ashamed of them? Is it possible that Leo I. should do it, who was so humble a man that he contended with six hundred and thirty bishops of the council of Chalcedon about the primacy of his see, and whose epistles breathe so much of self-denial in all the contests he had about it? And although pope Agatho and the rest be of later standing, when the popes did begin a little more openly to take upon them, yet can the protestants think that these men were biassed with their proper interest? Are not these weak pretences for them to reject their authority upon? For your part, (you say,) you could never understand this proceeding of protestants. The more a great deal is the pity; and if we could help your understanding and not endanger our own, we would willingly do it. Well, but though Bellarmine's pregnant reasons prove so abortive, and though the pope's authorities should not be taken, yet his lordship must needs wrong Bellarmine in saying, that he doth upon
the matter confess, "that there is not one father in the church disinterested in the cause, who understands this text as Bellarmine doth, before Theophylact." And the reason is, "because, though Bellarmine cite no more, yet there might be more for all that: for must he needs confess there are no more authors citable in any subject but what he cites himself?" As though Bellarmine were wont to leave out any authorities which made for his purpose, especially in so weighty a subject as this? Do you think he was so weak a person to run to popes' authorities, if he could have found any other? and when he produces no more, is it not a plain confession he found no more to his purpose? But I am weary of such great

Conf.p.157.
sect. 25.
n. 16.

impertinencies, and would fain meet with something of matter that might hold up the reader's patience as well as mine. All that ever I can meet with that hath any thing of tendency that way is, that this privilege of the indeficiency of St. Peter's faith doth not belong to him as an apostle, but rather as he was prince of the apostles, and appointed to be Christ's vicar on earth after him. Very handsomely begged again! but where is the proof for all this? have you no popes stand ready again to attest the truth of it? for none else that have any reason would ever say it. Did St. Peter deny Christ as prince of the apostles? Indeed it was then much for his honour that the captain should fly from his colours first! and Christ's vicar upon earth should the most need to have his faith prayed for that it should not fail! I had thought St. Peter had been head of the apostles, and not Simon: if Christ had spoke to him as his vicar he would sure have called him *Peter, Peter*, and not *Simon, Simon*. But it seems he did not attend that Peter was the rock on which his church must be built; or else he minded it so much, that he thought that name improper when he mentions his falling; you have therefore stoutly and unanswerably (not proved, but) demonstrated that these words were spoken of St. Peter, not as an apostle, but as Christ's vicar upon earth.

§. 3. But suppose it were so, what is this to those who pretend to be his successors? Yes, very much. For, say you, whatever our Saviour intended should descend by virtue of that prayer of his, did effectively so descend. You might have put one of Bellarmine's *sine dubios* to this. For whoever was so senseless as to question that? But you confess, it is a very disputable question, whether every thing which Christ by his prayer intended and obtained for St. Peter, was likewise intended by him to descend to St. Peter's successors. Yet that some special privilege was to descend to them, is, you say, manifest by Bellarmine's authorities and reasons. If from nothing else, I dare confidently say, no man in his wits will believe it manifest. And what that is, neither you nor any one else can either prove or understand. Yes, say you, it is, that none of his successors should ever so far fall from the faith as to teach heresy *in pontificalibus*, or, as you speak with Bellarmine, any thing contrary to faith *tanquam pontifex*,

421 i. e. in virtue of that authority which they were to have in the church as St. Peter's successors. Here then we fix a while to see this proved; but our expectation is again frustrated: for instead of proofs we meet with the old mumpsimus of the pope's erring as private doctor, but not as pastor of the church; a distinction so ridiculous, that many among yourselves deride it, as will appear presently. And therefore put in your *tanquam pontifex* as long as you please, you will gain no great matter by it. When you can prove that Christ did intend in that one prayer some part of the gift personally and absolutely to St. Peter, and another part conditionally to his successors, I will grant it no absurdity to say, that perhaps some part of the gift did not belong to either of them. But these are such strange fetches out of a plain scripture, that those may admire your subtilty who cannot be convinced by your reason. Yet to let you see that these things are not so clear as you would have them, I shall bring you some arguments out of your own writers against your interpretation of this place; and I pray answer them at your leisure. Vigorius therefore proves that this place cannot be understood of St. Peter and his successors, that their faith should not fail; for then, saith he, 1. "the canons had decreed to no purpose that a pope might be deposed in case of heresy; for those that suppose that he may fall into heresy, do doubtless suppose that his faith fails^b." Now here is a witness against you from your own church, and that out of your canons too; and that is better worth than twenty testimonies of popes for you. 2. If this were understood of St. Peter's successors, they who succeeded him at Antioch would enjoy this privilege as well as those at Rome; for they are, saith he, as well St. Peter's successors as the other. And, saith he, if they understand this of one and not of the other, *totis faucibus se deridendos propinarent*, they expose themselves to contempt and laughter. 3. If this were true of St. Peter's successors at Rome, then the decrees of one pope could not be revoked by the other; because it is impossible they should err in making those decrees. But it is not Vigorius alone who hath shewed the weakness of your arguments from this place; for our learned

Lab. p. 210.
n. 2.

^b Comment. in Ep. Synod. Concil. Basil. c. 7. sect. 3.

countryman Mr. White hath more fully and largely discovered the weakness of all your pretences from scripture, fathers, and reason, concerning the pope's succeeding St. Peter in his infallibility. And particularly as to this place he saith^c, "that either it concerns the present danger St. Peter was in, or else doth represent what was to be afterwards in the church: and that it doth primarily and directly relate to St. Peter's imminent temptation, all the circumstances persuade us; first, because he is called by his private name, *Simôn*, and not by his apostolical name, *Peter*. 2. Because Christ immediately subjoins after St. Peter's answer his threefold denial of him. 3. The event itself makes it appear, by the apostles' flight, St. Peter's temptation and fall, his conversion and tears when Christ looked on him, and by his confirming the disciples after Christ's resurrection. But," saith he, "if this place be taken as respecting the future times of the church, the same thing must be expected in St. Peter's successors which fell out in St. Peter himself, viz. that either through fear or some other motive they may be drawn into the show of heresy, or into heresy itself; but so as either in themselves or their successors they should be restored to the catholic faith." But what reason there is for this latter interpretation, (though destructive to the pope's infallibility,) neither doth that person acquaint us, nor can I possibly understand. All the evasion that you have to avoid the force of whatever is brought against you out of this place, is by conjuring up that rare distinction of the pope's not erring when he defines any thing as matter of faith. But see what that same person saith of this distinction of yours^d: *Excipiunt aliqui*, saith he, *papam posse esse hæreticum, sed non posse hæresim promulgare. Adeo quidlibet effutire pro libidine, etiam licitum est*; "Some answer, that the pope may be a heretic, but cannot promulge or define 422 heresy: so far do men think it lawful to say what they please. But can any man," saith he, "be guilty of so much incogitancy as not to see that these things are consequent upon each other; It is a pear tree, and therefore it will bear pears: It is a vine, and therefore it will bring forth grapes. Christ saith, an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit; but these

^c Tabulæ Suffrag. tab. 10. p. 111.^d Tab. Suffr. p. 145.

say, an evil tree cannot bring forth bad fruit. The apostle saith, the wisdom of the flesh cannot be subject to God; but these say, it cannot but be subject to God." And then he further presseth, "that they would declare from what author they brought this contradiction into the church of God, lest men should believe they were inspired by the father of lies when they made it." Nay he goes further yet in these stinging expressions—*An putatis licere, in re quæ totum ecclesiæ statum ad vivum tangit, novitatem adeo inauditam, adeo rationi adversantem, adeo excedentem omnem fidem, ex somniis cerebri vestri inferre?* "Do you think it lawful, in a matter which toucheth the whole state of the church to the quick, to produce so unheard of a novelty, so repugnant to reason, so far above all faith, out of the dreams of your own brain?" Go now and answer these things among yourselves; complain not that we account such evasions silly, absurd, and ridiculous; you see they are accounted so by some of your own communion, (or at least who pretend to be so,) and those no contemptible persons neither. But such as have seen so much of the weakness and absurdity of your common doctrine, that they openly and confidently oppose it, and that upon the same grounds that protestants had done it before them. And I hope this is much more to our purpose to shew the insufficiency of these proofs, than it was for you to produce the testimonies of several popes in their own cause. Which was all the proof that Bellarmine or you had, that these words are extended to St. Peter's successors, when we bring men from among yourselves, who produce several reasons, that they ought not to be so interpreted.

§. 4. But yet there is another place as pertinent as the former; the celebrated *Pasce oves et agnos*, John xxi. 15, 16,

Lab. p. 211.
n. 3.
Conf. p. 158.
sect. 25.
n. 17.

17. But sheep and lambs, say you, are Christ's whole flock. So there are both these, saith his lordship, "in every flock that is not of barren wethers; and every apostle, and every apostle's successor hath charge to feed both sheep and lambs; that is, weaker and stronger Christians, not people and pastors, subjects and governors, as A. C. expounds it, to bring the necks of princes under the Roman pride." No, say you, "no such charge is given to any other apostles, in the places his lordship cites, Matt. xxviii. 19. Matt. x. 17, for these speak

of persons unbaptized, but that place of St. John of those who were actually Christ's flock; and the words being absolutely and indefinitely pronounced, must be understood generally and indefinitely of all Christ's sheep and lambs, that is, of all Christians whatsoever, not excepting the apostles themselves; unless it appear from some other place, that the other apostles had the feeding of all Christ's sheep as universally and unlimitedly committed to them as they were here to St. Peter. But all this is nothing, as Vigorius^e speaks about the *solvere, ligare, pascere*, but *dudum explosis cantilenis aures Christianorum obtundere*, to bring us those things over and over, which have been answered as oft as they have been brought. For how often have you been told, that these words contain no particular commission to St. Peter, but a more vehement exhortation to the discharge of his duty, and that pressed with the quickness of the question before it, "Lovest thou me." How often, that the full commission to the apostles was given before, "As the Father hath sent me, so send I you^f:" and that as Christ was by his Father's appointment the chief Shepherd of the sheep and lambs too, so Christ by this equal commission to all the apostles gives them all an equal power and authority to govern his flock. How often, 423 that nothing appears consequent upon this, whereby St. Peter took this office upon him; but that afterwards we find St. Peter called *the apostle of the circumcision*, which certainly he Gal. ii. 7. would never have been had he been looked on as the universal pastor of the church: we find the apostles sending St. Peter Acts viii. to Samaria, which was a very unmannerly action, if they¹⁴ looked on him as head of the church. How often, that these indefinite expressions are not exclusive of the pastoral charge of other apostles over the flock of Christ; when they are not Mark vi. only bid to "preach the gospel to every creature," but even¹⁶ those bishops which they ordained in several churches are charged to "feed the flock:" and therefore certainly the apo- Acts xx. 28. stles themselves had not only a charge to preach to unbaptized persons, (as you suppose,) but to govern the flock of those who were actually Christ's sheep and lambs, as well as St. Peter. How often, I say, have you been told all these

^e Vigor. p. 61.^f John xx. 21.

and several other things in answer to this place ; and have you yet the confidence to object it, as though it had never been taken notice of, without ever offering to take off those answers which have been so frequently given ? But you must be pardoned in this, as in all other things of an equal impossibility.

§. 5. Well, but his lordship objects a shrewd consequence from this universal pastorship ; that this brings the necks of
 Conf.p.159. princes under the Roman pride. “ And if kings be meant,”
 sect. 25. his lordship saith, “ yet the command is, *pasce*, feed them ;
 n. 17. but *deponere* or *occidere*, to depose or kill them, is not *pascere* in any sense ; *lanii id est, non pastoris* ; that is the butcher's, not the shepherd's part.” This you call his lordship's winding about, and falling upon that odious question of killing and deposing kings. An odious question indeed, whether we consider the grounds, or the effects and consequents of it. But yet you would seem to clear yourselves from the odium of it. First, by saying that it is a gross fallacy to argue *a negatione speciei ad negationem generis*, which is a new kind of logic. It is indeed, for it is of your own coining ; for his lordship argues *ab affirmatione generis ad affirmationem speciei*, and I hope this is no new logic, unless you think that he saith, He who hath power over all living creatures hath not thereby power over men too. His lordship therefore doth not argue against the pope's universal supremacy from the denial of that, but deduces that as a consequence from your assertion, and explication of what you mean by *sheep and lambs*. But this is but a
 Ibid. slight answer in comparison of what follows ; “ Secondly, we
 Lab. p. 212. answer, that the point of killing kings is a most false and scandalous imputation ;” scandalous enough indeed, if false : and though your popes have not given express warrant for the doing it, yet it is sufficiently known how the pope in consistory could not contain his joy when it was done, in the case of Henry III. of France. And it hath been sufficiently confessed and lamented by persons of your own communion, how much the doctrine of the Jesuits hath encouraged those assassinations of those two successive Henries of France. Will you, or dare you vindicate the doctrines of Mariana and others, which do not obscurely deliver their judgment as to that very thing of killing heretical princes ? But if we should grant

you this, that the pope may not command to kill, what say you to that of deposing princes, which seldom falls much short of the other? As to this, you dare not cry, It is a false and scandalous imputation, as you did to the other; but you answer, It is no point of your faith, that the pope hath power to do it; and therefore you say it is no part of your task to dispute it. Is this all the security princes have from you, that it is no point of your faith that the pope hath power to do it? Is it not well enough known, that there are many things which are held undoubtedly by the greatest part of your church, which yet you say are no points of faith? And 424 yet in this you are directly contradicted by one who knew what were points of faith among you as well as you, and that was father Creswell^g, whose testimony I have cited already; and he saith expressly, *Certum est, et de fide*, "It is a thing certain, and of faith, that the subjects of an heretical prince are not only freed from allegiance, but are bound *ex hominum Christianorum dominatu ejicere*, to cast him out of his power," which certainly is more than the deposing of him. And Sanders^h plainly enough saith, "that a king that will not submit to the pope's authority is by no means to be suffered, but his subjects ought to do their utmost endeavour that another may be placed in his room." Indeed, he saith not, as the other doth, that this is *de fide*, but that is the only reserve you have when a doctrine is odious and infamous to the world, to cry out, it is not *de fide*, when yet it may be as firmly believed among you as any that you account *de fide*. And if you believe the duke of Alvaⁱ in his manifesto at the siege of Pampelona, when the pope had deposed the king of Navarre to whom that city belonged, he saith, that it is not doubted but the pope had power to depose heretical princes. And if you had been of another opinion, you ought to have declared yourself more fully than you do. If you had said, that indeed some were of that opinion, but you abhorred and detested it, you had spoken to the purpose; but when you use only that pitiful evasion, that it is not of faith, &c., you sufficiently shew what your judgment is, but that you dare not publicly own it. It seems you remember what was said

^g Philopator. sect. 157. p. 149.

^h De visib. Monarch. l. 2. c. 4.

ⁱ Nebrissens. de Bello Navarr. l. 1. c. 6.

by your masters in reference to Emanuel Sà, *Non fuit opus ad ista descendere*, There was no need to meddle with those things. It seems, if there had been, there was no hurt in the doctrine, but only that it was unseasonable. I pray God keep us from that time when you shall think it needful to declare yourselves in this point. But you conclude this with a most unworthy and scandalous reflection on protestants, in these words: "But what protestants have both done and justified in the worst of these kinds is but too fresh in memory." But were those the practices and principles of protestants? were they not abhorred and detested in the highest manner by all true protestants, both at home and abroad? It will be well if you can clear some of yourselves from having too much a hand in promoting both those principles and practices. I suppose you cannot but have heard who it was is said to have expressed so much joy at the time of that horrid execution; what counsels and machinations are said to have been among some devoted sons of the church of Rome abroad about that time: therefore clear yourselves more than yet you have done of those imputations, before you charge that guilt on protestants, which they express the highest abhorrence of. And let the names of such who either publicly or privately abet or justify such horrid actions, be under a continual anathema to all generations.

Conf. p. 159.
sect. 25.
n. 18.

§. 6. After all this discourse about the pope's authority, A. C. brings it at last home to the business of schism. For he saith, "The bishop of Rome shall never refuse to feed and govern the whole flock in such sort, as that neither particular man nor church shall have just cause, under pretence of reformation in matters of faith, to make a separation from the whole church." "This," his lordship saith, "by A. C.'s favour, is mere begging the question. For this is the very thing which the protestants charge upon him; namely, that he hath governed, if not the whole, yet so much of the church as he hath been able to bring under his power, so as that he hath given too just cause of the present continued separation. And as the corruptions in the doctrine of faith in the church of Rome were the cause of the first separation, so are they at this present day the cause why the separation continues. And 425 the oppression of the church of Rome," he further adds, "is

the great cause of all the errors in that part of the church which is under the Roman jurisdiction. And for the protestants, they have made no separation from the general church properly so called, but their separation is only from the church of Rome, and such other churches as by adhering to her have hazarded themselves, and do now miscall themselves the whole catholic church. Nay, even here the protestants have not left the church of Rome in her essence, but in her errors; not in the things which constitute a church, but only in such abuses and corruptions as work towards the dissolution of a church." Let now any indifferent reader be judge, whether his lordship or A. C. be the more guilty in begging the question. For all the answer you can give is, "that his lordship Lab. p. 212. begs it, in saying that the Roman church is not the whole n. 4. catholic church, and that the Roman catholic church may be in an error;" but the former we have proved already, and I doubt not but the latter will be as evident as the other, before our task be ended. But as though it were not possible for you to be guilty of begging the question, after you have said that the Roman church cannot err, you give this as the reason for it, "Because she is the unshaken rock of truth; and that she hath the sole continual succession of lawfully sent pastors and teachers, who have taught the same unchanged doctrine, and shall infallibly continue so teaching it to the world's end." Now who dares call this begging the question? No, it must not be called so in you, it shall be only *taking it for granted*. Which we have seen hath been your practice all along, especially when we charge your church with error; for then you cry out presently, What, your church err? No, you defy the language. What, the spouse of Christ, the catholic church, err? that is impossible. What, the unshaken rock of truth to sink into errors? the infallible church be deceived? she that hath never taught any thing but truth be charged with falsehood? she that not only never did err, but it is impossible, nay, utterly impossible, nay, so impossible that it cannot be imagined, that ever she should err? This is the sum of all your arguments, which, no doubt, sound high to all such who know not what confident begging the question means, or, out of modesty, are loath to charge you with it.

Much to the same purpose do you go on, to prove that

protestants have separated not from the errors, but the essence of your church. And if that be true which you say, that those things which we call *errors* are essential to your church, we are the more sorry for it; for we are sure (and, when you please, will prove it) that they are not, cannot be, essential to a true church; and if they be to yours, the case is so much the worse with you, when your distempers are in your vitals, and your errors essential to your church's constitution. What other things you have here are the bare repetitions of what we have often had before in the chapters you refer us to. And here we may thank you for some ease you give us in the far greatest remaining part of this chapter, which consists of tedious repetitions of such things which have been largely discussed in the first part, where they were purposely and designedly handled; as that concerning traditions, chap. 6; that concerning necessities to salvation, chap. 2, 3, 4; that concerning the scriptures being an infallible rule, throughout the controversy of resolution of faith; and that which concerns the infallibility of general councils, we shall have occasion at large to handle afterwards; and if there be any thing material here which you omit there, it shall be fully considered. But I know no obligation lying upon me to answer things as often as you repeat them, especially since your gift is so good that way. It is sufficient that I know not of any material passage which hath not received an answer in its proper place.

N. 6.
N. 8.

Conf. p. 165.
sect. 26.
n. 6.

Lab. p. 218.
n. 9.

426 §. 7. That which is most pertinent to our present purpose, is that which concerns the necessity of a living judge besides the scriptures for ending controversies of faith. As to which his lordship saith, that, supposing there were such a one, and the pope were he, "yet that is not sufficient against the malice of the devil and impious men, to keep the church at all times from renting even in the doctrine of faith, or to soder the rents which are made. For *oportet esse hæreses*, 1 Cor. xi. 19, heresies there will be, and heresies there properly cannot be but in the doctrine of faith." To this you answer, "That heresies are not within, but without the church, and the rents which stand in need of sodering are not found among the true members of the church, who continue still united in the faith, and due obedience to their head; but in those who have

deserted the true church, and either made or adhered to schismatical and heretical congregations." A most excellent answer ! His lordship says, If Christ had appointed an infallible judge besides the scripture, certainly it should have been for preventing heresies and sodering the rents of the church. So it is, say you; for if there be any heresies, it is nothing to him, they are out of the church ; and if there be any schisms, they are among those who are divided from him. That is, he is an infallible judge only thus far, in condemning all such for heretics and schismatics who do not own him. And his only way of preventing heresies and schisms is the making this the only trial of them, that whatever questions his authority is heresy, and whatever separation be made from him is schism. Just as Absalom pretended that there was no judge appointed to² Sam. xv. hear and determine causes, and that the laws were not sufficient without one, and therefore he would do it himself ; so doth the pope by Christ ; he pretends that he hath not taken care sufficient for deciding controversies in faith, therefore there is a necessity, in order to the church's unity, he should take it upon himself. But now if we suppose in the former case of Absalom, that he had pretended he could infallibly end all the controversies in Israel, and keep all in peace and unity ; and yet abundance of controversies to arise among them by what right and power he took that office upon him, and many of them cry out upon it as an usurpation, and a disparagement to the laws and government of his father David ; and upon this, some of the wiser Israelites should have asked him, whether this were the way to end all controversies, and keep the nation in peace ; would it not have been a satisfactory answer for him to have said, Yes, no doubt it is the only way ; for only they that acknowledge my power are the king's lawful subjects, and all the rest are rebels and traitors ? And is not this just the same answer which you give here ? That the pope is still appointed to keep peace and unity in the church, because all that question his authority be heretics and schismatics. But as in the former case the surest way to prevent those consequences were to produce that power and authority which the king had given him, and that should be the first thing which should be made evident from authentic records, and the clear testimony of the gravest

senators ; so, if you could produce the letters patents whereby Christ made the pope the great lord chancellor of his church, to determine all controversies of faith, and shew this attested by the concurrent voice of the primitive church, who best knew what order Christ took for the government of his church ; this were a way to prevent such persons turning such heretics and schismatics as you say they are by not submitting themselves to the pope's authority. But for you to pretend that the pope's authority is necessary to the church's unity, and when the heresies and schisms of the church are objected, to say, that those are all out of the church, is just as if a shepherd should say, that he would keep the whole flock of sheep within such a fold, and when the better half are
427 shewed him to be out of it, he should return this answer : That those were without, and not within his fold, and therefore they were none of the flock that he meant. So that his meaning was, those that would abide in he could keep in, but for those that would not, he had nothing to say to them. So it is with you ; the pope he ends controversies and keeps the church at unity. How so ? They who do agree are of his flock and of the church, and those that do not are out of it. A quaker or anabaptist will keep the church in unity after the same way, only the pope hath the greater number of his side ; for they will tell you, If they were hearkened to, the church should never be in pieces ; for all those who embrace their doctrines are of the church, and those who do not are heretics and schismatics. So we see upon your principles what an easy matter it is to be an infallible judge, and to end all controversies in the church ; that only this must be taken for granted, that all who will not own such an infallible judge are out of the church, and so the church is at unity still, how many soever there are who doubt or deny the pope's authority. Thus we easily understand what that excellent harmony is which you cry so much up in your church ; that you most gravely say, that, had not the pope received from God the power he challenges, he could never have been able to preserve that peace and unity in matters of religion that is found in the Roman church. Of what nature that unity is, we have seen already ; and surely you have much cause to boast of the pope's faculty of deciding controversies, ever since the late

decree of pope Innocent in the case of the five propositions. For how readily the Jansenists have submitted since, and what unity there hath been among the dissenting parties in France, all the world can bear you witness: and, whatever you pretend, were it not for policy and interest, the infallible chair would soon fall to the ground; for it hath so little footing in scripture or antiquity, that there had need be a watchful eye and strong hand to keep it up.

§. 8. But now we are to examine the main proof which is brought for the necessity of this living and infallible judge; which lies in these words of A. C.: "Every earthly kingdom, when matters cannot be composed by a parliament, (which cannot be called upon all occasions,) hath, besides the law-books, some living magistrates and judges, and above all one visible king, the highest judge, who hath authority sufficient to end all controversies, and settle unity in all temporal affairs; and shall we think that Christ, the wisest King, hath provided in his kingdom the church only the law-books of holy scripture, and no living visible judges, and above all one chief, so assisted by his Spirit as may suffice to end all controversies for unity and certainty of faith? which can never be, if every man may interpret holy scripture, the law-books, as he list." "This," Conf. p. 169. sect. 26. n. 7. his lordship saith, "is a very plausible argument with the many, but the foundation of it is but a similitude, and, if the similitude hold not in the main argument, is nothing." And so his lordship at large proves that it is here: for whatever further concerns this controversy concerning the pope's authority is brought under the examination of this argument; which you mangle into several chapters, thereby confounding the reader, that he may not see the coherence or dependence of one thing upon another. But having cut off the superfluities of this chapter already, I may with more conveniency reduce all that belongs to this matter within the compass of it; and that he may the better apprehend his lordship's scope and design, I shall first sum up his lordship's answers together, and then more particularly go about the vindication of them. 1. Then, his lordship at large proves, that the militant church is not properly a monarchy, and therefore the foundation of the similitude is destroyed; 2. that supposing it a kingdom, yet the church militant is spread in many earthly 428

kingdoms, and cannot well be ordered like one particular kingdom; 3. that the church of England under one supreme governor, our gracious sovereign, hath, besides the law-book of the scripture, visible magistrates and judges, archbishops and bishops, to govern the church in truth and peace; 4. that as in particular kingdoms there are some affairs of greatest consequence, as concerning the statute-laws, which cannot be determined but in parliament; so in the church, the making such canons which must bind all Christians, must belong to a free and lawful general council. Thus I have laid together the substance of his lordship's answer, that the dependence and connection of things may be better perceived by the intelligent reader.

Conf. p. 166. We come now, therefore, to the first answer; as to which
sect. 26.
n. 8. his lordship saith, "It is not certain that the whole church militant is a kingdom; for they are no mean ones which think our Saviour Christ left the church militant in the hands of the apostles and their successors in an aristocratical or rather a mixed government, and that the church is not monarchical otherwise than the triumphant and militant make one body under Christ the Head; and in this sense, indeed, and in this only, the church is a most absolute kingdom. And the very expressing of this sense is a full answer to all the places of scripture and other arguments brought by Bellarmine to prove that the church is a monarchy. But the church being as large as the world, Christ thought fittest to govern it aristocratically, by divers, rather than by one viceroy. And I believe," saith he, "this is true; for so it was governed for the first three hundred years, and somewhat better; the bishops of those times carrying the whole business of admitting any new consecrated bishops or others to, or rejecting them from, their communion." And this his lordship saith he hath "carefully examined for the first six hundred years, even to and within the time of St. Gregory the Great." Now
Lab. p. 219.
n. 10. to this you answer, 1. "that though A. C. urgeth the argument in a similitude of a kingdom only, yet it is of force in any other kind of settled government, as in a commonwealth." But by this A. C. seems a great deal the wiser man, for he knew what he did when he instanced in a kingdom; for he foresaw that this only would tend to his purpose concerning

the pope's supremacy; but though there be the same necessity of some supreme power in a commonwealth, yet that would do him no good at all, for all that could be inferred thence would be the necessity of a general council. And by this you may see how little your similitude will hold any other way than A. C. put it. Therefore, 2. you answer, That the government of the church is not a pure, but a mixt monarchy, i. e. the supreme government of the church is clearly monarchical, you confess; yet bishops within their respective dioceses and jurisdictions are spiritual princes also, that is, chief pastors and governors of such a part of the church in their own right. How far this latter is consonant to your principles, I have already examined; but the former is that we dispute now, concerning the supreme government of the church, whether that be monarchical or no: and this is that which his lordship denies; and, for all that I see, we may continue to do so too, for any argument you bring to the contrary.

§. 9. Although you produce your Achilles in the next paragraph, viz. "that since the government of one in chief is by Lab. p. 220. all philosophers acknowledged for the most perfect, what n. 11. wonder is it that Christ our Saviour thought it fitter to govern the church by one viceroy, than aristocratically, or by many, as he would have it?" But are you sure Christ asked the philosophers' opinions in establishing a government in the church? The philosophers judged truly that of all forms of civil government monarchy was the best, i. e. most conducing to the ends of civil government; for the excellency of such things must be measured by their respect to the ends. Now if we apply this to the church, we must not measure it by 429 such ends as we fancy to ourselves, or such as are only the ends of mere civil societies, but all must be considered with a respect to the chief design of him who first instituted a church; and from thence we must draw our inferences as to what may tend most to the peace and unity of it. Now it appearing to be the great design of Christ that mankind should be brought to eternal happiness, we cannot argue from hence as to the necessity of any manner of government, unless one of them hath in itself a greater tendency to this than another hath. For in civil governments the whole design of the society is the civil peace of it; but it is otherwise in the

church ; the main end of it is to order things with the greatest conveniency for a future life : now this being the main end of this society, and no manner of government having in itself a greater tendency to this than other, it was in the power of the legislator to appoint what government he pleased himself. But when we consider that he intended this church of his should be spread all over the world, and this to be his immediate errand he sent his apostles upon, “ to preach to every creature,” and to plant churches in the most remote and distant places from each other, we can have the least ground to fancy he should appoint an universal monarchy in his church of any government whatsoever ; for if we will take that boldness you put us upon, to inquire what form is fittest for a society dispersed into all parts of the world, and that are not bound, upon their being Christians, to live nearer Rome than Mexico or Japan, could any one imagine it would be to appoint one viceroy to superintend his church at such a place as Rome is ? Suppose all the East and West Indies consisted of Christian churches, what advantage, in order to the government of those churches, could the pope's authority be ? what heresies and schisms might be among them before his holiness could be acquainted with them ! These are therefore very slender and narrow conceptions concerning Christ's institution of a government over his catholic church, as though he should only have regard to these few adjacent parts of Europe, without any respect to the good of the whole church. But since we see Christ designed such a church which might be in most remote and distant places from each other, and yet at such a distance might equally promote the main ends wherefore they became churches, it is very unreasonable to think he should appoint one viceroy to be head over them all. For which, let us suppose that Europe might be (as the eastern churches have been) overrun with the Turkish power, and only some few suffering Christians left here, and the pope much in the same condition with the patriarch of Constantinople ; but, on the other side, that Christianity should largely spread itself in China and the East Indies, and the Christian church flourish in America ; could any philosopher think that fixing a monarchy at Rome, or elsewhere, were the best way to govern the catholic church, which consists of all these Christian

societies? for that is certainly the best government which is suited to all conditions of that society which it is intended for: now it is apparent the Christian church was intended to be so catholic that no one viceroy can be supposed able to look to the government of it. If Christ had intended merely such a church which should have consisted of such persons which lay here near about Rome, and no others, the supposition of such a monarchy in the church would not have been altogether so incongruous (though liable to very many inconveniences); but when he intended his religion for the universal good of the world, and that in all parts of it, without obliging them to live near each other, it is one of the most unreasonable suppositions in the world that he should set up a monarchical government over his catholic church in such a place as Rome is. But now, if we suppose only an aristocra- 430 tical government in the church under Christ as the alone supreme Head, nothing can be more suitable to the nature of the church, or the large extent of it, than that is; for wherever a church is, there may be bishops to govern it, and other officers of the church to oversee the lesser parts of it, and all join to promote the peace and unity of it; which they may with the more ease do, if no one challenge to be supreme head, to whom belongs the chief care of the church: for by this means they cannot with that power and authority redress abuses, and preserve the church's purity and peace, which otherwise they might have done. So that considering barely the nature of things, nothing seems more repugnant to the end for which Christ instituted a catholic church than such a monarchy as you imagine, and nothing more suitable than an aristocracy, considering that Christian churches may be much dispersed abroad, and that where they are, they are incorporated into that civil society in which they live, (according to the known saying of Optatus, *Ecclesia est in republica*, &c.;) and therefore such a monarchy would be unsuitable to the civil governments in which those churches may be. For it were easy to demonstrate, that such a monarchy as you challenge in the church is the most inconvenient government for it, take the church in what way or sense you please, whether as to its own peace and order, or to its spreading into other churches, or to the respect it must have to the civil govern-

ment it lives under : and if we would more largely inquire into these things, we might easily find that those which you look on as the great ends wherefore Christ should institute such a monarchical government in his church, are things unsuitable to the nature of a Christian church, and which Christ, as far as we can judge, did never intend to take care that they should never be ; which are, freedom from all kind of controversies, and absolute submission of judgment to the decrees of an infallible judge. We nowhere find such a state of a Christian church described or promised, where men shall all be of one mind, (only that peace and brotherly love be continued is that all Christians are bound to,) much less certainly that this unity should be by a submission of our understandings to an infallible judge, of whom we read nothing in that book which persuades us to be Christians ; and without which freedom of our understandings (which this pretended infallibility would deprive us of) we could never have been judicious and rational Christians.

§. 10. But granting that wise men have thought monarchy the best government in itself, what is this to the proving what government Christ hath appointed in his church ? For that is the best government for the church, not which philosophers and politicians have thought best, but which our Saviour hath appointed in his word ; for he certainly knew best what would suit with the conveniences of his church. And these are bold and insolent disputes, wherein those of your side argue, “ that Christ must have instituted a monarchy in his church, because all philosophers have judged that the most perfect government.” I need not tell you what these speeches imply Christ to be, if he doth not follow the philosophers’ judgment. Will you give him leave to judge what is fittest for his church himself ? or do you think he hath not wisdom enough to do it unless the philosophers instruct him ? Let us therefore appeal to his laws, to see what government he hath there appointed. And now I shall deal more closely with you. You tell me, “ therein Christ hath appointed this monarchical government ;” but I may be nearer your mind when you will answer me these following questions. When and where did any wise legislator appoint a matter of so vast concernment to the good of the society as the supreme government of it, and express no more

of it in his laws than Christ hath done of this monarchical government of the church? Is there not particular care taken in all laws about that, to express the rights of sovereignty, to hinder usurpations, to bind all to obedience, to determine the way of succession by descent or election? And hath Christ instituted a monarchy in his church, and said nothing of all these things, when the utmost you can pretend to are some ambiguous places, which you must have the power of interpreting yourselves, or they signify nothing to your purpose? So that none of the fathers, or the primitive church for several centuries, could find out such mysteries in *Super hanc petram, Dabo tibi claves*, and *Pasce oves*, as you have done. If such a monarchy had been appointed in the church, what should we have had more frequent mention of in the records of the church than of this? Where do we meet with any histories that write the affairs of kingdoms for some hundreds of years, and never mention any royal acts of the kings of them? If St. Peter's being at Rome had settled the monarchy of the church there, what more famous act could have been mentioned in all antiquity than that? what notice would have been taken by other churches of him whom he had left his successor! what addresses would have been made to him by the bishops of other churches! what testimonies of obedience and submission! what appeals and resort thither! And it is wonderful strange that the histories of the church should be silent in these grand affairs, when they report many minute things even during the hottest times of persecution. Did the Christians conspire together in those times not to let their posterity know who had the supreme government of the church then? or were they afraid the heathen emperors should be jealous of the popes, if they had understood their great authority? But then methinks they should have carried it however among themselves with all reverence and submission to the pope, and not openly oppose him as soon as ever he began to exercise any authority, as in the case of Victor and the Asian bishops. But of all things it seems most strange and unaccountable to me, that Christ should have instituted such a monarchy in his church, and none of the apostles mention any thing of it in any of the epistles which they writ, in which are several things concerning the peace and government

of the church ; nay, when there were schisms and divisions in the church, and that on the account of their teachers, among whom Cephas was one, (by that very name on which Christ said he would build his church,) and yet no mention of respect more to him than to any other ; no intimation of what power St. Peter had for the government of the church, as the head and monarch of it ; no references at all made to him by any of the divided parties of the church at that time ; no mention at all of any such power given him in the epistles written by him ; but he writes just as any other apostle did, with great expressions of humility, and, as if he foresaw what usurpations would be in the church, he forbids any lording it over God's heritage, and calls Christ *the chief pastor of the church* : and this he doth in an epistle not writ to the catholic church, which had been most proper for him if head of the church, but only to the dispersed Jews in some particular provinces. Can any one then imagine he should be monarch of the church, and no act of his, as such, recorded at all of him, but carrying himself with all humility, not fixing himself as head of the church in any chair, but going up and down from one place to another as the rest of the apostles, for promoting the gospel of Christ ? To conclude all ; is it possible to conceive there should be a monarch appointed by Christ in the church, and yet the apostle, when he reckons up those offices which Christ had set in the church, speak not one word of him ? he

Eph. iv. 11. mentions *apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers* ;
 432 but the chief of all is omitted, and he to whom the care of all the rest is committed, and in whose authority the welfare, peace, and unity of the church is secured. These things to me seem so incredible, that, till you have satisfied my mind in these questions, I must needs judge this pretended monarchy in the church to be one of the greatest figments ever were in the Christian world. And thus I have at large considered your argument from reason, why there should be such a monarchy in the church ; which I have the rather done, because it is one of the great things in dispute between us, and because the most plausible argument brought for it is, “ the necessity of it in order to the church's peace, which monarchy, being the best of governments, would the most tend to promote. To return now to his lordship.

§. II. He brings an evidence out of antiquity against the acknowledgment of any such monarchy in the church from the *literæ communicatoriæ*, “which certified, from one great patriarch to another, who were fit or unfit to be admitted to their communion, upon any occasion of repairing from one see to another; and these were sent mutually, and as freely in the same manner from Rome to the other patriarchs, as from them to it. Out of which,” saith his lordship, “I think this will follow most directly, that the church-government then was aristocratical: for had the bishop of Rome been then accounted sole monarch of the church, and been put into the definition of the church (as he is now by Bellarmine), all these communicatory letters should have been directed from him to the rest, as whose admittance ought to be a rule for all to communicate, but not from others to him, at least not in that even equal brotherly way as now they appear to be written. For it is no way probable the bishops of Rome, which even then sought their own greatness too much, would have submitted to the other patriarchs voluntarily, had not the very course of the church put it upon them.” To this you answer, “that these *literæ communicatoriæ* do rather prove our assertion, being ordained by Sixtus I. in favour of such bishops as were called to Rome, or otherwise forced to repair thither, to the end they might without scruple be received into their own diocese at their return; having also decreed that without such letters communicatory none in such case should be admitted. But that these letters should be sent from other bishops to Rome in such an even, equal, and brotherly way,” you say, “is one of his lordship’s chimeras:” but this difference or inequality you pretend to be in them, “that those to the pope were merely testimonial, those from him were mandatory; witness,” say you, “the case of St. Athanasius and other bishops restored by the pope’s communicatory letters. But supposing them equal,” you say, “it only shewed the pope’s humility, and ought to be no prejudice to his just authority, and his right and power to do otherwise if he saw cause.” But all this depends upon a mere fiction, viz. “that these communicatory letters were ordained by Sixtus I. in favour of such bishops as were called to Rome;” than which nothing can be more improbable. But I do not say that this

Conf. p. 167.
sect. 26. n. 8.

Lab. p. 220.
n. 11.

is a chimera of your own brains, for you follow Baronius^k in it; for which he produceth no other evidence but the author of the lives of the popes: but Binius adds that which seems to have been the first ground of it, which is the second decretal epistle of Sixtus I., in which that decree is extant. But whosoever considers the notorious forgery of those decretal epistles, (as will be more manifested where you contend for them,) on which account they are slighted by card. Perron, and in many places by Baronius^l himself, will find little cause to triumph in this epistle of Sixtus I.; and whoever reflects on the state of those times in which Sixtus lived, will find it improbable enough that the pope should take to himself so much authority to summon bishops to him, and to order that none should be admitted without communicatory letters from
 433 him. It is not here a place to inquire into the several sorts of those letters which passed among the bishops of the primitive church, whether the canonical, pacifical, ecclesiastical, and communicatory, were all one, and what difference there was between the communicatory letters granted to travellers, in order to their communion with foreign churches, and those letters which were sent from one patriarch to another. But this is sufficiently evident, that those letters which were the *tessera hospitalitatis*, as Tertullian calls it, the passport for communion in foreign churches, had no more respect to the bishop of Rome than to any other catholic bishop. Therefore the council of Antioch^m passeth two canons concerning them; one, that no traveller should be received without them; another, that none but bishops should give them. And that all bishops did equally grant them to all places, appears by that passage in St. Austinⁿ, in his epistle to Eusebius and the other Donatists, relating the conference he had with Fortunius, a bishop of that party; wherein St. Austin asked him, “whether he could give communicatory letters whither he pleased? for by that means it might be easily determined whether he had communion with the whole catholic church or no.” From whence it follows that any catholic bishop might, without any respect to the bishop of Rome, grant communi-

^k Baron. Annal. A.D. 142. sect. 6.
 Bin. Concil. tom. i. p. 74.

^l Baron. An. 865. sectt. 5, 8.

^m Concil. Antioc. can. 7, 8.

ⁿ Aug. ep. 168.

catory letters to all foreign churches. And the enjoying of that communion which was consequent upon these letters, is all that Optatus means in that known saying of his, that they had communion with Siricius at Rome, *commercio formatarum*, by the use of these communicatory letters. But, besides these, there were other letters, which every patriarch sent to the rest upon his first instalment, which were called their *synodical epistles*^o; and these contained the profession of their faith, and the answers to them did denote their communion with them. Since, therefore, these were sent to all the patriarchs indifferently, and not barely to the bishop of Rome, there appears no difference at all in the letters sent to or from him and the other patriarchs on this occasion. As for your instance of the pope's restoring Athanasius, I have sufficiently answered it already: and if the pope's letter were never so mandatory, (as it was not,) yet we see it took no effect among the eastern bishops; and therefore they were of his lordship's mind, "that the government of the church was not monarchical, but aristocratical." I did expect here to have met with the pretended epistle of Atticus of Constantinople about the manner of making *formed letters*, wherein one Π is said to be for the honour of St. Peter; but since you pass it over on this occasion, I hope you are convinced of the forgery of it.

§. 12. In the beginning of your next chapter (which because of the coherence of the matter I handle with this) you find great fault with his lordship for a marginal citation out of Gerson, because he supposeth that Gerson's judgment was, that the church might continue without a monarchical head, because he writ a tract *De Auferibilitate Papæ*; "whereas," you say, "Gerson's drift is only to shew how many several ways the pope may be taken away, that is, deprived of his office, and cease to be pope as to his own person, so that the church, *pro tempore*, till another be chosen, shall be without her visible head." But although the truth of what his lordship proves doth not at all depend upon this testimony of Gerson, which was only a marginal citation, yet since you so boldly accuse him for a false allegation, we must further examine how pertinent this testimony is to that which his lordship brought it for. The sentence to which this citation of Gerson refers is

^o Optat. l. 2.

Lab. p. 221.
n. 1.

Conf. p. 166. this: "For they are no mean ones who think our Saviour
sect. 26. n. 8.

Christ left the church militant in the hands of the apostles and their successors in an aristocratical, or rather a mixed government, and that the church is not monarchical otherwise than the triumphant and militant make one body under Christ
434 the Head." Over against these words that tract of Gerson *De Auferibilitate Papæ* is cited. If, therefore, so much be contained in that book as makes good this which his lordship says, he is not so much guilty of false alleging Gerson as you are of falsely accusing him. To make this clear, we must consider what Gerson's design was in writing that book, and what his opinion therein is concerning the church's government. It is well known that his book was written upon the occasion of the council of Constance in the time of the great schism between the three popes; and that the design of it is to make it appear that it was in the power of the council to depose the popes, and suspend them from all jurisdiction in the church^p. Therefore he saith "that the pope may not only lose his office by voluntary cession, but that in many cases he may be deprived by the church, or by a general council representing the church, whether he consent to it or no;" nay, in the next consideration he saith, "that he may be deprived by a general council which is celebrated without his consent, or against his will;" and, in the following consideration, adds, "that this may be done not only declaratively, but juridically." The question now comes to this, whether a person who asserts these things doth believe the government of the militant church to be monarchical, and not rather aristocratical and mixed government? And I dare appeal to any man's reason, whether that may be accounted a monarchical government, where he that is supreme may be deposed and deprived of his office in a juridical manner, by a senate that hath authority to do these things? for it is apparent the supreme power lies in the senate, and not the prince, and that the prince is only a ministerial head under them. And this is plainly Gerson's opinion as to the church: although therefore he may allow the supreme ministerial authority to be in the pope, (which is all your citations prove,) yet the radical and

^p Gerson *De Auferibilitate Papæ*, consider. 10.

intrinsecal power lies in the church, which, being represented in a general council, may depose the pope from his authority in the church. And the truth is, this opinion of Gerson makes the fundamental power of the church to be democratical, and that the supreme exercise is by representatives in a general council, and that the pope at the highest is but a ministerial and accountable head. And therefore Spalatensis⁹ truly observes, “that this opinion of Gerson” (which is the same with that of the Paris divines, of which he speaks,) “doth only in words attribute supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the pope, but in reality it takes it quite away from him.” And this is the same doctrine which then prevailed in the council of Constance, and afterwards at Basil, as may be seen at large in their synodical epistle, defended by Richerius, Vigorius, and others. Now let any man of reason judge whether, notwithstanding your charge of false citation, (from some expressions intimating only a ministerial headship,) his lordship did not very pertinently cite this tract of Gerson’s, to prove “that no mean persons did think the church militant not to be governed by a monarchical, but by an aristocratical or mixed government?”

§. 13. But no sooner is this marginal citation cleared, but the charge is renewed about another, viz. St. Hierom; yet ^{Lab. p. 222.} here you dare not charge his lordship with a false allegation,^{n. 2.} but you are put to your shifts to get off this testimony as well as you can. For St. Hierom saying expressly in his epistle to Evagrius, *Ubicunque fuerit episcopus, sive Romæ, sive Eugubii, sive Constantinopoli, sive Rhegii, &c. ejusdem meriti est, ejusdem est et sacerdotii*, his lordship might well infer, “that doubtless he thought not of the Roman bishop’s monarchy; for what bishop,” saith he, “is of the same merit or the same degree in the priesthood with the pope, as things are now carried at Rome?” To this you answer, “that he speaks not of the pope, as he is pope, or in respect of that eminent authority which belongs to him as St. Peter’s successor, but only ⁴³⁵ compares him with another private bishop in respect of mere character or power of a bishop, as bishop only.” But though this be all which any of your party ever since the Reformation

⁹ Spalat. de Rep. Eccles. tom. 1. l. 4. c. 7. sect. 5.

have been able to answer to this place, yet nothing looks more like a mere shift than this doth; for had St. Hierom only compared these bishops together in regard of their order, was not *sacerdotium* enough to express that by? if St. Hierom had said only that all bishops are *ejusdem sacerdotii*, there might have been some plausible pretence for this distinction; but when he adds *ejusdem meriti* too, he wholly precludes the possibility of your evading that way: for what doth *merit* here stand for as distinct from *priesthood*, if it imports not something besides what belongs to bishops *as* bishops? what can *merit* here signify but some greater power, authority, and jurisdiction given by Christ to one bishop above another? St. Hierom was not so senseless as not to see that the bishops of Rome, Constantinople, and Alexandria had greater authority and larger jurisdiction in the church than the petty bishops of Eugubium, Rhegium, and Tanis; but all this he knew well enough came by the custom of the church, that one bishop should have larger power in the church than another. But (saith he) if you come to urge us with what ought to be practised in the church, then, saith he, *Orbis major est urbe*, it is no one city, as that of Rome (which he particularly instanceth in), which can prescribe to the whole world; for, saith he, “all bishops are of equal merit, and the same priesthood, wheresoever they are, whether at Rome or elsewhere.” So that it is plain to all but such as wilfully blind themselves, that St. Hierom speaks not of that which you call *the character* of bishops, but of the *authority* of them; for that very word he useth immediately before, *Si auctoritas quaeritur, orbis major est urbe*: and where do you ever find *merit* applied to the bishop's character? They who say it is understood of the merit of good life, make St. Hierom speak nonsense; for, are all bishops of the same merit of good life? But we need not go out of Rome for the proper importance of *merit* here; for in the third Roman synod under Symmachus^r that very word is used concerning authority and principality in the church; *ejus sedi primum Petri apostoli meritum sive principatus, deinde conciliorum venerandorum auctoritas, &c.*: where Binius confesseth an account is given of the supremacy of the bishop of

^r Concil. Rom. 3. sub Symmach. tom. 3. p. 688.

Rome, the first ground of which is St. Peter's merit or principality; apply now but this sense to St. Hierom, and he may be very easily understood: All bishops are *ejusdem meriti sive principatus*, of the same merit, dignity, or authority in the church. But you say, "he speaks not of the pope, as he is pope:" good reason for it, for St. Hierom knew no such supremacy in the pope as he now challengeth. And can you think, if St. Hierom had believed such an authority in the pope as you do, he would ever have used such words as these are to compare him with the poor bishop of Agobio in merit and priesthood? I cannot persuade myself you can think so, only something must be said for the cause you have undertaken to defend; and since Bellarmine, and such great men, had gone before you, you could not believe there were any absurdity in saying as they did. Still you say, "he doth not speak of that authority which belongs to the bishop of Rome as St. Peter's successor;" but if you would but read a little further, you might see that St. Hierom speaks of all bishops, whether at Rome, or Eugubium, &c. as equally the apostles' successors; "for it is neither," saith he, "riches or poverty which makes bishops higher or lower," *cæterum omnes apostolorum successores sunt*, "but they are all the apostles' successors;" therefore he speaks of them with relation to that authority which they derived from the apostles. And never had there been greater necessity for him to speak of the pope's succeeding St. Peter in the supremacy over the church than here, if he had known any such thing; but he must be excused, 436 he was ignorant of it. "No, that he could not be," say you again, "for he speaks of it elsewhere, and therefore he must be so understood there, as that he neither contradict nor condemn himself." But if the epistle to Damasus be all your evidence for it, a sufficient account hath been given of that already: therefore you add more, and bid us go find them out, to see whether they make for the purpose or no. I am sure your first doth not out of his commentary on the 13th psalm, because it only speaks of St. Peter's being head of the church, and not of the pope's; and that may import only dignity and preeminence, without authority and jurisdiction: besides, that commentary on the Psalms is rejected as spurious by Erasmus, Sixtus Senensis, and many others among yourselves. Your

second, *ad Demetriadem virginem*, is much less to your purpose ; for that only speaks of Innocentius coming after Anastasius at Rome, *qui apostolicæ cathedræ et supradicti viri successor et filius est*, “ who succeeded him in the apostolical chair ;” but do you not know that there were many apostolical chairs besides that of Rome, and had every one of them supreme authority over the church of God ? What that should be on the sixteenth of St. Matthew I cannot imagine, unless it be that St. Peter is called *princeps apostolorum*, which honour we deny him not, or that he saith, *Ædificabo ecclesiam meam super te* : but how these things concern the pope's authority, unless you had further enlightened us, I cannot understand. That ep. 54. ad Marcellam is of the same nature with the last, for the words which I suppose you mean are, *Petrus super quem Dominus fundavit ecclesiam* ; and if you see what Erasmus saith upon that place, you will have little cause to boast much of it. Your last place is, l. 1. cont. Lucifer., which I suppose to be that commonly cited thence ; *Ecclesiæ salus in summi sacerdotis dignitate pendet* ; but there even Marianus Victorius will tell you, it is understood of every ordinary bishop. Thus I have taken the pains to search those places you nakedly refer us to in St. Hierom, and find him far enough from the least danger of contradicting or condemning himself, as to any thing which is here spoken by him. So that we see St. Hierom remains a sufficient testimony against the pope's monarchical government of the church.

§. 14. His lordship further argues against this monarchy in the church “ from the great and undoubted rule given by Optatus^s ; that wheresoever there is a church, there the church is in the commonwealth, and not the commonwealth in the church. And so also the church was in the Roman empire. Now from this ground,” saith his lordship, “ I argue thus. If the church be within the empire, or other kingdom, it is impossible the government of the church should be monarchical. For no emperor or king will endure another king within his dominion that shall be greater than himself, since the very enduring it makes him that endures it upon the matter no monarch.” Your answer to this is, “ That these

Conf. p. 167.
sect. 26.
n. 9.

I ab. p. 223.
E. 2.

^s Optat. l. 3.

two kingdoms are of different natures, the one spiritual, the other temporal: the one exercised only in such things as concern the worship of God and the eternal salvation of souls; the other in affairs that concern this world only." Surely you would persuade us we had never heard of, much less read Bellarmine's fifth book *De Pontifice*, about the pope's temporal power, which was fain to get license for the other four to pass at Rome; and although he minces the matter as much as may be, and much more than Baronius and others did, who pleaded downright for the pope's temporal power; yet he must be a very weak prince who doth not see how far that indirect and reductive power may extend, when the pope himself is to be judge what comes under it, and what not. And what may not come under it, when deposing of princes shall be reduced under that you call *the worship of God?* and absolving subjects from their obedience tend to promote their eternal salvation? But if the pope may be judge what temporal things are *in ordine ad spiritualia*, and bring them under his power in that respect, why may not the prince be judge what spiritual things are *in ordine ad temporalia*, and use his power over them in that respect too? But in the mean time, is not a kingdom like to be at peace then? If the pope challenged no other authority but what Christ or the apostles had, his government might be admitted as well as that authority which they had; but what do you think of us the mean while, when you would persuade us that the pope's power is no other than what Christ or the apostles had? you must certainly think us such persons as the moon hath wrought particularly upon, as you after very civilly speak concerning his lordship. Your instance from the kings of France and Spain his lordship had sufficiently answered, by telling you, that he that is not blind may see, if he will, of what little value the pope's power is in those kingdoms, further than to serve their own turns of him, which they do to their great advantage. And when you would have this to be upon the account of faith and conscience, let the pope exercise his power apparently against their interest, and then see on what account they profess obedience to him. But as long as they can manage such pretences for their advantage, and admit so much of it and no more, they may very well endure

Lab. p. 224.
n. 3.

it, and his lordship be far enough from contradicting himself. When you would urge the same inconvenience against the aristocratical government of the church, you suppose that aristocratical government wholly independent on, and not subordinate to, the civil government; whereas his lordship and the church of England assert the king's supremacy in government over all both persons and causes ecclesiastical: and therefore this nothing concerns us. And if from what hath gone before it must, as you say, remain therefore fully proved that the external government of the church on earth is monarchical; it may, for all that I see, remain as fully proved, that you are now the man who enjoy this monarchical power over the church. And whatever you style the pope, whether *the deputy* or *vicar general of Christ*, or *servus servorum*, or what you will; it is all one to us as long as we know his meaning, whatever fair words you give him. As though men would take it one jot the better to have one usurp and tyrannize over them, because he doth not call himself *king* or *prince*, but their *humble servant*. Is it not by so much the greater tyranny, to have such kind of ecclesiastical Saturnalia, when the *servus servorum* must, under that name, tyrannize over the whole world?

Conf. p. 168
sect. 26.
n. 9.

Lab. p. 224.

We have already at large shewed, how destructive this pretended supremacy is to that government of the church by bishops, which his lordship proves from the ancient canons and fathers of the church doth of right belong to them, viz. from several canons of the councils of Antioch and Nice, and the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Cyprian. To all this you only say, That you allow the bishops their portion in the government of Christ's flock: but it is but a very small portion of what belongs to them, if all their jurisdiction must be derived from the pope; which I have shewed before to be the most current opinion in your church: and I dare say you will not dispute the contrary. His lordship was well enough aware to what purpose Bellarmine acknowledged that the government of the church was ever in the bishops; for he himself saith, it was to exclude temporal princes; but then he desires A. C. to take notice of that, when secular princes are to be excluded, then it shall be pretended that bishops have power to govern: but when it comes to sharing stakes

between them and the pope, then hands off; they have nothing to do any further than the pope gives them leave. What follows concerning the impossibility of a right executing of this monarchy in the church hath been already discoursed of, and you answer nothing at all to it that hath any face of pertinency; for when you say, it will hold as well against the aristocratical form, I have plainly enough shewed you the contrary.

§. 15 That which follows about the design of an universal monarchy in the state as well as the church, about pope Innocent's making the pope to be the sun, and the emperor the moon, the Spanish friars two scutcheons, Campanella's eclogue, since you will not stand to defend them, I shall willingly pass them over. But what concerns the supremacy of the civil power is more to our purpose, and must be considered. His lordship therefore saith, "That every soul was to be subject to the higher power, Rom. xiii. 1; and the higher power there mentioned is the temporal. And the ancient fathers come in with a full consent, that *every soul* comprehends all without exception: all spiritual men, even to the highest bishop, even in spiritual causes too, so the foundations of faith and good manners be not shaken: and where they are shaken, there ought to be prayer and patience, there ought not to be opposition by force. Nay, emperors and kings are *custodes utriusque tabulæ*; they to whom the custody and preservation of both tables of the law, for worship to God and duty to man, are committed. A book of the law was by God's own command in Moses his time to be given to the king, Deut. xvii. 18: and the kings under the law, but still according to it, did proceed to necessary reformation in church businesses; and therein commanded the very priests themselves, as appears in the acts of Hezekiah and Josiah, who yet were never censured to this day for usurping the high priest's office. Nay, and the greatest emperors for the church's honour, Theodosius the elder, and Justinian, and Charles the Great, and divers others, did not only meddle now and then, but enact laws to the great settlement and increase of religion in their several times." Now to this again you answer, That the civil and spiritual are both absolute and independent powers, though each in their proper orb, the one

Lab. p. 225,

227.

Conf. p. 170.

sect. 26.

n. 11.

Lab. p. 226.
n. 6.

in spirituals, the other in temporals. But what is this to that which his lordship proves, that there can be no such absolute independent spiritual power, both because all are bound to obey the civil power, and because the civil power hath a right to meddle in ecclesiastical matters? And though you express never so much honour to civil authority, yet still you limit it to the administration merely of civil affairs; and how far that is, is well enough known. You tell us plainly, that it doth not belong to the emperor to order the affairs of the church; but why do you not answer the reasons and instances which his lordship brings to the contrary? Yet you yield, "That in case of notorious and gross abuses, manifestly contrary to religion, and connived at by the pastors of the church, Christian princes may lawfully and piously use their authority, in procuring the said abuses to be effectually redressed by the said pastors, as the examples of Ezekias and Josias prove." But in case the high priest would not have yielded to such a reformation, might not those princes, by the assistance of other priests, have effected it? This is the case you were to speak to: for whereas you fly out, and say, that princes may not take the priest's office upon them, whom do you dispute against in that? Not his lordship certainly, nor any of the church of England, who never said they might, though they have been most injuriously calumniated as though they did. That which we assert is, that princes may enact laws concerning religion, and reform abuses in divine worship; but we do not say they may take the pastoral office upon them; and therefore you say no more in that than we do ourselves. But when you say they may not reform religion in the substance of it, I cannot well tell how to understand you. If you mean, not so reform religion as to take away any of the substance, that is a reformation to purpose; but if you bring it *ad hypo-*
439 *thesin*, we utterly deny that any of the substance of religion was taken away upon our church's reformation: if you mean, not reform abuses which go under the name of the substance of religion, that will be to make the most unsufferable abuses the most incurable. But when you add, that nothing must be enacted pertaining to religion by their own authority without or contrary to the priest's consent, (the high priest I suppose you mean,) shew us where the kings of Israel were

bound not to reform in case the high priest did not consent ; and if you could do this, you must prove such a high priest now, and that princes are bound to wait his leisure for reforming abuses in religion, when his pretended authority is upheld by maintaining them. As for your commendations of pope Hildebrand and Innocent the Third for very prudent men, and worthy champions of your church, we see what *prudence* is with you, and what a worthy church you have. But it is still an excellent evasion, “that they never endeavoured to sub-^{Lab. p. 227. n. 8.}ject the emperor to themselves in temporal matters,” no nor Alexander the Third neither, when he trod upon the emperor’s neck ! But the proceedings of these popes with the emperors, as likewise Adrian IV, Lucius III, and others, are so gross, that it had been more for your interest with Christian princes to disown them, than to go about to palliate them with such frivolous distinctions, that his understanding must be as blind as his obedience that doth not see through them. You are much concerned that his lordship should seem to give a lash to those mortified self-denying men the Jesuits, in bidding them leave their practising to advance the greatness of the pope and emperor ; for who could believe they should deprive themselves of the riches and pleasures of the world upon such designs ? Undoubtedly you are one of the number, for I never heard that any other order among you did ever give them half so good words, but condemned them as much for their practising as we do ourselves. And what holy men they are, and what excellent casuistical divinity about both the riches and pleasures of the world, if we did not otherwise know, the mysteries of Jesuitism would sufficiently discover. To what his lordship saith further, that there is no necessity of one supreme living judge to keep the church in peace and unity, but that the several bishops under their sovereign princes are sufficient in order to it ; you only say, that he quotes Occham^{Lab. p. 228.} for it. But doth he nothing else but quote Occham ? Why^{n. 9.} do you not answer to the thing, and not barely to Occham ? You have very good reason for it ; for you have little to say to the thing itself ; but for Occham, you have enough to tell him in his ear. 1. That he is in the index of forbidden books ; a good testimony for the man’s honesty. 2. That he sided with the emperor ; a crime beyond an *index expurgatorius* at

Rome. 3. That if there were such a government as Occham supposes, all those governors must be infallible, or else there would be mere anarchy in the church. And why not as well in the state, without infallibility there? You say, for want of this infallibility those countries where it is not acknowledged are in schisms; and we say, the pretence of this infallibility hath caused the greatest of them. 4. You say, Occham speaks only *de possibili*, of what might have been if our Saviour had pleased; but Occham says, there is no necessity there should be one chief governor under Christ, and we say you can never prove that Christ hath appointed that there shall be one; and therefore this is more than disputing a bare possibility.

But now, as though all your beggings the question had been arguments, all your sayings proofs, and all your proofs demonstrations, with as much authority as if you were *in cathedra*, you conclude; "Remain it therefore a settled catholic principle, that the pope hath power over the whole church of God;" but you leave out something which should be at the
440 end of it, "among all those who can believe things as strongly without reason as with it." And for the greater solemnity of the sentence you give it in the words of the œcumenical council at Florence: and I must needs say, you have fitted them very well, for that was just as much an œcumenical council as the pope is œcumenical pastor; but that neither the one nor the other is so, I have sufficiently proved already.

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.

The illegality of it manifested, first from the insufficiency of the rule it proceeded by, different from that of the first general councils, and from the pope's presidency in it.—The matter of right concerning it discussed.—In what cases superiors may be excepted against as parties.—The pope justly excepted against as a party, and therefore ought not to be judge.—The necessity of a reformation in the court of Rome acknowledged by Roman catholics.—The matter of fact inquired into, as to the pope's presidency in general councils.—Hosius did not preside in the Nicene council as the pope's legate.—The pope had nothing to do in the second general council.—Two councils held at Constantinople within two years; these strangely confounded.—The mistake made evident.—St. Cyril not president in the third general council as the pope's legate.—No sufficient evidence of the pope's presidency in following councils.—The justness of the exception against the place manifested; and against the freedom of the council from the oath taken by the bishops to the pope.—The form of that oath in the time of the council of Trent.—Protestants not condemned by general councils.—The Greeks and others unjustly excluded as schismatics.—The exception from the small number of bishops cleared and vindicated.—A general council in antiquity not so called from the pope's general summons.—In what sense a general council represents the whole church.—The vast difference between the proceedings in the council of Nice and that at Trent.—The exception from the number of Italian bishops justified.—How far the Greek church and the patriarch Hieremias may be said to condemn protestants; with an account of the proceedings between them.

§. 1. **H**AVING thus far considered the several grounds on which you lay the charge of schism upon us, and shewed at large the weakness and insufficiency of them, we should now have proceeded to the last part of our task, but that the great Palladium of the present Roman church, viz. the council of Trent, must be examined, to see whether it be *διοπετὲς* or no; whether it came from heaven, or was only the contrivance of some cunning artificers. And the famous bishop of Bitonto, in the sermon made at the opening the council of Trent^t, hath given us some ground to conjecture its

^t Hist. Council of Trent, l. 1. p. 132.

original by his comparing it so ominously to the Trojan horse. Although therefore that the pretences may be high and great, that it was made *divina Palladis arte*, the Spirit of God being said to be present in it and concurring with it, yet they who search further will find as much of artifice in contriving and deceit in the managing the one as the other. And although the cardinal Palavicino uses all his art to bring this similitude off without reflecting on the honour of the council, yet that bishop, who in that sermon pleaded so much, that the Spirit of God would open the mouths of the council, as he did once those of Balaam and Caiaphas, was himself in this expression an illustrious instance of the truth of what he said.

441 For he spake as true in this as if he had been high priest himself that year. But as if you really believed yourself the truth of that bishop's doctrine, That whatever spirit was within them, yet being met in council, the Spirit of God would infallibly inspire them, you set yourself to a serious vindication of the proceedings of that council, and not only so, but triumph in it, as that which will bring the cause to a speedy issue. And therefore we must particularly inquire into all the pretences you bring to justify the lawfulness and freedom of that council; but, to keep to the bishop's metaphor,

Accipe nunc Danaum insidias; et crimine ab uno
Disce omnes.

And when we have thoroughly searched this great engine of your church, we shall have little reason to believe that ever it fell from heaven. His lordship then having spoken of the usefulness of free general councils for making some laws which concern the whole church, his adversary thinks presently to

Lab. p. 229. give him a choke-pear, by telling him, that the council of Trent
n. 1. was a general council, and that had already judged the protestants to hold errors. This you call "laying the axe to the root of the tree;" that tree, you mean, out of which the pope's infallible chair was cut: for the management of this dispute about the council of Trent will redound very little to the

Lab. p. 213. honour of your church or cause. But you do well to add,
n. 4. that his lordship was not taken unprovided: for he truly answered, That the council of Trent was neither a legal nor a general council. Both these we undertake to make good, in

opposition to what you bring by way of answer to his lordship's exceptions to them.

§. 2. That which we begin with is, that it was not a legal council; which his lordship proves: first, Because that council maintained publicly, that it is lawful for them to conclude any controversy, and make it to be *de fide*, and so in your judgment fundamental, though it have not a written word for its warrant, nay, so much as a probable testimony from scripture. The force of his lordship's argument I suppose lies in this, that the decrees of that council cannot be such as should bind us to an assent to them, because, according to their own principles, those decrees may have no foundation in scripture; and that the only legal proceeding in general councils is, to decree according to the scriptures. Now to this you answer, "That the meaning of the council or catholic authors is, not ^{Lab. p. 230.} that the council may make whatever they please matter of ^{n. 1.} faith, but only that which is expressed or involved in the word of God written or unwritten;" and this you confess "is defined by the council of Trent in these terms, that in matters of faith we are to rely, not only upon scripture, but also on tradition: which doctrine," you say, "is true, and that you have already proved it:" and I may as well say, it is false, for I have already answered all your pretended proofs. But it is one thing, whether the doctrine be true or no; and another, whether the council did proceed legally in defining things upon this principle. For upon your grounds you are bound to believe it true because the council hath defined it to be so: but if you will undertake to justify the proceedings of the council as legal, you must make it appear that this was the rule which general councils have always acted by, in defining any thing to be matter of faith. But if this appear to be false, and that you cannot instance in any true general council which did look on this as a sufficient ground to proceed upon, then though the thing may, since that decree, be believed as true, yet that council did not proceed legally in defining upon such grounds. Name us therefore, what council did ever offer to determine a matter of faith merely upon tradition? In the four first general councils it is well known what authority was given to the scripture in their definitions; and I hope ⁴⁴² you will not say that any thing they defined had no other

ground but tradition. But suppose you could prove this, it is not enough for your purpose, unless you can make it appear, that those fathers in making such decrees did acknowledge they had no ground in scripture for them. For if you should prove that really there was no foundation but tradition, yet all that you can infer thence is, that those fathers were deceived in judging they had other grounds, when they had not. But still, if they made scripture their rule, and looked on nothing else as a foundation for their definitions but the written word of God, then the council of Trent did not proceed legally, in offering to define matters of faith on such grounds which were not acknowledged by the primitive church to be sufficient foundation for such definitions. Cardinal Cusanus^u at large gives an account of the method of proceeding in the ancient general councils, and therein tells us, not only that the word of God was placed in the middle among those who sat in council, but gives this as the only rule of their proceeding, *quod secundum testimonia scripturarum decrevit synodus*; that they decreed according to the testimonies of scripture. Now if another council shall go according to a different rule from what the church hath esteemed the only true and adequate foundation for definition of faith, that council breaks the inviolable laws of councils, and therefore its proceedings cannot be legal. As for instance; supposing a parliament not to have power to make new laws, but to declare only what is law and what not, (for that is all you pretend to as to general councils;) and that all other former parliaments have all along professed this to be their rule, viz. that they search into the body of the laws; and if any thing be controverted whether it be a law or no, they make a diligent search into it, and examine all circumstances concerning it, for their own satisfaction, and according to the evidence they find of its being contained in this body of laws they declare themselves: but many things growing much in use among a prevailing party which have no colour of being in the written laws, but yet tend much to the interest of that party, and these being opposed by such who stand up for the ancient and known laws, the other are forced to make use of as good an

^u Cusanus de Concord. Cath. l. 2. c. 6.

expedient as they can to preserve their interest and credit together. To which end they pack together a company of such who are most concerned to maintain the things in question, and among these, the great innovator sits as president among them, and suffers none to come there but such as are obliged by oath to speak nothing against his interest; and these, when met together, seeing how unable they are to manage their business according to former precedents, the first thing they do is to declare, That customs and usages have as much the force of laws among them, as any contained in the body of them; and having established this their rule, according to it they decree all the matters in difference to be true and real laws. Would any man say, that these men proceeded legally, who first make the foundation they are to go on, contrary to all former precedents, and then define according to that? Yet this, in all particulars, is exactly the case of the council of Trent; but the last part is that we are now about; that they should, contrary to the proceedings of all general councils in matters of faith, first make their rule, and then bind all men to all those decrees which are made according to it. And therefore, though the council of Trent may be thought to act wisely in advancing traditions to an equality with scripture in the first place, yet he must have a great deal of confidence and little judgment, who says, that in decreeing matters of faith from tradition it acted legally, i. e. according to the rules of the undoubted general councils. I cannot therefore say, whether you have more of the one, or 443 less of the other, when you tell us, without offering to prove it, "that the council did not proceed in a different manner from other lawful general councils, whilst she grounded her definitions partly on scripture, partly on tradition, even in matters not deducible by any particular or logical inference from scripture." The absurdity of which doctrine in itself, I have at large discovered already in our discourse of the resolution of faith, where it is shewed in what sense his lordship says, that apostolical tradition is the word of God; but that this was a legal way of proceeding in the council of Trent, to define matters of faith by such traditions as have no ground in scripture, had need be better proved than by your bare affirmation. And if that be a tradition too, I am sure it

is one that is neither contained in nor deducible from the scripture.

§. 3. 2. His lordship justly excepts against the council of Trent, from the pope's sitting as president in it. For, saith he, "is that council legal, where the pope, the chief person to be reformed, shall sit president in it, and be chief judge in his own cause against all law, divine, natural, and human?" To this you return an answer, both to the matter of right and the matter of fact. To the matter of right you say, "that the pope not being justly accusable of any crime, but such as must involve not only the council, but the whole church as well as himself, the protestants had no just cause to quarrel with the pope's presiding in it. Nay, that it is conformable to all law, divine, natural, and human, that the head should preside over the members: and to give novelists liberty to decline the pope's judgment, or the judgment of any other their lawful superiors, upon pretence of their being parties, is in effect to exempt absolutely such people from all legal censure; and to grant there is no sufficient means effectually to govern the church, or condemn heresy, schism, and other offences against religion." But is it not unanswerable on the other side, that this plea of yours makes it impossible that the errors and corruptions of a church should be reformed, in case the governors of the church do abet and maintain them? If you say, that it is not possible the governors of the church should do so, we have nothing but your bare word for it, and reason and experience manifest the contrary. In case then there be a vehement presumption at least, in a considerable party of the church, that the church is much degenerated and needs reformation, but those who call themselves the lawful superiors of the church utterly oppose it; what is to be done in this case? must the church continue as it did, merely because the superiors make themselves parties? Nay, suppose that which you would call *idolatry* be in the church, and the pope and a council of his packing declare for it; must there be no endeavours of a reformation but by them who pronounce all heretics who oppose them? But you say, The head must preside over the members: an excellent argument to defend all usurpations both in church and state! for doubtless, they who are in power will call themselves the heads of all others,

Lab. p. 230,
231. n. 2.

if that will secure them from any danger. But this will exempt them from all legal censure: so will your principles all governors of the church, though guilty of heresy, blasphemy, idolatry, or what crime soever. For still, I hope, the head must be over the members; and you say, it will bring the church to confusion, if any shall except against their superiors as parties. You must therefore absolutely and roundly assert, that it is impossible that the superiors in the church may be guilty of any error or corruption; or that, if they be, they must never be called to an account for it; or else that it may be just in some cases to except against them as parties. And if in some cases, then the question comes to this, whether the present be some of those cases or no? and here if you make those superiors judges again, what you granted before comes to nothing. This will be more clear by a parallel case: Suppose the setting up the calves at Dan and Bethel had been done without such an open separation as that of Jeroboam was, but that the people had sensibly declined from the worship of God at Hierusalem, and had agreed to assemble at those places, the high priest and the priests and Levites having deserted Hierusalem, and approving this alteration of God's worship: but although this might continue for many years, yet some of the inferior priests and others of the people reading the book of the law, they find the worship of God much altered from what it ought to be, which they publish and declare to others, and bring many of the people to be of their mind; but the high priest and his clergy (foreseeing how much it will be to their prejudice to bring things into their due order) they resolutely oppose it. I pray tell me now, what were to be done in this case? Must the people stand wholly to the judgment of those superior priests, who have declared themselves to be utterly averse from any reformation? And if a council be called, is it reasonable or just that he should sit as president in it because he pretends to be the head over the members? and that if superiors be once accused as parties, all order and peace is gone? Is there any way left or no, whereby the church of Israel might be reformed? Yes, say you, by a general council. But must it be such a general council wherein the high priest sits as president, and all who sit with him sworn to do nothing against

him? Is this a free and general council likely to reform these things? And is it not all the justice in the world, that such a council should be truly free and general, and those freely heard who complain of these as great corruptions? and that before the most equal and indifferent judges; or, in case such cannot be assembled, that by the assistance of the civil power the church may be reformed by its parts; so that still these parts be willing to give an account of what they do before any free and general council, where the main party accused sits not as president in it. But what then, may you say, will you allow all inferiors to proceed to a reformation in case the superiors do not presently consent? No: but men ought first to exhibit their complaints of abuses, and the reasons against them, to those who are actually the superiors of the church; and that with all due reverence to authority: but if, notwithstanding this, they declare themselves wilful and obstinate in defence of those things, by the concurrence of the supreme power they may lawfully and justly proceed to a reformation.

Lab. p. 231.
n. 2.

§.4. Well, (but you say,) all this comes not to your case, for the pope was not justly accusable of any crime; for you deny not, but that other bishops in council may proceed against the pope himself if the case do necessarily require it, as if he be a heretic. If you will then grant, that in some cases, as in that of heresy, the pope may be excepted against as a party, you destroy all that ever you say besides. For when the pope is accused for heresy in a council, who must sit as president in that council? the pope himself, or not? If the pope must sit as president, (for the head, you say still, must be over the members,) do you think he will ever be condemned for heresy if he hath the supreme management of the council? If he may not sit as president then, by the same reason he ought not to do it when he is accused of error or usurpation; but the other bishops of the church, met together by the assistance of Christian princes in a free and general council, ought to be judges in that case as well as the former. And this is no more than is agreeable to the doctrine and practice of the councils of Constance and Basil; for if they had suffered the popes to have been presidents in them, or have had that power over them which the popes had in the council of Trent, do you think they could have done so to the present popes as they

did? But the popes were grown wiser afterwards; they had these examples fresh in their memory, and therefore they 445 were resolved never to be ridden by general councils more. And thence came that continual opposition to all proposals of the emperor for a general council, till necessity put the pope upon yielding to it: thence came the resolution at Rome not to venture any more councils in Germany, for that place breathed too much freedom for the pope's interest, though this were most vehemently desired by both the emperor and German princes and bishops: thence, when a council must be called, he summons it first at Mantua, then at Vicenza, and when none would come thither, at last he yields it should be at Trent, a most inconvenient place for the Germans to come to: when they were there, though all art possible was used to prevent the mention of any thing of reformation, yet sometimes some free words breaking out, troubled the legates, who dispatch notice of it to Rome, and receive instructions what to do; yet all could not prevent their fears and jealousies lest something concerning the pope's interest should be discussed; upon which to make all sure they translate the council to Bononia, and leave the emperor's bishops to blow their fingers at Trent. And when upon the emperor and king of France's protestations, the pope saw a necessity of removing it back to Trent again, though any fair pretence would have been taken to have dissolved the council, yet since that could not be, the greatest care must be used to spin out the time, in hopes of some occurrence happening which might give a plausible pretext for breaking it up. But to be sure nothing must pass but what was privately dispatched to Rome and approved there first, (a good sure way to prevent any mischief,) and thence the Holy Ghost came in a portmanteau once or twice a week, as the common byword was then. But when, notwithstanding all this, the grand points of the residence and power of bishops were so hotly debated by the Spanish bishops, what arts were used to divert them! when that would not do, how they bait them in council by the flouting Italians! what private cabals were kept by the legates, what dispatching and posting to Rome, what numbers of jolly Italians are made bishops, and sent away to overvote them! And when the French bishops were come, what spies did they keep

upon them, what bones were thrown to divide the French and Spanish bishops, what caressing the cardinal of Lorrain to bring him off by the court of Rome! and when any others durst speak freely, what checks and frowns and disgraces did they meet with! and all this to keep the pope safe, who was still in bodily fear till the council was ended to his mind; and then what rejoicing that they had cheated the world so, that that which was intended to clip the wings of the court of Rome, had confirmed and advanced the interest of it. This was truly the head's presiding over the members: for all the life and motion they had, proceeded from the influence of their head the pope. Call you this presiding in a council? it is rather riding of it, that by the spurring some and bridling others they may go just as the pope would have them. And that this is a true account of it appears, notwithstanding whatever your cardinal Palavicino hath been able to object against the impartial history of it; whose two volumes pretended in answer to it, consist of so many impertinencies, and hath so very little material in it, that a Roman catholic himself hath declared to the world, that he hath done more disservice to the church of Rome by his Answer than ever father Paul did by his History^x: by whom his two great books are compared to those night birds that make a great show, but are all feathers and very little flesh. This then being the way of management of things at Trent, judge you, or any reasonable man, whether the protestants have not just cause to except against the presidentship which the pope had in that
 446 council; and name you any general council (that was truly accounted so) where ever he had any thing like it? The particulars you mention will be considered afterwards.

Lab. p. 131.
 n. 2.

§. 5. But you say, all this was because the pope was not justly accusable of any crime but what must involve not only the council, but the whole church as much as himself. If so, there was the greater reason that he should leave it to the church in a free council to have impartially debated things, without his acting and interposing so much as he did. But the pope was wiser than to think so; he knew there were many things in the court of Rome which many other bishops

^x Cæsar Aquilinus de tribus Historicis Concilii Trident. pp. 49, 51.

struck at, as well as the protestants, and that they desired a reformation of abuses as well as the other, especially the German, French, and Spanish bishops. Nay, it is strange to see how much interest or prejudice blinds men, that they will not acknowledge now that there was any such need of reformation, when pope Adrian VI. confessed, at the diet at Norimberg A. D. 1522, by Cheregatus his legate, that the popes themselves had been the fountain and cause of all those evils in the church, in these remarkable words (part of which have been cited already on another occasion): *Scimus in hac sancta sede, aliquot jam annis, multa abominanda fuisse, abusus in spiritualibus, excessus in mandatis, et omnia denique in perversum mutata. Nec mirum, si ægritudo a capite in membra, a summis pontificibus in alios prælatos descenderit. Omnes nos (sc. prælati ecclesiastici) declinavimus, unusquisque in vias suas, nec fuit jamdiu, qui faceret bonum, non fuit usque ad unum. Quamobrem necesse est, ut omnes demus gloriam Deo, et humiliemus animas nostras ei: videat unusquisque nostrum unde exciderit, et se potius quilibet judicet, quam a Deo in virga furoris sui judicari velit. Qua in re quod ad nos pertinet, polliceberis, Nos omnem operam adhibituros, ut primum curia hæc, unde forte omne hoc malum processit, reformetur: ut sicut inde corruptio in omnes inferiores emanavit, ita ab eadem sanitas et reformatio omnium emanet. Ad quod procurandum nos tanto arctius obligatos reputamus, quando universum mundum hujusmodi reformationem avidius desiderare videmus.* Can you now for shame say there was no need of reformation at that time, and that the popes were no more concerned than the whole church? The whole church was indeed concerned to see the court of Rome reformed; and we see the pope confesseth that all the world desired a reformation: doth not he ingenuously acknowledge “that many abominable things had been for many years in the holy see,” (and very *holy* it was the mean time;) “that all things were out of order; that the distemper had fallen from the head to the members, from the popes to other prelates; that they had all gone out of the way, that for a long time there had been none that did good, no not one; that therefore it was necessary that all should give glory to God, and humble their souls, and every one see whence he was fallen, and judge himself, rather than be judged by God in the rod.

of his fury. Wherefore" (saith he to his legate) "thou shalt promise for us, that we will use our utmost endeavour that this court, from whence all the mischief hath proceeded, may be reformed; that as the corruption hath flowed from thence unto inferiors, so the health and reformation of all may come from thence too. And we look on ourselves as the more obliged to procure this, because we see the whole world doth earnestly desire such a reformation." Whom must we now believe, the pope or you? the pope ingenuously and christianly bemoaning the corruptions that had been in popes themselves, and from them had spread to others, or you, who basely and untruly flatter the popes, as though they needed no reformation but what concerned the council and church as well as them? And the pope gives you the true reason of it—"because the corruptions had been so great at Rome, that from thence they had spread over all others." And can you think
447 now that the pope was not justly accused of any crime but that he might sit as president, and manage the affairs of the council, as though there had been no need at all of any reformation? But I remember an observation of Baronius, that the providence of God was so great in watching over the Roman see, that the popes who were unfit to govern it seldom continued long in it; which he makes upon Siricius' favour to Ruffinus: and such a pope was this Adrian accounted; this confession of his being very distasteful at Rome, he continued not long after it. But yet I know you have another answer ready at hand—that all this concerned only some abuses in manners and management of affairs, but nothing confessed to be amiss in doctrine of faith. However, since it belonged to the council to reform those abuses, the pope, as an interested person, ought not to have presided there, had it not been his intention to have prevented any real reformation: for all the decrees of the council to that purpose were merely delusory, and nothing of reformation followed upon them; and the most important things to that end could never pass the council. And if we gain this, that the pope ought not to be judge where himself is concerned, as to the reformation of abuses, your former assertion will make the other follow, viz. that in case of heresy other bishops may in council proceed against the pope, and, by the same reason, when any errors in faith

are charged upon him, or those who join in communion with him, that such ought to be debated in a full and free council, where no one concerned may preside to overawe the rest; but such presidents should be appointed as were in former general councils, to whom it belonged to manage the debates of the council, without any such power and jurisdiction over them as the pope pretended to have over all those assembled at Trent. And thus it appears, that what his lordship said was just and true, "That it is contrary to all law, divine, natural, and human, that the pope should be chief judge in his own cause." Your instances of Pope Leo at the council of Chalcedon, and Alexander at the council of Nice, will be considered in their due place.

§. 6. Which that we may come to, we must examine the matter of fact as to the pope's presidency in general councils. His lordship denying that the pope did preside in the council of Nice, either by himself or legates, because Hosius was the president of it, you answer, "That Hosius did preside in that council, and so did likewise Vitus and Vincentius, priests of Rome, but," you say, "they all presided as the pope's legates, and not otherwise. This," you say, "appears by their subscribing the conciliary decrees in the first place, of which no other account can be given, and because Cedrenus and Photius confess that the pope gave authority to this council by his legates; and in the old preface to the council of Sardica it is said expressly that Hosius was the pope's legate, and the same acknowledged by Hincmarus and Gelasius Cyzicenus," whom you prove that Photius had read. These being then all the evidences you produce for the pope's presidency at the Nicene council, we are obliged to afford them a particular consideration.

Your first argument, which Bellarmine and Baronius likewise insist on, is the order of subscription, "because the name of Hosius is set first;" but, if we mark it, this argument supposeth that which it should prove. For thus it proceeds: Hosius subscribed first, and therefore he was the Roman legate; Hosius was the Roman legate, and therefore he subscribed first: for it supposeth that the first subscription did of right belong only to the Roman legate; which we may as well deny by an argument just like it—Vitus and Vincentius

did not subscribe first, and therefore the Roman legates did not subscribe first. But you ask, “Why then did Hosius subscribe before the patriarchs, and other bishops, of greater dignity than himself?” I answer, because Hosius was president of the council, and not they. But if you ask why they chose him president before others, the Nicene fathers must answer you, and not I. But you say Cedrenus and Photius confess that the pope gave authority to the Nicene council by his legates; but how comes that to prove that Hosius was one of those legates? Photius, I am sure, in his book of the Seven Synods, (first published in Greek by Justellus out of the Sedan library,) says no such thing, but only mentions the two presbyters who were there the Roman bishop’s legates; and Cedrenus only mentions the Roman legates amongst those who were chief in that council, reckoning up the several patriarchs. Your old preface to the Sardican synod (supposed of Dionysius Exiguus) is no competent testimony, being of a later author, and a Roman too; and Hincmarus is much younger than he; and therefore neither of their testimonies hath any force against the ancient writers: neither hath that of Gelasius Cyzicenus, who lived under Basiliscus A. D. 476. And that you may not think I do you wrong to deprive you of his testimony, you may see how freely Baronius^y passeth his censure upon those acts under the name of *Nicene council*; *Sed, ut libere dicam, somnia puto hæc omnia*, “that I may speak freely, I account them no better than dreams;” and gives this very good reason for it—because, ever since the time of that council, all persons have been so extremely desirous of the acts of that council, and yet could never obtain them. But that which comes in the rear transcends all the rest, which is, “that Photius, though a schismatical Greek, and bitter enemy of the Roman church, witnesseth he had read this book of Gelasius, and in it the above-cited testimony.” And, I pray, what follows from thence? I hope Photius had read many other books, in that excellent collection of his *bibliotheca*, besides this; and will you say that Photius believed all that he there saith he had read? No, but you say “that thereupon he confesses that the said Hosius was legate for the bishop of

^y Baron. A. D. 305. sect. 6.

Rome at the council of Nice." But you would have done well to have told us where this confession is extant^z; for you seem to insinuate as though it were in the same place where he mentions the reading this book of Gelasius: but he only saith that Gelasius affirms it, adding nothing at all of his own judgment; and in his book of the Seven Synods, where he declares his own mind, he only mentions Vitus and Vincentius as the legates of the Roman see^a, and brings in Hosius afterwards, not joining him with Vitus and Vincentius, but with Alexander of Constantinople, and Sylvester and Julius of Rome, and Alexander and Athanasius of Alexandria, whom he makes the chief in the council. For if Photius had intended to have made Hosius one of the pope's legates, there was all the reason in the world he should have set him before Vitus and Vincentius, who were only presbyters. And that the pope had no other legates there but these two presbyters, we have the consent of all the ancient ecclesiastical historians; Eusebius^b mentioning the absence of the Roman bishop because of his age, adds, *πρεσβύτεροι δὲ αὐτοῦ παρόντες τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν ἐπλήρουν*, "his presbyters being present supplied his place;" so Theodoret^c, the bishop of Rome, could not be present, *δύο μὲντοι πρεσβυτέρους ἀπέστειλε*, but he sent two presbyters with power to give his assent, not to preside over the council. To the same purpose Sozomen^d, Nicephorus^e, Zonaras speak. And it is very strange not one of all these historians should mention this, if Hosius had presided there as legate of the bishop of Rome; and much more that Hosius should not subscribe first in that capacity, but only as bishop of Corduba; for the pope's legates do not use to be so forgetful of their place and honour. It seems then very plain that the pope had no manner of presidency at the council of Nice: we come, therefore, to following councils.

§. 7. You grant, "that in the second general council Nec- Lab. p. 232.
tarius bishop of Constantinople was president, and not the^{n. 2.}
pope or his legates; but the reason," you say, "was because 449
pope Damasus, having first summoned that council to be held

^z Photius in Biblioth. Cod. 88.
p. 21.

^a Phot. de 7. Synod. &c. p. 163.

^b Euseb. de Vita Const. l. 3. c. 7.

^c Theod. Hist. Eccles. l. 1. c. 6.

^d Sozom. l. 1. c. 16.

^e Nicephor. l. 8. c. 14.

at Constantinople, and the bishops of the oriental provinces being accordingly there met, the pope, for some reasons, altered his mind, and would have had them come to Rome, to join with the bishops he had there assembled; which the prelates at Constantinople refusing in a submissive manner, alleged such arguments as the pope remained satisfied with them. So the council," you say, "was upon the matter held in two places, at Rome and Constantinople; so that while the pope presided in the council at Rome, and gave allowance to their proceedings at Constantinople, and that by reason of their intercourse they were looked on but as one council in effect, and the pope to have presided therein." In all this you discover how much you take up things upon trust, and utter them with great confidence when they seem for your purpose, although they are built upon notorious mistakes in ecclesiastical history, as I shall make it plain to you this answer of yours is. For neither was the general council at Constantinople ever in the least summoned by the pope, neither did it sit at the same time that the council at Rome under Damasus did; neither were any letters sent from that council to the pope; and therefore certainly pope Damasus could not in any sense be said to preside there. These things, I know, make you wonder at first; but I shall undertake to make it appear how much your great masters (I need not name them to you) have abused your credulity in this story. We are to know, then, that the emperor Theodosius having been newly admitted into a share of the empire by Gratian, and the eastern parts of it being allotted to him, he, considering what a deplorable condition the churches of those parts were in by reason of the factions and heresies which were among them, judges it the best expedient to call a council at Constantinople, to see if there were any hopes to bring the church to any peace. For this purpose 150 bishops meet from the several provinces at Constantinople, who condemn Macedonius, publish a new creed, make several canons, accept of Gregory Nazianzen's resignation of the see of Constantinople, choose Nectarius in his room, and on the death of Meletius at Antioch elect Flavianus to succeed him, make a synodical epistle to the emperor Theodosius, giving him an account of their proceedings, and so dissolve. This is the short of the narra-

tion of it in Theodoret, Socrates, and Sozomen^f. But as soon as the report of their actions was come into the western parts, great discontents are taken at their proceedings, especially at the election of Flavianus to the see at Antioch, because the church of Rome had declared itself in favour of Paulinus at Antioch during the life of Meletius, and therefore by no means would they now yield to the succession of Flavianus. Upon this, Damasus solicits the emperor Gratian for a general council, that the cause might be heard; and, that the eastern bishops might meet too, he sends other letters to Theodosius to the same purpose; upon the intimation of which, the eastern bishops, who either were detained at Constantinople by several occurrences there, or were sent again out of their provinces thither, assemble together, and write a synodical epistle to Damasus, Ambrosius, Britton, Valerian, &c., wherein they give an account why they could not come to Rome, because the eastern churches could not, in so divided and busy a time, be left destitute of their bishops, and therefore they desire to be excused; but, however, they had sent Cyriacus, Eusebius, and Priscianus, as their legates thither. This excuse the emperor Theodosius accepted of, and Damasus and his council were fain to rest satisfied with it; only some of Paulinus's party met him there, as Epiphanius and St. Hierom, (although St. Hierom, being no bishop, could only shew his good will, and take that opportunity of returning to Rome.) 450

What this council did under Damasus, we are to seek; for both Baronius and Binius confess that the acts of that council are wholly lost; only Baronius^g thinks the condemnation of Apollinaris and Timotheus (which Theodoret mentions) to have been done before, and that Paulinus was restored to the see of Antioch by this council; which seems the more probable, in that Paulinus the next year returns to Antioch, and because the bishops of Rome afterwards took his part, and defended his successor against Flavianus in the see of Antioch. This being the true account of those proceedings, let now any indifferent person judge whether you were not much put to it, when you are fain to confound two councils, held at several times on several occasions, on purpose to blind the reader, and

^f Theodoret. Eccles. Hist. l. 5. c. 8, 9. Socrat. l. 5. c. 8. Sozom. l. 7. c. 12.

^g Baron. Ann. 382. sect. 17.

to make him believe that pope Damasus had somewhat to do in calling and presiding in the general council at Constantinople, because he requested the meeting of the bishops again the year after the general council. And the truth of this is so plain, that Baronius and Binius confess the difference of these two councils, both as to the times and occasions of them. Baronius^h placeth the œcumenical council at Constantinople A. D. 381, Eucherius and Syagrius being coss. in May; but the other council at Constantinople he placeth the year after, A. D. 382ⁱ, Syagrius and Antonius coss., at which time likewise the council at Rome sat. And so Binius^k reckons this council as a second council at Constantinople under Damasus, and, in all things concerning the times of this and the former, follows Baronius exactly. So much are the two great cardinals Bellarmine^l and Perron^m mistaken, when they would have the council at Constantinople called *œcumenical* on this account, because there was a council at Rome sitting under Damasus at the same time, approving what was done at Constantinople; whereas the occasion of the council at Rome was given by some of the last acts of the œcumenical council, viz. the election of Flavianus. But that this could not be, that those two councils at Rome and Constantinople should sit together at the same time, and on the same account, appears by the synodical epistle of the council the year following, sent to Damasus, which is exemplified both in Biniusⁿ and Baronius, and is originally extant in Theodoret^o; although Binius placeth it at the end of the œcumenical council, but Baronius much more fairly in the next year, as being the act of the second council^p. Now there are two things in that synodical epistle by which I shall prove it impossible that either the letters of pope Damasus did concern the calling of the œcumenical council, or that the sitting of the council at Rome, and the general one at Constantinople, could be at the same time. The first is from the date of those letters, which is thus expressed there; that they met together at Constantinople, having received the letters which were sent the year before

^h Baron. Ann. 381. sect. 17.

ⁱ Id. Ann. 382. sect. 4, &c.

^k Tom. 1. Concil. p. 686.

^l Bellarm. de Concil. l. 1. c. 5.

^m Perron's Reply, l. 1. c. 34.

ⁿ Bin. tom. 1. Concil. p. 665.

^o Theod. Hist. Eccles. l. 5. c. 9.

^p Baron. Ann. 382. sect. 9.

from them to the emperor Theodosius, *μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀκυλείᾳ σύνοδον*, “after the synod at Aquileia.” Now the synod^q at Aquileia, by Baronius’s computation, was held the same year, A. D. 381, in which the œcumenical council at Constantinople was held, and much later in the year too, for this was held in the nones of September, and the other in May; and so much is likewise confessed by Binius^r in his notes on that council. Now let me demand of you, whether is it impossible that Damasus should by his letters summon the œcumenical council, when the date of those letters to Theodosius is so long after the sitting of it? But besides this, these eastern bishops, in that council which sat after these letters of Damasus, clearly distinguished themselves from the œcumenical council of the year foregoing; for, after they had given a brief account of their faith, they refer the pope and western council to that declaration of faith which had been made the year 451 before by the œcumenical council assembled at Constantinople, *τῷ πέρυσι ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει παρὰ τῆς οἰκουμενικῆς ἐκτεθέντι συνόδου*. Is it possible then any thing should be more evident than that this council assembled upon the letters of Damasus to Theodosius, and sitting with the council at Rome, is clearly distinct from the œcumenical council of Constantinople? And thus I hope I have dispelled those mists which you would cast before the reader’s eyes by confounding these two councils, and thereby offering to prove that the pope had some kind of very remote presidency in the second general council; which is so far from being true, that there is not any intimation in any of the ancient historians, Theodoret, Socrates, or Sozomen, that the pope, or any of the western bishops, had any thing at all to do in it. But you will ask, How comes it then to be accounted an œcumenical council? For this indeed Baronius would fain find out some hand that Damasus had in it, or else he cannot conceive how it should become œcumenical; but all the proof he produceth is, because in the acts of the sixth council it is said that Theodosius and Damasus opposed Macedonius: and so I hope he might do by declaring his consent to the doctrine decreed in this council; not that thereby his approbation made it œcumenical. And as

^q Ann. 381. sect. 80.^r Tom. 1. Concil. p. 682.

that doctrine was received, and that confession of faith embraced, all over the world, so that council became œcumenical: for I cannot see but that if Damasus had stood up for Macedonius, if the decrees against him had been received by the catholic church, it had been never the less œcumenical in the sense of antiquity. That testimony which Baronius brings out of his own library, and a copy of the Vatican, expressing that Damasus did summon the council at Constantinople, is not to be taken against the consent of the ancient church historians; it being well known what interest those Roman copies have a long time driven on. I deny not, therefore, but that the council of Constantinople was assented to by Damasus and the western bishops in the matters of faith there decided, but I utterly deny that Damasus had any thing to do in the presidency over that council. So that we find a council always acknowledged to be œcumenical, in which the pope had no presidency at all; and this very instance sufficiently refutes your hypothesis, viz. that the pope's presidency is necessary to a general council.

§. 8. In the third general council, held at Ephesus A. D. 431, it is agreed on both sides that St. Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria, was the president of it; but the question is in what capacity he sat there, whether in his own, or as legate of Cœlestine bishop of Rome? All the proof you produce for the latter is, “that it appears by a letter written to him by the pope long before he sent any other legates to that council; in which letter he gives St. Cyril charge to supply his place, as is testified by Evagrius, Prosper, Photius, and divers other authors.” But here again you offer to confound two things which are of a distinct nature; for you would have your reader believe that this letter was sent by Cœlestine to Cyril in order to his presidentship in the council; whereas this letter was sent the year before, without any relation to the council, as appears by the series of the story; which is briefly this. The differences in the eastern churches increasing about the opinions broached by Nestorius, St. Cyril of Alexandria chiefly appearing in opposition to them, they both write (much about the same time) to pope Cœlestine, impeaching each other of heresy. But before Cœlestine had read the letters from Nestorius in vindication of himself, Possidonius, a deacon

Lab. p. 232.
n. 2.

of Alexandria, comes with several dispatches from St. Cyril, wherein a large account is given of the heresy and actions of Nestorius: upon which the pope calls a council at Rome, and therein examines the allegations on both sides; which being 452 done, the council condemns Nestorius, and passeth this sentence on him—that ten days should be allowed him (after notice given) for his repentance; and, in case of obstinacy, he should be declared excommunicate. And for executing this sentence, Coelestine commits his power to Cyril; not as though it belonged to the pope only to do it, but that by this means there might appear the consent of the western with the eastern bishops in putting Nestorius out of the communion of the catholic church. St. Cyril having received these letters by the return of Possidonius, dated the third of the ides of August, as appears by the letters extant in Baronius^s, calls a council at Alexandria, in which four legates are decreed to be sent to Constantinople in pursuance of the sentence against Nestorius: they deliver the letters of Coelestine and Cyril to him; he returns them no answer at all, but addresses himself to the emperor Theodosius, and complains of the persecutions of Cyril, which occasioned a very sharp letter of the emperor to him, charging him with disturbing the church's peace. But this was not all; for Cyril having with the synodical epistle of the council of Alexandria sent twelve anathematisms to be subscribed by Nestorius, he was so far from it, that he charges Cyril with the heresy of Apollinaris in them, and sends them to Johannes Antiochenus, who (with the Syrian bishops of his diocese) join with Nestorius in the impeachment of Cyril. So that by this means the sentence against Nestorius could not be put in execution, because of the dissent of the eastern bishops, and that St. Cyril stood charged with heresy as well as the other. Things being grown to this height, Theodosius calls a general council at Ephesus, to be held the ensuing year, writes to all the metropolitans to appear there at the time appointed, and bring such bishops with them as they thought convenient. But what contentions happened there between the two parties is not here our business to relate; but the emperor, foreseeing what disturbance was

^s Baron. Ann. 430. sectt. 23, 25.

like to be there, sent the count Candidianus, for better management of the affairs of the council. Now St. Cyril and his party having the advantage of the other, both in number and forwardness of being there, Cyril sits as president among them. The question now is, whether he sat there by virtue of that legantine power he had for the excommunicating Nestorius the year before, or not, or only as patriarch of Alexandria and chief of that party? But by what authority he should challenge to be president of the council because he had been deputed by Cœlestine to act his part in the excommunicating Nestorius, I think is somewhat hard to understand: neither doth any thing appear in the council which gives any ground for it; for Cyril subscribes to it merely as patriarch of Alexandria, the council on all occasions call him and Memnon of Ephesus their *πρόεδροι*, and when they speak of Cœlestine after his legates came, they say he did only *συμβεβύειν*, assist together with them in council. But why should Cœlestine send other legates afterwards, viz. Arcadius, Philippus, and Projectus, if St. Cyril supplied the pope's place there already? Yet although we should grant that before the legates came Cyril did supply the place of Cœlestine, it doth not follow that he sat president of the council on that account, but only to shew the concurrence of Cœlestine with the council in matter of doctrine; and this there was good reason for, because Cœlestine had fully declared himself to Cyril concerning that already. And this was usual in the councils, as appears in this very council by Flavianus bishop of Philippi, subscribing likewise in the place of Rufus of Thessalonica. So that if we grant Cyril to sit in the council as legate of Cœlestine, yet it doth not follow that he was president of the council in that capacity: for the other was only to testify his consent; this
453 required a particular commission to that purpose: so that he might give a vote in the council for Cœlestine, and yet sit (as he did) president of the council as patriarch of Alexandria. Thus it being manifested that in the three first general councils the pope sat not, either by himself or his legates, as president, it is sufficiently proved thereby that his presidency is no necessary condition to a general council; and if not, then we say it is unjust and unreasonable he should challenge it, when he is the person mainly accused. But, in the mean

while, it is not at all necessary that we should deny that ever he sat as president in any other general council; for being the bishop of the chief see, why should he, in a case of general concernment to the church, as that of Chalcedon, not be allowed by his legates to have the prime place? but there wants sufficient evidence too that these were properly the presidents of that council. In the next, at Constantinople, you grant that Eutychius, bishop of Constantinople, sat president; but you say that he acknowledged this privilege to be due to pope Vigilius: but how came it to pass, then, that he would not sit there, though then at Constantinople? It appears, by the many frivolous excuses he made, that he durst not trust himself in the council, for fear that authority should not be given him which he expected. For that hath always been the subtilty of the popes in those elder times, when they began to encroach, not to venture themselves in presence in a general council, for fear of opposition; but by their absence they reserved to themselves a liberty to declare their dissent when any acts passed which did not please them; as Leo did in the case of the council of Chalcedon. But, however, this is evident from the fifth general council, that the pope's presidency was not then thought at all necessary. What was done in following councils is not material to our purpose, because it doth already sufficiently appear that the pope's presidency is not necessary to a general council; and therefore you conclude with a notorious falsity in saying with Bellarmine "that the pope hath been possest full 1500 years of the right of presiding in general councils."

§. 9. His lordship's third exception against the council of Trent is, "that the place was not free, but either in or too near the pope's dominions." To this you answer, "that certainly Trent is not within the pope's dominion;" but it is ^{Lab. p. 232.} ^{n. 3.} well enough known that Trent was under the sole jurisdiction of the bishop; and the bishop, to be sure, was under the pope's dominion, having been particularly obliged, too, by receiving a cardinal's hat. And therefore it was not without just reason that the place was protested against, not only by the German protestants, as being out of Germany, where the states of the empire had often promised the council should be—at the diet at Norimberg 1524, at Auspurg 1526, Spire 1529,

Ratisbone 1532, 1541, again at Norimberg 1543, and last of all at Spire 1544—but as a most inconvenient place for them to come to, being a week's journey (as they say) from the borders of Germany, seated in a barren and almost inaccessible place, having no freedom of passage, almost amidst the Alps: this place, I say, was not only protested against by them, as being contrary to the promises made to them, but the German bishops made it their earnest request that the council might be held in Germany; for at Trent they said they could neither be present themselves, nor send any legates thither; and particularly instance in the unpassableness of the Alps between them and Trent, and that it was rather in the borders of Italy than Germany. And the pope himself, in his answer to the German bishops, and the emperor's protestation upon the removal of the council from Trent to Bononia, insists upon the inconvenience of Trent for the long residence of the bishops there; and, in behalf of the protestants declaring against this place in regard of the unsafeness of it, the places
 454 about being all under the pope's authority, Du Ranchin^t tells you, “that it is an exception allowable by the doctors of the canon law, who all agree that an exception against the safety of the place is pertinent, and ought to be admitted; that it is good, both by the civil law and the law of nature, that a man summoned to a place where any danger threatens him, is not bound to appear, nor to send his proctor; and that a judge is bound to assign the parties a place of safety for the hearing of their cause, otherwise there is just cause of appeal:” that the council of Pisa excepted against appearing at Rome on the same accounts; and if they durst not venture to Rome upon the offer of safeconduct, much less reason had the protestants to do it, to such a place as Trent, a city, by reason of the neighbouring woods, very subject to treacheries and ambushments: that the very designing such a place yielded ground of fear and suspicion, especially to such as had not forgotten the late examples of John Huss and Hierom of Prague at the council of Constance: that the states of Germany, in the diet at Francford A. D. 1338, pleaded the nullity of the pope's excommunication of Lewis V, because he

^t Review of the Council of Trent, l. i. c. 7.

was cited to Avignon, where the pope was lord of the place; and the place being not free for him to appear at, the summons were not canonical, but void and invalid in law. This, and many other instances, are there brought by the same learned author, to justify the protestants in not appearing at Trent, because the place was not free nor safe, although the author seems not to have been one himself. All these things being considered, he must have been an infidel indeed who would pronounce Trent to have been the most indifferent place for both parties to meet at. For what you say, "that it might have been as unsafe for the pope and his party if it had been in Germany," there is no reason at all for it, because of the emperor's openly owning that interest; but if you plead the wars of Germany which then broke out, I hope that may serve as a further plea for the protestants, who were in a good condition to go to a free council about matters of religion, when a war was already begun upon them upon the account of religion, as most evidently appears, not only by the supplies sent by the pope, but by the transactions afterwards between the pope and the emperor, in some of which it is expressly confessed.

§. 10. But supposing the place had been never so free, there is another great exception remaining still, viz. "that none had suffrage but such as were sworn to the pope and church of Rome, and professed enemies to all that called for reformation or a free council." To this you answer, 1. "That it is no new thing for bishops to take an oath of canonical obedience to the pope, for St. Gregory mentions it as an ancient custom in his time; and therefore this objection would serve as much against ancient general councils as this of Trent." 2. "That the bishops' oath doth not deprive them of the liberty of their suffrage; nay, it doth not so much as oblige them not to proceed and vote even against the pope himself, if they see just cause; but only that they will be obedient to him so long as he commands things suitable to the will of God and the sacred canons of the church." But what falsehood and fraud lies in both these answers, it will not take up much time to discover. Could you without blushing offer to say that no other oath was taken by the bishops at the council of Trent than what was taken in ancient general councils?

for so much your words imply when you say that the same objection would have held as well against them as this of Trent. Why do you not produce some instance of any oath taken to the pope in any of the first general councils? I dare challenge you to bring any footsteps of any such thing in any ancient council; and you must needs have exceedingly hardened your forehead that durst let fall any thing tending that way. It was in much later times before that oath of canonical obedience from bishops to their metropolitan came up; and when it did, no more took any such oath to the bishop of Rome than such as were under his metropolitical jurisdiction. In your citation of Gregory, you would let us see how far you can outgo Bellarmine himself in these things: for Bellarmine^u only proves that it is not new for bishops to take an oath of canonical obedience to the pope; but you say that Gregory^x mentions it as an ancient custom in his time, which is egregiously false; for there is not one word in all that epistle implying any thing of former custom, neither doth it contain an oath of canonical obedience made by every bishop at his consecration, but only a form of renunciation of heresy by any bishop who comes off from it to the catholic church; and so the title of it is, *Promissio cujusdam episcopi hæresin suam anathematizantis*: and what is this, I pray, to the oath taken by every bishop at his consecration, wherein he swears to defend and retain the Roman papacy, and the royalties of St. Peter, (so their new pontifical hath it, whereas in the old one it was *regulas sanctorum patrum*,) against all men? And was this no more than a bare oath of canonical obedience? The first mention we meet with of any oath of canonical obedience taken by men in orders, is in the eleventh council of Toledo, cap. 10, held, saith Loaysa, A. D. 675; and therein indeed they say it is *expedibile*, a matter they judge expedient, “that those in orders should *promissionis suæ vota sub cautione spondere*, bind themselves by promise to observe the catholic faith, and obey their superiors.” But here is nothing at all concerning any oath to be taken by all bishops to the pope, though Bellarmine produce it to that purpose; for that was much later than the time of this council, it beginning at the

^u De Concil. l. 1. c. 22.^x Greg. ep. l. 10. c. 31.

time of the contests between the popes and princes about investitures: then the pope, to secure as many as he could to himself, binds them in oath of fealty and allegiance, rather than canonical obedience, to himself; by which, as Spalatensis^y truly saith, “he makes the bishops his slaves and vassals.” And therefore in another place he justly wonders that any Christian princes will suffer any bishops to make that homage by this oath to the pope, which is only due to themselves; for, saith he, “that oath which was only of canonical obedience before, they have turned it into absolute homage to the pope, so that none can be consecrated bishops without it.” But yet you would persuade us, that notwithstanding this oath, they may proceed and vote against the pope himself. Surely pope Pius II. was of another mind, who (as the appendix to Urspergensis tells us) in an epistle to the chapter at Mentz saith, “that to speak truth against the pope is to break their oath.” But all this will more evidently appear, if we produce the form of the oath itself; I mean, not that in the old Roman pontifical, but that which was taken in Julius the Third’s time, which was in the time of the sitting of the council of Trent; in which, besides, in the first place, a promise of obedience to the pope and his successors, and a promise of concealment of all his counsels, there are these express words: *Jura, honores, privilegia, et auctoritatem Romanæ ecclesiæ, domini nostri papæ et successorum prædictorum conservare, defendere, augere, et promovere curabo*^z, “I will take care to preserve, defend, increase, and promote the rights, honours, privileges, and authority of the Roman church, and of our lord the pope and his successors aforesaid.” But lest this should not be full enough, there follows another clause: *Nec ero in concilio, in facto, seu tractatu, in quibus contra dominum nostrum, vel Romanam ecclesiam, aliqua sinistra sive præjudicialia personarum, juris, honoris, status, et potestatis eorum, machinentur: et, si talia a quibusdam tractari cognovero, aut procurari, impediam hoc pro posse; et quantocyus potero commodè significabo eidem domino nostro, vel alteri per quem ad ipsius notitiam possit pervenire*; “I will not be in any council, action, or debate, in which they shall plot or contrive any

^y De Repub. Eccles. tom. 1. l. 4. c. 7. sect. 52. tom. 2. l. 6. c. 7. n. 102.

^z Protestatio adversus Concil. Trident. p. 22. A. D. 1563.

456 thing to the prejudice of our lord the pope, or the Roman church, or of any persons, right, honour, state, or power belonging to them." Was not this now a fit oath to send bishops to a free council with, where the main thing to have been debated had been the usurped power of the pope and church of Rome? He that can believe a council made up of such persons (who judge this oath lawful) to be free, may think those men free to rebel against their sovereign who had but just taken an oath of allegiance to him. Not that the pope had any right or power to impose it, or that the oath is in itself lawful, but that those who judged both these things true could not possibly be more obliged not to act in any measure against the pope than they were; and therefore the pope knew what he did when he utterly denied to absolve the bishops of this oath, which the states of the empire pressed him to, as necessary in order to the freedom of the council. "No," said he, "I do not mean to have my hands bound up so:" he knew well enough how much his interest lay at stake, if the bishops were released of this oath, and therefore he was resolved to hold them fast enough to himself by it. What restrictions or limitations can you now find out in this oath, whereby these bishops might freely debate the power and authority of the bishop of Rome? They that swear not to be in any council or debate against the pope are not like to make any free council about the matters then in dispute. And do you think now the protestants had no cause to except against this council, where all the bishops were sworn beforehand to maintain and defend that which they most complained of? And were there nothing else but this oath, so unheard of a thing in all ancient councils, so contrary to the ends of a free council, this were enough to keep them from ever submitting to the judgment of such a council as that of Trent was.

And yet this is not all neither; for his lordship adds, that the pope himself, to shew his charity, had declared and pronounced the appellants heretics before they were condemned by the council. "I hope," saith he, "an assembly of enemies are no lawful council; and I think that the decrees of such a one are *omni jure nulla*, and carry their nullity with them through all law." All the answer you give to this is, "that the pope did nothing therein but in pursuance of the canons

of the church which required him so to do, and of the decrees of general councils, which had already condemned their opinions for heresy." You mend the matter well; for it seems the pope not only did so, but was bound to do so. For shame then never talk of a free and general council, to debate those things which you say were already condemned for heresies by general councils. One may now see what the safe-conduct had been for the protestants, if they had come to Trent; for it seems they were condemned for heretics before they came there, and nothing then was wanting but execution. But if the protestants' opinions were condemned for heresies before by general councils, why was the council of Trent at all summoned? why was the world so deceived with the promises of a free and general council? why did they proceed to make new decrees in these matters? in what ancient general councils will you shew us the pope's supremacy, the infallibility of the church of Rome decreed, that those who held the contrary should be accounted heretics? Speak them out, that we may find ourselves therein condemned. Give us a catalogue of the rest of your Tridentine articles, and name us the general councils in which they were decreed as they are there. But this is not a work for you to meddle in. However, what folly and madness would it be to account that a free council, in which the things to be debated are looked on as condemned heresies already, and no liberty allowed to any persons to debate them!

§. 11. The last exception, you say, of his lordship, is against 457 the small number of bishops present at the Tridentine council; and in the first place he mentions the Greeks, whom he takes (say you) to have been unjustly excluded. To this you say, 1. "The pope called all who had right to come;" *Ibid.* (you should say, all whom he would judge to have right to come.) 2. "The Greeks, by reason of their notorious schism, had excluded themselves." And might not the Greeks (if they were in condition) every whit as well hold a general council among themselves, and say the Latins had excluded themselves by their notorious schism? You say, "it is confessed that no known heretic or schismatic hath right to sit in council;" but still you make your own selves judges who are orthodox, and who heretics and schismatics. And might

not the Greeks again say the very same of you, and, for all that I know, with much more truth and reason? It was then very like to be a general council, when the pope and his party must sit as judges who were to be admitted and who not. Might not the Donatists in Africa have called their council of seventy bishops an *œcumenical council* upon the same grounds, because they accounted none to belong to the church but such as were of their own party? and if they did not belong to the church, they could have no right to sit in council. It seems, the more uncharitable you are, the freer your councils are; for the pope may, by pronouncing men heretics and schismatics, keep them from coming to councils, and appearing against him there, and the council be never the less general for all that. If the Greeks be not called to the council, they may thank themselves, they are “notorious schismatics,” and, if we believe you, heretics too; if the protestants be not admitted, it is their own fault, they are condemned heretics! if none appear from any other more remote churches, still the same plea will serve to exclude them all. For my part, I much approve the saying of Eugenius in the council of Florence, when they spake of the paucity of bishops for a general council, “that where he and the emperor, and the patriarch of Constantinople were present, there was a general council, though there were no more.” And pope Pius the Fourth might have saved a great deal of money in his purse, with which he maintained his bishops errant at that council, had he been of the same mind. But the scene of things was altered in Europe: there were such clamours made for a general council, that something must be done to satisfy the world; and as long as the pope knew how to manage the business, there would be nothing could breed so great danger in it. He therefore barely summons a council, without acquainting any of the eastern patriarchs with it, (as was the custom in the ancient general councils,) among whom it was debated after the emperor’s indicting of it; these summoned, by the emperor’s order, their metropolitans, the metropolitans the bishops; the bishops they agreed among themselves who should go to the council, who on that account might be said to represent those churches from whence they came. What was there like this in the council of Trent? what messages

were there sent to the eastern patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria? what metropolitans came thence? what bishops by the consent of those churches? And if there were nothing of all this, what boldness is it to call this a general council! just by the same figure that your church is called *the catholic church*, which is by an insufferable catachresis. And must six fugitive Greek bishops give vote here for all the eastern churches, and two fugitive English bishops for all the church of England? I do not then at all wonder how easily this might be a general council, though there were so very few persons in most of the sessions of it. But you say, “there was no need of any particular sending from the Greeks, Lab. p. 234. as the case then stood, and still continues; it is sufficient^{n. 5.} they were called by the pope.” Sufficient indeed for your 458 purpose, but not at all for a general council; for if the Greek churches had been in condition to have sent an equal number of eastern to western bishops, the popes would rather have lost all than stood to the judgment of such a council. And this you know well enough, for all your saying that the Greek church condemns the protestants: you dread the Greek church’s meeting you in a free general council, and therefore, to prevent that, they must be called *schismatics*, and excluded as such, though you would never permit the debate of the schism in a free council: “as the case then stood, and still continues, there was no need of sending.” And why so? is it because those churches were then under persecutions, and are still, and therefore there is no hopes that the bishops should come to a general council? But all that thence follows is, that as things stood then, and do still, there can be no truly general council; and that is a just inference: but I suppose you rather mean, because those churches were then in schism, and are still, which still discovers what a wonderful good opinion you have of yourselves, and how uncharitable you are to all others. And so great is the excellency of your bishops, that one of them may represent a whole nation, and so about fifty will be more than sufficient for the whole world: and therefore I rather wonder there were so many bishops at Trent; for if the pope pleased, as he made patriarchs, primates, and archbishops of such places where they never durst go, (which he knew well enough,) it had been but appointing such to

stand for such a nation, and such for another, and a small number might have served turn, without putting any to the trouble of coming from any foreign countries at all: for otherwise, if we go about to examine the numbers of bishops by their proportions to the churches they come from, as it ought to be in general councils, we shall find a most pitiful account in the council of Trent.

Conf. p. 179.
sect. 27. n. 2.

§. 12. For, as his lordship saith, “is it to be accounted a general council, that in many sessions had scarce ten archbishops, or forty or fifty bishops present? In all the sessions under Paul III. but two Frenchmen, and sometimes none, as in the sixth under Julius III, when Henry II. of France protested against that council; and from England but one or two,” (by your own confession,) “and those not sent by authority. And the French” (he saith) “held off till the cardinal of Lorraine was got to Rome. As for the Spaniards, they laboured for many things upon good grounds, but were most unworthily overborne.” Now to this you have a double

Lab. p. 234.
n. 5.

answer ready: 1. “That mission or deputation is not of absolute necessity, but only of canonical provision, when time, or state of the countries whence bishops are sent, will permit; in other cases it sufficeth they be called by the pope.” 2. “For those who were absent, the impediment was not on the council’s part; and in the latter sessions (wherein all that had been formerly defined by the council was *de novo* confirmed and ratified by the unanimous consent of all the prelates) it is manifest the council was so full, that in the number of bishops it exceeded some of the first four general councils.” I begin with your first answer, which necessarily implies, that a general council is not so called by representation of the whole church, but by relation to the pope’s summons; so that if the pope make a general summons, that must be called a general council, though none be present but such whom the pope shall think fit to call thither. But where do you find any such account of a general council in all antiquity? I have given you instances already of general councils, in which the popes had nothing at all to do with the summoning of them; nay, all the four general councils were called by the emperor, and not by the pope, as any one may see that doth not wilfully blind himself. The pope sometimes did beseech and intreat the

emperor to call a council, but never presumed to do it himself in those days; and this is evident, not only from the historians, but from the authentic acts of the councils themselves: and cardinal Perron's distinction of the temporal and spiritual call of councils is as ill grounded as the pope's temporal and spiritual power; there being no foundation at all in antiquity, nor any reason in the thing, for two such several calls, the one by the emperor, and the other by the pope. But this is a mere evasion, the evidence being so clear as to the emperor's calling those councils, the Nicene by Constantine, the Constantinopolitan by Theodosius, the Ephesine by the junior Theodosius, the Chalcedonian by Martian and Valentinian; and this is so clear, that Bellarmine^a in his *Recognitions* confesseth his mistake about the Constantinopolitan council being called by the letters of pope Damasus, and acknowledges that to be true which I at large proved before, "that the synodical epistle was not sent by the general council, but by another the year after." If then the calling of councils belongs not of right to the pope, it is not his summoning which can make a general council, without mission and deputation from those churches whom they are to represent. And any other sense of a general council is contrary to the sense of antiquity, and is forced and unreasonable in itself: for it must be either absolutely general, or by representation; none ever imagined yet an absolutely general council, and therefore it must be so called as it doth represent; if so, then there is a necessity of such a deputation. But here a question might arise, whether those deputies of churches have power by their own votes to oblige the churches they are sent from by convening in a general council, or else only as they carry with them the sense of those churches whom they represent: and this latter seems more agreeable to the nature of a truly general council, whose acts must oblige the whole church: for that can only be said to be the act of the whole church, which is done by the bishops' delivering the sense of all particular churches; and it is not easy to understand how the universal church can be obliged any other way, unless it be proved that general councils are instituted by some positive law of Christ, so that what

^a *Recognit.* p. 46.

is done by the bishops in them must oblige the catholic church; and then we must find out, not only the institution itself, but the way and manner how general councils should be called, of which the scripture is wholly silent. And therefore there is no reason that there should be any other general council imagined, but by such a representation; and in order to this, the consent of all those churches must be known by the particular bishops before they can concur with others, so as to make a general council. The most suitable way then to a general council is, that the summons of them being published by the consent of Christian princes, every prince may call together a national synod, in which the matters to be debated in the council are to be discussed, and the sense of that synod fully declared, which those bishops who are appointed by it to go to the general council are to carry with them, and there to declare the sense of their particular church; and what all these bishops so assembled do all agree in as the sense of the whole church, may be called the decree of a general council: or in case some great impediment happen, that such bishops cannot assemble from all churches, but a very considerable number appearing and declaring themselves, which, upon the first notice of it, is universally received by all particular churches, that may *ex post facto* be called a *general council*, as it was with the first four œcumenical councils. And yet that in them there was such a deputation as this is, appears by that expression in the synodical epistle of the bishops of Constantinople before mentioned; for in that they give this account why they could not do what the western bishops desired, “because they brought not with them the
460 consent of the bishops who remained at home to that purpose: Καὶ περὶ ταύτης μόνης τῆς συνόδου, τὴν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις μεινάντων ἐπισκόπων συγκατάθεσιν ἐπαγόμενοι^a, “and concerning this only council,” viz. at Constantinople, “have we brought the consent of those bishops which remain in the provinces:” so that they looked on the consent of the other bishops to be necessary as well as their own. But now, if we examine your council of Trent by this rule, how far is it from any appearance of a general council! what bishops were there

^a Tom. I. Concil. p. 667.

sent from the most of Christian churches? those that did appear, what equality and proportion was there among them? For voices in general councils ought not to go by the number of bishops, but by the number of churches; so that if six were sent from the church of England or France, delivering the sense of that church they come from, they have equal votes with the greatest number of Italian bishops. But here lay the great imposture of that council: first, that the council's being general depended upon the pope's general summons, though never so few bishops appeared; next, that the decrees of the council were to be carried by most voices, and the bishops to give their bare *placet*: these things being thus laid, when there was any fear that businesses would not go right, it was but the legates' using some art in delaying it, and sending intelligence to Rome, and forty bishops are made together, and posted to Trent, to help out the number of voices; and thus it was in the case of the institution and residence of bishops: and this is that you call a *general council*. 2. To your other, "that what was wanting in number at first, was made up at last, when all former decrees were confirmed by a full number of bishops," it is soon replied, that this is, as all the rest of the proceedings of that council was, but a mere artifice: for it appears by the history of that council^b, that in the last session under Pius IV. a proposition was made, that all the decrees under Paul and Julius should be approved; which was opposed, because they said it would be a derogation to the authority of the council of those times, if it should seem that the things then done had need of a new confirmation of the fathers, and would shew that this and that was not all one, because none can confirm his own things; but, upon the French bishops' earnest insisting upon it, it was determined simply to read them, and no more. And do you call this a confirming and ratifying them *de novo*? So that, for all appears by this last session, the authority of those decrees must, as far as concerns the council, depend upon the number of the bishops then present, which was but very small, certainly, for a general council, there being not so many in most of the sessions as were in the Donatists' council in Africa;

^b Hist. Council of Trent, l. 8. p. 804.

so far were they from the number of the ancient general councils.

Ibid. n. 4. §. 13. But here comes your grand objection in the way, “That nothing is pretended by us against the council of Trent which might not have been in effect as justly objected by the Arians against the council of Nice.” But is not there easily discernible a vast disparity between these two, which way soever we conceive them? the one called by the emperor, who in person sat in the council, to prevent all disorders and clancular actions; the other by the pope, who presided in it by his legates, and ordered all things by his directions. In that of Nice, the Arian bishops were as freely admitted to debate as any of the other; but it was far from being so at the council of Trent. In the Nicene council, though Alexander Lab. p. 230. n. 2. was no further a party as to the doctrine than the other bishops, (no more was Leo at the council of Chalcedon, or Cyril at Ephesus, though those are the three you instance in before,) yet he sat not as president of the council, but the emperor had the chief inspection for the right management of it, and, for the conciliar actions, Hosius was president. Would the pope have been contented with such a council in his case, 461 wherein the emperor should have sat in chief, and some other person besides the pope to have presided? If not, never go about to parallel these two councils with each other. Again, in the council of Nice all the bishops came free, without any preengagement to maintain the party of Alexander; but the bishops at Trent were all sworn to defend the papal interest. At Nice, the bishops themselves debated the matters in controversy; at Trent, the divines dispute, the bishops in their formalities give their *placet*. At Nice, every one was freely heard, none died for grief of checks being given them for their too free speaking, as there did at Trent. And these, I hope, shew there was much greater reason for the protestants to except against the council of Trent, than for the Arians against the council of Nice. And yet, besides all these grounds of disparity, those two remain good still, which his lordship instanceth in, viz. “That the council of Nice proceeded wholly by the scripture, and that the sentence of it hath been universally received by the church, both before and after it;” neither of which can be said of the council of Trent.

Conf. p. 181.
sect. 28. n. 3.

But to these two you offer something by way of answer: to the first, "That both these councils had the scripture for their rule, but not their only rule; for," you say, "Theodoret^c expressly says, that in condemning the Arian heresy the council of Nice grounded itself upon tradition." But Theodoret says no such thing; only out of an epistle of Athanasius he says, "When the Arians objected that they used words not contained in scripture, they gave them this answer, That so did they too; but the words which they used were such as their fathers had used before them." And do you call this the grounding the condemnation of them upon tradition? Yet, to do you right, I must suppose that either you took this upon trust, without searching Theodoret, or if you did, you looked no further than Christophorson's translation, which in things concerning the papal controversies doth notoriously trip, (to say no worse of it, as it were easy to manifest from several examples;) but we need no more than this present. For whereas the words in Greek run thus, Ἐξ ἀγράφων γὰρ ἀσεβήσαντες (ἀγραφα δὲ τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, καὶ τὸ ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν) αἰτιῶνται ὅτι ἐξ ἀγράφων μετ' εὐσεβείας ἐννοουμένων λέξεων κατεκρίθησαν: which Sirmondus faithfully renders, *Nam cum ipsi ex verbis non-scriptis impietatem suam adstruxerint: (nusquam enim scriptum reperias Ex non extantibus; aut, Erat quando non erat;) accusant quod per voces non-scriptas, pie tamen excogitatas, condemnati sint; i. e.* Though the Arians made use of unwritten words themselves, yet they accused their adversaries for condemning them by unwritten words; meaning the ὁμοούσιον. But Christophorson translates αἰτιῶνται *afferunt*, and there ends the sentence, and then makes a new sentence: *Quapropter ex non-scriptis vocibus, pie tamen excogitatis, condemnati sunt.* By this we see what necessity there is of searching your citations in antiquity, which you deliver with so much confidence, as though none had ever looked into the fathers but yourselves. But I find you so often tripping in your quotations, that where Bellarmine hath been abused by the Latin interpreter, you very securely follow him in it; as in another place mentioned in this chapter, where Christophorson renders ἐκ τῶν πέρυσι γραμμάτων, *man-*

^c Hist. l. i. c. 8.

dato literarum, which Bellarmine confidently cites as importing Damasus's power to summon the council of Constantinople, than which nothing can be further from the meaning of those words. Thus you see how vain your attempt is of proving that the council of Nice grounded her definition on tradition as the council of Trent did, which is directly contrary to the advice of Constantine, and the proceedings of the council, as his lordship truly told you. To the second, concerning the consent of the church, you answer, "that the like consent of the church both is and was when protestants first began."

462 But will this reach to a parity, if it were granted? for his lordship speaks of the consent of the church in all ages from the primitive and apostolical times. I pray, prove your mass, invocation of saints, worship of images, purgatory, &c., by such a consent as this, and then you may say there is no such disparity between them. As to what you further add of the council of Nice condemning the *quartodecimani* for heretics, I know not where you will find it; I am sure Constantine is far from saying so in his epistle persuading to union as to that matter. Cannot the council of Nice appoint time to celebrate Easter, or determine that those who come from heretics shall not be rebaptized, but they must presently condemn all who do otherwise for heretics? But you must be pardoned; you are proving a parity between the council of Nice and Trent, and you know you could not do that sufficiently unless they condemned all dissenters in any punctilio for heretics.

Conf. p. 182.
sect. 29. n. 1.

§. 14. His lordship further proves, "That Trent could be no indifferent council to the church, the pope having made himself a strong party in it, because there were more Italian bishops there than of all Christendom besides, yea more than double; for where the number of prelates is expressed that had suffrage and vote in that council, the Italians are set down to be a hundred eighty-seven, and all the rest make but eighty-three; so that there were more Italian bishops by a hundred and four than of all the rest of Christendom: sure," saith he, "the pope did not mean to be overreached in this council; and whatsoever became of his infallibility otherwise, he might this way be sure to be infallible in whatsoever he would have determined. And this, without all doubt, is all the infallibility he hath." To this you answer, "That the

Lab. p. 236.
n. 7.

pope's making a party is disproved by the very argument he brings to assert it, viz. the multitude of Italian prelates; for who knows not that the Italians are more divided in point of interest and dependence than in any other nation of Christendom, by reason of the many sovereign principalities and states into which Italy is divided?" But what is this to the purpose, unless you could prove that the Italian prelates were so divided in point of interest and dependence? Since therefore they have all their dependence on the pope, and not on those principalities in which they live, this evasion, though very slight, is yet the best your cause would bear. And the greater you say the number of bishoprics is in Italy, the more friends, I hope, the pope must make by disposing them; and could they do the pope better service than to help him in this grand business at Trent, wherein they sought to outvie each other by promoting the pope's interest? But not only the protestants complained of this, but the emperor and other princes, and all impartial men in Germany, France, nay, and in some parts of Italy too. But here his lordship encounters an objection of Bellarmine, viz. "that in the council of Nice Conf.p.183. sect.29. n.3. there were as few bishops of the west present as were of the east at Trent," and manifestly shews the great disparity between the two councils: 1. "Because it is not a mere disparity in number which he insists on, but with it the pope's carriage, to be sure of a major part; but neither the Greek church in general, nor any patriarch of the east, had any private interest to look to in the council at Nice. 2. It was not so much a disparity between the eastern and western bishops, but that there were so many more Italians and bishops obnoxious to the pope's power than of all Germany, France, Spain, and of all other parts of the west besides. 3. Even in the comparison of those two councils as to eastern and western bishops, there is this remarkable difference, that pope Sylvester with 275 bishops confirmed the council at Nice, but the council at Trent was never confirmed by any council of eastern bishops." To the two first of these you answer with your best property, 463
 silence: only you would fain persuade some silly people, (if there be any so weak in the world that inquire into such things,) "that the pope had no private interest at Trent but what was common to him with other bishops." You should

have done well to have commended the excellency of an implicit faith before you had uttered a thing so contrary to the sense of the whole Christian world. To the third you confess, Lab. p. 237. n. 7. "It is some disparity, but nothing to the purpose, because if the pope himself had ratified them, the council would have had as much authority as by that accessory assembly." The more to blame was the pope a great deal for putting so many bishops to so needless a trouble. But you say further, "This council was not held just at the same time;" but Binius^d tells you it was held as soon as might be after the notice of what was done at Nice: shew us the like of the eastern bishops at any time, and we will not quarrel with you because it was not at the same time. Though these answers may pass for want of better, they come not near your last, which is a prodigious one, the sense of it being, That the doctrine of faith defined by the council of Trent was more universally received in the church than that of the council of Nice. "For that of Trent," Ibid. you say, "was universally received by the whole catholic church, and hath been more constantly held ever since; whereas many provinces, either in whole or in part, deserted the faith defined at Nice, and embraced the Arian heresy." It seems, then, the twelve good articles of Trent have been more generally received by the catholic church than the *eternal existence of the Son of God!* and consequently, that you are more bound to believe the doctrine of *purgatory* or *transubstantiation* than that the Son is "of the same substance with the Father!" for your grounds of faith being resolved into the *church's infallibility*, you cannot believe that which hath been so much questioned in the church so firmly as that which hath been universally believed and constantly held. But the universal reception of the doctrine of the council of Trent by the whole catholic church is so intolerable a falsehood, that you would scarce have vented it, unless it were your design to write for the *whetstone*.

To A. C.'s objection, "That neither French nor Spanish nor schismatical Greeks did agree with the protestants in those points which were defined by the council," his lordship Conf. p. 184. sect. 29. n. 4. answers, "That there can be no certainty who did agree and

^d Tom. I. Concil. p. 449.

who not, (or who might have agreed before the council ended,) because they were not admitted to a fair and free dispute; and it may be too, some decrees would have been more favourable to them, had not the care of the pope's interest made them sourer." Here you complain of his lordship's falling again to his surmises of the bishops' being overawed by the pope's authority in the council; which you call "an empty and injurious suspicion, an unworthy accusation, and arguing the want of Christian charity." But usually when you storm the most you are the most guilty: for if you call this *an empty suspicion*, &c., you charge many more with it besides his lordship, and those the greatest of your own communion: what meant else the frequent protestations of the French and Spanish ambassadors, in which they often declared, that as things were managed the council was not free? what meant those words of the emperor Ferdinand^e, in his letters to the legates and the pope, "that the liberty of the council was impeached chiefly by three causes: one, because every thing was first consulted of at Rome; another, because the legates had assumed to themselves only the liberty of proposing, which ought to be common to all; the third, because of the practices which some prelates interested in the greatness of the court of Rome did make." The French ambassador, monsieur de Lansac, writ to the king his master, "that the pope was so much master of this council, that his pen-464 sioners, whatsoever the emperors or we do remonstrate to them, will do but what they list." Several of the like nature might easily be produced; so that it is not his lordship only is guilty of this *want of charity* (as you call it), but all impartial persons who were most acquainted with the affairs of that council; whose judgment is certainly much more to be taken than such who have sworn to defend it. But you have an excellent argument to prove the council free, "because the bishops of the council continued in the faith and doctrine of it as long as they lived:" and had they not good reason so to do, when they were sworn beforehand to defend the pope; and having secured him from danger of reformation by the council, and subscribed the decrees of it, they were as much

^e Hist. Council of Trent, l. 7. p. 683.

bound to defend their own acts. And although it is well enough known what practices were used to bring off the French and Spanish bishops, yet when they were brought off, what a shame would it have been for them to have revolted from their own subscriptions! But what is this to that general freedom which was desired by the Roman catholic princes for reformation of the court of Rome, and by protestants both of the court and church? was the council any thing the more free because that party which met there continued in what they had done? just as if a part of a common-council should suffer only such persons to come there whom they thought fit, and suffer nothing to be debated but what two or three of the leading men should propound, and yet this be called a *free common-council*, because they who were of it did, after they had done, persist in it. And this is all you have to plead for the freedom of the council of Trent.

§. 15. Touching the Greek church, and the writings of the patriarch Hieremias, it is to little purpose to say that they differ from us in several things, unless you could prove that they did agree with you in all; and if (as you say) they do condemn protestantism, you cannot but know they do much more condemn popery, and that in some of the main articles of it. And therefore we have reason to believe that you more dread a free council, wherein the Greek churches may be admitted to equal votes with the Latin, than the protestants do the judgment of the Greek church: for it is sufficiently known how much the Greeks agree with us in the opposition to the great points of the pope's *supremacy* and the *infallibility* of the church of Rome; how far they are from the belief of *purgatory* in your sense, and several other things which are contained in the decrees of the council of Trent. If the patriarch Hieremias did not in all things agree with the Lutheran divines, doth it thence follow that he would subscribe to the council of Trent? But because you pretend to give us a full account of the proceedings between the patriarch Hieremias and the Lutheran divines, we must a little further

Lab. p. 238.
n. 9.

inquire into them. You tell us then, "That about the end of the last century, some eminent protestants of the Lutheran party endeavoured to feel the pulse of the Greek church, to see if they could there find any symptoms of their own disease.

The design was," you say, "to close with the Greeks, for the better making out the pretended perpetual succession of their church; which project they so hotly pursued, though formerly in vain attempted, that they would not desist till the patriarch being settled in his throne, they had sent him the sum of their reformed belief, drawn up according to the Augustan confession. After a long intercourse of letters, answers, and replies, mutually continued for some years, and all arguments used that might induce the patriarch to receive them into his communion, he could not be courted to so much as the least show of approving their doctrine, but did in all his answers 465 clearly confirm the tenets of the Roman catholic church, which those Lutherans endeavoured to overthrow; insomuch that the patriarch, tired with their importunity, gave them a rebuke for their departure from the doctrine of the catholic church, and desired them not to trouble him any more with their writings." A very formal story! One would expect the next news should have been, that the patriarch had come to kiss his holiness's feet, or at least subscribed to the council of Trent. But all your stories out of the east have not so much truth as formality in them: witness, one for all, that solemn legation from Gabriel, patriarch of Alexandria, to pope Clement VIII, wherein an acknowledgment was made of the pope's supremacy as head of the church; upon which such joy was conceived at Rome, that Baronius unmeasurably triumphs upon it, and says, it tends as much to the joy of catholics as to the confusion of heretics; and therefore hath very solemnly published the legation itself at the end of the sixth tome of his annals; but, upon a further examination of it, it was all found to be a mere fiction and imposture of one Barton, as both Thuanus^f and Thomas à Jesu^g confess. But we must suppose no such danger in this story, for you tell us you have it from Spondanus, and he out of the writings of those protestants themselves; but I much rather believe, by the circumstances of your story, that either you or Spondanus had it from Socolovius, their virulent adversary, who having clancularly procured a copy of the patriarch's answer, he publishes it in Latin with the title of *Censura Orientalis Ecclesiæ*,

^f Thuan. Hist. l. 114. ad A. 1595.

^g Thom. à Jesu de Convers. omn. Gent. l. 7. c. 6. p. 364.

and gives much the same account as you do here. In which there are two grand mistakes: first, as to the design, which you say "was to be admitted into communion with the Greek church;" the second, as to the event, which you say was, "that the patriarch did not shew the least approbation of their doctrine, but did in all his answers confirm the tenets of the Roman catholic church." Both which, how notoriously false they are will presently appear by a full account of the circumstances of this affair. We must know then, that the news of the Lutherans' appearing in Germany against the pope being spread at Constantinople, great inquiry was made what their doctrine was, and they were represented (by whose arts one may easily guess) as men holding strange opinions, denying the divinity of Christ, &c.; as appears by a letter lately published of a divine^h about that time resident in Constantinople; and withal, that they were defamed generally as persons of no religion at all, and of wicked and flagitious lives. Upon this, those German divines send by Stephanus Gerlachius, chaplain to the emperor's ambassador, a Greek copy of the Augustan confession, Martinus Crusius having before sent a letter only of respect to the patriarch Hieremias; who, by the means of Cantacuzenus, was made patriarch in the room of Metrophanes, who was then deposed. Gerlachius, as appears by a letter of his dated May 24, 1575, carries the copy of the Augustan confession to the patriarch, who then had his council about him, which with great joy and delight, he saith, he read in the presence of them, and delivered it to be read to the priests and *calogeri*: but five points he selected out of it to be further discussed; and when afterwards he waited on the patriarch to know his judgment concerning it, Johannes Zygomalas, who was then the *rhetor patriarchicus*, a kind of chancellor to him, told him, that having read it almost all over, they approved almost all, except that about "procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son," and "unleavened bread:" but he particularly desired the patriarch to return an answer to the divines who sent it, with his judgment upon it; and having spoken with the metropolitan of Nice and others, they seemed very much pleased with

^h Hottinger. Archaiolog. Orient. c. 3. p. 69.

that confession. With the patriarch's letter, Johannes Zygomalas writes to Martin Crusius, and therein tells him, that 466 though in all things the patriarch did not assent to them, yet it might be evident to all ὡς ἐν τοῖς προσεχέστεροις καὶ συνεκτικωτέροις τῆς πίστεως συμφωνοῦμενⁱ, "that they did agree in the most important articles of Christian faith, and that in other things they might easily agree, if they left the new and strange customs, and adhered to the catholic church with them;" and there was the greater hopes of it, οὐδετέρων συμφωνούντων τῇ τῆς πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώμης ἀρχιερεῖ, οὔτε τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐκατέρων ἀντιφερομένων ταῖς κακαῖς αὐτοῦ συνηθείαις καὶ παραχρήσεσιν, "since neither part did agree with the bishop of old Rome, or the church which joins with him, but both oppose the evil customs and abuses which come by him:" which bears the same date with the patriarch's first answer to the Tubing divines, May 15, 1576. And the patriarch in his letter "heartily wishes an union and conjunction between them." From hence we may easily gather how true both those things were, viz. "that the intent of their writing was, to be admitted into the communion of the Greek church, and that the patriarch did not in the least approve their doctrine, but confirmed the tenets of the Roman catholic church." But we must look further into the writings themselves, to see how far they agreed, and wherein they differed. It appears, then, that the patriarch^k did profess his consent with them in these things, besides the articles of the Creed, and the "satisfaction of Christ," and other more general points, viz. That the sacrament was to be received in both kinds, That the use of marriage was not to be absolutely forbidden the clergy, though their custom is, that they must be married before they take orders; besides the grand articles of *the pope's supremacy*, and *the Roman church's infallibility*: doth he that joins with them in these things not in the least approve their doctrine, but confirm the tenets of the Roman catholic church? But withal it must be confessed, that besides that common article of *the procession of the Spirit*, wherein he disputes most earnestly, there are five others in which they dissented from each each other; about free-will—justification

ⁱ Apud Chytræ. de Statu Eccl. Orient. p. 122.

^k Primum Patriarch. Resp. p. 149.

by faith—the number of sacraments—invocation of saints—and monastic life; and about these the remaining disputes were. In some of which it is easy to discern how far the right state of the question was from being apprehended; which the Lutheran divines perceiving sent him a larger and fuller explication of their mind in a body of divinity, in Greek: but the patriarch's troubles coming on, Cantacuzenus deposing him too, and other businesses taking him off upon his restoration, he breaks off the conference between them. But although he differed from them in these things, yet he was far enough from rebuking them for departing from the Roman church, although he was desirous they should have joined with them in the approbation of such things as were in use among themselves. And in those things in which he seems to plead for some practices in use in the Roman church, yet there are many considerable circumstances about them, wherein they differ from the church of Rome, as hath been manifested by many others; as in the article of *invocation of saints*, the patriarch saith, "They do not properly invoke saints, but God; for neither Peter nor Paul do hear us;" upon which ground it is impossible to maintain the Romish doctrine of *invocation of saints*: and in most of the other, the main difference lies in the want of a true state of the questions between them. But is this any such great matter of admiration, that the patriarch, upon the first sight of their confession, should declare his dissent from them in these things? It is well enough known how much barbarism had crept into the Greek church after their being subdued by the Turks, the means of instruction being taken from them, and it being very rare at that time to have any sermons at all, insomuch that one of their *calogeri*, being more learned than the rest, and preaching there in
467 Lent, was thereby under great suspicion, and at last was by the patriarch himself sent out of the way. It is therefore more to be wondered they should preserve so much of the doctrine of faith entire as they have done, than that any corrupt practices should prevail amongst them. The most then which you can make of the judgment of the patriarch Hieremias is, that in some things he was opposite to the protestants, as in others to the church of Rome. But what would you have said if any patriarch of Constantinople had declared his

consent so fully with the church of Rome as the patriarch Cyril did afterwards with the protestants, who on that account suffered so much by the practices of the Jesuits, of whom he complains in his epistle¹ to Utenbogard? And although a faction was raised against him by Parthenius, who succeeded him, yet another Parthenius succeeding him stood up in vindication of him. Since, therefore, such different opinions have been among them about the present controversies of the Christian world, and there being no declared confession of their faith which is owned by the whole Greek church as to these things, there can be no confident pronouncing what their judgment is as to all our differences, till they have further declared themselves.

¹ Epist. Remonst. p. 412.

PART III.

469

Of Particular Controversies.

CHAP. I.

OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF GENERAL COUNCILS.

How far this tends to the ending controversies.—Two distinct questions concerning the infallibility and authority of general councils.—The first entered upon, with the state of the question.—That there can be no certainty of faith that general councils are infallible, nor that the particular decrees of any of them are so; which are largely proved.—Pighius's arguments against the divine institution of general councils.—The places of scripture considered which are brought for the church's infallibility, and that these cannot prove that general councils are so; Matth. xviii. 20. Acts xv. 28. particularly answered.—The sense of the fathers in their high expressions of the decrees of councils.—No consent of the church as to their infallibility.—The place of St. Austin about the amendment of former general councils by latter at large vindicated.—No other places in St. Austin prove them infallible, but many to the contrary.—General councils cannot be infallible in the conclusion, if not in the use of the means.—No such infallibility without as immediate a revelation as the prophets and apostles had; taking infallibility not for an absolute unerring power, but such as comes by a promise of divine assistance preserving from error.—No obligation to internal assent but from immediate divine authority.—Of the consistency of faith and reason in things propounded to be believed.—The suitability of the contrary doctrine to the Romanists' principles.

§. 1. **I**F high pretences and large promises were the only things which we ought to value any church for, there were none comparable to the church of Rome; for there can be nothing imagined amiss in the Christian world, but, if we believe the bills her factors set up, she hath an infallible cure for it. If any inquire into the grounds of religion, they tell us that her testimony only can give them infallible certainty; if any are afraid of mistaking in opinions, they have the only

infallible judge of controversies to go to; if any complain of the rents and divisions of the Christian world, they have in-
470 fallible councils either to prevent or heal them. Who then would not run into the bosom of such a church as this, with whom there is nothing but what is infallible? who but sceptics, heretics, and schismatics would keep out of her communion? for what is there men can desire more in a church than she hath, where every thing is so infallible? faith is infallible, tradition infallible, the church infallible, the pope infallible, general councils infallible, and what not? But who are there that more cheat and deceive the world than those mountebanks who pretend to the most infallible cures? for what is wanting in truth and reality must be helped out with the greater confidence; and so we shall find it to be in these infallible pretenders, who fall short in nothing more than where they lay the highest claim to infallibility. Thus we have already manifested that none have more weakened faith than such who have given out that they only could make it infallibly certain; none have brought more errors than that church which arrogates to herself that she is infallible: it now remains that we discover that nothing is further from promoting the church's peace than this present pretence of the infallibility of general councils: for the ending of controversies was the occasion of this dispute; but this dispute itself hath caused more; and will do so, as long as men desire to see reason for what they do: for it cannot be expected that men should yield their judgments up to the decrees of every such combination of men as shall call itself *a general council*, unless it be evidently proved that it is impossible they should err in those decrees. Where there be no other ways found out for the ending some great controversies of the church but by a free and general council, all wise men will value the church's peace so far as not to oppose the determinations of it, it being the highest court of appeal which the church hath: but there is a great deal of difference between a submission for peace sake, in those things which are not contrary to the fundamentals of faith, and the assent of the mind to all the decrees of such a council as in themselves infallible: for supposing them subject to error, yet if that error be not such as doth overweigh the peace of the church, the authority of it may be so great as to

bind men to a submission to them. But where they challenge an internal assent by virtue of such decrees, there must be first proved an impossibility of erring in them, before any can look on themselves as obliged to give it. And while men contend about this, that which was mainly aimed at is lost by these contentions, which is the unity and peace of the church. For it is a most fond and unreasonable thing to suppose there may not be as great divisions in the world about the ways to end controversies as any other; nay, it is apparent that the greatest controversies this day in the Christian world are upon this subject. It is not therefore any high challenge of infallibility in any person or council which must put an end to controversies; for nothing but truth and reason can ever do it, and the more men pretend to unreasonable ways of deciding them, instead of ending one they beget many: for the higher the pretences are, the more all wise men are apt to suspect them, and to require the more clear and pregnant evidence for what they say; and if they fail in that, they have reason to question their integrity much more than if they had contented themselves with more moderate claims. For it is not saying councils are infallible will make men yield the sooner to their determinations, unless you first convince their reason by proving that they are so. But if you aim at nothing but the church's peace, you might save yourselves this labour; persuade men to be meek and humble, sober and rational, and I dare promise you the church shall be more at quiet than if you could prove all the councils in the world to be infallible: for will that ever put a stop to the contentious spirits of men? will that alter their tempers, or make them delight in those things which are contrary to them? No: you 471 only offer to apply that physic to the foreheads of men which should be taken inwards. If you would endeavour to promote true piety and a Christian spirit in the world, that would tend more to the church's peace than all your contests about the infallibility of general councils. But since you are resolved to contend, the nature of my task requires me to follow you, which I shall more cheerfully do, because, in pretence at least, it is for peace sake.

§. 2. This is then the first of those particular controversies which this last part is designed for the handling of, and which,

in the consequence of it, brings in many of those particular errors which we charge your church with. In handling of which, I must (as I have hitherto done) confine myself to those lines you have drawn for me to direct my course by. Only in this first, to prevent that confusion and tediousness which your discourse is subject to, I find it necessary to alter the method somewhat: for there being two distinct questions treated of, viz. whether general councils be infallible, and, supposing them not infallible, how far they are to be submitted to, you have intermixed these two so together, that it will easily puzzle the reader to see which of them it is you discourse of. And although I must confess his lordship hath gone before you in it, as his occasion of entering into it required, yet now the points coming to be more fully examined, it will be the most natural and easy method to handle them apart, and to begin first with that of infallibility; for the other supposing the denial of it, it ought to follow the reasons which are given for that denial. But although I thus transpose your method, I assure you it is not with an intention to skip over any thing material, but I shall readily resume the debate of it in its proper place. In your entrance into this dispute, you give us very little hopes of any great advantage is like to come by it, because, upon your principles, it is impossible we should agree about the requisites to a general council; for his lordship wishing that a lawful general council were called to end controversies, you presently say, "A pure one to be sure, if according to his wish." Yes, too pure a great deal for you to be willing to be tried by! And when his lordship professes that any general council shall satisfy him that is "lawfully called, continued, and ended according to the same course, and under the same conditions which general councils observed in the primitive church," you say it is too general to be ingenuous. You mean, such a council would be too general for your purpose; for you are resolved, in your following words, "not to yield to such a council wherein all excommunicate bishops, heretics, and schismatics are not excluded;" which is, in short, to tell us you are resolved to account none general councils but such as are wholly of your own party, in which the pope shall sit as judge who are admitted and who not, though this be as contrary to sense and

Conf. p. 184.
sect. 29. n. 4.

Lab. p. 240.
n. 1.

reason as it is to the practice of the primitive church in those councils which were then called; in which I have already proved that the pope did not sit as president. And, as long as you hold to such unreasonable conditions, it evidently appears that your discourses of general councils are merely delusory; and, to use your own words, "such a general council as you would have is a mere nothing," (as to a general and free council,) "an empty name to amuse silly people with;" for you require such conditions in order to it as are destructive both to the freedom and being of a general council. If therefore it be true which you say, That morally speaking such a general council as protestants would have is impossible to be had, it is much more true, that such a general council as you would have, it is most unreasonable we should submit to; for as long as you condemn all other bishops but those of Lab. p. 241. your own church for outlaws, and deserters of the catholic ^{n. 1.} church, and give no other reason for it but because you say so, we thereby see how absolutely averse you are from any ⁴⁷² free council, and that without any show of justice you condemn all others but yourselves, without suffering them to plead for themselves in an indifferent council, where both parties may be equally heard. But it was wisely said of pope Clement VII, "that general councils are very dangerous when the pope's authority is called in question:" and this you know well enough; for if a free council were held, the pope himself might be found with his party to be the greatest outlaws and deserters of the truly catholic church. But in such packed councils, where the pope sits as president, and orders all by his legates, I shall desire you once more to ruminate over your own words, "What rebel would ever be found criminal, if he might be allowed to be his own judge?" But of such a kind of council as you would have, I have spoken sufficiently in the precedent chapter. That which we are now upon, is not the hypothesis, but the thesis, in which we are to inquire, whether such a general council as you suppose be infallible or no? His lordship maintains the negative, and you the affirmative. Your opinion then is, "that the decrees of a general council, confirmed by the pope, are infallible," and that the holding of this is a piece of catholic faith; and that it secures all the members of the church from erring in any matter of

faith. For you say, "it is not *de fide* that the pope without a council is infallible;" but that pope and council together are infallible, you all along above assert to be so; and "that the decrees of general councils fall nothing short, in point of certainty, of the scripture itself; and that the contrary opinion does actually expose and abandon all the adherents to it to an inevitable wavering and uncertainty in faith." These are your own words, in several places which I have laid together, the better to discern the state of the question. The main thing then whereon the use of general councils depends being, that this must be believed to be *de fide*, in order to the certainty of men's faith, and prevention of errors, that I may the better shew how insignificant all this pretext of the infallibility of general councils is, I shall first prove, from your own principles, that this cannot be *de fide*, and then examine the grounds you insist on for the proof of their infallibility.

§. 3. I begin with the first, which will sufficiently demonstrate to how little purpose you talk of this "infallibility of councils," for preventing "uncertainty of faith," when you cannot have any certainty of faith at all as to that principle which must prevent it. For supposing that really general councils are infallible, if you cannot give me any reasons to believe that they are so, their decrees can have no power over my understanding, to oblige me to assent to them. And since you say this principle must be held *de fide*, if there be no foundation at all for such an assent of faith to it, I must needs be uncertain, whatever the decrees of those councils be upon your own principles. If you require an assent to the decrees of councils as infallible, there must be an antecedent assent to this proposition, That whatsoever councils decree is infallible; as I cannot assent to any thing as infallible which is contained in scripture, unless I first assent to this, That the scripture itself is infallible. If I therefore prove from your own principles, that none can have an assent of faith to this proposition, That whatever general councils decree is infallible, then all your discourse comes to nothing, and men can have no more certainty by their decrees than if they were not infallible. And this I shall prove by these things: 1. That you can have no certainty of faith (I must use your own terms) that the decrees of general councils in the general are infal-

libile. 2. That you can have no such certainty as to the decrees of any general council in particular.

1. That you cannot in the general have any certainty of faith as to the infallibility of general councils. For, 1. what infallible testimony have you for this, without which, you say, no certainty of faith is to be had? It is not enough for you to 473 say that the testimonies of scripture you produce are an infallible testimony for it; for that were to make the scripture the sole judge of this great controversy, which you deny to be the sole judge of any: and we must consider this as a present controversy which divides the church, Whether general councils be infallible or no; in order to the ending which controversy, we desire you to assign the way to it; for you tell us you have the only infallible way of putting an end to controversies. Shew us, therefore, which way this must be ended, in the first place: not by scripture, for that were to come wholly over to us; and if it may decide this controversy, it may as well all others. Who must then? the pope? That cannot be, for we are not bound to believe him infallible but only with a general council, as you tell us often. Must every one judge it by his reason? No; this is the *private spirit*, and would leave all to uncertainties. What then must do it? the pope and council together? But that is it we are inquiring for, whether we are to believe pope and council or no; and then the reason is, we must believe them because they say so! And can any thing be more ridiculous than for you to deny that the scriptures are to be believed for themselves, and to assert that the pope and council are to be believed for themselves? If the pope and council then should declare their decrees infallible, on what account are we bound to believe them to be so? You have found out then an excellent way for ending all other controversies, that are so far to seek for ending this; which you cannot possibly do without renouncing some of your principles, or an apparent contradiction. But besides this, 2. your very manner of asserting the infallibility of general councils destroys all certainty of faith concerning it: for you say that councils are not infallible unless they be confirmed by the pope; which, to the apprehension of any reasonable man, is, that they are not in and of themselves infallible but by virtue of the pope's confirmation. And therefore to say

that councils are infallible, and then make that infallibility depend upon the pope's confirmation, is merely delusory; for you may as well say that the pope and provincial councils are infallible. For doth the decree receive any infallibility from the council or not? If it doth, then the decree is infallible whether the pope confirm it or no; if it doth not, then the infallibility is wholly in the pope, and he may as well make a provincial council infallible as a general. But suppose it be some promise which helps the pope in a general council, which doth not in a lesser, (though there be no reason for that, for he is head of the church in one as well as in the other,) yet you cannot have any certainty of faith that the council is infallible. For you say the pope's confirmation is necessary to make it infallible, but that the pope may infallibly confirm the council is no matter of faith; and therefore the infallibility of the council can be none. For if the council's infallibility depend on the pope's confirmation, you can have no greater certainty of the council's infallibility than you have that the pope will infallibly confirm it: but you can have no certainty of faith that the pope will infallibly confirm the council; therefore neither can you have any of the council's infallibility. The assumption depends upon this, that you acknowledge you can have no certainty of faith that the pope is infallible but when he decrees in a general council, i. e. that the decrees by pope and council are infallible: but you can have no certainty that the pope, in the act of confirming them, is infallible; for if so, you might assert it *de fide* that the pope without a council is infallible: for his act of confirmation is distinct from that infallibility which lies in the decrees which have passed both pope and council. So that if the infallibility
 474 of councils lies wholly in the pope's confirmation, and you can have no certainty of faith of the pope's infallibility, you can have no certainty of faith of the infallibility of general councils.

§. 4. But suppose we should grant that you might in general be certain of the infallibility of general councils, when we come to instance in any one of them, you can have no certainty of faith as to the infallibility of the decrees of it. For you can have no such certainty that this was a lawful general council, that it passed such decrees, that it proceeded lawfully

in passing them, and that this is the certain meaning of them ; and yet all these are necessary in order to the believing those decrees to be infallible with such a faith as you call *divine*.

1. You can have no certainty of faith that this was a lawful general council ; for that depends upon such things which you cannot say are *de fide*, as, that the bishops in the council are lawful bishops, that the pope who confirms them is a lawful pope ; for by your own explication afterwards of your doctrine “ concerning the intention of the priest,” you say it can be but a moral certainty, and that, you contend elsewhere, can be no ground for a divine faith. Besides, you can have no more certainty that is a lawful council whose decrees you assent to, than you have that those bishops who are excluded are heretics or schismatics ; but can you be certain of that with divine faith ? and whereon is that faith built ?

2. You can have no such kind of certainty of what decrees were passed by them, and whether those decrees were at all confirmed by the pope or no ; for Bellarmine confesseth, “ no other certainty can be had of that, than that whereby we believe there were such persons as Cicero or Julius Cæsar,” and condemns Vega for saying the certainty of it depends upon the definitions of the council itself. Now this at the best being but a human or moral certainty, you must contradict yourself, if you say that a divine faith may be built upon it.

3. What certainty can you have, that may be a ground for faith, that the council hath proceeded lawfully ? for, in case it doth not, your own authors say it may not be infallible : for so Bellarmine^a answers in the case of the council of Chalcedon, *Concilium legitimum posse errare in his quæ non legitime agit*, “ that a lawful council may err, in case it doth not proceed lawfully.” Now, who can assure one that there have been no practices at all used to bring off some men to give their votes with them ? It is hard to conceive such a body of men wherein some few do not sway and govern all the rest ; and, in that case, can any one say that it was the Spirit of God which governed the council ? especially if one preside in the council who hath authority and power above all the rest, and that others in the council have any dependence on him ; who can

^a De Concil. l. 2. c. 7.

then expect that freedom which is requisite to a general council? The councils of Ariminum and Seleucia are condemned, because, though there were a very great number of bishops, yet some outwitted all the rest, and by their subtlety brought them to subscribe that confession of faith which pope Liberius afterwards confirmed by his own subscription. And if so great a council as this must be reprobated on that account, why not all others where there are suspicions of the same arts and subtilties? Nay, how can a man be sure there have not been such arts used in councils? for it is not to be expected that such things should be much known to the world, they being privately managed with the greatest secrecy that may be. And yet it is in this case necessary to know that the council proceeded with all simplicity and plainness, for otherwise their determinations may not be infallible. In order to which, nothing is more requisite than that there be no one which hath any great authority over them: for if the
475 second council of Ephesus, lawfully summoned, and the pope's legates being present, be therefore rejected, because Dioscorus the patriarch of Alexandria did overrule the rest, what assurance can we have of any fair dealing where the pope himself presides, who hath more ways both to terrify and oblige than ever Dioscorus could have? Besides, set aside this overawing by some potent person, suppose some active and subtle men, perceiving how things are like to go in a council, use their wits to bring off some men, not of so deep reach as others, to their own party, and, it may be, by the accession of a small number, they overvote the rest, must we presently say that the Spirit of God went off with those few men to the other party? for the decrees of councils going by votes, and those votes by the major part, who doth not see how easy it is (when it stands, it may be, upon a few votes) to fetch off a number to the other side. And I do not know where the Spirit of God hath promised, that where three or four men may so much alter the decrees of a general council, those decrees, if they pass the major part, shall be infallible, and as certain as the scripture. To be sure then there ought to be great confidence of the simplicity of the council's proceedings where a man must assent to them as infallible; and to that end men must be assured that they came thither without any

prejudice upon their minds, that when they were there they sought nothing but the truth and the honour of Christ, or else, to be sure, they are not "gathered in his name," and if not so, they cannot expect he should "be in the midst of them." Now let any one who understands the world and human nature see if he can persuade himself that a council can have no prejudices or by-ends upon them, that nothing of interest and reputation may sway upon them when they are met there, that there shall be no heats or contentions among them; for if there be, let him then see whether he can believe them to be infallible. If you say, In a matter so highly concerning the church, the Spirit of God will not suffer them to err, you must first shew where the Spirit of God hath promised this, and then, if you could, that those promises do not suppose the performance of some conditions, which if they neglect they may want the effect of them; in which case, there can be no greater assurance of the Spirit's presence than there is of performance of the conditions; which is the thing I now aim at. Besides all which, we have known that when it hath been a matter of as great concernment to the church as any of those you can fancy, great numbers of bishops at Sirmium, Seleucia, Ariminum, Ephesus, have miscarried, and decreed that which hath been judged heresy by the church.

4. Suppose men could be assured of the proceedings of the council, yet what certainty of faith can be had of the meaning of those decrees? for we see they are as liable to many interpretations as any other writings. If the scriptures cannot put an end to controversies on that account, how can general councils do it, when their decrees are as liable to a private sense and wrong interpretation as the scriptures are? nay, much more, for we have many other places to compare, the help of original tongues, and the consent of the primitive church, to understand scriptures by, when the decrees of councils are many times purposely framed in general terms, and with ambiguous expressions, to give satisfaction to some dissenting parties then in the council. Who knows not what disputes have been raised about the sense of some of the decrees of the council of Trent, about which the several parties neither are nor are like to be agreed? nay, who is so

unacquainted with the proceedings of that council, as not to understand how much care was taken in many of the decrees to pass them in such general terms that each party might find their sense in them? how fearful were they of declaring them-
 476 selves, for fear of disobliging a particular party! And are these the effects of an infallible spirit? since we know it hath been thus in some councils, who dares venture his faith it hath not been so in others? who dare be confident this or that is the meaning of such a decree, when it may be capable of several senses? Was it a sign that council was infallible that was afraid to speak out in a case of great consequence and necessity in the church? the council of Trent I mean, in determining that due honour be given to images, without assigning what that due honour was, which was the most needful of all to be done. If the decrees of councils were not ambiguous, what mean so many disputes still about them as are in the world? And when at last you say "that the councils are infallible when the pope confirms them," you say nothing more than if we should say that councils are infallible when scripture confirms them: nay, you say nothing near so much; for all are agreed that scriptures are infallible, but many among yourselves are far from believing that the pope is infallible. And therefore we are much nearer ending controversies in saying councils confirmed by scripture are infallible, than you are in saying councils confirmed by the pope are so.

§. 5. These things being thus in the general premised, we come now to the particular handling this controversy between his lordship and you. And for the greater clearness of proceeding, he premises some things by way of consideration; Conf. p. 190. sect. 33. n. 4. whereof the first is, "That all the power an oecumenical council hath to determine, and all the assistance it hath not to err in that determination, is all from the universal body of the church, whose representative it is. For the government of the church being not monarchical but as Christ is head, this principle is inviolable in nature; every body collective that represents, receives power and privileges from the body which is represented, else a representation might have force without the thing it represents, which cannot be; so there is no power in the council, no assistance to it, but what is in and to the church." But withal his lordship adds, "that the

representative body cannot be so free from error as the whole church, because in all such assemblies many able and sufficient men being left out, they which are present may miss or misapply that reason and ground upon which the determination is principally to rest; by which means the representative body may err, whereas the represented, by virtue of those members which saw and knew the ground, may hold the principle inviolated." All the answer which you return to this is, "That ^{Lab. p. 245.} his supposition of the church's not being monarchical is con- ^{n. 4.} futed already," (and I say, whatever you have produced is answered already,) "and that the power and assistance of general councils cannot possibly be communicated to them by the church, but must proceed from the same fountain now it did in the apostles' time, viz. the direction of the Holy Ghost; this spiritual power not being of human, but divine institution, and not proceeding so much from the abilities of the persons as from the cooperation of the Holy Spirit with them." To which I reply, that all this had need be more than thus barely asserted: it being confessed by yourselves (as his lordship shews) that a general council is a representative of the whole church, you ought to have shewed us the divine institution of this representative, and the promises made to it under that notion, or else we may still say with his lordship, that all the power and assistance it hath is by virtue of that body which it represents. But I need not in this urge the arguments of protestants against you; for in this, as in most other controversies, we have enough from those of your own party to oppose against these affirmations of yours. For Albertus Pighius^b not only asserts, but proves, that "general councils are not of divine but human institution, arising from a dictate of right reason; that matters of doubt may be better debated by many prudent and experienced persons than by a few. So that as the supreme authority for administration of affairs ⁴⁷⁷ belongs to one, so it is most agreeable to right reason that debates should be by many." This he proves at large, that nothing but human reason is the foundation of councils in the church; for, saith he, *in scripturis canonicis nullum de iis verbum est; nec ex apostolorum institutione, speciale quicquam de*

^b Hierarch. Eccles. l. 6. c. 1.

illis accepit illa primitiva Christi ecclesia, “there is not a word of them in scripture, neither did the primitive church receive any particular order from the apostles concerning them;” which he from thence proves, because in all the time of the primitive church till the Nicene council, there is no mention at all of them; and at that time it did not receive any new revelation concerning the celebrating general councils, but the emperor Constantine’s zeal for the peace of the church was the first cause and original of them. From whence he concludes that they have no supernatural or divine institution, *sed prorsus humanam*, “but altogether human;” for they are, saith he, “the invention of Constantine, sometimes useful, but not at all necessary.” This man speaks intelligibly, and not like those who jumble pope and council together, to make something infallible between them: for he says, “It is the better way by far to go immediately to the apostolical see, and consult that as the infallible oracle in all doubts of faith;” and very honestly tells us, that he believes “Constantine was ignorant of that privilege of the holy see when he first instituted general councils:” than which nothing could be spoken truer. If you have then nothing more to say for the divine institution of general councils than what you have acquainted us with, it would be much more wisdom in you to contend with Pighius for the pope’s infallibility, and let that of general councils shift for itself.

§. 6. His lordship’s second consideration you admit of, viz. “That though the act which is hammered out by many together must needs be perfecter than that which is but the child of one man’s sufficiency, yet this cannot be infallible, unless it be from some special assistance of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore omitting your very impertinent addition to this consideration, viz. “so as to make its decrees infallible,” (which is the thing in question,) we proceed to the third; which is, Conf.p.191.
sect.33.n.1. “That the assistance of the Holy Ghost is without error, which,” saith he, “is no question, and as little that a council hath it; but the doubt that troubles is, whether all assistance of the Holy Ghost be afforded in such a high manner as to cause all the definitions of a council in matters fundamental in the faith, and in remote deductions from it, to be alike infallible.” From this last expression you would very subtly

infer, contrary to his lordship's design, that he granted general councils to be infallible in deductions as well as fundamentals, but not to be alike infallible; whereas it is plain his lordship means no more by *alike infallible*, than whether the assistance be alike in both to make them infallible. And this you might easily perceive, but it would have prevented your cavil about *a graduated infallibility*, which I know none assert but yourself. This consideration brings on the main of the battle, in those texts of scripture which are most insisted on to prove the infallibility of general councils, viz. John xvi. 13, "I will send you the Spirit of truth, and he shall lead you into all truth;" John xiv. 16, "this Spirit shall abide with you for ever;" Matth. xxviii. 20, "Behold, I am with you to the end of the world;" Matth. xvi. 18, the "founding of the church upon the rock against which the gates of hell shall not prevail;" Luke xxii. 32, Christ's prayer for St. Peter, "that his faith should not fail;" Matth. xviii. 20, "where two or three are gathered together in my name, I will be in the midst of them;" Acts xv. 28, "it seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." All which places (except the two last) have been already examined, as far as concerns any promise of infallibility in the questions concerning the church's and the pope's infallibility; and there being no reason at all given why any infallibility at all is promised by them to the church after the apostles' times, 478 it may seem wholly needless to bestow a particular consideration again upon all of them: for it is evident in those places, all your drift and design is only to prove a promise of infallibility in the church, and to the councils only by virtue of that. But having at large before shewed that no such thing can be inferred from these or any other places, that which is built upon it is wholly taken away too; for the only pretence that you have why councils should be proved hence infallible, is because the church hath infallibility promised by these texts; which must be very well proved, and much better than you have done either here or elsewhere, before the other can be deduced from hence. And yet supposing I should grant that infallibility was promised to the church, I see no such necessary consequence from thence that general councils must be infallible, unless you can prove from scripture that the infallibility of the church is meant of the church *representative*,

and not *diffusive*; which is a new task which you have not yet undertaken. For it is not enough to say, “that the body of the church is bound to believe and profess the doctrine taught by the representative, and therefore the representative must be infallible,” unless you could first prove that there is a necessity of some continued infallible teaching by the church representative; which I despair of ever seeing done. I am so far therefore from thinking as you do, “that these texts are sufficiently clear in themselves to prove the infallibility of general councils,” that I believe a philosopher might hear them repeated a hundred times over without ever imagining any such thing as a general council, much less concluding thence that they are infallible. But because you again cavil with another expression of his lordship’s, in that he saith “that no one of them doth infer, much less enforce infallibility,” from whence you not *infer* but *enforce* this consequence, “that he was loath to say all of them together did not,” I shall therefore give you his lordship’s answer from all of them together; which is likewise sufficient for every one of them.

“And for all the places together,” saith he, “weigh them with indifferency, and either they speak of the church (including the apostles), as all of them do, and then all grant the voice of the church is God’s voice divine and infallible; or else they are general, unlimited, and applicable to private assemblies as well as general councils, which none grant to be infallible but some mad enthusiasts; or else they are limited, not simply to all truth, but all necessary to salvation: in which I shall easily grant a general council cannot err, suffering itself to be led by this Spirit of truth in scripture, and not taking upon it to lead both the scripture and the Spirit. For suppose these places, or any other, did promise assistance even to infallibility, yet they granted it not to every general council, but to the catholic body of the church itself; and if it be in the whole church principally, then is it in a general council but by consequent, as the council represents the whole: and that which belongs to a thing by consequent, doth not otherwise nor longer belong unto it than it consents and cleaves to that upon which it is a consequent. And therefore a general council hath not this assistance but as it keeps to the whole church and spouse of Christ, whose it is to hear his word and

Lab. p. 254.
n. 7.

Lab. p. 246.
n. 5.

Conf. p. 199.
sect. 33. n. 8.

determine by it; and therefore if a general council will go out of the church's way, it may easily go without the church's truth." Which words of his contain so full an answer to all these places together, that, till that be taken off, there is no necessity at all to descend to the particular places, especially those which are acknowledged by yourselves to speak primarily of the church's infallibility.

§. 7. Yet for your satisfaction (more than any intelligent reader's) I shall add somewhat further, to shew the impertinency of the former places, and then consider the force of the two last, which have not yet been handled.

1. There can be nothing drawn from promises made to the 479
diffusive body for the benefit of the representative, unless the maker of those promises did institute that representation. Therefore, supposing that infallibility were by these promises bestowed upon the catholic church, yet you cannot thence infer that it belongs to a general council, unless you prove that Christ did appoint a general council to represent the church, and in that representation to be infallible. For this infallibility coming merely by promise, it belongs only to those to whom the promise is made, and in that capacity in which it is made to it: for spiritual gifts are not bequeathable to heirs, nor can be made over to assigns; if the church be promised infallibility, she cannot pass away the gift of it to her assigns in a general council, unless that power of devolution be contained in the original grant; for she can give no more than is in her power to bestow: but this infallibility being out of her disposal, the utmost that can be given to a general council is a power to oblige the church by the acts of it, which falls much short of infallibility. Besides, this representation of the church by a general council is a thing not so evident from whence it should come, that from a promise made to one it must necessarily be understood of the other. For, as Pighius^c says, "it cannot be demonstrated from theological grounds that a general council, which is so far from being the whole church that it is not a thousandth part of it, should represent the whole church: for either," saith he, "it hath this from Christ or from the church; but they cannot produce

^c Hierarch. Eccles. l. 6. c. 4.

one tittle from scripture where Christ hath conveyed over the power and authority of the whole church to a hundred or two hundred bishops. If they say it is from the church, there are two things to be shewed; first, that it is done, and secondly, that it is *de jure*, or ought to be so done." First, it can never be shewed that such a thing ever was done by the universal church; for if it were, it must either be by some formal act of the church, or by a tacit consent. It could not be by any formal act of the church, for then there must be some such act of the universal church preceding the being of any general council; for by that act they receive their commission to appear in behalf of the universal church: and this could not be done in a general council, because that is not pretended to be the whole church, but only to represent it; and therefore it must have this power to represent the church by something antecedent to its being; else it would only arrogate this power to itself without any act of the church in order to it. Now that the universal church did ever agree in any such act is utterly impossible to be demonstrated, either that it could be, or that it was; yet such a delegation to a general council must be supposed in order to its representation of the whole church. And this delegation must not only be before the first general council, but, for all that I can see, before every one: for how can the church by its act in one age bind the church in all ages succeeding to the acts of those several councils which shall be chosen afterwards? If it be said that such a formal act is not necessary, but the tacit consent of the whole church is sufficient for it, then such a consent of the church must be made evident by which they did devolve over the power of the whole church to such a representative. And all those must consent in that act whose power the council pretends to have; and so it cannot be sufficient to say that those who choose bishops for the council do it; for then they could only represent those who chose them, and so their authority will fall much short of that of the whole church. But suppose such a thing were done by the whole church, of which no footsteps at all appear, we must further inquire by what right or authority this is done? for the authority of the church being given it by Christ, it cannot be given from itself without his commission for doing it; which if we stay till it can be pro-

duced in this case, we may stay long enough before we see 480 any such infallible representative of the universal church. The utmost then that can be supposed in this case is, that the parts of the church may voluntarily consent to accept of the decrees of such a council, and by that voluntary act, or by the supreme authority enjoining it, such decrees may become obligatory. But what is this to an infallibility in the council because it represents the whole church? for neither is there evidence enough for such a representation, neither, if there were, could any privilege of that nature belong to the representative body because of any promise made to the diffusive body of the church.

§. 8. 2. What belongs to the representative body of the church, by virtue of a promise made to the diffusive, can in no other sense be understood of the representative than as it belongs to the diffusive; because no further right can be derived from any than they had themselves. Therefore supposing a promise of infallibility made to the church, it is necessary to know in what way and manner that promise belongs to it; for in no other way and manner can it belong to the council which represents it. If therefore the church's infallibility lies only in fundamentals, the council's infallibility can extend no further. If the church's infallibility doth not imply that all the church, or the major part, should be infallible, but that though the major part err, yet all the church shall not, then neither can it be true of a general council that all, or the major part, should be infallible, but only that there should be no such general council wherein all the bishops should err. But then this is utterly destructive to the infallibility of the decrees of general councils, for those must pass by the major part of the votes; which Canus, one of the acutest of our adversaries, was sensible of, and grants "that the major part in a general council may err, and the lesser part hold the truth;" but then he saith, "that the pope is not bound to follow the major part^d;" which is expressly to take away any pretext of infallibility from the decrees of the council, and place it wholly in the pope: and why may not then the pope and a provincial council be as infallible as the pope

^d Canus loc. Theol. 1. 5. c. 5.

and the lesser part of a general council? what then do the promises of infallibility to the council signify, if the major part may definitively err? And therefore Bellarmine likes not this answer, as being too plain and open, but gives another as destructive to the council's infallibility as this is; which is, "that in case the major part doth resist the better in a general council, as in that of Ariminum, and the second at Ephesus, yet that it cannot conquer it^e." How so? doth it not conquer it when the decrees are passed by the major part? "No," saith he, "for these decrees are afterwards made void." Very good: but then I suppose in the council the major part did conquer, although not after. But by whom are they made void? "by him to whom it belongs to confirm his brethren," saith Bellarmine. Well, but the skill is, to know who that is in this case who can reverse the decree of the representative body of the church under the plea of confirming his brethren. If it be the pope, who reversed the decrees of the council of Sirmium, to which the pope subscribed? And for that of Ariminum and Seleucia, Hilary did more to reverse it than ever the pope did. Therefore others say, it is in the church's power to make void the decrees of general councils, as she did the decrees of the Arian councils. If so, then we plainly see the infallibility doth not lie in the representative, but in the diffusive body of the church still, if that hath the power to avoid and repeal the decrees of general councils. So that all the infallibility of councils is merely probationary, and stands to the good liking and consent of the diffusive body of the church; by which means the decrees of a provincial council, being accepted by the church, are as infallible as of a general. But in all these ways there is no proper infallibility at all in
 481 the major part of a general council, but it wholly lies either in the pope, or in the diffusive body of the church still.

3. If these places which mention a promise of infallibility to the church must imply the infallibility of general councils, as the church's representative, then it will thence follow that the decrees of general councils are infallible, whether the pope confirm them or no. For the infallibility is not promised at all *mediante papa*, but *virtute ecclesiæ*; for if they be infallible

^e Bellarm. de Concil. l. 2. c. 9.

as representing the church, they are infallible whether there be any pope or no, for the pope doth not make them more represent the church than they did before. And this is very well understood and proved by those who from these promises to the church, and from that infallibility consequent upon it (by their adversaries' confession) to a general council, do infer the council's authority to be above the pope's: which is a just and necessary consequence from this assertion, That the privileges of the universal church are by virtue of its representation in a general council. Which doctrine was asserted by the councils of Constance and Basil, and by the Sorbonne doctors, till their being jesuited of late; who have therefore asserted, that it might be as lawful to call in question the decrees of the council of Trent as of those two councils. And whereas their adversaries object that this is not *de fide*, they answer, It is impossible but that it should be *de fide*, since it is decreed by general councils; "for," say they, "were the fathers at Constance and Basil acted by any other spirit than those at Nicæa and Ephesus? why may not then the council of Trent be opposed as well as them? for if there be any difference, they had much the advantage. In the council of Constance," say they, "two popes were present, all the cardinals, two patriarchs of Constantinople and Antioch, and the emperor himself, and the legates of all Christian princes; and besides all this, it was confirmed by pope Martin, and the acts of confirmation extant in the 45th session. And so the council of Basil was begun according to the decrees of the councils of Constance and Pisa, and by virtue of the bulls of Martin and Eugenius; and the pope's legates were presidents in it." So that if general councils be infallible, it must be *de fide catholica* that their authority is above the pope's; and if so, their infallibility cannot depend upon his confirmation. Now if we search into the grounds on which they build this power of general councils independently on the pope, we shall find they derive it wholly from those places of scripture which speak so much concerning the church and councils as is agreed on both sides. And therefore Æneas Sylvius^f (afterwards Pius II.) says, "that is not the less *de fide* because it is con-

^f Æneas Sylv. de Gest. Concil. Basil. l. 1.

tradicted by some, since it is founded on the promises of Christ concerning the church." Since therefore the pope himself is but *filius ecclesiae*, and the church is *sponsa Christi*, they say it is unreasonable that the son of the church should not be subject to the spouse of Christ. If therefore these promises concerning the church infer an infallibility in it, and that infallibility be in a general council as representing the church, it follows thence that councils must be in themselves infallible, whether confirmed by the pope or no. And we may see how little this opinion of infallibility of general councils is like to stand between them, by the answers which are given by those of the other party, who make the pope's confirmation necessary to the infallibility of the council. For Canus expressly saith, "that the council is said to be infallible in no other sense than the church is, i. e. in those things wherein all agreed, and not the major part." Bellarmine^s likes not this; "for," saith he, "if the major part of the council err, the council must of necessity err; for that which properly belongs to the council is, passing judgment in matter of faith, or making decrees: now if that were not the lawful decree of the council which is made by the major part, there never could
482 be a lawful decree, for none passes without some dissenting; and therefore he denies that the council doth fully represent the church without the pope." So that on both sides we see how pregnant these proofs are for the council's infallibility, when one saith, that if they be understood of the church, the council's infallibility doth not want the pope's confirmation; the other, to make the pope's confirmation necessary, denies such an absolute representation of the church in the council. If then the council doth represent the church, it is infallible, although not confirmed by the pope; if it doth not, then the promises made to the church cannot belong to the general council. Thus I have shewed you how far these places concerning (as you say) the infallibility of the church are from proving the infallibility of general councils.

§. 9. But though these general places concerning the church may not so clearly prove the infallibility of general councils, yet you say there are some particular places to this purpose;

which are, Matt. xviii. 20. and Acts xv. 28 : which not having been handled already, I must follow you more closely in the examination of them. The first place is Matt. xviii. 20, "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." The substance of the argument from this place his lordship thus repeats from Bellarmine: "The strength of the argument is not taken from these words Conf. p. 190. sect. 33. n. 6. alone, but as they are continued with the former; and that the argument is drawn *a minori ad majus*, from the less to the greater, thus; If two or three gathered in my name do always obtain that which they ask at God's hands, viz. wisdom and knowledge of those things which are necessary for them, how much more shall all the bishops, gathered together in council, always obtain wisdom and knowledge to judge those things which belong to the direction of the whole church?" To which his lordship answers, "That there is very little strength in these words, either considered alone, being generally interpreted by the fathers of consent in prayer, or with the argument *a minori ad majus*, 1. Because, though that argument hold in natural or necessary things, yet not in voluntary or promised things, or things which depend upon their institution. 2. Because it follows not but where and so far as the thing upon which the argument is founded agrees to the less: now this infallibility doth not belong to the lesser congregation, and therefore cannot be inferred as to the greater. 3. Because it depends upon conditions here supposed of being gathered together in the name of Christ; and therefore supposing infallibility promised, these conditions here implied must be known before such a congregation can be known to be infallible. 4. Because Christ's promise of presence in the midst of them is only to grant what he shall find to be fit for them, not infallibly whatsoever they shall think fit to ask for themselves. 5. Because Gregory de Valentia and Stapleton confess that this place doth not properly belong to prove an infallible certainty of any sentence in which more agree in the name of Christ, but to the efficacy of consent for obtaining that which more shall pray for in the name of Christ, if at least that be for their souls' health; for else it would hence follow, that not only the definition of a general council, but even of a provincial, nay, of two or three bishops gathered

Lab. pp.
251, 252.
n. 6.

together, is valid, and that without the pope's consent." The utmost I can make of your reply to these answers lies in this, That you grant that "primarily and directly our Saviour doth not intend that particular infallibility; and this is that which Gregory and Stapleton assert; but only that he signified in general that he would be present with his church, and all faithful people gathered together in his name, so often and so far as their necessities required his presence, they duly imploring it. But yet the argument holds for the infallibility of general councils, and not national or provincial, because the necessities of the church require one, and not the other; and that it will follow *a minori ad majus* in things promised as well as natural, where the motive is increased, and neither goodness nor power wanting in the promiser." But all this
483 depends on a false supposition, viz. that there is a necessity of infallibility to continue in the church, and that all persons are bound to believe the decrees of the councils to be the infallible oracles of truth: but we say neither of these are necessary in the church, and therefore you have no ground to extend this promise of Christ's presence to the infallibility of councils. For you are not to extend the power and goodness of Christ as far as you shall judge fitting, but as far only as he hath promised to extend it: for otherwise it would be far more for the peace and unity of the church, if every particular congregation had this infallibility, than if only general councils had it, because, by that means, many disputes about the authority, calling, and proceedings of general councils would be prevented; nay, it might be extended much further, for by this argument from the goodness and power of Christ you might, for all that I can see, infer with more force, that every true Christian should be infallible, and so there be no need of any councils at all: for whatever argument you can produce why Christ's goodness should extend to make councils infallible, it will much more hold as to the other; for the peace and unity of the church would be far better secured this way. If you say, that experience shews Christ never intended this by the errors of particular men in all ages, to the same purpose we answer you as to councils, that large experience shews that when bishops have solemnly met in council they have been grossly deceived, as you confess in all the Arian councils.

If your argument would have ever held from the power and goodness of Christ, would it not have held at that time, when so great a matter of faith was under debate? If Christ therefore suffered so many bishops so grossly to err in a matter of such importance, wherein the church was so highly concerned, how can you infer from his power and goodness that he will never suffer general councils to err? If you answer, That these erred for not observing the conditions requisite in order to Christ's hearing them, viz. that they were not met in the name of Christ, did not come without prejudice, nor rely on divine assistance, I pray take the same answer as to all other councils, That we cannot know that Christ hears them, or that they are infallible, till we are assured of their performance of the conditions requisite in order to that infallibility. And when you can assure us that such a council met together in the name of Christ, and came merely with a desire to find out truth, and relied wholly on his assistance for it, we do not so much distrust the power and goodness of Christ as to think he will suffer them to be deceived; for we know upon those conditions he will not suffer any good man to err, much less an assembly of them met in a general council. But here you have the hardest task of all lying upon you, which is, to prove that a general council hath observed all these conditions, without which nothing can be inferred from this place as to Christ's being in any sense "in the midst of them."

§. 10. The last place mentioned for the infallibility of general councils is that, Acts xv. 28, where the apostles say of themselves, and the council held by them, "it seems good to the Holy Ghost, and to us." "And," saith his lordship, "they might well say it, for they had infallibly the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and kept close to his direction: but there is a great deal of difference between them and succeeding councils, who never arrogated this to their definitions, though they presumed of the assistance of the Holy Ghost; and though that form might be used, yet they did not assume such an infallibility to themselves as the apostles had. And therefore it is little less than blasphemy in Stapleton to say that the decrees of councils are the very oracles of the Holy Ghost. And that all councils are not so infallible as was this of the apostles, nor the causes handled in them as there they were,

Conf. p. 197.
sect. 33. n. 7.

is manifest by the ingenuous confession of Ferus to that purpose." This is the substance of his lordship's answer to this place; which you think to take off by saying, "That there is no essential difference between the certainty of the things determined by the apostles, and those decided by a general council, confirmed by the Roman bishop; and though after-councils use not the same expression in terms, yet they do it in effect by enjoining the belief of their decisions under the pain of anathema." If this be the meaning of the anathemas of councils, there had need indeed be no great difference between the apostles' decrees and theirs. But this had need be very well proved; and so it is by you; for you produce several expressions of Cyril, Athanasius, Austin, Leo, Gregory, and some others (out of Bellarmine), in which they magnify the decrees of general councils, calling them "a divine oracle," "a sentence inspired by the Holy Ghost, not to be retracted," and some others to the same purpose, by which you vindicate Stapleton, and tell us he said no more than the fathers had done before him. Yet all this is far from any vindication of Stapleton, or proving your assertion as to the equal certainty of the decrees of councils, and of the apostles: for the ground of all those expressions, and several others of the same nature, was not the supposition of any inherent infallibility in the decrees of general councils, but their great assurance of the truth of that doctrine which was determined by those first general councils. For although I am far enough from believing the council of Trent infallible, yet if that had determined the same points of faith which were determined in the first four general councils, and nothing else, I might have said that "the decrees of that council was a holy and divine oracle, a sentence inspired by the Holy Ghost," &c.; not that I thought the council in the least infallible in determining these things, but that they were of themselves divine truths which the council determined. And in this sense Athanasius might well term the definition of the Nicene council against Arius "the word of our Lord which endureth for ever;" and Constantine style it "a celestial mandate;" and Gregory might reverence the four councils as the four Gospels, (though Bellarmine tells you that expression must be taken in a qualified sense;) yet all these, and any other of a like nature, I say, import no

Lab. p. 253.
n. 7.

484

more than that they were fully assured the matters decreed by them were revealed by God in his word, and not that they believed that they became such holy and divine oracles merely by the council's definition: for the contrary might be abundantly manifested by many expressions in them quite to another purpose; and if, instead of all the rest, you will but read Athanasius and Hilary concerning councils, you will find yourself strangely deceived, if you believed they ever thought them infallible. What you add afterwards, "that it is sufficient that there be a real infallibility, though not like to that of the apostles," will not be sufficient for me, till you can shew me the degrees of infallibility; for I will promise you, if you can once prove that councils are really infallible, I shall not stick to say that they are alike infallible with the apostles. As for your discarding Ferus as a prohibited author, it only shews the great integrity of the man, who spoke too much truth to be borne by the tender ears of the Roman inquisition.

Before I had proceeded any further, I had thought (because of a former promise) to have looked back to the place where you speak in vindication of the Decretal Epistles; but because you only refer to Turrianus's defence of them, I shall only return you an equal courtesy, and refer you to the abundantly sufficient answer to him by David Blondel. One would have thought you should have been ashamed of so notorious an imposture as those Decretal Epistles are; but we see what shifts a bad cause puts you upon, that such men as Ferus, Cassander, Erasmus, are under an *index expurgatorius*, but the Decretal Epistles must be still justified: but he that doth not see the reasons of these proceedings wants a greater *index expurgatorius* for his brains than ever they did for their books.

§. 11. We return therefore to our present subject, and having manifested how far the infallibility of general councils is from being grounded on the veracity of divine promises, as you pretend without ground, we now proceed to the consent of the church as to this subject: which his lordship speaks to in the next consideration; which is, "that all agree that the church in general can never err from the faith necessary to salvation; but there is not the like consent that general

councils cannot err." Whether Waldensis, asserting that general councils may err, speak of such councils as are accounted unlawful or no, is not much material, since, as his lordship says, "the fathers having to do with so many heretics, and so many of them opposing church authority, did never, in the condemnation of those heretics, utter this proposition, That a general council cannot err. And supposing that no general council had erred in any matter of moment to this day, which will not be found true, yet this would not have followed—that it is therefore infallible, and cannot err." And, to shew that St. Augustine puts a manifest difference between the rules of scripture and the definitions of men, he produceth that noted place in him, wherein he so fully asserts the prerogative of scripture above all the writings of men or definitions of councils; which, because it will be often referred to, I have cited at large in the margin^h; but his lordship gives the sum of it in these words: "That whatsoever is found written in scripture may neither be doubted nor disputed whether it be true or right: but the letters of bishops may not only be disputed, but corrected, by bishops that are more learned and wise than they, or by national councils, and national councils by plenary or general; and even plenary councils themselves may be amended, the former by the latter." From whence he infers, "that it seems it was no news with St. Austin that a general council might err, and therefore be inferior to the scripture, which may neither be doubted nor disputed where it affirms; and if it be so with the definition of a council too, where is then the scripture's prero-

^h Quis autem nesciat sanctam scripturam canonicam, tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti, certis suis terminis contineri, eamque omnibus posterioribus episcoporum literis ita præponi, ut de illa omnino dubitari et disceptari non possit, utrum verum, vel utrum rectum sit, quicquid in ea scriptum esse constiterit? Episcoporum autem literas quæ post confirmatum canonem vel scriptæ sunt vel scribuntur, et per sermonem forte sapientiore cujuslibet in ea re peritioris, et per aliorum episcoporum graviolem auctoritatem, doctorumque prudentiam, et per concilia licere reprehendi, si quid in eis

forte a veritate deviatum est. Et ipsa concilia quæ per singulas regiones vel provincias fiunt, plenariorum conciliorum auctoritati, quæ fiunt ex universo orbe Christiano, sine ullis ambagibus cedere, ipsaque plenaria sæpe priora posterioribus emendari, cum aliquo experimento rerum aperitur quod clausum erat, et cognoscitur quod latebat, sine ullo typho sacrilegæ superbix, sine ulla inflata cervice arrogantix, sine ulla contentione lividæ invidiæ, cum sancta humilitate, cum pace catholica, cum charitate Christiana.—Aug. de Bapt. c. Donatist. l. 2. c. 3.

gative?" But his lordship adds, "that there is much shifting about this place, but it cannot be wrastled off;" and therefore undertakes punctually to answer all the evasions of Stapleton and Bellarmine, who have taken most pains about it. But before you come to particular answers, you are resolved to make your way through them by a more desperate attempt, which is, to prove "that it cannot be St. Austin's Lab. p. 255. meaning, in this place, that general councils may err in their^{n. 7.} definitions of faith, because then St. Austin must contradict himself, because he delivers the contrary in other places." This is indeed to the purpose, if you go through with your undertaking; but we must examine the places. The first is lib. 1. c. 7. de Baptism. c. Donatist., where you say he expressly teacheth, "that no doubt ought to be made of what is by full decree established in a general council." But here a great doubt may justly be made, whether ever you searched this place or no; for if you had, you would have had little heart to produce it to this purpose: for St. Augustine is there giving an account why he would not insist upon any human authorities, but bring certain evidence out of scripture for what he said; and the reason he gives for it is, because in the former times of the church, before the schism of Donatus brake forth, the bishops and particular councils did differ from each other about the question in hand, viz. rebaptizing heretics, until that by a general council of the whole world that which was most soundly held *etiam remotis dubitationibus firmaretur* was confirmed, the disputes being taken away. The utmost that can be drawn hence is, that when this con- 486 troversy was decided by a general council, the disputes were ended among the catholic bishops; but by what arts can you hence draw that St. Austin thought the council infallible in its definitions? When the business came to be argued in a free council by the dissenting parties, and they more fully understood each other, and agreed upon one sentence, St. Austin says the former doubts were taken off; that is, the reasons and scriptures produced on the other side satisfied them; but he doth not say that no doubt is to be made of what is by full decree established in a general council, but that no doubts were made after it. But if you say there could be no agreement unless the council's definition were

supposed infallible, you speak that which is contrary to the sense and experience of the world, and even of that general council where this decree is supposed by Bellarmine to be made, viz. the council of Nice. For will you say the council was infallible in deciding the time of keeping Easter, because after that council the Asian bishops submitted to the custom of other churches? is there no way imaginable to convince men but by infallibility? If there be, their doubts may be taken away by a general council, and yet that council not be supposed infallible. For if St. Augustine had meant so, nothing had been more pertinent than to have insisted on the decree of that council; and yet he there leaves it, and calls all arguments of that nature *human arguments*, and therefore saith, *ex evangelio profero certa documenta*, “I bring certain evidences out of the gospel:” which words doubtless he would never have so immediately subjoined to his former concerning a general council, if he had judged it infallible, or its decrees as certain as the scripture. In your second place, lib. 7. c. 5, there is nothing hath any shadow of pertinency to your purpose: that which I suppose you may mean is lib. 5. c. 17, where what he said before was decreed by a general council, he after saith was “the judgment of the holy catholic church;” from whence you may indeed infer that the catholic church did approve that decree of the council, but how it proves it infallible I cannot understand. Your last place is one sufficiently known to be far enough from your purpose, Ep. 118. ad Januar., where he saith, “in case of indifferent rites it is insolent madness to oppose the whole church;” but you are an excellent disputant, who can hence infer that therefore general councils are infallible in their definitions in matters of faith. For any thing then you have brought to the contrary, St. Austin is far enough from the least danger of contradicting himself. But if you could prove that he were of your mind, that the definitions of councils are infallible as well as the scriptures, never did any man more expressly contradict himself than St. Augustine must do in a multitude of plain placesⁱ, wherein he saith, That no other writing is infallible but the scripture; that only according to them he judged freely of all

ⁱ Aug. ep. 19. ad Hieronymum De Nat. et Gratia c. 61. c. Faustum, c. Crescon. Grammat. 1. 2. c. 31. 1. 11. c. 5. Epistol. 112.

other writings; and that because he could yield an undoubted assent to none but them. That there is no other writing wherein human infirmities are not discovered but in them; that men are at liberty to believe or not believe any thing besides the scripture. Can any man who says these things be reasonably supposed to assert that the decrees of general councils are as certain as the scripture is? You see then what little advantage you have gained by this attempt of offering to make St. Austin contradict himself, if in this place he should be supposed to assert that general councils may err: which he doth plainly enough to any but those who are resolved not to understand him.

§. 12. This prejudice being therefore removed, we come to the particular evasions of this place; which you thus sum up in order to the defence of them. “That when he saith, for-^{Lab. p. 256.}mer general councils may be amended by the latter, it is only^{n. 7.} to be understood in matters of fact, in precepts pertaining to manners and discipline, or by way of more full and clear explication of what had been delivered by former councils.”

To both these his lordship offers very just exceptions. To 487 the first, that it is to be understood of precepts of manners and discipline, he saith, 1. that Bellarmine contradicts him-^{Conf. p. 201.}self, because he had said before, that general councils cannot^{sect. 33. n. 2.} err in precepts of manners. No, say you, this is no contradiction, because these depend much upon circumstances of time, place, person, &c., which varying, it often so falls out, that what at first was prudently judged fit to be done, becomes afterwards unfitting, and in this case one general council may be amended by another, and yet neither charged with error. But do you suppose the mean while that St. Austin spake pertinently to this business, or no? If he did, he can be understood only of such a precept as that relating to the baptism of heretics. Suppose then one council should decree heretics to be baptized, and another afterwards correct this, and say, they should not, will you say that neither of these were in an error? So that your answer is wholly impertinent to the scope of St. Austin's discourse. And so his lordship saith, this whole answer is concerning precepts of manners: for St. Austin disputes against the error of St. Cyprian followed by the Donatists, which was an error in faith; namely,

Lab. p. 257.
n. 7.

that true baptism could not be given by heretics and such as were out of the church. But you say, "St. Austin doth not confine his discourse to St. Cyprian's case only, but by occasion of his and his council's error, he lays down general doctrine, touching the different authority of the writings of particular bishops, provincial, national and general councils." Although I should grant you this, it will make little for your purpose; for St. Austin's main design is to set the authority of scripture far above all these, and that in point of certainty and infallibility; and this being his main scope, whatsoever he says of any of these, it is certain his purpose is to shew that all of them fall short of the sacred scripture, as to our yielding assent to them. For these in the first place are set by themselves, as only being infallible, and deserving an undoubted assent to all that is contained in them: which being supposed, he proceeds to shew what the extent is of all other authority besides this. For the writings of bishops, saith he, "they are so far from deserving such an assent as we give to the scriptures, that they may be corrected by others, or by national councils; and national councils, by plenary; and plenary may be amended, the former by the latter." In all which gradations two things must be repeated ἀπὸ κοινού as running through the whole discourse, which are, 1. the difference of all these from the scripture in regard of our yielding assent to them; for that is it which he begins with, that we are not in the least to doubt whether any thing contained therein be true or no: and then comes the other in by way of immediate antithesis; but, the writings of bishops, &c.: and although there be a gradation in all these, yet all of them are therein different from scripture, that whatsoever is found there may neither be doubted nor disputed; but the writings of bishops may be doubted or disputed of, because they may be corrected by other bishops or councils. And those national councils may be, because they may be corrected by general; and even these general councils cannot require such an undoubted assent as the scripture doth, because the former may be amended by the latter. So that if you take the scope of St. Austin's discourse in this place, whether he speaks generally or particularly, nothing can be more evident than that he puts this difference between the scriptures and all other

writings or councils, that the one may not at all be doubted or disputed of, but the other may : and the common reason of all is, because none are so infallible but they may be corrected by something besides themselves, which cannot be in any sense said of the scripture. 2. Although St. Austin adds that clause, *si quid in eis forte a veritate deviatum est*, “ if they have erred from the truth,” only where he speaks of the writings of bishops ; yet the series of his discourse implies, that it should be understood in what follows too : that as the writings of bishops may be corrected by councils, if they have erred, so national councils may be corrected by general if they have erred ; and so former general councils by latter on the same supposition still, that they have erred. For as the errors was supposed to be the ground of correction in the former, it must be likewise of amendment here. And whatever is not so perfect but that it may be amended, cannot be supposed infallible ; for if the persons had been infallible who had made those decrees in general councils, they would have prevented any necessity of further amendments by succeeding councils. So that, take *amendment* in what sense you will, either for supplying defects or correcting errors, it is destructive to your pretence, that the decrees of general councils are infallible, and as certain as the scripture. Which is so repugnant to the scope of this speech of St. Austin, as nothing can be more. Your criticism then, from the signification of *emendare* from *menda*, and *menda* from *minus*, and so importing only the taking away any defect, yields you no relief at all : for that defect which is supposed in general councils, which needs that emendation, doth sufficiently argue there was no infallible assistance of the Spirit of God in the decrees of those councils. For where God’s Spirit assists infallibly, it leaves no such defects as are necessary to be amended afterwards, by some other council which can pretend to no higher assistance than the other had before. But your critical judgment is not extraordinary, if you will have the signification of words taken from the conjectural etymologies of them, such as this of Scaliger is in the place where he corrects Varro’s etymologies (at the end of his *Conjectanea*) ; but besides that all attempts of that nature are but conjectural essays, it is but an ill way to judge of the use of a word by the etymology

488

Lab. p. 258.

n. 7.

of it ; for what multitudes of words are carried further in their sense than their originals would bear ! His lordship therefore takes a far surer way to know St. Austin's meaning than running to Martinus for the signification of the word *menda* ; which is, by producing a parallel place in St. Austin^k, where it is taken for *to correct*, and supposes an evident fault ; *Aliud quod præcipere jubemur, aliud quod emendare præcipimur* ; where *emendare* is plainly to amend something amiss, not to supply something defective. So that Stapleton's sense of *amending* by explication of something not fully known, and not by correction of something erroneous, cannot here have place. For, as his lordship well observes, the national council which St. Austin did in this dispute speak most of, was not guilty merely of not fully explaining itself, but of a positive error, viz. that under St. Cyprian, determining that baptism of heretics was no baptism. And therefore when St. Austin speaks of amendment, it is such an amendment as doth suppose error, and not barely defect. And so the words used before of *reprehension* and *yielding*, do both imply more than a bare explanation ; and those which follow after evince it fully, where St. Austin lays down the cautions whereby such amendments should be made, “ without sacrilegious pride, or swelling arrogancy, without contention of envy, and in holy humility, in catholic peace, in Christian charity.” All which words were very needless, if he meant only an explanation of something not fully declared before ; but are very necessary, supposing it to be the amendment of some former error. All the answer you have is, “ That these last words relate not in particular to general councils,” (by no means, although they follow them at the heels,) “ but to the other several subjects, viz. private bishops, provincial and national councils ; which are subject to pride, arrogancy, and contention in their emendations.” But was not St. Austin an unhappy man then at expressing himself, that he must needs set those caveats after he had spoken of general councils, which refer to the particulars that went before, without any reference to the immediate antecedents ? For if they do at all respect the proceedings of general councils, (as doubtless they do, and that most

Lab. p. 258.
n. 7.

489

^k Cont. Faustum, l. 20. c. 21.

immediately, as appears to any one who reads them,) then they imply still, that this amendment of general councils must be done without pride, arrogance, and envy, and with the greatest humility and peace and charity; which it is hard to conceive why St. Austin should add, unless he supposed some errors to be amended in them. Nothing remains further for the clearing this place, but only that his lordship mentions that which he calls “the poorest shift of all in Bellarmine,” Conf. p. 204. sect. 33. n. 6. viz. that he speaks of unlawful councils: and it is a sign it is so indeed, when you have nothing more to say for it, but only that it was given *ex superabundanti*, and with a peradventure. When his lordship concludes, that the pope’s confirmation to make councils infallible is a mere trick, and unknown to the ancient church; you have nothing more to prove it to be grounded on the practice of councils of the church, and of reason, but to refer the reader back to what you have said about the pope’s supremacy; and therefore I must do so too, for an answer to what you have said on that subject.

§. 13. The next thing which belongs to this question is contained in his lordship’s sixth consideration; which is, “If Conf. p. 207. sect. 33. n. 1. the definition of a general council be infallible, then the infallibility of it is either in the conclusion, and in the means that prove it; or in the conclusion, not the means; or in the means, not the conclusion. But it is infallible in none of these. Not in the first: for there are divers deliberations in general councils, where the conclusion is catholic, but the means by which they prove it not infallible. Not in the second; for the conclusion must always follow the nature of the premises or principles out of which it is deduced; therefore if those which the council uses be sometimes uncertain, the conclusion cannot be infallible. Not in the third; for the conclusion cannot but be true and necessary if the means be so.” Your answer is, That it is infallible in the conclusion, Lab. p. 263. n. 2. that is, in the doctrine defined, though it be not infallible in the means, or arguments upon which it proceeded to the definition. And your reason is, because one is necessary for the government of the church, but the other is not; for, *Deus non deficit in necessariis, nec redundat in superfluis*. You mean, it is necessary for you to assert it, whether it hath any foundation in reason or no; for you have not yet proved that the infallibility of general councils is necessary for the church’s

government, and therefore cannot thence infer so great an absurdity as this, that where all the premises are fallible and uncertain, yet the conclusion may be prophetic and infallible. But so involved and obscure are your discourses on this subject, that while you pretend a general council is seeing visions, one might easily believe you were dreaming dreams. For, I pray, speak out, and tell us, what you mean by councils being fallible in the use of means, and yet infallible in the conclusion drawn from those premises, which she was fallible in the deducing the conclusion from. For the deducing the conclusion is in the use of the means; therefore how is it possible that the council should be infallible in the conclusion, when it was fallible in making that conclusion? But it may be I do not yet fully apprehend what you would have, neither, I doubt, do you. For you would fain be infallible in the conclusion too, without so much as truth in the premises. But I shall attempt to make you speak intelligibly; it must be one of these two things you mean, when you say, councils are infallible in the conclusion; either that they are infallible in deducing the conclusion, or in assenting to the conclusion. If infallible in the deducing the conclusion, then it must be infallible in the use of the means; for unless it doth infallibly discern the connexion of the premises, it is impossible it should be infallible in drawing the conclusion from them. So
490 that it is nonsense and a contradiction to say, that a council is infallible in the drawing a conclusion, and not infallible in the use of the means: for it is to say it is infallible and not infallible at the same time, and about the same thing, and in the same manner. For what is drawing a conclusion, but a discerning that truth which results from the connexion of the premises together? for that which is concluded hath all its truth depending upon the evidence of the premises, otherwise it is a simple proposition, and not a conclusion. If you had then said, that the Spirit of God did immediately reveal to the council the truth of what was to be decreed, you had spoken that which might have been understood, though not believed; but this you durst not say, for fear of the charge of enthusiasms and new revelations: but when you say, the council must use means and make syllogisms, as other fallible creatures do, but then it is infallible in the drawing the conclusion from the premises, (though it be fallible in the con-

nexion of those premises,) is an unparalleled piece of profound nonsense. For suppose the matter the council was to determine was the pope's infallibility; in order to the proving this, you say, the council must use all arguments tending to prove it; there comes in Christ's prayer for St. Peter, that his faith should not fail, and that this must be extended to his successors; thence the argument is formed: Whomsoever Christ prayed for, that his faith should not fail, is infallible; but Christ prayed for the pope that his faith should not fail; therefore he is infallible. Now you say, the council is fallible in the use of the means for this conclusion, i. e. it may not infallibly believe the truth of the major or minor proposition, but yet it may infallibly deduce thence the conclusion, though all the strength of the conclusion depends upon the truth of the premises. You must therefore either assert that the decrees of councils are immediately revealed as divine oracles, or else that they are fallible conclusions drawn from fallible premises. And were it not for a little shame, because of your charging others with immediate revelations, I doubt not but you would assert the former; which you must of necessity do, if you will maintain the infallibility of general councils: for if there be any infirmity in the use of the premises, it must of necessity be in the conclusion too. But suppose you mean an infallible assent to the matter of the conclusion, though it be fallibly deduced, you are as far to seek as ever; for whereon must that assent be grounded? it must be either upon the truth of the premises, or something immediately revealed: if on the truth of the premises, the assent can be no stronger than the grounds are on which it is built; if on something revealed, it must needs be still an immediate revelation. But I forget myself all this while, to urge you thus with absurdities consequent from reason; for, in answer to his lordship, you grant, that it is a thing altogether unknown in nature, and art too, that fallible principles can either, as father or mother, beget or bring forth an infallible conclusion; for when his lordship had objected this, you return him this answer, "That this is a false supposition of ^{ab. p. 263.} the bishop, for the conclusion is not so much the child of ^{n. 2.} those premises," (i. e. it is not the conclusion,) "as the fruit of the Holy Ghost directing and guiding the council, to produce an infallible conclusion, whatever the premises be," (true

or false, certain or uncertain, all is a case.) “This is necessary for the peace and unity of the church” (to believe contradictions), “and therefore not to be denied, unless an impossibility be shewed therein.” (I doubt, believing contradictions is accounted no impossibility with you.) “But, I hope, no man will attack God’s omnipotency, and deprive him of the power of doing this.” Is it come to that at last? Whatever you assert that is repugnant to the common reason of mankind, and involves contradictions in it, that you call for
 491 God’s omnipotency to help you in. Thus transubstantiation must be believed, because God is omnipotent; and that men may believe any thing, though not grounded on scripture, and repugnant to reason, because God is omnipotent. We acknowledge God’s omnipotency as much as you, but we dare not put it to such servile uses, to make good any absurd imaginations of our brains. If you had said, it was possible for God to enlighten the minds of the bishops in a general council, either to discern infallibly the truth of the premises, or immediately to reveal the truth of the conclusion, you had spoken intelligible falsehoods. But to say, that God permits them to be fallible in the use of the means, and in drawing the conclusion from them, but to be infallible in the conclusion itself, without any immediate revelation, and then to challenge God’s omnipotency for it; I know not whether it be a greater dishonour to God or reproach to human understanding. And if such incongruities as these are do not discover that you are miserably hampered, as his lordship saith, in this argument, I know not what will.

§. 14. But we must proceed to discover more of them; two things his lordship very rationally objects against Stapleton’s
 Conf.p. 208. assertion, that the council is discursive in the use of the
 sect. 33 n. 3. means, but prophetic in delivering the conclusion. 1. “That since this is not according to principles of nature and reason, there must be some supernatural authority which must deliver this truth, (which,” saith he, “must be the scripture.) For if you fly to immediate revelations, the enthusiasm must be yours. But the scriptures which are brought, in the very exposition of all the primitive church, neither say it, nor enforce it. Therefore scripture warrants not your prophecy in the conclusion. Neither can the tradition. Produce one father who says, this is an universal tradition of the church,

that her definitions in a general council are prophetic, and by immediate revelation: produce any one father that says it of his own authority, that he thinks so." To all this you very gravely say nothing; and we can shrewdly guess at the reason of it. 2. His lordship proves, "That it is a repugnancy to say, that the council is prophetic in the conclusion, and discursive in the use of the means; for no prophet, in that which he delivered from God as infallible truth, was ever discursive at all in the use of the means; nay," saith he, "make it but probable in the ordinary course of prophecy, and I hope you go no higher, nor will I offer at God's absolute power," (but his lordship was deceived in you, for you run to God's omnipotency,) "that that which is discursive in the means can be prophetic in the conclusion, and you shall be my great Apollo for ever." And this he shews is contrary to what your own authors deliver concerning the nature and kinds of prophecy, and that none of them were by discourse. To this you answer, That both Stapleton and you deny that the church is simply prophetic, either in the premises or conclusion, but rather the quite contrary; and that by the definition of the council's being prophetic in an analogical sense, no more is meant but that by virtue of divine assistance and direction, such a conclusion or definition, in regard of precise verity, is as infallibly true and certain as if it were a prophecy. But if you had a mind that we should understand or believe what you say, why do not you come more out of the clouds, and shew us the difference between that which is simply prophetic, and that which is only analogically so, but as infallibly true and certain as the other? But, that you may no longer blind the world with such insignificant discourses, I shall put you upon speaking more distinctly, by inquiring into those ways whereby God may be supposed supernaturally to work upon the minds of men, in order to the discovery of truth. These two ways we may conceive that God may make known truth to the minds of men. 1. By the immediate discovery of something which could not otherwise be known but by immediate revelation: and of this nature were all those future events which were revealed to the prophets, and this I suppose you call *simply prophetic*; so likewise all those doctrines which are of pure revelation, i. e. such as could never have been known unless God had revealed them: of which

Lab. p. 264.
n. 2.

kind there are several in the gospel. 2. God may discover such things to the minds of men, which, though they might otherwise be known, yet not with that degree of certainty as by this immediate assistance of God's Spirit: now this I suppose is that you call *analogically prophetical*, which you assert to differ nothing at all from prophecy, in regard of infallible truth and certainty, being by virtue of divine assistance and direction. And this you say a general council hath, but not the former.

§. 15. Now to convince you of the absurdity of your assertions, I shall shew you these two things: 1. that this cannot be without an immediate revelation; 2. that being so, it cannot be discursive, as you say it is in the use of the means. 1. That this cannot be without an immediate revelation: for which I need nothing but your own assertions, viz. that this is a higher discovery of truth than nature can ever attain to, or ordinary grace; and that it is such as obliges all men to an internal assent to it when it is declared. Now I shall desire you, or any of your party, to tell me, what difference there is between this, and the inspiration which the apostles had in writing the books of scripture. I mean not such as contain prophecies in them, but those which deliver to us the gospel of Christ: as for instance, in St. John's Gospel, he doth not pretend to deliver any thing which was not revealed before, but to give an account of the doctrine and life of Christ. And so that inspiration was not simply prophetical, as in writing the prophecies in the Apocalypse, but analogically so, in that such an assistance of God's Spirit as made what he writ to be as infallibly true and certain as if it were a prophecy; which are your own words concerning the infallibility of councils. Shew us therefore any rational difference between this kind of infallibility, and that inspiration by which the books of scripture are written. If you say, the one was immediate and the other not, you beg the question; for I am proving that what you assert doth necessarily imply, that it is as immediate as that which the apostles had. Nay, I will go yet further, and say, it is as immediate as that which the apostles themselves had in council. For when they said, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," can any thing more possibly be understood, than that the Spirit of God did so far assist their minds that they should not err in their

definitions? And therefore when of late you are grown (forsooth) somewhat jealous of the word *infallibility*, and you give us a grave advertisement at the end of your preface, that you do not mean by it an intrinsical unerring power in all things, in those whom you account infallible, but only that they never have erred nor shall err in definitions of faith; you do not at all advantage yourselves by it. For none of your considerate adversaries do charge you so much with usurping God's incommunicable attribute of infallibility, (which is thereby avoided because you pretend to derive it from him,) but that you challenge the same infallibility which the apostles had. And so must of necessity assert as much of divine enthusiasm and immediate revelation in your church, as any of the apostles themselves had. For whatever they had came by virtue of Christ's promise, and that is all you say for the church's infallibility: but that doth no more take it off from being an immediate revelation in the church, than it did in the apostles. If you say, The church is only secured that it neither hath erred nor can err in definitions of faith, what more had the apostles than this? And if this in them did require an immediate inspiration, certainly it must do so in the church too. But you say, "Neither church nor council do publish immediate revelations, nor create any new articles of faith, but only declare and unfold by their definitions that doctrine, which Christ and his apostles in some manner first delivered." 493

But all this, supposing it true, doth not hinder, but the council's infallibility must imply an immediate revelation on the part of the council, though not of the doctrine decreed by them. For granting the decrees of the council are no new articles of faith, (which is yet contrary to your own principles; for if by the definitions of councils that may be *de fide* which was not before, then the councils do make new articles of faith, though not new doctrines,) i. e. that the matter of them in some manner was before revealed, yet since you say the council in declaring them hath an infallibility equal to prophecy, it must be by immediate inspiration. For, hath the council greater certainty and higher assistance than any ordinary believer hath, or not? if not, it can be no more infallible than an ordinary believer; if it hath, it must be immediate, because it hath a higher degree of certainty than can

Lab. p. 264.
n. 2.

be attained by the use of means. And to say this, as you do expressly, when you assert the council fallible in the use of means, but infallible in the conclusion, is a most palpable contradiction. For it is to assert a certainty beyond and above the use of means, and yet not immediate. But here lies your perpetual mistake, as though nothing could be an immediate revelation but what is a revelation of some doctrine never revealed before : whereas if there be a further explanation of that doctrine in as infallible a manner as the apostles at first revealed it, that explanation is by as immediate a revelation as the first discovery of it. As is clear in the council of the apostles, for I hope you will not deny, but the non-obligation of the ceremonial law was in some manner revealed to them before ; and yet I hope you will not say but the apostles had an immediate revelation as to what they decreed in that council. It is very plain therefore, that when you say, general councils neither have erred nor can err in their definitions, they usurp as great a privilege thereby as ever the apostles had, and in order to it must have as immediate an inspiration. For never was there any such infallibility, either in the prophets or apostles, as did suppose an absolute impossibility of error ; but it was wholly hypothetical in case of divine assistance, which hindered them from any capacity of erring so long as that continued with them, and no longer. For inspiration was no permanent habit, but a transient act in them ; and that being removed, they were liable to errors as well as others ; from whence it follows, that where revelations were most immediate, they did no more than what you assume to your church, viz. preserve them from actual error in declaring God's will. So that nothing can be more evident than that you challenge as great an infallibility and as immediate assistance of God's Spirit in councils as ever the prophets and apostles had. And therefore that divine was in the right of whom Canus speaks¹, who asserted, that since general councils were infallible, their definitions ought to be equalled with the scriptures themselves. And although Canus and others dislike this, it is rather because of the odium which would follow it, than for any just reason they give why it

¹ Canus, l. 5. c. 5.

should not follow. For they not only suppose as great a certainty or infallibility in the decrees of both, but an equal obligation to internal assent in those to whom they are declared. Which doth further prove, that the revelation must be immediate: for if by virtue of those definitions we are obliged to assent to the doctrines contained in them as infallibly true, there must be an immediate divine authority which must command our assent. For nothing short of that can oblige us to believe any thing as of divine revelation; now councils require, that we must believe their definitions to be divine truths, though men were not obliged to believe them to be so before those definitions. For that is your express doctrine, that though the matters decreed in councils were in some manner revealed before, yet not so as to oblige all men with an explicit assent to believe them; but after the definitions of councils they are bound to do it. So that though there be not an object newly revealed, yet there ariseth a new obligation to internal assent; which obligation cannot come but from immediate divine authority. If you say, The obligation comes not simply by virtue of the council's definitions, but by a command extant in scripture, whereby all are bound to give this assent to the decrees of councils; I then say, we must be excused from it, till you have discharged this new obligation upon yourself, by producing some express testimony of scripture to that purpose: which is, I think, sufficient to keep our minds at liberty from this internal assent to the definitions of general councils by virtue of any infallibility in them. And thus having more at large considered the nature of this infallibility which you challenge to general councils, and having shewed that it implies as immediate a revelation as the apostles had, the second thing is sufficiently demonstrated, That this infallibility cannot suppose discursiveness with fallibility in the use of the means, because these two are repugnant to each other.

§. 16. The next thing to be considered is Stapleton's argument why councils must be prophetical in the conclusion; because that which is determined by the church is matter of faith, and not of knowledge, and the assent required else would not be an assent of faith, but an habit of knowledge. To which his lordship answers, That he sees no inconvenience

Conf. p. 210.
sect. 33. n. 4.

in it, if it be granted; for one and the same conclusion may be faith to the believer that cannot prove, and knowledge to the learned that can. Which he further explains thus: "Some supernatural principles which reason cannot demonstrate simply, must be supposed in order to faith; but these principles being owned, reason being thereby enlightened, that may serve to convert or convince philosophers and the great men of reason in the very point of faith where it is at the highest." This he brings down to the business of councils; as to which he saith, that the first immediate fundamental points of faith, as they cannot be proved simply by reason, so neither need they be determined by any council, nor ever were they attempted, they are so plain set down in scripture. If about the sense and true meaning of these, or necessary deduction out of the prime articles of faith, general councils determine any thing, as they have done at Nice and the rest, there is no inconvenience that one and the same canon of the council should be believed as it reflects upon the articles and grounds indemonstrable, and yet known to the learned by the means and proof by which that deduction is vouched and made good. And again, the conclusion of a council, suppose that in Nice about the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father, in itself considered, is indemonstrable by reason; there (saith he) I believe, and assent in faith: but the same conclusion, if you give me the ground of scripture and the Creed, (for somewhat must be supposed in all whether faith or knowledge,) is demonstrable by natural reason against any Arian in the world. So that he concludes, The weaker sort of Christians may assent by faith, where the more learned may build it on reason, the principles of faith being supposed. This is the substance of his lordship's discourse. In answer to which you

Lab. p. 265. tell us, "That the bishop seems to broach a new doctrine,
n. 2. that the assent of faith may be an habit of knowledge. But surely," say you, "divine faith is according to the apostle, Heb. xi, an argument of things which do not appear, viz. by the same means by which we give this assent of faith: otherwise our faith would not be free and meritorious." An answer, I must needs say, hugely suitable to your principles, who are most concerned of all men to set reason at a distance from faith; and so you do sufficiently in this discourse of it. For

it is no easy matter to understand what you mean, but that is not to be wondered at, since you make obscurity so necessary to faith. “Divine faith is,” you say, “an argument of things which do not appear, viz. by the same means by which 495 we give this assent of faith.” Do you mean that the objects of faith do not appear? or that the reason of believing doth not? If only the former, which is all the apostle means, that is nothing to your purpose, for we are not inquiring, whether men may not believe the things which are not seen, but, whether the assent of faith may not be consistent with reason: which I am so far from thinking any strange doctrine, that I cannot see how there can be an assent of faith without reason. And they must be such great meriters at God’s hands as you are, who must think to oblige him with believing what you cannot understand, or see any ground in reason for. For assent, being an act of the mind, cannot be elicited without sufficient reason persuading the mind to it; or else it is so far from being free, and as you (who are so loath to be beholding to God) call it, *meritorious*, that it is brutish and irrational. Not that there are demonstrations to be expected for every thing we believe, but there must be sufficient reason for the mind to build its assent upon, and that reason is evidence, and that evidence destroys that obscurity which you make necessary to faith. Evidence, I say, not of the object, but of the reason and obligation to assent. When you say, that faith, as faith, cannot be knowledge, his lordship grants it; but yet it doth not thence follow, that what may be believed by one may not be known by another: and though Christ (as you add) did not set up a school of knowledge, but of faith; yet he did not set up a school of blind implicit faith, but such a one as consists of a rational and discursive act of the mind. You must not therefore expect that we should believe the definitions of councils because they pretend to be infallible, but you must first convince our reasons that they are so, and then we shall assent to them. But you have very well contrived your business, to have an obscure, implicit faith, for such doctrines which are so far from any evidence of reason.

OF THE USE AND AUTHORITY OF GENERAL COUNCILS.

The denying the infallibility of general councils takes not away their use and authority.—Of the submission due to them by all particular persons.—How far external obedience is required in case they err.—No violent opposition to be made against them.—Rare inconveniences hinder not the effect of a just power.—It cannot rationally be supposed that such general councils as are here meant should often or dangerously err.—The true notion of a general council explained.—The freedom requisite in the proceedings of it.—The rule it must judge by.—Great difference between external obedience and internal assent to the decrees of councils.—This latter unites men in error, not the former.—As great uncertainties supposing general councils infallible as not.—Not so great certainty requisite for submission as faith.—Whether the Romanists' doctrine of the infallibility of councils, or ours, tend more to the church's peace.—St. Austin explained.—The keys, according to him, given to the church.—No unremediable inconvenience, supposing a general council err.—But errors in faith are so, supposing them infallible when they are not.—The church hath power to reverse the decrees of general councils.—The power of councils not by divine institution.—The unreasonableness of making the infallibility of councils depend on the pope's confirmation.—No consent among the Romanists about the subject of infallibility, whether in pope or council.—No evidence from scripture, reason, or antiquity, for the pope's personal infallibility.

§. 1. **T**HE first question being thus dispatched, I now come to the second, which is, Of what use and authority general councils are in the church, supposing them not infallible. And here again two things are to be examined: first, How far general councils are to be submitted to; secondly, Whether our opinion or yours tend more to the peace of the church; for both these his lordship handles distinctly, and so shall we. For the first, nothing is more necessary than throughly to understand his lordship's meaning, which he

Conf.p. 204. most fully delivers in these words: "General councils law-
sect. 33. n. 1. fully called and ordered, and lawfully proceeding, are a great and awful representation, and cannot err in matters of faith, keeping themselves to God's rule, and not attempting to make

a new one of their own, and are with all submission to be observed by every Christian, where scripture or evident demonstration comes not against them." Two things you mainly object against this opinion: 1. That in case such a council err, it tends only to unite men in error; 2. Who shall be judge of all those conditions implied in the council's proceedings? To these two all that I can find material, scattered up and down in your discourse on this subject, may be reduced. For the first, we must consider the occasion of his lordship's entrance into this subject concerning general councils, how far they may err or not; which he saith "is a question of great consequence in the church of God: for to say they cannot err leaves the church not only without remedy against an error once determined, but also without sense that it may need a remedy, and so without care to seek it, which is the misery of the church of Rome at this day; to say they can err seems to expose the members of the church to an uncertainty and wavering in the faith, to make unquiet spirits not only to disrespect former councils of the church, but also to slight and contemn whatsoever they may now determine." So that great inconveniences appearing on both sides, his lordship endeavours to steer his course so as not to dash on the rocks of either side, by betraying the church's faith in asserting their infallibility, or the church's peace by acknowledging them fallible. But as he could not see any reason to believe them infallible, so neither could he see any necessity that the church's peace should be broken, supposing them not to be so. And the most obvious objection being, If a general council be fallible, what is to be done in case it should err? for that he propounds this expedient, "that the determination of a general council erring was to stand in force, and to have external obedience at the least yielded to it, till evidence of scripture, or a demonstration to the contrary, made the error appear, and until thereupon another council of equal authority did reverse it." And he after explains what he means by this external obedience, viz. "that which consists in silence, patience, and forbearance yielded to it;" which he builds on this reason, "that controversies arising in the church must have some end, or they will tear all in sunder: therefore supposing a general council should err, and an erring decree be by the

Conf. p. 186.
sect. 32. n. 1.

Conf. p. 186.
sect. 32. n. 2.

Conf. p. 188.
sect. 32. n. 5.

law itself invalid, I would have it," saith he, "wisely considered again, (supposing the council not to err in fundamental verity,) whether it be not fit to allow a general council that honour and privilege which all other great courts have, namely, that there be a declaration of the invalidity of its decrees, as well as of the laws of other courts, before private men can take liberty to refuse obedience." Therefore he concludes, "that this seems most fit and necessary for the peace of Christendom, unless in case the error be manifest and intolerable, or that the whole church, upon peaceable and just complaint of this error, neglect or refuse to call a council to examine it, and there come in national and provincial councils to reform for themselves." These words contain the full account of his lordship's opinion, which you charge with so many interclashings and inconveniences. The first of which is, "that it tends only to oblige all the members of the church to an unity in error against scripture and demonstration during their whole lives, or rather to the world's end; since such an Utopian rectifying council as the bishop here fancies is morally impossible ever to be had;" and therefore you call it "a strange (not to say an impious) doctrine, advanced without authority of God's word or antiquity, nay, contrary to all solid reason."

Conf. p. 189.
sect. 32. n. 5.

Lab. p. 242.
n. 2.

§. 2. This being a charge of the highest nature, and managed with such unmeasurable confidence, we must somewhat further inquire into the grounds of his lordship's opinion, to see whether it be guilty of these crimes or no. There are three things therefore must be cleared in order to his lordship's vindication: 1. the design of his discourse; 2. the suppositions he makes as to the proceedings of the council; 3. the obligation of its decrees, supposing that it should err.

1. The design of his discourse is to be considered; which is to remedy a supposable inconvenience, and to provide for the church's peace. For the first question in debate was, Whether a general council might err or no; in which his lordship gives sufficient evidence from scripture, antiquity, and reason, that it might. But then here comes an inconvenience to be removed; for his adversary objects, "What are we then nearer to unity after a council hath determined, supposing it may err?" To this his lordship suits his answer; wherein we ought

to consider that the inconvenience objected is, on his lordship's suppositions, one of the *rara contingentia*; and such a one ought not to destroy a principle of government in all other cases useful and necessary: for there cannot possibly be any way thought of for peace and government, but there may be a supposition made of some notable inconvenience; but that not being necessary, nor immediately consequent upon it, but something which may happen, and far more probably may not, it ought not to hinder the obtaining of that which is generally both useful and necessary. To give you a parallel case to this: It is granted on all hands that the civil authority of a nation is fallible, and therefore we may suppose it actually 498 to err, and that so far as to bind men by law to something in itself unlawful. Will you say now that the intent of civil authority is to bind men necessarily to sin? I hope you will not: but by this you may easily see the fallacy of your arguing against his lordship; for it is an inconvenience indeed supposable, but not at all necessary: if he had said indeed that general councils must necessarily err, your argument had been strong against him; but as it is, it hath no more force against his assertion than the supposition before made hath against civil authority. For that case may be easily put, that such a law may pass, but doth this hinder men from their obligation to duty and submission to a just authority? or will you have men presently to renounce obedience, and to repeal such a law themselves, and not rather in all ways of duty and reverence to authority make known their just complaints, and desire a redress by the hands of supreme authority? And this is all which his lordship aims at, that in case a general council should err, (which is not easily imaginable upon his suppositions,) it tends more to the church's peace for private men not to oppose the decrees of it, but to endeavour that another general council be called to repeal it, and till then to preserve the church's peace, supposing the error not manifest or intolerable. In this case then there are two inconveniences put: the one of them is, that when a council is supposed to err, every particular man may be at liberty to oppose the decrees of it, and so put the church into confusion; the other is, that though private men may know it to be an error, yet they should be patient till the church by another council may repeal

it. Now these two inconveniences being laid together, the question is, which is the greater? His lordship, with a great deal of reason, judges the former to be; because in the latter case it is only a silencing of some less necessary truth for some time, but in the other it is an exposing the church to the fury of men's turbulent spirits. But that which shews the unreasonableness of your objection, "that this is the way to bind the church to an union in error," is, that this doth not necessarily follow from his lordship's opinion, but is only a case supposable; and no rare inconvenience ought to prejudice a general good; and the peace of the church, in such a case, ought to be preferred before private men's satisfaction.

§. 3. But this will further appear, if we consider, secondly, the suppositions his lordship makes; for by that we shall see how rarely incident this case is: for I hope the supposing that a general council may err doth not suppose that it must necessarily err; and granting those things which are supposed by him, it is a rare case that it should err. For these things are by him supposed: 1. That it must be a council lawfully called and ordered; and so not such councils as that of Trent was, or any like it, wherein the pope gives only a general summons, and that it must be called a *general council* on that account, how few bishops soever appear in it, nay, though the far greatest part of the Christian world be excluded from it; but it must be such a council as may be acknowledged to be general by the general consent of the Christian world: for that we would make our judge in the case, as it was in the four first general councils. Not that we would stand upon bishops being actually present from every particular church, but that such a number be present from the greatest churches as may make it not be suspected to be merely a faction, packed together for the interest of some potent prelate, but that they do so indifferently meet from all parts, that there may be no just ground of suspicion that they design any thing but the common good of the Christian world. And therefore we acknowledge the first four general councils to be truly such in our present sense; neither do we quarrel at them because
499 so few bishops were present who lived out of the Roman empire; for supposing the church at the same freedom from particular interesses that it was then, and so great a number

of bishops assembled together, we look on it to be so great and awful a representation, that its determinations ought not to be opposed by any factious or turbulent spirits: and in case some bishops be not present from some churches, whether eastern or western, yet if upon the publishing those decrees they be universally accepted, that doth, *ex post facto*, make the council truly œcumenical. By this you see what we mean by a *general council*. And for the calling of it, though we say it should be by the consent of the chief patriarchs, yet the right and custom of the ancient church clearly carries it, that it ought to be summoned by the authority of Christian princes; for nothing can be more evident to such who will not shut their eyes against the clearest evidence, than that the first general councils (before the pope had got the better of the emperors) were summoned by the emperor's command and authority; and since the division of the empire into so many kingdoms and principalities, the consent of Christian princes is necessary on the same grounds. Neither ought it only to be a general council, and lawfully called, but lawfully ordered too, viz. that no prelate challenge himself such a presidency, not in but over the council, that his instructions must be looked on as the only chart they must steer their course by; and that nothing be debated but *proponentibus legatis*, as it was at Trent; for these things take away utterly that freedom which is necessary for a general council. And therefore his lordship justly requires, 2. That the council do proceed lawfully; which it cannot do if it be overawed, as the second Ephesine was by Dioscorus and his party, or if practices be used, as at Ariminum; but there must be the greatest freedom in debates, no canvassing for votes, but every one suffered to deliver his judgment without prejudice or partiality; that those who give their judgments deliver their reasons before, and not only appear *in pontificalibus* to give their *placet*; that the bishops present be men of unquestionable abilities, and generally presumed to be well acquainted with the matters to be debated there: for otherwise nothing would be more easy than for the more subtle men, under ambiguous expressions and fair pretences, to bring over a great number of the rest to them, who want either judgment or learning enough to discern their designs. And this is supposed to be the case of

the council at Ariminum, where the occidental bishops, for want of learning, were overreached by the subtilty of the Arian party. 3. His lordship supposes that this council keeps itself to God's rule, and not attempt to make a new one of their own; for in so doing they commit an error in the first concoction, which will be incorrigible afterwards. And this is not only reasonable, but just and necessary, because nothing can be a rule of faith but what is of immediate divine revelation; and this hath been the practice of the first general councils, which never owned or proceeded by any other rule of faith but this. These things being supposed, may we not justly say, that an erring determination of such a council, so proceeding, is a rare case? Since we believe that God will not deny to any particular person (who doth sincerely seek it) the knowledge of his truth, much less may we think he will do it to such an awful representation of the church, when assembled together purposely for finding out that truth, which may be of so great consequence to the Christian world: for both the truth of God's promises, the goodness of God to his people, and his peculiar care of his church, seem highly concerned that such a council should not be guilty of any notorious error.

§. 4. But because we deny not but such a council is fallible, therefore we grant the case may be put, that such a council may err; and the question is, what is to be done then? whether every particular person may oppose such a determination, or submit till another council reverse the decrees of it? His lordship asserts the latter; and so we come to the effect of such an erring decree, which was the third thing to be spoken to. As to which, these things must be considered: 1. That he doth not assert that men are bound to believe the truth of that decree, but not openly to oppose it: for so he speaks expressly of "external obedience," and, at least so far as it "consists in silence, patience and forbearance yielded to it." And therefore you are greatly deceived, when with such confidence you assert "that this obliges all the members of the church to unity in error;" for that is only consequent upon your principle, that the decrees of general councils are to be believed by an internal assent; for this indeed would necessarily oblige them to unity in error: but the most that is

consequent on his lordship's opinion is, that in such cases wherein a general council hath erred, men ought rather to be silent for a time as to some truth than to break the church's peace. In the mean time he doth not deny but that men may be bound to follow their own judgments in the discovery of truth; nay, and they may use all means consistent with the church's peace to promote that truth; for he allows that just complaints may be made to the church for reversing the decrees of the former council, and this cannot be without discovering the error of that council. And I hope this liberty of dissent and just complaint is sufficient to keep all the members of the church from being united in error. And I pray, sir, what cause is there now for such hideous outcries, that this is such "a strange and impious doctrine, against scripture, antiquity, and solid reason," which appears, for all that I can see, very just and reasonable, taking it in the way which he explains himself in? But whereas you object, "that this will keep men in error to the world's end, because such a council is morally impossible," it is easy to shew you, that if the rectifying council be impossible, the general erring council is equally impossible; therefore there is no danger coming that way neither. And that such general councils are grown such morally impossible things, we may in a great measure thank your church for it, which hates as much such a *true rectifying council* (as you call it) as the court of Rome does a thorough reformation: for all your design is to persuade men that those only are general councils which have the pope's summons, and wherein he rules, and, in effect, does all: and to persuade men to believe the decrees of such councils, is the most effectual way in the world to "unite men in the belief of errors to the world's end;" for as long as the pope's interest can carry it, to be sure, all rectifying councils shall be (as you say) *Utopian* too; for he will prevent, if possible, their ever appearing in Europe. Therefore all this discourse of his lordship doth suppose such a state of the church as that was in the time of the Nicene councils, and after, when there might be a liberty of calling such councils, that in case one errs another might be summoned to reverse it. But this is not to be expected *in fœce Romuli*, in this state of the Christian world, that there should be such a general council so called and so

proceeding as he supposes; and therefore there is no such danger of being united in error by virtue of its decrees: but if the state of things would bear such a council so decreeing, we might as well think it would bear another to reverse it, if need were, and then his lordship's supposition would come to act, that in the interstice of those councils private men ought not to oppose the decrees of the former, but patiently wait till the latter reverse them. But, as things are now in the Christian world, his lordship doth not suppose that any council hath such a power to oblige because it calls itself *a general council*; but a truly general council being, as you say, morally impossible, nothing is left but that the church reform itself by parts, and wait to give an account of its proceedings therein
 501 till such a general council as we before described be assembled in the Christian world. Thus we see how vain and empty your first objection is, "that from his lordship's opinion, it would follow that the church must be united in error," which is only the direct consequent of your own assertion, that men are bound to believe the decrees of those you call *general councils* to be infallible.

§. 5. Your next great objection is, "That this doctrine exposes all to uncertainties; for who shall be judge whether it be a lawful council, and proceeds lawfully? whether the errors be fundamental and intolerable or no? whether there be scripture and demonstration against them or no? For if every man be judge, there can be no such submission to any general council." This is the force of the many words which, Lab. p. 242, in several places, you spend upon this subject, and therefore I
 &c. 260, &c. shall consider them together. I answer, therefore, 1. In general, if this be so intolerable an inconvenience, it is unavoidable upon your own principles; and therefore it is unreasonable to object that to another which you cannot quit yourself of: for you say that the infallibility of general councils confirmed by the pope, is the best way to end controversies; but there is not one term in the main proposition but is liable to the same uncertainty which you here object to his lordship: for, 1. you do not say that all councils are infallible, but only general councils; who then shall be judge whether the council you would have me believe be general or no? You "do not say that all must be there to make a general council, but the

pope's general summons is sufficient ;" but who must be judge whether that be sufficient or no ! You say so, but I see no reason for it. Must you be my judge, or I my own ? If I may be my own judge, so must every one else, and so every man is left to believe what councils to be general he please himself.

2. You say general councils are infallible : who must be judge of that too ? must the council be infallibly believed in it ? But that is the thing in question. Must the pope be judge ? " But no man," you say, " is bound to believe him infallible without the council." Must the scripture be judge ? but who must judge what the sense of the scripture is ?

3. Who must be judge in what sense and how far the council is infallible ? who must judge how the council comes to be infallible in the conclusion, that was fallible in the use of the means ? And when any controversy arises concerning the meaning of the decrees of the council, who must be judge which is the infallible sense of them ? for there is but one sense infallible, though the words may bear many, and unless I know which is the infallible sense, I am not bound to yield my assent to it. But who must decide this ? The council cannot ; for that leaves no exposition with the decrees. The pope cannot ; for he is not infallible without the council. So that still it falls to every man's private reason to judge of it.

4. Who must be judge that the pope's confirmation is necessary to make the decrees infallible ? Not the council without the pope, nor the pope without the council ; for you say we are not bound to believe them infallible but as they are together : and together they cannot ; for that is the question, Why not a council without the pope's confirmation as well as with it ? and when did pope and council determine that no council without the pope is infallible ? but the contrary hath been determined by a council, viz. that a council is above the pope, and consequently needs not his confirmation. So that for all your pretending to end controversies, you leave men at as great uncertainties as any whatsoever ; being not able to resolve some of the most necessary questions, in order to the church's peace, according to your own principles.

§. 6. 2. I answer more particularly, that his lordship's opinion doth not expose near to so great uncertainties as yours doth ; upon this reason, because you requiring an in-

ternal assent to the decrees of councils, and infallible certainty in all that men believe, must of necessity leave men in the greatest perplexities, where you cannot give them that kind
502 of certainty on which they may build their faith: but his lordship only requiring external obedience to the decrees of councils, a far less degree of certainty will be sufficient; that is, such a kind of moral certainty as things of that nature are capable of. You ask then, Who shall be judge whether a council were lawfully called, and did lawfully proceed or no? I answer, let every man be judge according to the general sense and reason of mankind. If there were sufficient authority for calling them together, according to the known practice of the church; if there was no plain ground of suspicion of any practices by the power of any particular prelate, no complaints made of it, either in or after the council; if there be no plain evidence that it takes any other rules for its decrees but the scripture; then we say, they are bound to yield external obedience to them, supposing the council generally received in the Christian world for a lawful and general council. If you ask again, How should it be known when errors are manifest and intolerable, and when not? we here appeal to scripture, interpreted by the concurrent sense of the primitive church, the common reason of mankind, (supposing the scripture to be the rule of faith,) the consent of wise and learned men; which certainly will prevent the exorbitances and capricious humours of any fantastical spirits, which may cry out that the most received truths, ever since Christianity was in the world, are intolerable errors. If you are resolved yet further to ask, Who shall be judge what a necessary reason or demonstration is? his lordship tells you, I think plain enough, from Hooker, what is understood by it, viz. "such as being proposed to any man, and understood, the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent to it." And do you require any other judge but a man's own reason in this case? But, you say, "others call their arguments *demonstrations*;" but let them submit to this way of trial, and they may soon be convinced that they are not. Still you say, "they will not be convinced, but will break the peace of the church, supposing they have sufficient evidence for what they say." But if men will be unreasonable, who can help it? can you, with telling

them councils are infallible? I doubt you would hear of more arguments than you could well satisfy against that presently. We appeal then to the common reason of mankind, whether it be not a far more probable way to end controversies, to persuade men in disputable matters to yield external obedience to the decrees of a lawful general council, than to tell them they are bound to believe whatever they decree to be infallibly true? And therefore you are very much mistaken when you say, "his lordship declines the main question," which Lab. p. 262. is, "of the necessity of submitting to a living judge, or a ^{n. 1.} definitive sentence, in case two parties, equal for learning and integrity, both pretend to equal evidence for what they say:" for his lordship doth not deny but that in such a case the submitting to a definitive sentence may be a reasonable way to end the controversy; but then the difference between you lies in two things: 1. that you would bind men to internal assent to the decrees of a council, as being infallible; but his lordship saith, they bind to external obedience, as being the supremest judicatory can be expected in the church. 2. You pretend that councils called and confirmed by the pope are thus infallible, and our supreme judge in matters of faith: his lordship justly denies that, and says that a free general council, observing the same conditions which the first did, is the only equal and indifferent judge. So that the question is not so much whether there shall be a living judge, as who shall be he, and how far the definitive sentence binds, and what is to be done in case there cannot be a free and indifferent judge; for in this case we say every church is bound to regard her own purity and peace, and, in case of corruptions, to proceed to a reformation of them.

§. 6. We now come to the remaining inquiry, which is, whether your doctrine or ours tends more to the church's peace? For clearing of this, his lordship premises these things 503 by way of considerations: 1. "That there is no necessity of Conf. p. 212. any such infallibility in the church as was in the apostles." sect. 33. n. 2. 2. "That what infallibility or authority belongs to the church Conf. p. 213. doth primarily reside in the whole body of the church, and sect. 33. n. 3. not in a general council." 3. "That in case a general council Conf. p. 214. err, the whole church hath full authority to represent herself sect. 33. n. 4. in another council, and so to redress what was amiss either

practised or concluded." And so upon these principles his lordship saith, "here is a sufficient remedy for what is amiss, and yet no infringing any lawful authority in the church;" and yet he grants, as the church of England doth, that a general council may err. But he saith, "it doth not follow, because the church may err, therefore she may not govern; for the church hath not only a pastoral power, to teach and direct, but a prætorian also, to control and censure too, where errors or crimes are against points fundamental, or of great consequence." Thus he represents the advantages which follow upon his opinion; after which he comes to the disadvantages of yours. But we must first consider what you have to object against what his lordship hath here delivered. To the first you say nothing but that Stapleton and Bellarmine attribute more infallibility to the church than his lordship doth, which is an excellent way to prove the necessity of it, if you had first proved those two authors infallible. To the second your answer is more large; for his lordship, to confirm what he said, that the power and authority given by Christ lies in the whole church, produces that saying of St. Austin^a, "That St. Peter did not receive the keys of the church but as sustaining the person of the church;" from whence he proves against Stapleton, "That it is not to be understood finally only for the good of the church, but that the primary and formal right is in the church; for he that receives a thing in the person of another, receives it indeed to his good and use, but in his right too." To this you answer from Bellarmine^b, "That there is a twofold representing or bearing the person of another; the one parabolical, and by way of mere figure and supposition only, as Agar represented the people of the Jews under bondage of the law, &c.; the other historical and real, viz. when the person representing has right or relation *a parte rei*, in and towards the thing represented, by virtue whereof it bears the person of the thing represented. Now St. Peter," say you, "sustained the person of the church in this latter sense, really and historically, and not parabolically and in figure, i. e. he received the keys as head of the church, though that reception were ordained for the good of the whole

Conf. p. 215.
sect. 33. n. 4.

Lab. p. 266.
n. 3.

^a Aug. de Agone Christiano, c. 30.

^b De Pontif. l. 1. c. 12.

church." But, sir, our inquiry is not how many ways one may imagine a representation to be made, but what kind of representation that is which is suitable to St. Austin's meaning. That there may be an allegorical representation, nobody denies; but I cannot imagine how it can belong to this place, or who ever meant that St. Peter stood here for an allegory of the church; and therefore the members of your distinction are not apposite. For those who assert that St. Peter did sustain the person of the church in his lordship's sense, do yet acknowledge that he did it *historicè*, and not *parabolicè*, as you speak, i. e. the donation was really made to him; but then the question is, in what right or capacity it was made to him, whether in his personal or representative capacity; for these are the two only proper members of a distinction here. St. Austin saith, not only in that place, but in very many others^c, that St. Peter did sustain the person of the church when Christ said to him, "I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Now the question is, in what sense he sustained the person of the church? You say, in his own right, as head of the church; we say, as a public person representing the church, not parabolically (for that is no sustaining the person at all), but really and historically. And that St. Austin means as a public person, appears by the other expressions in the places cited, that he did *universam significare ecclesiam*, "signify the whole church;" and that those things which are 504 spoken of Peter, *Non habent illustrem intellectum nisi cum referuntur ad Ecclesiam cujus ille agnoscitur in figura gestasse personam*, "have no clear sense but when they are referred to the church, whose person he did bear." Can you say this of a king who receives the keys of a town, whereof he takes possession for himself, though it be for the good of the kingdom, that he signifies the whole kingdom in it, and that it cannot have any clear sense but when it is applied to the kingdom which he represents? No, this cannot be; for the king takes possession in his own full right; and it is not the possession, but the administration, which is referred properly to the good of the kingdom. But this might be properly said of a duke of Venice, that he takes possession of a town in the person of

^c Aug. in Psal. 108. in Johan. tr. 124. Serm. 30. de divers. Retract. l. 1. c. 21.

the state, and that the proper sense is, that the state took possession, and he only representing it; so that the full right lies in the body of the state, but he as chief member represents the whole. And this is that which St. Austin means, when he saith that St. Peter represented the church *propter primatum*, “for the primacy” which he had amongst the apostles, i. e. such a primacy of order, whereby he was fittest to represent the whole church. For it is impossible to conceive that he should mean that St. Peter should receive this as head of the church, when you acknowledge that he was not head of the church till after the keys were given him: for you say the performance of Christ’s promise, in making him head of the church, was not till after his resurrection; but will you say the church had no power of the keys till then, and then only finally too, and not formally? What became then of the power of the keys at St. Peter’s death, if only formally in him, and not in the church? what becomes of them at the death of every pope? Will you say, as Bellarmine doth, that Christ takes them, and gives them to his successor? but he must be sure to wait till the cardinals agree to whom he must give them. Nothing then could be further from St. Austin’s meaning, than that St. Peter received the keys as head of the church, and so that he represented the church only finally; whereas his expressions carry it, that he means the formal right of them was conveyed to the church, and that St. Peter was only a public person to receive them in the name of the church. But whatever St. Austin’s meaning was, the strength of his lordship’s assertion doth not stand or fall with that; for there are arguments sufficient besides to prove that the authority for governing the church was not committed formally to St. Peter, much less to any pretended successor, but that it primarily and formally resides in the whole body of the church. And were that the thing to be here disputed, you must not think to take it for granted, that if the keys were given personally to St. Peter, by them was meant the supreme authority of governing the church exclusively of the other apostles.

Lab. p. 267. §. 7. To the third consideration you answer, “That in case
n. 4. a general council err, there can be no redress for error in faith; for if one council may err, so may another, and a third,

and a fourth," &c. This indeed is very suitable to your doctrine from the beginning, that a man can be certain of nothing but what it is impossible should be otherwise. I hope you are certain yourself you do not err; but I suppose you do not think it impossible you should: so, although we do not think it impossible a council should err, yet we may be certain it doth not; and supposing it should, we do not say it is impossible that a council should not err so that another council may correct the error of the former. And doubtless men may be certain of it too, if, as his lordship saith, plain scripture and evident demonstration be brought against the former error. But these are strange doctrines, that because a council may err, therefore a council can never afford remedy against inconveniences: for one great inconvenience is, the breaking the church's peace; that is remedied by the council's au- 505
thority: another is, error in faith; that may be remedied by another council. No, say you, for that may err too. But doth it follow that it must err? or is it probable that it should err, if the former error be so discovered, and the council so proceed as his lordship supposes? For your other difficulty, Lab. p. 268.
about the calling another general council, I have answered it^{n. 4.} already, when I shewed what we meant by a *general council*, and when it was lawfully called. When you after add, "that the church never represented herself in another council but where the former council was unlawful," and instance in the councils of Ariminum and Ephesus, you say the same which his lordship doth; for these councils were therefore accounted unlawful because erroneous and factious; and he never asserts the necessity of calling a new council but in those two cases. But if you would have us account none such but whom you do, you must excuse us till we see greater reason for it than we do yet; and so likewise for what follows, "that the councils which rectified the errors of those were called by the pope's authority, as that of Trent and others were," which, to speak mildly, is a gross untruth.

You urge, from his lordship's granting "that the church hath a prætorian power to control and censure too, where errors or crimes are against points fundamental or of great consequence," that therefore he and all protestants are justly censured by the Roman church for opposing those doctrines

which are with her fundamental and of great consequence. But still there is no difference with you between the Roman church and the catholic, between papal councils and free and general, between what she judges fundamental, and what all are bound to judge so. If you prove then that we are bound to rely only on the judgment of your church, your consequence is good, but otherwise it is tied with a rope of sand, and therefore we do not fear the lashes of it. And the same fault

Lab. p. 269.
n. 4.

runs through your subsequent discourse, in which you suppose the church infallible in all she propounds, which you know is constantly denied, and hath been at large disproved in our first part. For the ground of your resolution of faith being removed, I see the fabric of your church falls down with it; for take but away your pretence of infallibility, and your confounding the *catholic* and *Roman* church, all the rest moulders, as not being able to stand without them. But that is still your way, if any thing be said of the catholic church, we must presently understand it of yours; so that it cannot be said in any sense that the church is "without spot or wrinkle," but by you it must be understood presently of the "doctrine of the Roman catholic church universally received as a matter of faith:" but till you prove not only your two former assertions, but that St. Austin understood those words ever in that sense, your vindication of that place in him concerning it will appear utterly impertinent to your purpose. And his lordship's assertion may still stand good, "that the church on earth is not any freer from wrinkles in doctrine and discipline than she is from spots in life and conversation."

Ibid.

§ 8. Having thus vindicated his lordship's way from the objections you raised against it, we must now consider how well you vindicate your own from the unreasonableness he charges it with in several particulars. 1. "That if we suppose a general council infallible, and it prove not so, but that an error in faith be concluded, the same erring opinion, which makes it think itself infallible, makes the error of it irrevocable, and so leaves the church without remedy." To this you answer, "Grant false antecedents and false premises enough, and what absurdities will not be consequent, and fill up the conclusion?" But you clearly mistake the present business; which is not whether councils be infallible or no, but

Conf. p. 217.
sect. 33. n. 5.

Lab. p. 269.
n. 4.

whether opinion be liable to greater inconveniences, that which asserts that they may, or that they cannot err? Will you have your supposition of the infallibility of councils taken for a 506 first principle, or a thing as true as the scriptures? So you would seem indeed, by the supposing the scriptures not to be God's word, which you subjoin as the parallel to the suppos- Lab. p. 270. ing general councils fallible. But will you say the one is as ^{n. 4.} evident, and built on as good reason, and as much agreed on among Christians, as the other is? I suppose you will not; and therefore it was very absurd and unreasonable to say, "Supposing the word of God were not so, errors would be irrevocable, as if general councils were supposed infallible and proved not so." But this is a question you grant to be disputable among Christians, and will you not give us leave to make a supposition that it may prove not so? You must consider, we are now inquiring into the conveniences of these two opinions, and in that case it is necessary to make such suppositions: and let any reasonable man judge what opinion can be more pernicious to the church than yours is, supposing it not to be true; for then it will be necessary for men to assent to the grossest errors as the most divine and infallible truths, and there can be no remedy imagined for the redress of them. If then the inconvenience of admitting it be so great, men had need look well to the grounds on which it is built. And I cannot see any reason men can have to admit any infallible proponent in matters of faith to the church but on as great and as clear evidence as the prophets and apostles had that they were sent from God: for the danger may be as great to believe that to be infallible which is not, as not to believe that to be infallible which is; for the believing an error to be a divine truth may be as dangerous to the souls of men as the not believing something which is really revealed by God. But to be sure, those who see no reason to believe a general council to be infallible cannot be obliged to assent to errors propounded by it; but such who believe it infallible must, whatever the errors be, swallow them down without questioning the truth of them. And it argues how conscious you are of the falseness of your principles, that you are so loath to have them examined, or so much as a supposition made that they should not prove true; whereas truth always

invites men to the most accurate search into it. We see the apostles bid men search whether the things they spake were true or no; and those are most commended who did it most; and I hope men were as much bound to believe them infallible as general councils. But we see how unreasonable you are, you would obtrude such things upon men's faith which must lead them into unavoidable errors if false, and yet not allow men the liberty of examination whether they be true or no. But such proceedings are so far from advancing your cause, that nothing can more prejudice it among rational and inquisitive men.

Conf.p.217.
sect.33. n.5. His lordship, for the clearing this, proceeds to an instance of an error defined by one of your general councils, viz. communion in one kind; but that we shall reserve the discussion of to the ensuing chapter, which is purposely allotted for the discovery of those errors which have been defined by such as you call *general councils*. Therefore I proceed.

Conf.p.219.
sect.33. n.6. §. 9. 2. His lordship saith, "Your opinion is yet more unreasonable, because no body collective, whensoever it assembled itself, did ever give more power to the representing body of it, than a binding power upon itself and all particulars; nor ever did it give this power otherwise than with this reservation in nature, that it would call again, and reform, and, if need were, abrogate any law or ordinance upon just cause made evident that the representing body had failed in trust or truth. And this power no body collective, ecclesiastical or civil, can put out of itself, or give away to a parliament or council, or call it what you will, that represents it." To this

Lab. p.272.
n. 6. again you answer, "This is only to suppose and take for granted, that a general council hath no authority, but what is merely delegate from the church universal which it repre-

507 sents." I grant, this is supposed in it, and this is all which the nature of a representative body doth imply; if you say, there is more than that, you are bound to prove it. Yes, say you, "we maintain its authority to be of divine institution, and, when lawfully assembled, to act by divine right, and not merely by deputation and consent of the church." But if all the proof you have for it be only that which you refer us to in the precedent chapter, the palpable weakness of it for any such purpose hath been there fully laid open. His lordship

saith, "That the power which a council hath to order, settle, and define differences arising concerning faith, it hath not by any immediate institution from Christ, but it was prudently taken up by the church from the apostles' example. So that to hold councils to this end, is apparent apostolical tradition written: but the power which councils have is from the whole catholic church, whose members they are, and the church's power from God." You say, "True it is, the calling such assemblies was taken up, and hath for its pattern the example of the apostles, Acts xv; yet surely there is little doubt to be made, but the apostles had both direction and precept too for doing it so often as just occasion required, from Christ himself." The whole force of which answer lies in those well placed words, "surely there is little doubt to be made;" for as to any thing of reason, you never offer at it. Just such another of Bellarmine's *sine dubios* comes after; "Though a general council be the church representative, and do not meet or assemble together *hic et nunc*, but by order and deputation from man; yet it follows not but the power and authority by which they act when they are met may be from God, as doubtless it is." Can any man have the face to question, whether the authority of general councils be of divine institution or no, when you say, Yes, surely, there is no doubt to be made of it, doubtless it is? We do not question, as you would seem to imply afterwards, whether the people or the pastors have right to send to general councils, but what ground you have to assert, that general councils are an immediate divine institution. But I must needs say, I never saw any thing affirmed oftener, and offered to be proved less, than that is here: and yet as though you had done it invincibly, you triumphantly proceed: "General councils, then, are a principal and necessary part of that ecclesiastical hierarchy which Christ instituted for the government of his church, and not an human expedient only, taken up by the church herself merely upon prudential considerations, as the bishop will needs conceive." It strangely puzzles me to find out any thing that particle *then* relates to; and after all my search can find nothing but *surely, without doubt, and doubtless*. I pray, sir, think not so meanly of us, that we should take these for arguments or demonstrations: deal fairly with us, and if we

Conf. p. 219.
sect. 33. n. 6.Lab. p. 273.
n. 6.

fall by the force of reason, we yield ourselves up to you. But you are very much deceived if you think these things are taken for proofs with us: we can easily discern the weakness of your cause through the most confident affirmations. If you had brought any law of Christ, appointing that general councils should be in the church, any apostolical precept, prescribing or giving directions concerning them, you had done something; but, not so much as to offer at a proof, and yet conclude it as confidently as if it were impossible to resist the force of your demonstrations, is an evidence, that either you know your cause to be weak, or suppose us to be so. Much such another discourse is that which follows, wherein you pretend to give a reason, why what is defined by one council in point of doctrine cannot be reversed by another. Which is, "Because the true Christian faith is *ex natura rei* unchangeable, that it admits not of yea and nay, but only yea; that it is always the same, that it must stand without alteration for ever, nay that it is to be invariable and admit no change." All these expressions we have in one paragraph, and, for all that I see, are the greatest strength of it. But what is it you mean by all this? Do you think we could not understand what you meant by the unchangeableness of Christian faith, without so many diversified expressions of it? And what follows now from all this? that one council cannot repeal the decrees of another? How so? was not the faith of Christ as unchangeable in the time of the Arian councils as it is now? and yet then one council repealed the decrees of others in point of doctrine; and yet by that nothing was derogated from the institution or honour of Christ, by such a reversing those decrees. Though the faith, i. e. the doctrine of Christ, be always the same, doth it thence follow, then men shall always believe all this unalterable doctrine? If so, how came Arianism to overspread the church? how came six hundred bishops at the council of Ariminum to be deceived in a doctrine of faith, by your own confession? It is therefore a profound mistake, to infer from the fallibility of general councils the alteration of the faith of Christ. The faith of Christ is founded on a surer bottom than the decrees of councils, though all men are liars God is true, and Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. But of this more afterwards.

Lab. p. 273.
n. 6.

508

§. 10. You would seem to argue more pertinently in the following pages against his lordship's opinion: for you say, "He says and unsays the same; and what he seems to attribute to general councils in one proposition, he takes away in another." That which his lordship says is, "That the definitions of a general council are binding to all particulars and itself; but yet so, that they cannot bind the whole church from calling again, and in the after-calls upon just cause to order, and, if need be, to abrogate former acts." And after adds, "And because the whole church can meet no other way, the council shall remain the supreme, external, living, temporary, ecclesiastical judge of all controversies. Only the whole church, and she alone, hath power when scripture or demonstration is found, and peaceably tendered to her, to represent herself again in a new council, and in it to order what was amiss." Now we must consider what we find contradictory and repugnant to themselves in these words. Three things, if I mistake not, the main of this charge may be reduced to:

1. That men should be bound to that which scripture and demonstration be against; but this is very easily answered, for his lordship doth not say, men are bound to believe it, but not so to oppose it as to break the peace of the church by it.
2. That another council cannot be called without opposition to the other: this his lordship prevented, by supposing that the just reasons against the decrees of the former council ought to be peaceably tendered to the church, but no boisterous opposition to be made against it.
3. To what purpose should another council be called, if the whole church be satisfied that there is scripture and demonstration against the decrees of the former? But, 1. his lordship supposes there may scripture and demonstration be, where the whole church is not satisfied; and therefore there may be necessity of calling another council.
2. That the council may free all those who may suppose themselves still bound not to oppose the former error.
3. That no erroneous decree of a council may remain unrepealed in the church: that so no erroneous person may challenge such a decree of a council as a ground for his opposition to the doctrine of the church. And where now lies any such appearance of contradiction in his lordship's words?

§. 11. 3. The last thing his lordship chargeth your way with unreasonableness in is, "That you do not only make the definition of a general council, but the sentence of the pope, infallible; nay, more infallible than it. For any general council may err with you, if the pope confirm it not. So belike this infallibility rests not in the representative body, the council, nor in the whole body, the church, but in your head of the church, the pope of Rome. And if this be so, to what end such a trouble for a general council? or, wherein are we nearer to unity, if the pope confirm it not?" To this you answer, 1. "That a general council is not held by you to be infallible at all, unless it involve the pope or his confirmation; and so there is but one infallibility, viz. of the pope presiding in and confirming of the votes of a general council. 2. You confess there are two different opinions among you; the first and more common is, that the pope, even without a general council, is infallible in his definitions of faith, when he teaches the whole church; the second is, that he is not infallible in his definitions, save only where he defines in and with a general council. Now the bishop," you say, "takes no notice of the second opinion, but only of the first, as though that were the opinion of all catholic doctors. But, for your part, you will not meddle much with any matters of private opinion or dispute, and therefore you will briefly pass over what his lordship saith further, and only correct some mistakes of his." But whereas you pretend it only necessary to believe, that pope and council together are infallible, for this all catholics are agreed in; but whether the pope be infallible without a council or no, you leave it as matter of dispute; I shall manifest how great a cheat you put upon the world by this assertion, in these two things: 1. That there is no such agreement among yourselves in this common principle as you pretend. 2. That from the making the pope's confirmation necessary to the infallibility of the council, you must make the pope infallible without a council. 1. Whereas you pretend such a consent among all catholics in this common principle, That pope and council are infallible together, it is evident that there is no such thing. For, 1. some among you have asserted, that the representative body of the church is not at

Conf. p. 220.
sect. 33. n. 7.

Lab. p. 276.
n. 6.

509

all the subject of infallibility, but the diffusive. For Occham contends at large^d, that the privilege of infallibility belongs only to the whole militant church; and neither to the pope, nor general council, nor body of the clergy. And so likewise doth Petrus de Alliaco^e, Cusanus^f, Antoninus of Florence^g, Panormitan^h, Nicolaus de Clemangisⁱ, Franciscus Mirandula^k, and others, whose words you may find at large in some of your writers, and therefore I forbear repeating them. 2. Some assert, that councils are no further infallible than they adhere to universal tradition; and you cannot be ignorant who they are at this day among you who assert this doctrine. 3. Some further say, that councils are in themselves infallible, and therefore must be so, whether the pope confirm them or no. And this opinion, however now you say, it be not so common as the other, yet it is certain that before the council of Lateran under Leo X. it was much the more common opinion, as appears by the councils of Constance and Basil. And that there is an irreconcilable difference between the authors of this opinion and those who make the pope's confirmation necessary to the infallibility of a general council, I shall prove out of Bellarmine himself, from the state of the question, and the arguments he urges against it. Bellarmine tells us^l, the first occasion of this controversy was about the deposition of popes, viz. whether the pope might against his consent be judged, condemned, and deposed by the council: and therefore, saith he, they are mistaken who think the question is, whether the council with the pope be greater than the pope without a council? for it cannot be conceived he should give consent to his own deposition. And this he proves from the council at Basil, who defined their council to be above the pope, at that time, when neither the pope nor his legates were present. And this council of Basil, in their synodal epistle, declare a general council, as representing the universal church, to be infallible, when at the same time they assert, that popes

^d Occham, Dialog. p. 1. l. 5. cap. 25, 29, 31.

^e Cameracensis Quæst. Vesp. art. 3. ad liter. O. et P.

^f Cusan. Concord. Cathol. l. 2. c. 3.

^g Antonin. Summ. Summarum, p. 3. tit. 23. c. 2. sect. 6.

^h Panormitan. Decret. p. 1. l. 1. tit. de elect. cap. significasti.

ⁱ Clemangis Disput. de Concil. Gener.

^k Mirandula de Fide et Ordine credend. theorem. 4. &c.

^l Bellarm. de Concil. l. 2. c. 13.

have fallen into heresy. Now can any one possibly imagine these men should believe the pope's confirmation to be necessary to the council's infallibility, who suppose the pope may
 510 be an heretic at the same time in which a council may be infallible? and when they assert it to belong to the council only to pronounce whether the pope be guilty of heresy or no? Those therefore who contend for the council's authority above the pope, do not at all look at the pope's confirmation as necessary to make the decrees infallible, though some of them may to make them canonical. For there lies one of your fallacies; because they look on the pope as ministerial head of the church, therefore to make canons to be valid, they may judge it in most cases necessary that the pope confirm the decrees; but yet they do not suppose this confirmation doth at all make them infallible; but whether the pope had confirmed them or no, they had been infallible however. So that you cannot say, that it is a principle of faith among you, that pope and council together are infallible; for those of this opinion make it a principle of faith, that the council in itself is infallible, and consequently, whether it be confirmed by the pope or no. And therefore Bellarmine saith^m, their opinion is, "that in case the pope be dead, deposed, or refuseth to come to the council, the council is not at all the less perfect, but that it hath full power to make definitions in matters of faith." And when he comes to urge against this opinionⁿ, one of his arguments is, that from hence it follows, that the council would not at all need the pope's confirmation; and another, that councils without the pope may err in decrees of faith; for which he instanceth in the councils of Sirmium, Milan, Ariminum, Ephesus, &c. "Neither," saith he, "can it be answered, that these councils erred because they were unlawful councils; for the most of them wanted nothing but the pope's consent, and the second Ephesine council was just such another as that of Basil." From which disputation of Bellarmine it is both clear that those who make councils above the pope, do not judge the pope's confirmation necessary; and those who judge it necessary do not suppose the council infallible without it. So that you are either deceived

^m De Concil. l. 2. c. 14.ⁿ Cap. 16.

yourself, or would deceive others, when you would make them believe that there is but one infallibility asserted by you, whereas nothing can be more evident than that two distinct subjects of infallibility are asserted in your church, some placing it in the council without the pope, and others in the pope and not in the council, and neither of them absolutely and formally in the pope and council together.

§. 12. 2. I shall therefore more fully shew, that those who make the pope's confirmation necessary, do really place the infallibility in the pope, and not in the council; and that from these things: 1. Because they in terms assert, that though nothing be wanting to a council but the pope's confirmation, it may err, if the pope confirm it not. And this we produced Bellarmine's assertion for already, giving that as the only reason why those councils did err, which wanted nothing but that. Nay, he elsewhere asserts^o, not only that general councils may err, though the pope confirm them not, but although the pope's legates be present, and consent with the council, yet if they do not follow the certain instruction of the pope, the council may err. And can any one then possibly conceive, that the infallibility lies any where but in the pope? 2. You assert, "that all the power and infallibility which is in the church is formally in the pope, and only finally in the church, because it is for the good of the church;" this I suppose you have not forgot, since you told us, that St. Peter Lab. p. 266. "sustained the person of the church *historicè*, and not *para-*^{n. 4.} *bolicè*, and that the fulness of all ecclesiastical power was in him as head of the church:" if this be true, as there you assert it confidently, whatever you pretend here, you are bound to defend, that all the infallibility in the council comes wholly from the pope; for I know you will not place infallibility in one, and the fulness of ecclesiastical power in another. 3. Because the main ground of the reprobating councils lies in the pope's dissent. So that councils which in all other particulars are accounted lawful and general, yet if any thing 511 passed displeasing in them to the pope, so far they are reprobated; as the proceedings of the council of Chalcedon, Constance, and Basil, in reference to the popes, do sufficiently

^o L. 2. de Concil. c. 11.

testify. For although they were the same persons, acting with equal freedom in those as in other things, yet when they came to touch any thing of the pope's interest, then, because the pope doth not consent, so far they were not infallible. By which it is plain, that, though the council stands for a show and blind to the world, all the infallibility lies wholly in the pope. And by this means, to be sure, the pope shall never receive any hurt by general councils; for if he pleases, the council shall either be approved or rejected, or partly approved and partly rejected, or neither approved nor rejected; for of all these sorts Bellarmine tells us councils are: which in short is, the councils which make for the pope's turn are infallible, but none other. And therefore Bellarmine, very consonantly to his principles, says expressly^p, *Totam firmitatem conciliorum legitimorum esse a pontifice, non partim a pontifice, partim a concilio*; "The whole strength of lawful councils depends wholly on the pope, and not partly on the pope and partly on the council." And if their firmness doth, their infallibility must do so too. This is not a mere private opinion of his, but that which doth necessarily follow from the making the pope's confirmation necessary to the infallibility of general councils. Although therefore you would fain put off this as a matter of dispute among yourselves, yet it can be no matter of dispute any more than whether the decrees of councils, as confirmed by the pope, be infallible or no. And therefore all that his lordship objects falls upon all such who assert this: whereof the first which you mention is, "that then the council is called but only in effect, to hear the pope give his sentence in more state." To which you answer, "that the objection hath the same force against the council called in the apostles' time, viz. that it was done only to hear St. Peter pronounce his sentence in more state." Neither had it been any more, if the infallibility of the council had only depended on St. Peter's sentence: but I hope you will not deny the rest of the apostles to have been as infallible as St. Peter was. But you answer, 2. "that the pope being to use all means morally requisite to find out the truth, the council is called really to help and assist the pope; and the advice of the council is a

Ibid.

^p De Pontif. Rom. l. 4. c. 3.

necessary medium to his holiness, whereby to make a full inspection into the matters he is to define." But all this only confirms what his lordship saith, that it is for his giving sentence in more state; for the council is only a subservient means, and contributes nothing at all to the infallibility of the sentence. But, you say, they are a necessary medium.

1. Then the pope cannot define any matter of faith without a general council. Which all who assert that opinion utterly deny; for they say, the pope may define matters of faith without a general council; and Bellarmine saith^a, "that the state of the church without general councils (which was for three hundred years) might have continued so to the world's end; and therefore it was necessary there should be a living judge, whose infallibility should not depend upon any council:" and elsewhere he says^r, "that if seven heresies have been condemned by seven general councils, more than a hundred have been condemned without, by the pope and provincial councils.
2. Though the pope must use all moral means, yet why must a general council be that necessary medium? why may not a provincial or lesser council serve turn? And so Bellarmine^s tells you it would; he saith, indeed "some kind of council is necessary, *magnum aut parvum, unum vel plura, prout ipse judicaverit*; great or little, more or less, as the pope shall judge fitting;" so that still a general council is but a piece of state, for all moral means might be used without one.
3. What use are these moral means for? to enable him to pass a right judgment, or no? If they be, then the pope is bound to pronounce according to the decree of the council, and so it will not be in his power not to confirm it; if not, 512 what do these moral means signify? No more than the crucifix pope Innocent shewed to monsieur de Saint-Amour^t; "before which," he told him, "he kneeled down to take at the feet thereof his resolution, according to the inspiration given to him by the Holy Spirit, whose assistance was promised to him, and could not fail him." We see, the pope understood his infallibility better than to make use of such moral means as councils are; he knew his infallibility came not that way,

^a De Rom. Pontif. l. 4. c. 3.^r De Concil. l. 1. c. 10.^s Ibid. c. 11.^t Journal of Mr. de Saint-Amour, part 3. chap. 4. p. 78.

Lab. p. 277.
n. 7.

and therefore he took the more likely course to receive his inspiration from heaven, by taking his resolution at the feet of a crucifix. And this he called his council in matters of faith: and yet, if we believe him, he did as much want all moral means for finding out the truth as another; since he so ingenuously confessed at another audience^u, that he was old, and had never studied divinity. But what need he to do it, that could so easily be inspired by kneeling at the feet of a crucifix? Your doctrine then would not be very well taken at Rome, that general councils are a necessary medium to his holiness, in order to the definition of matters of faith. No more would your following distinction in vindication of Staple-

Ibid.

ton, "that though the pope acquires no new power or certainty of judgment by the presence of a general council, yet there is something thereby which conduceth to the due exercise of that power:" so that it must be an usurpation or undue exercise of power for the pope to offer to define without a general council. I know not what liberty you have to write these things among us; but if you were at Rome you durst not venture to do it. Your saying, that Bellarmine only says, That the firmness of a council in regard of us depends wholly on the pope's confirmation, argues you had very little to say: for what firmness hath a council at all in this dispute, but in regard of us; since you look on men as obliged to believe the decrees of it infallible? And if the decrees had any infallibility from the council, that might make them firm in regard of us, as well as the pope. But you object to yourself, "that if the pope be infallible without the council, and the council subject to error without the pope, it must needs follow, that all the infallibility of general councils proceeds from the pope only; not partly from the pope and partly from the council." To which you answer, "That the assertors of that opinion" (of whom you must be one, if you know what you say) "may say, that Christ hath made two promises to his church, the one to assist her sovereign head and pastor to make him infallible, another to assist general councils to make them so." But what need this latter if the former be well proved? for if the head be infallible by

^u Journal, part 3. chap. 12. p. 120.

virtue of a promise from Christ, he must be infallible whether in council or out of it. And therefore it is a ridiculous shift to say, the pope hath one promise to make him infallible in a general council, another to make him so out of it. But I commend you, that since you thought one would not hold, you would have two strings for the pope's infallibility. And it is but adding a third promise to the church in general, and then your threefold cord may be surely infallible.

§. 13. You give many reasons (but none so convincing as experience) why the popes should not be impeccable; and if ^{Lab. p. 278. n. 7.} you search scripture, antiquity, and reason, you may find as much why they should not be infallible. For that of the necessity of one and not the other for the church is of your own devising, it having been sufficiently proved, that the certainty of faith doth not at all depend upon the pope's, or your church's or councils' infallibility. And it seems still very strange to all who know the doctrine and promises of Christianity, and that the promotion of holiness is the great design of it, and that faith signifies nothing without obedience, and that the Spirit of God is a Spirit of holiness as well as truth, that you dare challenge such an assistance of the divine Spirit as may make your popes infallible, who have led lives quite contrary to the gospel of Christ; "nay, such lives," as his ⁵¹³ lordship saith, "as no epicurean monster, storied out to the ^{Conf. p. 221. sect. 33. n. 7.} world, hath outgone them in sensuality, or other gross impiety, if their own historians be true."

Your vindication of pope Liberius his submitting his judgment to Athanasius, because the pope had passed no definition *ex cathedra* in the business, hath no strength at all, unless you first prove, that the pope's definitions *ex cathedra* were held infallible then, which none would ever believe that read the passage, which his lordship cites out of Liberius his epistle to Athanasius. For, as he saith, the "pope complimented exceeding low, that would submit his unerring judgment to be commanded by Athanasius, who he well knew could err." ^{Conf. p. 222. sect. 33. n. 7.} Whether St. Ambrose in his epistle meddles with any doctrinal definitions, or only with some difficulties which that year happened about the observation of Easter, (the fourteenth of the first month falling on the Lord's day,) is not very material to our purpose. But that it was something

else besides astronomical definitions (which I know not what St. Ambrose's excellency was in) might easily appear, if you had read the epistle^x. So that you might have spared your large account of the paschal letters sent by the bishops of Alexandria about the keeping of Easter, (which are no great novelties to such who are at all acquainted with antiquity,) and given us a fuller account, why in such a matter of dispute about the right of the day to be kept that year, the Roman bishops should not rather have stood to the pope's definition, than write to St. Ambrose, if it had been then taken for granted that the pope was infallible. But I might as well have passed by this testimony of St. Ambrose, as you do that of Lyra, which is so express for the erring and apostatizing of several popes, that you thought the best answer to it were to let it alone. However you come off with the story of Peter Lombard, (which is not of that consequence to require any further examination of the truth of it,) I am sure you are hard put to it in the case of Honorius, when you deny that Honorius did really maintain the Monothelites' heresy, and excuse the council's sentence, by saying, it was only in case of misinformation. Since it manifestly appears by the sixth synod, act. 13, that they condemned his epistle written to Sergius as containing heretical and pernicious doctrine in it. And in the seventh synod he is reckoned up with Arius, Macedonius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, and the rest of condemned heretics, among whom he is likewise reckoned by Leo II. in his epistle to Constantine^y. Which evidence is so great, that Canus^z wonders at those who would offer to vindicate him. And in the mean time you provide excellent moral means for the pope to judge of matters of faith by in general councils, if they may be guilty of so gross misinformation as you suppose here in the case of Honorius; and not one barely, but three successively, the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the whole church from their time, till Albertus Pighius, who first began to defend him. For conclusion of this point, "his lordship would fain know (since this had been so plain, so easy a way, either to prevent all divisions about the faith, or to end all controversies, did they arise) why this brief but most neces-

Lab. p. 280.
n. 8.

Conf. p. 224.
sect. 33. n. 8.

^x Ambros. l. 10. ep. 83. ^y Action. 8. synod. 6. ^z Canus, l. 6. c. ult.

sary proposition, The bishop of Rome cannot err in his judicial determinations concerning faith, is not to be found, either in letter or sense, in any scripture, in any council, or in any father of the church, for the full space of a thousand years and more after Christ?" To this you answer, 1. "That in ^{Ibid.} the sense wherein catholics maintain the pope's infallibility to be a matter of necessary belief to all Christians it is found (for sense) both in scripture, councils, and fathers, as you say you have proved, in proving the infallibility of general councils, of which he is the most principal and necessary member." So then, when we inquire for the infallibility of general councils, we are sent to the pope for his confirmation to make them so; but when we inquire for the pope's infallibility, we ⁵¹⁴ are sent back again to the councils for the proof of it. And they are hugely to blame if they give not an ample testimony to the pope, since he can do them as good a turn. But, between them both, we see the greatest reason to believe neither the one nor the other to be infallible. But, 2. you would offer at something too for his personal infallibility; in which I highly commend your prudence that you say, you will omit scripture; and you might as well have omitted all that follows, since you say only, that the testimonies you have produced seem to do it in effect; and at last say, that it is an assertion you have wholly declined the maintaining of, and judge it expedient to do so still. And you may very well do so, if there be no better proofs for it than those you have ^{Ibid.} produced; but however, we must examine them. "Doth not the council of Chalcedon seem to say, in effect, that the pope is infallible, when, upon the reading of his epistle to them in condemnation of the Eutychian heresy, the whole assembly of prelates cry out with acclamation, and profess that St. Peter (who was infallible) spake by the mouth of Leo, and that the pope was interpreter of the apostle's voice?" You do well to use those cautious expressions of *seeming to say in effect*, for it would be a very hard matter to imagine any such thing as the pope's infallibility in the highest expressions used by the council of Chalcedon. For after the reading of Leo's epistle against Eutyches, and many testimonies of the fathers to the same purpose, the council begins their acclamations with these words^a: "This is the faith of the fathers, this is the faith of

^a Concil. Chalced. part. 2. act. 2. p. 228.

the apostles ; all who are orthodox hold thus." And after it follows, " Peter by Leo hath thus spoken, the apostles have taught thus." Which are all the words there extant to that purpose. And is not this a stout argument for the pope's personal infallibility? For what else do they mean, but only that Leo, who succeeded in the apostolical see of St. Peter at Rome, did concur in faith with St. Peter and the rest of the apostles? But do they say that it was impossible that Leo should err, or that his judgment was infallible? or only that he owned that doctrine which was divine and apostolical? And the council of Ephesus (your next testimony) hath much less than this, even nothing at all. For the council speaks not concerning St. Peter or the pope in the place by you cited; only one of the pope's officious legates, Philip, begins very formally with St. Peter's being " prince and head of the apostles, &c., and that he to this day ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ διαδόχοις ζῇ καὶ δικάζει, lives in his successors and passeth judgment^b." Is it not a very good inference from hence, that the council acknowledged the pope's personal infallibility, because one of the pope's legates did assert in the council, that St. Peter lived and judged by the pope? And yet, might not this be done without his personal infallibility, in regard of his succession in that see which was founded by St. Peter? But you are very hard driven, when you are fain to take up with the sentence of a Roman priest instead of a general council, and any judgment in matters of faith instead of infallibility. Your other testimonies of St. Hierom, St. Augustine, and St. Cyprian, have been largely examined already; and for the remaining testimonies of four popes, you justly " fear it would be answered, that they were popes, and spake partially in their own cause." And you give us no antidote against these fears, but conclude very warily, " that you had hitherto declined the defence of that assertion, and professed that it would be sufficient for protestants to acknowledge the pope infallible in and with general councils only." But as we see no reason to believe general councils at all infallible, whether with or without the pope; so neither can we see, but if the infallibility of the council depends on the pope's confirmation, you are bound to defend the pope's personal infallibility, as the main bulwark of your church.

Lab. p. 281.
n. 8.

^b Concil. Ephes. part. 2. act. 3. p. 330.

OF THE ERRORS OF PRETENDED GENERAL COUNCILS.

The erroneous doctrine of the church of Rome in making the priest's intention necessary to the essence of sacraments.—That principle destructive to all certainty of faith upon our author's grounds.—The absurdity of asserting that councils define themselves to be infallible.—Sacramental actions sufficiently distinguished from others without the priest's intention.—Of the moral assurance of the priest's intention, and the insufficiency of a mere virtual intention.—The pope's confirmation of councils supposeth personal infallibility.—Transubstantiation an error decreed by pope and council.—The repugnancy of it to the grounds of faith.—The testimonies brought for it out of antiquity examined at large, and shewed to be far from proving transubstantiation.—Communion in one kind a violation of Christ's institution.—The decree of the council of Constance implies a *non obstante* to it.—The unalterable nature of Christ's institution cleared.—The several evasions considered and answered.—No public communion in one kind for a thousand years after Christ.—The indispensableness of Christ's institution owned by the primitive church.—Of invocation of saints, and the rhetorical expressions of the fathers which gave occasion to it.—No footsteps of the invocation of saints in the three first centuries; nor precept or example in scripture, as our adversaries confess.—Evidences against invocation of saints from the Christians' answers to the heathens.—The worship of spirits and heroes among the heathens justifiable on the same grounds that invocation of saints is in the church of Rome.—Commemoration of the saints without invocation in St. Augustine's time.—Invocation of saints, as practised in the church of Rome, a derogation to the merits of Christ.—Of the worship of images, and the near approach to pagan idolatry therein.—No use or veneration of images in the primitive church.—The church of Rome justly chargeable with the abuses committed in the worship of images.

§. 1. **A**LTHOUGH nothing can be more unreasonable than to pretend that church, person, or council to be infallible, which we can prove to have actually erred, yet we have yielded so much to you as to disprove what you have in general brought for the one, before we come to meddle with the other. But that being dispatched, we come to a more short and compendious way of overthrowing your infallibility, by shewing the palpable falsity of such principles which must be owned by you as infallible truths, because defined by general

Lab. p. 281. n. 1. councils confirmed by the pope. Whereof "the first in the indictment," as you say, "is that of the priest's intention defined by the councils of Florence and Trent (both of them confirmed by the pope) to be essentially necessary to the validity of a sacrament." Concerning this, there are two things to be inquired into; 1. Whether this doth not render all pretence of infallibility with you a vain and useless thing? 2. Whether it be not in itself an error?

Conf.p. 227. sect. 33. n. 11. We must begin with the first of these, for that was the occasion of his lordship's entering upon it; for he was shewing, "that your claim of infallibility is of no use at all for the settling of truth and peace in the church, because no man can either know or believe this infallibility. It cannot be believed with divine faith, having no foundation either in the written word of God, or tradition of the catholic church; and no human faith can be sufficient in order to it. But neither can it be believed or known, upon that decree of the councils of Florence and Trent, that the intention of the priest is necessary to the validity of a sacrament." And lest you should
516 think I represent his lordship's words too much with advantage, I will take his argument in the words you have summed it up in; which are these: "Before the church, or any particular man can make use of the pope's infallibility, (that is, be settled and confirmed in the truth by means thereof,) he must either know, or upon sure grounds believe, that he is infallible. But" (says the bishop) "this can only be believed of him as he is St. Peter's successor, and bishop of Rome; of which it is impossible, in the relater's opinion, for the church, or any particular man, to have such certainty as is sufficient to ground an infallible belief. Why? because the knowledge and belief of this depends upon his being truly in orders, truly a bishop, truly a priest, truly baptized; none of all which, according to our principles, can be certainly known and believed, because (forsooth) the intention of him that administered these sacraments to the pope, or made him bishop, priest, &c. can never be certainly known; and yet, by the doctrine of the councils of Florence and Trent, it is of absolute necessity to the validity of every one of these sacraments, so as without it the pope were neither bishop nor priest." Thus, I grant, you have faithfully summed up his lordship's argument: we must now

see with what courage and success you encounter it. Your first answer is, "That though it be levelled against the pope's infallibility, yet it hath the same force against the infallibility of the whole church in points fundamental; for we cannot be infallibly sure there is such a number of baptized persons to make a church." By this we see how likely you are to assoil this difficulty, who bring it more strongly upon yourself, without the least inconvenience to your adversary. For I grant it necessarily follows against the pretence of any infallibility, whether in church, councils, or pope, as being a certain ground for faith; for all these must suppose such a certainty of the due administration of sacraments which your doctrine of *intention* doth utterly destroy. For these two things are your principles of faith—that there can be no certainty of faith without present infallibility of the church, and that, in order to the believing this testimony infallible, there must be such a certainty as is ground sufficient for an infallible belief. Now how is it possible there can be such, when there can be no certainty of the being of a church, council, or pope, from your own principles? For when the only way of knowing this is a thing not possible to be evidenced to any one in any way of infallible certainty, viz. the intention of the priest, you must unavoidably destroy all your pretence of infallibility: for to what purpose do you tell me that pope or councils are infallible, unless I may be infallibly sure that such decrees were passed by pope and council? I cannot be assured of that, unless I be first assured that they were baptized persons, and bishops of the church: and for this you dare not offer at infallible certainty, and therefore all the rest is useless and vain. So that while by this doctrine of *the intention of the priest for the validity of the sacraments*, you thought to advance higher the reputation of the priesthood, and to take away the assurance of protestants as to the benefits which come by the use of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper, you could not have assured any thing more really pernicious to yourselves than this doctrine is: so strange an incogitancy was it in those councils to define it, and as great in those who defend it, and yet at the same time maintain the necessity of a present infallibility in the church and general councils. For can any thing be more rational

than to desire the highest assurance as to that whose decrees I am to believe infallible? And yet at the last you confess we can have but a moral certainty of it, and that of the lowest degree; the utmost ground of it being either the testimony of the priest himself, or that “we have no ground to suspect the contrary.” Now what unreasonable men are you, who, so much to the dishonour of Christian religion, cry out upon the rational evidence of the truth of it as an uncertain principle, 517 and that protestants, though they assert the highest degree of actual certainty, cannot have any divine faith, because they want the church’s infallible testimony! and yet, when we inquire into this infallible testimony, you are fain to resolve it into one of the most uncertain and conjectural things imaginable. For what can I have less ground to build my faith upon than that the priest had at least a virtual intention to do as the church doth? Whom must I believe in this case, and whereon must that faith be grounded? On the priest’s testimony? but how can I be assured but that he, who may wander in his intention, may do so in his expression too? Or must I do it because I have no reason to suspect the contrary? How can you assure me of that, that I have no reason to suspect the contrary? no otherwise than by telling me that the priest is a man of that honesty and integrity, that he cannot be supposed to do such a thing without intention: so that though I were in Italy or Spain, where some have told us it is no hard matter to meet with Jews in priests’ habits, and professing themselves such, and acting accordingly, yet I am bound to believe (though they heartily believe nothing of Christianity) that in all sacraments they must have an intention to do as the church doth; without which, we are told by you, “no sacrament can be valid, because the matter and form cannot be determined or united without the priest’s intention.” And therefore I do not only object, that this takes away the comfort of all sacraments as to the receivers, but that it destroys all certain foundations of faith; because the promises of infallibility supposing that which I can have no assurance of, that infallibility can be no foundation of faith at all to me. As for instance, suppose the title to an estate depends upon the king’s free donation, and this donation to be confirmed by his great seal, but yet so, that if the lord chancellor in the

sealing it doth not intend it should pass on that account, the whole gift becomes null in law; I pray tell me now what other assurance you can have of your title to this estate than you have of the lord chancellor's intention in passing the seal, and what infallible certainty you can have of such intention of his. Just such is your case: you tell us, the only ground of infallible certainty in faith is the church's infallibility; this infallibility comes by a free promise of Christ; this promise must suppose a church in being: that there is a church, we can have no more assurance than that there are baptized persons, but the validity of their baptism requires the priest's intention in administering it; and therefore we can have no more assurance of the church's infallibility than we have of the priest's intention. And is this it at last which your loud clamours of infallibility come to? is this the effect of all your exclamations against protestants, for making faith uncertain by taking away the church's infallibility? Must our faith at last be resolved into that which it is impossible we should have any undoubted assurance at all of? And will not the highest reason, the clearest evidence, the most pregnant demonstrations which things are capable of, be accounted with you sufficient ground to build our faith of the scriptures upon; and yet must a thing so impossible to be certainly known, so generally uncertain and conjectural, be accounted by you sufficient ground to believe your church's infallibility? Are not the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles, joined with the universal tradition of the Christian church, a ground firm enough for us to believe the doctrine of Christ divine? and yet must the intention of the priest with you be a much surer ground than these are. By all which it appears, that if I had not already largely discovered your grand imposture in your pretence to infallibility, this very doctrine would invincibly prove it; since, notwithstanding that pretence, you must resolve all into something which falls short of those grounds of certainty which we have to build our faith upon. But we must now consider how you offer to retort this upon 518 his lordship; for you say, "the same argument will hold against the infallibility of the whole church in fundamentals; since men cannot be infallibly sure there is such a company of men who are truly baptized." But how manifestly ridiculous

this is, will appear, 1. That it will hold indeed against all such who assert this doctrine of *the necessity of the priest's intention*, but not others. Therefore if his lordship had said this doctrine had been true, the retortion had been good; but you saw well enough he disproves it as an error, and urges this as an absurdity consequent upon it. Your argument then, as it is, runs in this form: If they who hold the priest's intention necessary cannot be sure who are baptized, then they who do not hold it necessary cannot. Where is your consequence? for he was shewing the uncertainty of it depended upon that principle, and therefore I suppose the denying of the principle doth not stand guilty of the same absurdity which the holding it doth. But it may be the force lies in being infallibly sure, and so that none can know the infallibility of the church in fundamentals but such as are infallibly sure that men are baptized. I answer, therefore, 2. That there is no such necessity of being infallibly sure upon our principles as there is upon yours: for you build your faith upon the church's infallibility in pope and councils, but we do not pretend to build our faith upon the church's infallibility in fundamentals: all that we assert is, that the church is infallible in fundamentals; but we do not say the ground of our faith is because she is so, for that were to make the church the formal object of our faith: since therefore we do not rely on the church as our infallible guide in fundamentals, there is no such necessity of that infallible certainty as to this principle as there is with you, who must wholly establish your faith upon the church's infallibility. The most then that we assert is, that there is and shall always be a church; for that (as I have told you) is all that is meant by a church being infallible in fundamentals: now for this we have the greatest assurance possible that there shall be from the promises of Christ, and that there is from the certainty we have of the faith and baptism of Christians; since no more is required by us to assure men of it than all men in the world are competent judges of, which surely they cannot be of the priest's intention. So much for your weak attempt of retorting this argument upon his lordship.

§. 2. But the main thing to be considered is your solid answer you give to it; which indeed is of that weight that it must not be slightly passed over. You answer therefore,

Ibid.

“That both a general council and the pope, when they define any matters of faith, do also implicitly define that themselves are infallible, and, by consequence, that both the pope in such case, and also the bishops that sit in council, are persons baptized, in holy orders, and have all things essentially necessary for that function which they then execute. Neither is there any more difficulty in the case of the pope now than there was in the time of the prophets and apostles of old; whom all must grant that with the same breath they defined or infallibly declared the several articles and points of doctrine proposed by them to the faithful, and their own infallibility in proposing them.” So indeed Vega answered in the case of general councils; for when it was demanded how it should be known that the council was a lawful council, he says, “because the council defined itself to be so.” But for this he is sufficiently chastised by Bellarmine^a, who gives this unanswerable argument against it: Either it doth appear, from some other argument, that while the council defines itself to be a lawful council, it was a lawful council, or it doth not: if it doth, to what purpose doth it define itself to be a lawful council? if it doth not, then we shall doubt of that decree whereby it defines itself to be so; for if I doubt whether the council were lawful before that decree, I doubt likewise whether it might not err in passing that decree. And therefore he grants that 519 no more than moral certainty or historical faith is requisite in order to it. Now this argument of Bellarmine’s holds with equal strength (if not more) against you; for you derive the lawfulness of the council from its infallibility, and that infallibility from the council’s definition. Thus therefore I argue: Either it doth appear that the council was infallible before that definition, or it doth not: if it appears to be infallible before, then its infallibility is not known by that definition; if it doth not, how can I know it to be infallible by it? for as I doubt whether it was infallible before it, so I must doubt whether it was infallible in it: and consequently it is impossible I should believe it infallible because it defines itself to be so. Neither do you at all salve this by calling it only *an implicit definition*; for whether it be implicit or explicit, it is

^a De Concil. l. 2. c. 9.

all one, since that definition is made the ground why we must believe the council to be infallible. And of all men in the world you seem the strangest in this, that you declaim with so much vehemency against those who believe the scriptures to be infallible for themselves, and yet assert that pope and general councils are to be believed infallible because they define themselves to be so: than which no greater absurdity can be well imagined; for they who assert that the scriptures are to be believed for themselves, do not thereby mean that they are to be believed infallible merely because they say they are infallible, but that out of the scriptures such arguments may be brought as may sufficiently prove that they come from God. But when you say that pope and general councils are to be believed infallible because of their implicit definition that they are so, you can mean nothing else but that they are infallible because they take upon them to be infallible; for that is all I can understand by your *implicit definition*; for if they should decree they were infallible, that were an explicit definition. But yet how should this implicit definition be known? for it must be some way certainly known, or else we can never believe that they are infallible upon that account. Which way then must we understand that they implicitly define it? Is it by their meeting, debating, decreeing matters of faith? that cannot be, for councils have done all these which are acknowledged to have erred: is it by pope and council joining together? but how can that be, unless I know before that when pope and council join they are infallible? If this then be all the way to prove that pope and council are true bishops because infallible, and they are infallible because they define themselves to be so, I see there is an absolute necessity of a man's putting out the eye of his reason, if ever he hopes to see pope and councils infallible. But further yet, there is more absurdity still (if more can be imagined) in this excellent answer; for here is a new *labyrinth* for our author to sport himself in: for we are to believe a council to consist of lawful bishops because they are infallible, and yet his only way to prove them infallible is by supposing that they consist of lawful bishops. For I ask whether all persons meeting together in council are infallible? No. Are all bishops of protestant, and the Greek, and other churches besides the

Roman, assembled in council, infallible? No. Must it not then be supposed that the bishops are lawful bishops, before they can implicitly define themselves infallible? And if their lawfulness must be supposed before their infallibility, they cannot first be proved to be infallible, before we can know whether they were lawful bishops or no; and we cannot know them to be lawful bishops, unless we knew the intention of the priest: and therefore it remains proved, with evidence equal to a demonstration, that your certainty of your church's infallibility can be no greater than that you have of the priest's intention in the administration of sacraments.

And by this it appears how absurdly you go about to com- 520
pare the case of pope and council with that of the prophets and apostles of old. For you challenge not an infallibility by immediate inspiration, but such as is constantly resident in the church by virtue of some particular promises, which must suppose the persons in whom it lodges to be actually members of the church: and therefore all the proof of their infallibility depends upon the certainty of that which you can never satisfy any rational men in; but I hope you will not say it was so in the prophets and apostles. Besides, God never sent any persons with a message from himself to the world but he gave the world sufficient evidence in point of reason that he sent them, either by miracles, the testimony of other prophets who wrought them, or some other satisfactory way to human reason, as I have elsewhere proved at large. But there is no such thing in your case; no rational evidence at all is offered, but we must believe the council lawful because infallible, and we must believe it infallible because it defines itself to be so: neither is it possible to conceive that any man should believe whatever the prophet or apostle said to be infallibly true, unless he were before convinced that they were infallible who spake it. But for this you have a further answer, "That it is not necessary to believe the infallibility of the proposer, viz. *prioritate temporis*, in respect of time, and afterwards the infallibility of the doctrine he proposeth; but it sufficeth to believe it first *prioritate naturæ*, so as the infallibility of the teacher be presupposed to the infallibility of his doctrine." But what this makes to your purpose I understand not; for it is not the time, but the evidence we inquire for, or the

ground on which we are to believe the proposer infallible, whether it must not be something else besides the implicit defining himself to be infallible. You assert that to be a sufficient ground in the case of pope and councils, and, I pray, will it not be as sufficient in the case of a quaker or enthusiast? may not they as well pretend this, that they are infallible? and if you ask them what evidence they have for it, they may tell you, just the same that pope and council have to be so; for as they implicitly define themselves to be infallible, so do they. So that, talk what you will of private spirits and enthusiasms, I know none lay so great a foundation for them as you do upon this pretence, That we are to believe the pope and council infallible, because implicitly they define themselves to be so: than which, one could hardly meet with a more absurd answer from the highest enthusiast; for he can tell you as boldly that he hath the Spirit of God because he hath it: and just so much you say, and no more—pope and council are infallible because they are infallible. But I must pity you: I know you would not willingly have run into these absurdities, but it was your hard fortune to maintain a bad cause, and you could not possibly help it; for the straits you were in were so great, that you must venture thorough some great absurdity to get out of them. But all the pity I have for you is gone when I read your next words: “Thus we conceive the relater’s Achilles is fallen.” How fallen? If he be, it is only with Antæus, to rise the stronger. But I assure you, so far was he from falling by any force of your answer, that he stands more impregnably than ever, having not so much as a heel left that you can wound him in. And if you have nothing more to say than what you here give us in answer to this argument, which you tell us is the common answer of divines, I am so far from wondering that his lordship took no notice of it, that I shall only wonder at the weakness of your judgment, or largeness of your faith, that can so contentedly swallow such grand absurdities.

§. 3. If this be but, as you say, the prologue to the play, I doubt you will find but a sad catastrophe in it. “The main business,” you tell us, “is about the *priest’s intention*, concerning which he positively lays down, that it is not of absolute necessity to the essence of a sacrament, so as to make it void,

though the priest's thoughts should wander from his work at 521 the instant of using the essentials of a sacrament, yea, or have in him an actual intention to scorn the church." What now have you to shew to the contrary?—If the priest's intention be not absolutely necessary to the essence or validity of a sacrament, you desire a reason of your adversaries, why we should not think a priest consecrates the body of Christ as much at a table where there is wheaten bread before him, and that either by way of disputation, or reading the 26th chapter of St. Matthew, he pronounces the words, *Hoc est corpus meum*, as he doth at the altar; since here is the true form, *Hoc est corpus meum*, the true matter wheaten bread, and he that pronounces the form is a true priest, and yet in all men's judgment here is no true sacrament made. Something else therefore is requisite to the essence of a sacrament, and what can that possibly be, if it be not the intention which the church requires? Since your request is reasonable, I shall endeavour your satisfaction; and the rather, because it tends to the full clearing the business in hand. To your inquiry then I answer, That the institution of Christ requiring such a solemnity for the administration of it, and such a disposition in the church for the receiving it, and the performance of such acts in order to the administration by the dispenser of it, these do sufficiently distinguish the Lord's supper from all other actions, what matter, form, or person soever be there. Were not, in the apostles' times, the assembling of the people together for this end, and the solemn performance of the acts of administration, sufficient to discriminate the Lord's supper from reading the 26th of Matthew by an apostle at the table, when there was bread and wine upon it? And I must confess, I cannot but wonder that you should be so much to seek, as not to know the one from the other, unless you knew the priest's intention. But I consider your question was not made for apostolical times, but for private masses, wherein the priest may mumble over the words of consecration to himself, and none else be the wiser or better for what he saith or doth. Here it was indeed very requisite you should make the priest's intention necessary to discriminate this action from that you mentioned; but wherever the Lord's supper is duly administered according to the primitive institution, the solemnity of

the action and circumstances do so far individuate it as sufficiently to difference it from any other formalities whatsoever. And so it is in conferring orders: is there not enough, do you think, in the solemnity of the action, with the preceding circumstances, and the bishop's laying on of his hands, with the using the words proper to that occasion, to difference it from the bishop's casual laying his hands on the head of a man, and in the mean time reading perchance the words of ordination? We assert then, that no further intention is at all necessary to the essence of a sacrament but what is discoverable by the outward action; which being of that nature which may difference itself by reason of peculiar circumstances from others, there is no imaginable necessity to have recourse to the private intention of the priest for satisfaction. But see how unreasonable you are herein; for you would make that to be necessary to distinguish a sacramental action from any other, which it is impossible any man should be acquainted with: for if I had no other way to distinguish in the case you mention but the priest's intention, I must be as much to seek as ever, unless I certainly knew what the priest's intention was; which if you have an art of being acquainted with, I pretend not to it. Is it then necessary to distinguish the one from the other, or not? If not, to what end is your question? if it be, to what purpose is the priest's intention, when I cannot know it? But you would seem to object against the circumstances discriminating a sacramental action, 1. If the circumstances do shew to the standers by that the priest really intends to make a sacrament, and this signification be
522 necessary, then the priest's intention is necessary, or else why is it necessary it should be signified? I answer, The circumstances are not intended to signify the priest's intention any further than that intention is discoverable by the actions themselves; so that it is not any inward intention which is thereby signified, but only such an intention as the outward action imports, which is the celebration of the blessed sacrament. So it is not the priest's *intending to make a sacrament*, as you phrasify it, but his *intending to celebrate it*, i. e. not such an intention as is unitive of matter and form, as your schools speak in this case, but such as relates to the external action. But against this you urge, 2. That such external

signification is not at all necessary ; for, say you, “ might not a catholic priest, to save the soul of some dying infant, baptize it, if he could, without any such signification by circumstances ? ” Yes, and a very charitable man he would be in it too, if, without any signification by circumstances, he could save the soul of a dying infant. But I should think his mere intention were sufficient, and that the chief priest would supply the rest, as the schools determine in a like case : for they put a very hard question to themselves ; If the intention of a priest be necessary to the validity of a sacrament, then what becomes of the soul of an infant which dies, being baptized without the priest’s intention ? To which they answer^b, “ It may very piously be believed, that in that case *summus sacerdos supplebit*, the high priest will supply that defect.” And what they say of *intention*, is much more true of baptism itself ; for in case it be not done out of contempt, I say that *summus sacerdos supplebit*. It is not the mere want of baptism will damn the soul of the infant, (as you suppose,) when you make it so necessary to use such shifts as you speak of to save the soul of a dying infant. But do you think seriously that is the way to do it, for a priest, under a physical pretence, to sprinkle water on the child’s face often, and once among the rest to say softly, or by way of discourse, *Ego te baptizo*, &c. with intention to confer the sacrament ? But you ask, however, whether the child be not really baptized by this, although none took notice of what the priest did ? I answer, though we should grant it, yet it proves not that the priest’s inward intention was it which made it a sacrament, but the observation of the institution of Christ in the external actions ; and so far as that is observed in this odd kind of baptizing, so far it is baptism, and no more. There are two things therefore to be observed in sacramental actions : 1. the differencing of them from other common or ordinary actions ; and this we say is done by the circumstances attending them : 2. the validity of them as sacraments ; and this depends wholly and only on the observation of Christ’s institution : for as it is institution which makes a sacrament, so it is the observation of it which makes this a sacramental action, and not another.

^b Alexand. Alensis, part. 4. quæst. præjudicio, &c. Bonaventur. c. 4. 8. memb. 3. art. 1. sect. 1. Reo sine dist. 6. art. 2. quæst. 1. ad fin.

But in neither case is the priest's intention necessary to the essence of a sacrament; for it may have its full force in all respects it was appointed for, whatever the priest's inward intention be. So that neither of your instances as to the sacraments of baptism or the eucharist, do at all imply the necessity of the priest's intention in order to the essence of a sacrament in either of them.

Lab. p. 284.
n. 1.

§. 4. As for the inconvenience which you say the bishop pretends would follow out of this doctrine, viz. that no man can rest secure that he hath been really made partaker of any sacrament, no not of baptism itself; you answer, 1. That as to the far greater part of Christians, the inconvenience follows as much out of the bishop's principles as yours, that they cannot be absolutely certain that they are baptized, because the priest may vitiate something pertaining to the essentials of baptism. 2. You answer, That moral assurance is sufficient in such cases, i. e. such as is liable to no just cause of doubting and suspecting the contrary. We accept of this latter answer in reference to your retortion of the inconvenience
528 upon us; as to which we say, that where is no sufficient cause of doubting, a man ought to rest satisfied. But I shall now shew you, that this moral assurance cannot be sufficient in your case, and that for these reasons: 1. Because you build a main principle of faith upon it, and you say that moral assurance cannot be a sufficient foundation for faith; for then all your discourse of the resolution of faith comes to nothing, which runs upon this principle—that nothing short of infallibility can be a sufficient foundation for faith. Now that you build a principle of faith upon it is evident, as I have proved already, even all that infallibility you pretend to in church, pope, and council; for all depends upon this, that you certainly know that such persons in your church have had the sacrament of baptism truly administered, which cannot be without knowing the priest's intention. 2. Because you acknowledged before, that there must be such a certainty as is sufficient to ground an infallible belief; for this you placed in his lordship's objection, and this you pretended to satisfy by saying that the pope and council implicitly define themselves to be infallible; and therefore you fall much beneath yourself now, when you say moral assurance is sufficient.

3. Because we have far greater ground for moral assurance than you: for we make no more requisite to the essence of a sacrament than what all men are competent judges of; and our church allows no such baptisms wherein none but the priest is present; therefore if he vitiates any thing essential to baptism, it may easily be discovered: but in your case you have no positive assurance at all of the priest's intention; the utmost you can pretend to is your having no ground to suspect it, which in many cases there may be: so that you cannot have properly a moral certainty which hath some evidence to build itself upon; but in your case there can be no evidence at all of the priest's intention, and therefore the knowledge of it is uncertain and conjectural. So that there is a vast difference between that moral assurance which we may have from the external action, and that which you can possibly have from the priest's intention. 4. The danger is far greater in not having this assurance upon your principles than upon ours, and yet we have far greater assurance than you can possibly pretend to. Your danger is manifestly greater, as appears by this evident demonstration of it, viz. that in case the priest's intention be wanting, you must, by your own confession, be guilty of gross idolatry; and yet you cannot certainly know what the priest's intention was. This is plain in the case of the eucharist, whose adoration you profess to be lawful, because you suppose Christ to be present there. Now this depends upon a thing impossible for you certainly to know, and that is the priest's intention in the consecration: for if the priest wanted that inward intention which you make necessary to the essence of a sacrament, then, for all his pronouncing the words of consecration, *Hoc est corpus meum*, Christ's body may not be there; and in case it be not there, you are by your own confession guilty of idolatry, for you do not then worship Christ, but merely the bread. Therefore, supposing adoration of the eucharist upon your principle of transubstantiation were not idolatry, yet since that depends upon a thing impossible to be known, who can with a good conscience do that which he cannot be certain but in the doing it he may commit the greatest idolatry? Wherefore all the ill consequences of this doctrine of *the intention of the priest* considered, besides the palpable errors of it, never was any

doctrine more imprudently contrived, or more weakly managed, than when this was decreed at the councils of Florence and Trent.

Lab. p. 284,
&c. n. 1.

§. 5. You spend many words to explain that *virtual intention* which the schools have taken up from Scotus upon this subject; but all that you say adds nothing of satisfaction, upon these grounds: 1. Because this virtual intention must suppose some actual intention, so it is in all those cases you
524 mention, of a servant on his journey, a labourer at his work; though these may not have always an express intention of the design of their journey or labour, yet there is sufficient evidence from both of them to know they had an actual intention, and there is no necessity of knowing any more of it than what their actions discover: but in your case it is necessary to know that there was once an actual intention, because upon that depends the essence of the sacrament; and that is it which we object against you, that you cannot have any assurance that the priest ever had an express intention. We do not therefore say that any wandering thoughts after do destroy the essence of a sacrament; but the want of an actual intention at all upon your principles doth it, and this you cannot be certain of upon your grounds. And therefore your *virtual intention* doth you no service at all; for you say, "this virtual intention is, when the priest doth really operate, or celebrate the sacrament in virtue of an express intention which he had to do it;" therefore it necessarily follows that the essence and validity of the sacrament must depend upon the first express intention, and not the after virtual one: so that if you cannot be certain of the first actual intention, the sacrament may want its essence, for all that you know. 2. Though a virtual intention may be consistent with some wandering thoughts from the first intention, yet not with an express intention to the contrary: as in your own instance—a servant sent upon business hath at first an express intention to do what his master commands him; after, falling into company upon his way, he loseth for the time his actual intention; but as long as he goes on upon his first business, he retains, I grant, a virtual intention of it: but supposing that company dissuade him from it, or his own mind turn, so that he hath an actual intention to the contrary, will you say this

man retains his virtual intention still? Now our argument doth not lie merely in this, that the priest, at the instant of consecration, may have his mind distracted from the matter, in which case you say the virtual intention remains still, and is sufficient, but that you cannot have any certainty but he may have an actual and express intention to the contrary at the instant of consecration, and this destroys his virtual intention, and consequently the essence of the sacrament: for as long as you require an inward intention besides the external action, you must be assured that he had no actual contrary intention at that time, or else your virtual intention signifies nothing to your purpose or satisfaction. That which remains is concerning Catharinus, of whom his lordship says, "That being present at Trent, he disputed this case very learnedly, and made it most evident that this opinion cannot be defended, but that it must open a way for any unworthy priest to make infinite nullities in the administration of sacraments; and that his arguments were of such strength as amazed the other divines which were present; and concluded, that no internal intention was required in the minister of a sacrament, but that intention which did appear, *opere externo*, in the work itself performed by him; and that if he had unworthily any wandering thoughts, nay more, any contrary intention within him, yet it neither did nor could hinder the blessed effect of any sacrament." To this you answer, "That the cardinal Palavicino is clear of opinion that the council decreed nothing against him; because he denied not an intention to be necessary in the sacrament, but only explicated the thing differently from the common way of the schoolmen." But whosoever will read the arguments which Catharinus used in the council of Trent against the priest's intention, will easily find that he disputes against all manner of inward intention but such as may be discovered by the external action. But we must consider that Palavicino had a particular kindness for Catharinus, as being of Siena (the present pope's country), insomuch that Cæsar Aquilinius saith, "If Luther had been of Siena, the cardinal Palavicino would have defended him:" and thence he endeavours to vindicate him in the point of certitude of grace, as well as in this of the priest's intention; though in both he goes contrary to the general

Conf. p. 230.
sect. 33.
n. 12.

Lab. p. 285.
n. 1.

525

sense of your divines, both then at Trent, and ever since, who looked on both opinions of Catharinus as condemned there, as is manifest by Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez, Valentia, and others. But, however, we may observe this from hence, what an excellent rule of faith and judge of controversies the decrees of your council of Trent are, when there have been, and are still, such different opinions and eager contests about the sense of them, that in one point Dominicus à Soto saith the council decreed of his side, Catharinus saith just the contrary, and yet both great divines, and present in the council. And in this doctrine of *the intention of the priest*, the general apprehension then was, and hath been since, that Catharinus's opinion was condemned there; but cardinal Palavicino undertakes to prove the contrary. So that in the mean time here is like to be a fair end of controversies by your pretended infallible decrees of councils, when you are so far from being agreed what the sense of them is; and yet *you, you* are the men who say controversies cannot be ended by the scripture, because there are such differences in the sense and interpretation of it. Thus (we hope) we have sufficiently vindicated his lordship's first charge of error against your pretended general councils confirmed by the pope.

Lab. p. 286.
n. 2.

§. 6. Before we come to the second, you say, "his lordship presents such a quaint subtilty against the pope's right to confirm them, and the necessity of his confirmation, that you cannot well avoid the taking notice of it." Thus then, you say, he argues: "No council is confirmed till it be finished; and when it is finished, even before the pope's confirmation be put to it, either it hath erred, or it hath not erred: if it hath erred, the pope ought not to confirm it; and if he do, it is a void act, for no power can make falsehood truth: if it hath not erred, then it was true before the pope confirmed it; so his confirmation adds nothing but his own assent." As quaint a subtilty as you call this, I am sure you are hard put to it to return any satisfactory answer to it; for you distinguish of the pope's joint-consent and of his actual confirmation. "In case," say you, "the pope, either in person or by his legates, concur with the council, then the definition is unquestionably infallible; but in case he doth not, then the actual confirmation is necessary: but in case the council err, the pope ought

not, and it is impossible he should confirm it; but if he doth not err, you grant it is true before the pope confirms it, but his confirmation makes us infallibly certain that it is true." This is the full force of your answer, which by no means takes off the difficulty, as will appear, 1. That by reason of the pope's rare appearance in general councils, (never in any that are unquestioned by the Greek and Latin churches,) that of his joint-consent cannot serve you: neither doth the presence of his legates suffice; for it is determined by Bellarmine^c, and proved by many reasons, that though the pope's legates consent, yet if they have not the express sentence of the pope, the council may err notwithstanding: so that still the pope's actual confirmation is supposed necessary, and that after the definitions of the council are passed. And this is the case which his lordship speaks to; and for your answer to that, I say, 2. That in plain terms you assert the pope's personal infallibility, which you disowned the defence of before: for you say, In case the council err, not only the pope ought not to confirm it, but that it is impossible he should; which what is it other than to assert that the pope shall never err, though the council may? Neither is it sufficient to say that he shall never err in confirming the decrees of a council: for in this case the council is supposed actually to err already, so that nothing of infallibility can be at all supposed in the council; and if the pope be not considered in his personal capacity, he might err as well as the council. From whence it follows, 526 since you suppose that a council may err, but not the pope, that you really judge the council not to be infallible, but the pope only. 3. When you say, That if the council erred not, the pope's confirmation doth not make the definition true, but makes us infallibly certain that it is true; I inquire further, whereon this infallible certainty depends? on a promise made to the council, or to the pope? Not to the council, for that you grant may err; but it is impossible the pope should confirm it, therefore still it is some promise of the pope's infallibility which makes men infallibly certain of the truth of what the council decrees. 4. To what purpose then are all those promises and proofs of scripture which you produced

^c De Concil. l. 2. c. 11.

concerning the council's infallibility, if, notwithstanding them, a general council may err? Only the pope shall never confirm it, and although it do not err, yet we cannot be infallibly certain of it but by the pope's confirmation. And let any reasonable man judge, whether a promise of the pope's infallibility, though there be none at all concerning councils, be not sufficient for all this? So that upon these principles you take away the least degree of necessity of any infallibility in councils, and resolve all into the pope's infallibility. For to what purpose are they infallible, if we cannot be certain that any thing which they decree is true but by the pope's confirmation.

§. 7. But that the pope's confirmation cannot make the decrees of those you account general councils infallible, nor us infallibly certain of the truth of them, his lordship proves by another evidence in matter of fact, viz. "that the pope hath erred by teaching in and by the council of Lateran (confirmed by Innocent III.) that Christ is present in the sacrament by way of transubstantiation. Which," his lordship saith, "was never heard of in the primitive church, nor till the council of Lateran; nor can it be proved out of scripture; and taken properly cannot stand with the grounds of Christian religion." This you call "a strange kind of proceeding, to assert a point of so great importance, without solving or so much as taking notice of the pregnant proofs your authors bring both out of scripture and fathers to the contrary of what he mainly affirms." How pregnant those proofs are, we must examine afterwards; but his lordship might justly leave it to those who assert so strange a doctrine to produce their evidence for it. Especially since it is confessed by so many among yourselves^d, that it could not be sufficiently proved, either from scripture or fathers, to bind men to the belief of it, till the church had defined it in the council of Lateran. Since the more moderate and learned men among yourselves (bishop Tonstall for one) have looked on that definition as a rash and

Conf. p. 231.
sect. 33.
n. 13.

Lab. p. 287.
n. 3.

^d Scotus in 4. sent. dist. 11. q. 3. Gabr. Biel in Canon. Missæ, lect. 40. Fisher contr. Captivit. Babyl. c. 9. p. 99. Cajetan. in 3. qu. 75. a. 1. Petrus de Alliaco in 4. sent. q. 6. Tonstall de Verit. Corp. Chris-

ti, &c. p. 46. Erasmus in 1 Cor. vii. Ferus in Matt. xxvi. Apud Episcop. Eliens. Resp. ad Apol. Card. Bellarm. cap. 1. p. 7. Suarez in 3. disp. 50. sect. 3. Barns Catholico-Romanus Pacificus, MS. s. 7. liter. C.

inconsiderate action. Since the English Jesuits confessed, that the fathers did not meddle with the doctrine of transubstantiation. Since Suarez confesseth, that the names used by the fathers are more accommodated to an accidental change. Since father Barns acknowledgeth, that transubstantiation is not the faith of the church, and that scripture and fathers may be sufficiently expounded of a supernatural presence of the body of Christ, without any change in the substance of the elements. For which he produces a large catalogue of fathers and others. Since therefore we have such confessions of your own side, what need his lordship (in a controversy so thoroughly sifted as this hath been) bring all the testimonies of both sides, which had been so often and so punctually examined by others? “At least,” you say, “he should have cleared how transubstantiation may be taken improperly, whereas of all the words which the church useth, there is none methinks less apt to a metaphorical and figurative sense than this of *transubstantiation*.” By which I see you are a 527 man who would really seem to believe transubstantiation, and are afraid of nothing but that it should not be impossible enough for you to believe it. For his lordship was only afraid that though the word itself were gross enough, yet some of the more refined and subtle wits might transubstantiate the word itself, and leave only the accidents of it behind, by taking it in a spiritual sense; as Bellarmine confesses those words of St. Bernard, *In sacramento exhiberi nobis veram carnis substantiam sed spiritualiter non carnaliter*, have a true sense; but adds, “that the word *spiritualiter* must not be too often used;” and the council of Trent would seem to provide an evasion by *sacramentaliter*; and his lordship not well knowing what they would have by such expressions, therefore he saith, “properly taken it cannot stand with the grounds of Christian religion.” And for all those expressions, Bellarmine as well as the council takes it in as gross a manner as you can desire; and I think the physician who wanted impossibilities enough to exercise his faith, needed nothing else to try it but your doctrine of transubstantiation. But you say, “The term Lab. p. 288. indeed was first authorized by the council of Lateran, as ^{n. 3.} *ὁμοούσιος* by that of Nice; but for the thing itself signified by this term, which is a real conversion of the substance of bread

into the body of Christ and of wine into his blood, it is clear enough that it was ever held for a divine truth." If you prove but that, I will never quarrel with you about the term, call it *transubstantiation* or what you will ; but we do not think it so clear, as not to want proofs stronger for the belief of it, than all the repugnancies of sense and reason are against it. For it is a vain thing for you to attempt to prove so unreasonable a doctrine as this is, by some few lame citations of fathers, unless you can first prove that the authority of them is so great as to make me believe any thing they say, though never so contrary to sense and reason. If you could bring some places of the fathers to prove that we must renounce absolutely the judgment of sense, believe things most contradictory to reason, yet you must first shew that the evidence they bring is greater than that of sense or reason. Or that I am more bound to believe them, than I am to believe the greatest evidence of sense or reason. When you say, " In these cases we must submit reason to faith ;" we acknowledge it, when it is no manifest contradiction, in things so obvious to sense or reason, that the asserting it will destroy the use of our faculties and make us turn absolute sceptics ; for then faith must be destroyed too. For may not a man question as well whether his hearing may not deceive him as his sight, and by that means he may question all the tradition of the church ; and what becometh of his faith then ? and if his sight might deceive him in a proper object of it, why might not the apostles' sight deceive them in the body of Christ being risen from the grave ? And if a man may be bound to believe that to be false which his sense judges to be true, what assurance can be had of any miracles which were wrought to confirm the Christian doctrine ? And therefore his lordship might well say, " that transubstantiation is not consistent with the grounds of Christian religion." But of this I have spoken already. That which I am now upon is, not how far reason is to be submitted to divine authority, in case of certainty that there is a divine revelation for what I am to believe ; but how far it is to be renounced when all the evidence which is brought is from the authority of the fathers ? So that the question in short is, whether there be greater evidence that I am bound to believe the fathers in a matter contrary to sense

and reason, or else to adhere to the judgment of them though in opposition to the fathers' authority? And since you do not grant their authority immediately divine; since you pretend not to places as clear out of them as the judgment of sense and reason is in this case; since you dare not say, that all 528 the fathers are as much agreed about it as the senses of all mankind are about the matter in dispute; I think, with men who have not already renounced all that looks like reason, this will be no matter of controversy at all. From whence it follows, that supposing the fathers were as clear for you (as they are against you) in this subject, yet that would not be enough to persuade us to believe so many contradictions as transubstantiation involves in it, merely because the fathers delivered it to us. I speak not this as though I did at all fear the clearness of any testimony you can produce out of them, but to shew that you take not a competent way to prove such a doctrine as transubstantiation is. For nothing but a stronger evidence than that of sense and reason can be judged sufficient to oversway the clear dictates of both.

§. 8. This being premised, I come to consider the clear evidence you produce out of antiquity for this doctrine, and since you pretend to so much choice in referring us to Bellarmine and Gualtierus for more, I must either much distrust your judgment, or suppose these the clearest to be had in them, and therefore the examination of these will save the labour of searching for the rest. And yet it is the great unhappiness of your cause, that there is scarce one of all the testimonies you make use of, but either its authority is slighted by some of your own writers, or sufficient reasons given against it by many of ours. Your first is "of St. Cyprian, (or at least an author of those first ages of the church,) who speaking of the sacrament of the eucharist, saith, This common bread changed into flesh and blood giveth life. And again, The bread which our Lord gave to his disciples being changed not in its outward form or semblance, but in its inward nature or substance, by the omnipotency of the word is made flesh^e." As to this testimony, there are two things to be considered, the authority, and the meaning of it. For its

^e Serm. de Coena Domini.

authority, you seem doubtful yourself whether St. Cyprian's or no, (since Bellarmine and others of your own deny it,) but "at least," you say, "an author of those first ages of the church," but you bring no evidence at all for it. Bellarmine^f grants that he is younger than St. Augustine; and others say that none mention him for eight hundred years after St. Cyprian's time. And the abundance of barbarisms which that book is so full fraught with, manifest that it is of a much later extraction than the time it pretends to. But the matter seems to be now out of question; since the book is extant in the king of France's library with an inscription to pope Adrian, and a MS. of it is in the library of All Souls in Oxford with the same inscription and the name of Arnaldus Bonavillacensis, who was St. Bernard's contemporary, and lived in the twelfth century^g. And those who have taken the pains to compare this book with what is extant of the same author in the Bibliotheca Patrum, not only observe the very same barbarisms, but the same conceptions and expressions about the sacrament which the other hath^h. Although therefore I might justly reject this testimony as in all respects incompetent, yet I shall not take that advantage of you; but supposing him an author as ancient as you would have him, I say he proves not the thing you bring him for. For which, two things must be inquired into: 1. what kind of presence of Christ he asserts in the sacrament; 2. what change he supposes to be made in the elements. For your doctrine asserts, that there is a conversion of the whole substance of bread and wine into the substance of the natural body and blood of Christ, and that this conveniently, properly, and most aptly is called *transubstantiation*. Now if this author speaks wholly of a real but spiritual presence of Christ, and if he asserts that the substance of bread and wine do remain still, you can have no pretence at all left, that this author asserts your
529 doctrine of transubstantiation. For the first, he expressly saithⁱ, "that these things must not be understood after a

^f De Amiss. Grat. l. 6. c. 2.

^g James of the Fathers, p. 12.

^h Albertinus de Eucharist. Sacramento, l. 2. p. 381.

ⁱ Sed in cogitationibus hujusmodi, caro et sanguis non prodest

quidquam; quia sicut ipse magister exposuit, verba hæc spiritus et vita sunt: nec carnalis sensus ad intellectum tantæ profunditatis penetrat, nisi fides accedat.—Auctor de Cœna Domini, sect. 4.

carnal sense, viz. Unless ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of man, ye shall have no life in you ; for Christ himself hath said, his words are spirit and life." And nothing can be more evident, than that this author speaks not of any corporeal, but spiritual presence of Christ, by the effects which he attributes to it, calling it *inconsumptibilem cibum*, "that food which cannot be consumed ;" and the reason he gives of it is, because it feeds to eternal life, and therefore he saith it is *immortalitatis alimonia*, "that which nourisheth to immortality ;" which cannot possibly be conceived of the corporal presence of Christ, since you confess the body of Christ remains no longer in the body than the accidents of the bread and wine do. And after he tells us^j, what the feeding upon the flesh of Christ is, viz. "our hunger and desire of remaining in Christ, by which the sweetness of his love is so imprinted and melted as it were within us, that the savour of it may remain in our palate and bowels, penetrating and diffusing itself through all the recesses of soul and body." And so just before he saith^k, Christ did *spirituali nos instruere documento*, "instruct us by a spiritual lesson, that we might know that our abiding in him is our eating of him, and our drinking a kind of incorporation, by the humility of our obedience, the conjunction of our wills, the union of our affections." And in another place denies^l that there is any corporal union between Christ and us, but a spiritual ; and therefore adds afterwards^m, "As often as we do these things, we do not sharpen our teeth to bite, but break and divide the holy bread by a sincere faith." All which and many other places in that author make it plain, that he doth not speak of such a corporal presence as you imagine, but of a real but spiritual presence of Christ, whereby the souls of believers have an intimate union and conjunction with Christ, which he calls *societatem*

^j Esus igitur carnis hujus quædam aviditas est, et quoddam desiderium manendi in ipso per quod sic imprimimus, et eliquamus in nobis dulcedinem charitatis, ut hæreat palato et visceribus sapor dilectionis infusus, penetrans et imbuens omnes animæ corporisque recessus.—Id. sect. 9.

^k Ut sciremus quod mansio nostra in ipso sit manducatio, et potus

quasi quædam incorporatio, subjectis obsequiis, voluntatibus junctis, affectibus unitis.—Id. ib.

^l Et non tam corporali quam spirituali transitione Christo nos uniri.—Sect. 4.

^m Hæc quoties agimus, non dentes ad mordendum acuimus, sed fide sincera panem sanctum frangimus et partimur.—Id. sect. 18.

germanissimam, in which respect they have communion with the body of Christ. But I need mention but one place more to explain his meaning, in which he fully asserts the spiritual presence of Christ, and withal that the substance of the elements doth remainⁿ. “That immortal nourishment is given us, which differs from common food, that it retains the nature of a corporeal substance, but proving the presence of a divine power by its invisible efficiency.” So that what presence of divine power there is, is shewed in regard of the effects of it, not in regard of any substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ; for in reference to that efficiency he calls it “immortal nourishment,” and afterwards, “that as common bread is the life of the body, so this substantial bread is the life of the soul, and health of the mind^o.” But I know you will quarrel with me for rendering *corporalis substantiæ retinens speciem*, by “retaining the nature of a corporal substance;” for you would fain have *species* to signify only the accidents of a corporeal substance to remain. This being therefore the main thing in dispute, if I can evince that *species* signifies not the bare external accidents, but the nature of a corporeal substance, then this author will be so far from asserting, that he will appear pointblank against your doctrine of transubstantiation. Now I shall prove that *species* was not taken then for the mere external shape and figure, but for the solid body itself especially of such things as were designed for nourishment. Thence in the civil law we read of the *species annonariæ*, and of the *species publicæ, largi-*
530 *tionales*, and *fiscales*; and those who had the care of corn are said to be *curatores specierum*; and thence very often in the Codes of Justinian and Theodosius^p, there is mention of the *species vini, species olei, species tritici*. But lest you should think it is only used in this sense in the civil law, not only Cassiodore^q and Vegetius^r use it in the same sense for the *species tritici* and *species annonariæ*, but, that which comes home to our purpose, St. Ambrose uses it where it is impossible

ⁿ Sed immortalitatis alimonia datur, a communibus cibis differens, corporalis substantiæ retinens speciem, sed virtutis divinæ invisibili efficientia probans adesse præsentiam.—Id. s. 2.

^o Id. sect. 6.

^p Cod. Theod. de Cursu publ. et leg. 67. Arcad. l. ult. De munerib. et honor.

^q Cassiod. l. 12.

^r Vegetius de Re Milit. l. 3. c. 3.

to be taken for the mere external accidents, but must be understood of the substance itself: speaking of Christ's being desired to change the water into wine, he thus expresses it^s, *ut rogatus ad nuptias aquæ substantiam in vini speciem commutaret*, "that he would change the substance of water into the species of wine;" will you say, that Christ turned it only into the external accidents, and not the nature of it? So when St. Austin says^t, that Christ was the same food to the Jews and us, *significatione non specie*, he opposes *species* to a mere type, and therefore it imports the substance and reality of the thing. And so the translator of Origen^u opposes the *regeneratio in specie* to the *baptismus in ænigmate*, and the *manna in ænigmate* to the *manna in specie*: in both which, being opposed to the figure, it denotes the reality. And one of those authors whom you cite, in the very same book and chapter which you cite^x, uses *species sanguinis* for "the substance of blood," for he opposes it to the *similitudo sanguinis*; for when the person objects and says, "That after the cup is consecrated, *speciem sanguinis non video*, I do not see the nature or substance of blood;" he answers him, *Sed similitudinem habet*, "But it hath the resemblance of it; for as," saith he, "there is the similitude of his death, so there is the similitude of his blood." These may be sufficient to shew that *species corporalis substantiæ* does not relate to the external shape and figure, but to the nature and reality of it: so that his meaning is, although it remains still the same substance of bread and wine, yet there is such an invisible efficiency of divine power going along with the use of it, as makes it to nourish the souls of men to eternal life.

§. 9. And now it will be no matter of difficulty at all to answer the places you bring out of this author. The first is, "This common bread changed into flesh and blood giveth life." But how little this place makes to your purpose is easy to discern, because we do not deny a sacramental change of the bread into the flesh and blood of Christ, but only that substantial change which you assert, but that author sufficiently disproves, even in that very sentence from whence

^s Ambros. serm. 21. de die sancto Epiphan.

^t Augustin. in Psalm. 82.

^u Origen. hom. 7. in Num.

^x Ambros. de Sacram. l. 4. c. 4.

those words are cited, if you had given them us at large. “For,” saith he^y, “that common bread being changed into flesh and blood, procures life and increase to our bodies; and therefore from the usual effect of things, the weakness of our faith is helped, being taught by a sensible argument, that the effect of eternal life is in the visible sacraments, and that we are not united to Christ so much by a corporal as spiritual union.” In which words he compares the sign and the thing signified together: that as the bread being sacramentally changed into the flesh and blood of Christ, doth yet really give life and nourishment to our bodies, (which certainly is far enough from that substantial change into the body of Christ which you assert,) so by that effect of the sign itself upon our bodies, our faith is helped the better to understand the efficacy of the thing signified upon our souls, in order to eternal life; there being as real, though spiritual, union between Christ and believers, as there is between the bread and our bodies. And that this is the plain and unsophisticated meaning of this author in these words, I dare appeal to the impartial judgment of any intelligent reader. By which we see, those first words of the change of the bread into the flesh and blood of Christ must be understood of a sacramental, and not a substantial change. But your other is the great and (as

531 Bellarmine thinks) unanswerable place; which you thus render^z: “The bread which our Lord gave to his disciples being changed, not in its outward form and semblance, but in its inward nature and substance, by the omnipotency of the word is made flesh.” As to which place, I must tell you first, that there are very shrewd suspicions of some unhandsome dealings with it; for some great critics have assured us that the place is corrupted, and that the ancient MSS. read it quite otherwise, *non effigie, nec natura mutatus*, which is so far from your purpose, that it is directly against it; and this seems far more consonant to the following words: “For,” saith he^a,

^y Panis iste communis in carnem et sanguinem mutatus, procurat vitam et incrementum corporibus; ideoque ex consueto rerum effectu, fidei nostræ adjuta infirmitas, sensibili argumento edocta est, visibilibus sacramentis inesse vitæ æternæ effectum, et non tam corporali quam

spirituali transitione Christo nos uniri.—Id. sect. 5.

^z Panis iste quem Dominus discipulis porrigebat, non effigie, sed natura mutatus, omnipotentia verbi factus est caro.—Id. sect. 6.

^a Et sicut in persona Christi humanitas videbatur, et latebat divini-

“as in the person of Christ the humanity was seen, but the divinity lay hid; so in the visible sacrament, the divine essence doth infuse itself after an unexpressible manner.” In which it is considerable how he doth parallel these two together; for as the human nature of Christ did substantially remain, notwithstanding the presence of the divine nature, so to make good the parallel, the substance of bread and wine must remain too, and that because he doth not say, that the body of Christ is present, which might exclude the substance of the elements, but the divine essence, which only imports a spiritual and real presence. And when he saith, that the bread is neither changed in its form or nature, when by the omnipotency of God it is made flesh, (i. e. as to the real communion which believers have of the body of Christ, which is an act of divine power as well as goodness,) he saith no more than Theodoret, Ephraim, and Gelasius do expressly speak. For, saith Theodoret^b, “the mystical symbols after consecration go not out of their own nature, but remain in their former substance, figure, and shape, and are visible and tangible as they were before:” which words, considering the occasion and importance of them, are so express, as nothing can be more. And in his former dialogue he gives an account why the external symbols are called by the names of the body and blood of Christ, “not by changing their natures, but by superadding grace to nature^c;” which is the same with that our author saith here, “though neither figure nor nature be changed, yet by God’s omnipotency it is made flesh;” that *πρόθεσις χάριτος* in Theodoret, and this *omnipotentia Dei* here, importing the same thing. To the same purpose Ephraim the famous patriarch of Antioch speaks in Photius. “For,” saith he^d, “the body of Christ which is received by believers doth not lose its sensible substance, and yet is inseparable from spiritual grace.” And so Gelasius, as plainly as either of the

tas; ita sacramento visibili, ineffabiliter divina se infudit essentia.—Ibid.

^b Οὐδὲ γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἁγιασμὸν τὰ μυστικὰ σύμβολα τῆς οἰκείας ἐξίσταται φύσεως· μένει γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας οὐσίας, καὶ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ εἶδους· καὶ ὁρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπτά, οἷα καὶ πρότερον ἦν.—Theodoret. Dia-

log. 2. tom. iv. p. 85.

^c Οὐ τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλὼν, ἀλλὰ τὴν χάριν τῇ φύσει προστεθεικώς.—Id. Dialog. 1. tom. iv. p. 18.

^d Τὸ παρὰ τῶν πιστῶν λαμβανόμενον σῶμα Χριστοῦ, καὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας οὐκ ἐξίσταται, καὶ τῆς νοητῆς ἀδιαίρετον μένει χάριτος.—Apud Photium in Biblioth. Cod. 229. p. 794.

foregoing, asserts^e, “that the sacraments of the body and blood of Christ, which we receive, are a divine thing, through and by which we are made partakers of the divine nature,” (which answers to “the omnipotency of God, by which it is made flesh,” in our author,) “and yet it doth not cease to be the substance, or nature, of bread and wine,” (which is the same with the former clause, “that the bread is not changed in figure or nature.”) So that the ancient reading of this place is not only consonant to the other parts of his discourse, but asserts no more than is in express terms said by genuine and unquestionable authors; who plainly overthrew your doctrine of transubstantiation. For these testimonies being so express for the remaining of the substance of bread and wine after consecration, are of far greater force against it, than the highest expressions concerning the change of the elements 532 can make for it. For in these they speak their judgments clearly and punctually against heretics, and speak that which is absolutely inconsistent with transubstantiation; but in their other they speak mystically and sacramentally; and their most lofty expressions must be understood by the nature and design of their discourse, which is to represent symbolical things in the most lively and affecting manner. But when our adversaries are urged with the former testimonies, they then tell us, “that *substance* and *nature* are not always taken properly, but sometimes at large for the accidents or use of things:” but although this can never be applied to the places of the foregoing authors, in their disputations with the Eutychian heretics; yet from thence we are furnished by themselves with a further answer to this place. So that although we admit of the present reading, *non effigie, sed natura mutatus*, yet since by their own confession *nature* doth not always import the *substance* of a thing, they cannot in any justice or reason from hence infer a substantial change. Let them then take their choice, whether are the words of *substance* and *nature* in the fathers always to be taken properly or no? If they must be taken so, we have three unquestionable testimo-

^e Certe sacramenta quæ sumimus, corporis et sanguinis Christi, divina res est, propter quod et per eadem divinæ efficimur consortes naturæ,

et tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura panis et vini.—Gelas. Tract. advers. Eutych. et Nestor.

nies of ancient fathers directly against transubstantiation, and we only lose the testimony of an uncertain author, built upon an uncertain reading, and contrary to other expressions in the same book: if they be not, then from the change of nature here expressed, no such thing as a substantial change can be inferred, but only accidental, upon consecration, in regard of the sacramental use and effect of it. Which that it is nothing strange in antiquity might be easily proved, but that our adversary's confession saves me the labour of it.

§. 10. The second testimony is of Gregory Nyssen, out of whose Catechetical Oration you produce these words: "With good reason do we believe, that the bread being sanctified by God's word, is changed into the body of the Word of God:" and a little after, "The nature of the things we see being transelemented into him." I might here tell you what exceptions are taken against this book, as not being genuine, not only by protestants, (as Fronto Ducaeus^f would have it, because of these expressions,) but by others too. But I will not insist on this, because I see no sufficient reason to question the authority of it; yet I know not how you can excuse it from some interpolations, since he therein mentions Severus, an heretical Acephalist, who lived not till after Gregory's time; yet for the main of the book, I say as Casaubon^g doth, that it is *opus plane eximium si paucos nœvos excipias*, an excellent piece in the general, and becoming its author, some few escapes excepted. And the design of it being to shew, that Christian religion hath nothing absurd or unreasonable in it, it would be very strange that he should assert so absurd and unreasonable a doctrine as transubstantiation is. But there is nothing tending to that in the places cited, but only the use of those two words, μεταποιεῖσθαι and μεταστοιχειοῦν^h; for the main force of all, you say, depends upon them. So that if we can give a good account of them without any transubstantiation, there remains no difficulty at all in these words of Gregory Nyssen. For we deny not that there is a

^f Not. in Greg. Nyss. p. 45.

^g Is. Casaub. Not. in Greg. Epist. ad Eustath. &c. p. 99.

^h Καλῶς οὖν καὶ νῦν τὸν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἁγιαζόμενον ἄρτον εἰς σῶμα

τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου μεταποιεῖσθαι πιστεύομαι, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μεταστοιχειώσας τῶν φαινομένων τὴν φύσιν.—Gregor. Nyssen. Orat. Catech. cap. 37. tom. 3.

change in the elements after consecration, but we say, it is a sacramental, and you, that it is a substantial change; and this you offer to prove from these two words here used in reference to the eucharist. The argument commonly formed by your authors from the first words is, “Whatsoever is changed, is not what it was before;” which we readily grant, so far as the change is; but still it remains to be proved, that the substance is changed in itself. But it were easy to shew that the word μεταποιεῖσθαι, in multitudes of places of the fathers, is used for an accidental and relative change, and Gregory Nyssen himself very frequently uses the word where it is capable of no
 533 other sense, as when he saith of the shining of Moses’ face, that it was ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδοξότερον μεταποίησις, “a change to that which was more glorious^g,” and when he affirms “the souls of men by the doctrine of Christ μεταποιηθῆναι πρὸς τὸ θειότερον, to be changed into that which is more divine^h.” And in this same Catechetical Orationⁱ he uses it several times to the same purpose, about the change which shall be in glorified bodies, and the change of men’s souls by regeneration: but I need not insist more on this, since I produced before the confession of Suarez, that “such expressions are more accommodated to an accidental mutation.” Neither is there any more strength in the other word, μεταστοιχειοῦν, though Suarez thinks this comes nearer the matter, and you confidently say, “What can here be signified by transelementation of the nature of the outward element, but that which the church now styles *transubstantiation*?” I will therefore shew you what else is signified by that word which Gregory used, which cannot be properly rendered *transelementation*; for μεταστοιχειοῦν doth not come from the noun στοιχείον, but from the verb στοιχειοῦν, and the Greeks expound στοιχειοῦν by τυποῦν, σχηματίζειν: and so μεταστοιχειοῦν by μετατυποῦν, μετασχηματίζειν, μεταπλάττειν; as you may see in Suidas and others. So that it imports not a substantial, but an accidental change too: and in that sense Gregory Nyssen^k uses it to express *regeneration* by τοὺς ἐξ παλιγγενεσίας, μεταστοιχειουμένους, those who are “transelemented by regeneration;” would you say, those who are *transubstantiated* by it? So that neither of these

^g De Vita Mosis.^h Hom. I. in Cant.ⁱ Orat. Catech. c. 37. 40.^k Epist. Canon.

testimonies imports any more than that there is a sacramental change in the elements after consecration, by which believers are made partakers of the body and blood of Christ; which is no more than we assert, and falls far short of your doctrine of *transubstantiation*.

§. 11. Your third testimony is of St. Cyril of Hierusalem, which you would make us believe “is so full and clear, that no catholic could express his own or the church’s belief of this mystery in more full, plain, and effectual terms.” Neither shall I here stand to dispute the reasons on which those mystagogical discourses under his name are questioned, but proceed to the consideration of the testimony itself; which lies in these words: “He that changed water into wine by his sole will (at Cana in Galilee), doth he not deserve our belief that he hath also changed wine into blood? Wherefore let us receive with all assurance of faith the body and blood of Jesus Christ; seeing under the species of bread the body is given, and under the species of wine his blood is given, &c.; knowing and holding for certain that the bread which we see is not bread (though it seem to the taste to be bread), but the body of Jesus Christ; likewise that the wine which we see (though to the sense it seem to be wine) is not wine for all that, but the blood of Jesus Christ¹.” This testimony you have patched together out of several places in that oration, very warily leaving out that which would sufficiently clear the meaning of St. Cyril in the words you cite out of him: for it is evident that his design is to persuade the catechumens (from whom the mysterious presence of Christ’s body in the sacrament was wont to be concealed) that the bread and wine were not mere common elements, but that they were designed for a greater and higher use, to exhibit the body and blood of Christ to believers; and therefore he saith expressly, “Do not consider them as mere bread and wine, for they are the body and blood of Christ, according to his own words^m.” By which it is plain he speaks of the body and blood of Christ as sacramentally, and not corporeally present; for he doth not oppose the body and blood of Christ to the substance of bread and

¹ Cyril. Catech. Mystagog. 4.

^m Μὴ πρόσεχε οὖν ὡς ψιλοῖς τῷ ἄρτῳ καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ· σῶμα γὰρ καὶ αἷμα

Χριστοῦ κατὰ τὴν δεσποτικὴν τυγχάνει ἀπόφασιν.—Id. ib. p. 237.

wine, but to mere bread and wine, i. e. that they should not look on the bread and wine as naked signs, but as *signa efficacia*, and that there is a real presence of Christ in and with them to the souls of believers. And this is it which he saith that they “ought not to make a question of, since Christ said, 534 ‘This is my body,’ and, ‘This is my blood;’ for if he could by his will turn the water into wine, shall we not believe him, that he can change his wine into his blood?” and after adds, “that under the symbols of bread and wine the body and blood of Christ is given, that thou mayest be a partaker both of his body and blood.” You render this under the species or form of bread and wine, in Cyril it is ἐν τύπῳ, in that which is the figure or representation of the body and blood of Christ; for τύπος is not taken in your sense for the external accidents, which you call *the species*, but for that which doth figure or represent; for in his next catechetical discourse he calls the bread and wine ἀντίτυπον σώματος καὶ αἵματος Χριστοῦⁿ, “the figure of the body and blood of Christ;” and this Theophylact^o, and those who assert *transubstantiation*, deny that the bread and wine are ἀντίτυπα. For where there are ἀντίτυπα, there must be ἀρχέτυπα which must answer to them; if Cyril therefore makes the bread and wine to be ἀντίτυπα, he must make the body and blood of Christ to be the ἀρχέτυπα, and consequently they cannot be the very body and blood of Christ in your sense. This ἀντίτυπον and τύπος here have the same signification, and are the same with σύμβολον; and so when he saith, ἐν τύπῳ γὰρ ἄρτου δίδοται σοι τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν τύπῳ οἴνου δίδοται σοι τὸ αἷμα, his meaning cannot be, “under the accidents of bread and wine the body and blood of Christ is present,” in your sense, for he speaks of such a presence as hath relation to the receiver, and not to the elements; for he saith, “under the type of bread and wine the body and blood of Christ is given to thee.” For otherwise it had been far more to his purpose to have said absolutely, that under the species of bread and wine the body and blood of Christ is substantially present; but when he saith only that it is given to the receiver, it doth not belong to such a corporeal presence as you dream of, but to such a real and spiritual presence

ⁿ Catech. Myst. 5.^o Theophyl. in Marc. 14.

whereby believers are made partakers of the body and blood of Christ. And therefore Cyril is in this well explained by that of Tertullian, *Hoc est corpus meum, id est, figura corporis mei*^p, “This is my body, i. e. the figure of my body,” which is the same with τύπος; and by that of St. Austin, *Non dubitavit Dominus dicere, Hoc est corpus meum, cum daret signum corporis sui*^q, “Christ did not scruple to say, ‘This is my body,’ when he gave the figure of his body;” and elsewhere speaking of Judas’s being present *ad convivium in quo corporis et sanguinis sui figuram discipulis commendavit et tradidit*^r, “at that supper in which Christ commended and delivered to his disciples the figure of his body and blood.” So that hitherto there is nothing in the testimony of Cyril importing *transubstantiation*. But it may be you think there is more force in it where he saith that “we must not believe our senses, that that which we see is not bread, though it seem to the taste to be so,” &c. As to which I answer, that this place of Cyril must be explained by that which went before it, wherein he said that we must not judge it to be mere bread and mere wine: for although sense be a sufficient judge of that which it sees and tastes, yet it cannot be a judge of that which is exhibited by that which is seen and tasted; therefore, though to the taste it seems to be nothing but common bread and wine, yet they ought to believe that it is the communion of the body and blood of Christ. So that this is not to be understood of the elements themselves, but of the mystical and sacramental nature of them. And, as cardinal Perron hath observed, “it is an usual thing, for the greater emphasis sake, to deny that to be which is meant only respectively, or to express the affirmation and denial of some qualities by the affirmation or denial of the substances themselves:” as in that of Tully, *Memmius semper est Memmius*, for one; that in St. Ambrose, *Ego non sum ego*, for the other; and in many other instances to the same purpose, in which he saith, “though the substance seem to be denied, yet only some quality is understood by it.” So when Cyril here saith that “bread is not bread,” &c., he means not by it any alteration of the substance of it, but that it is not that common bread which it was before, and as our

^p Tertull. c. Marcion. l. 4. c. 40.^q August. c. Adimant.^r Comment. in Psal. 3.

535 sight and taste judge it still to be. And what he saith here of the bread in the eucharist, he said the same before of the chrism, where he compares them both together: “for,” saith he, “do not think that to be mere ointment; for as the bread of the eucharist, after the invocation of the Holy Spirit, is no longer bread, but the body of Christ, so this holy ointment is no longer mere or common ointment, after it is consecrated, but a gift of Christ and the Holy Spirit, being effectual through the presence of his divine nature^r.” May not you then as well prove a *transubstantiation* here as in the eucharist, since he parallels these two so exactly together? And so elsewhere he speaks concerning baptism, “that they ought not to look on it as mere water, but as spiritual grace^s;” so that he means not a substantial change in the eucharist any more than in the other, but only relative and sacramental.

§. 12. Neither can any thing more be inferred from your testimonies out of your last author St. Ambrose^t, there being nothing at all in the words you produce which implies any substantial change in the elements; for, although it be only sacramental, yet it may be truly said, It is no longer that which nature hath framed it (viz. mere bread and wine), but that which the benediction of consecration hath made it to be; which I grant to be the body and blood of Christ, but not in your gross and corporeal sense. So St. Chrysostom saith of baptism, “that its virtue is so great, it doth not suffer men to be men^u;” will you therefore say it transubstantiates them? But you add further out of him, that he saith, “the force of benediction is greater than that of nature, seeing by that nature itself is often changed.” And so we assert too, that the force of benediction far exceeds that of nature, which can so alter common elements, as by the use of them to make us partakers of the body and blood of Christ. Your last words are out of the counterfeit St. Ambrose^x,

^r Ἄλλ' ὅρα μὴ ὑπονοήσης ἐκεῖνο τὸ μύρον ψιλὸν εἶναι· ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἄρτος τῆς εὐχαριστίας μετὰ τὴν ἐπίκλησιν τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος, οὐκ ἔτι ἄρτος λιτὸς, ἀλλὰ σῶμα Χριστοῦ· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἅγιον τοῦτο μύρον, οὐκ ἔτι ψιλόν, οὐδ' ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις κοινὸν μετ' ἐπίκλησιν, ἀλλὰ Χριστοῦ χάρισμα καὶ

Πνεύματος Ἁγίου, παρουσία τῆς αὐτοῦ θεότητος ἐνεργητικὸν γινόμενον.— Cyril. Mystag. 3. p. 235.

^s Catech. Illum. 3.

^t Ambros. de his qui initiantur, c. 9.

^u Chrysost. in Act. hom. 23.

^x De Sacrament. l. 4. c. 4.

which are only general, viz. "this bread is bread before the words of the sacrament, but when consecration comes, of bread it is made the flesh of Christ." This we deny not; but the dispute is about the sense in which it is made so, whether by a substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ: and that this cannot be this author's meaning, appears by those known words which are used by him, speaking of the efficacy of Christ's power in the sacrament, whereby he can make *ut sint quæ erant et in aliud commutentur*, "that they might be what they were, and yet be changed into something else." And although a great controversy hath been raised about the reading of these words, yet this reading is not only justified by many authors of competent antiquity, but by two MSS. in the king of France's library, besides many others elsewhere, and all editions but that at Rome and others which follow it. So that this author plainly asserts that the substance of the elements does remain still, and therefore can only be understood of a sacramental change.

Thus I have, to satisfy you, examined your testimonies in behalf of transubstantiation; but whereas you refer me for more to Bellarmine and other catholic authors, I shall refer you for answer to those no less catholic authors, though no believers of transubstantiation, who have taken large and excellent pains in answering what they have brought, either from scripture or antiquity. But you, having done your best in the latter, come at last to the former, but so pitifully manage your business as to scripture, that it had been more for the interest of your cause you had never meddled with it: for you only say, "that the words of scripture, taken in their proper and literal sense, do evidently shew, that the only substance which is delivered in this sacrament is the body of Christ, and that the substance of bread is no more there." And all this comes only from hence, because Christ saith, "This is my body," which you parallel with one "pointing to a hogshead of wine, saying, This is wine;" and with one "hold- 536
ing up a purse full of money, saying, This is gold; who, if they intend to speak truth, must signify that the only liquor contained *sub propria forma*, in the hogshead, is wine, and all the money in the purse, gold." But how weak this is will easily appear, 1. That you take it for granted that the ex-

pression of Christ is not at all figurative, but of the same nature with those propositions you mention, whereas it is largely proved, from the nature of a sacrament, from many parallel expressions in scripture, from evidence of antiquity, sense, and reason, that these words of Christ cannot be otherwise than figuratively understood. 2. You suppose that Christ must speak of the individual bread, when he said, "This is my body," as our parallel instances are of such individuals as are pointed to. But Bellarmine will tell you, "that if Christ had spoken of the bread, when he said, 'This is my body,' *absurdissima esset locutio*, it had been a most absurd speech;" and Vasquez saith, "If the pronoun *hoc*, 'this,' should relate to the bread, he confesses that by virtue of those words there could be no substantial change made in it, for the bread must remain still y." So that by the confession of your own authors, your parallel is absurd, and destructive to the doctrine of *transubstantiation*.

§. 13. The third error of a general council confirmed by the pope, which his lordship insists on, is that of administering the blessed sacrament to the laity under one kind only. Of this he had spoken before, and thither you refer us for your answer; but I purposely omitted the handling it there, because it comes in more properly in this place. There his lordship hath these words: "To break Christ's institution is a damnable error, and so confessed by Stapleton. The council of Constance is bold, and defines peremptorily, that to communicate in both kinds is not necessary, with a *non obstante* to the institution of Christ;" and although Bellarmine answers, that the *non obstante* only belongs to the time of receiving it, after supper, yet his lordship shews, from the words of the council, that "the *non obstante* must relate to both clauses foregoing, and hath as much force against receiving under both kinds as against receiving after supper: yea, and the after words of the council couple both together in this reference; for it follows, *et similiter*, 'and so likewise,' though in the primitive church, &c. And a man by the definition of this council may be an heretic for standing to Christ's institution in the very matter of the sacrament; and the church's

Conf.p.217.
sect.33.n.5.

law for one kind may not be refused, but Christ's institution under both kinds may. And yet this council did not err; no, take heed of it." But all this cannot persuade you that the *non obstante* relates to any thing but to the receiving after supper; which I much wonder at, since the design of the decree of the council was not to determine so much concerning the time of receiving, as the kinds in which it was to be received. Now to have said pointblank, that notwithstanding the institution of Christ to the contrary, they decreed that the sacrament should be received in one kind only, would have been too plain and gross; and therefore they fetch it about with a compass, and put in something not so much controverted then, the better to disguise the opposition between their decree and Christ's institution. But yet, by the adding the administration in both kinds to the time of receiving, and the *non obstante* following both, and the decree being against that which is acknowledged to have been done by Christ, nothing can be more evident than that the sense of the decree implies a *non obstante* to Christ's institution^z. For otherwise, to what purpose do they say, "Although Christ administered the sacrament in both kinds, and although the primitive church so received it," if they did not intend to decree something contrary to that administration and the practice of the primitive church? Therefore, whether by the mere form of words the *non obstante* doth relate to Christ's institution or no is not material, since the decree itself is directly opposite to it. Although therefore they did not put receiving in one kind immediately after the *non obstante*, (which is that you object,) as they do not consecrating after supper, and receiving fasting, yet the force of it reacheth to what follows after; as not only appears by the connection "and likewise," but chiefly by the scope of the decree itself. For the proctors of the council, Henricus de Piro and Johannes de Scribanis, in their

^z Licet Christus post cœnam instituerit, et suis discipulis administraverit sub utraque specie panis et vini, hoc venerabile sacramentum; tamen, *hoc non obstante*, non confici debet post cœnam, nec recipi nisi a jejunis; similiter, quod licet in primitiva ecclesia sacramenta recipe-

rentur sub utraque specie a fidelibus, tamen hæc consuetudo, ut laicis sub specie panis tantum suscipiatur, habenda est pro lege, quam non licet reprobare: et asserere hanc esse illicitam, est erroneum, et pertinaciter asserentes sunt arcendi tanquam hæretici.—Concil. Constant. sess. 13.

authentic instrument, never exhibited any controversy at all concerning the time of receiving, but only concerning the communion in both kinds, “because,” they said, “there was an ill custom” (so the observing Christ’s institution was called) “for some priests to give the cup to the laity, therefore they desired the council,” &c. So that it appears this bringing in the time of receiving was only the artifice of the contrivers of the decree, that they might with less noise and clamour thwart the plain institution of Christ: and accordingly it appears, by the title of the decree, that the intent of it was to forbid the giving the sacrament to the people in both kinds; and so Caranza delivereth the canon itself: *Præcipimus sub poena excommunicationis, quod nullus presbyter communicet populum sub utraque specie panis et vini*^a. Indeed, in the late editions of the councils by Binius, a complaint is supposed to be made concerning the celebrating the sacrament after supper, by some which he seems to take out of Cochläus, as appears by his notes^b; but in the instrument itself nothing appears of that nature; and since the decree contains nothing against that custom as well as the other, it seems probable that this was made use of the better to bring on the other. But whether it were so or no is not very much material; for however the council confessing that Christ did so administer it, and that it was the custom of the primitive church, their prohibiting of it doth in its own nature imply a *non obstante* to the institution of Christ.

Lab. p. 271.
n. 5.

§. 14. But this is that you stiffly deny, in saying, “That neither the decree of the council, nor the practice of the church in administering under one kind, is contrary to the institution and ordination of Christ: for,” say you, “to shew this, the bishop should have made it appear that Christ did so institute this sacrament of his last supper, that he would not have one part to be administered without the other, or that he would not have one part to be taken without the other. And it cannot be proved that laymen are bound to receive in both kinds from those words, ‘Drink ye all of this;’ for if this were a command, and not a counsel, it was given to the apostles, who all drunk of the chalice.” So that the state of the ques-

^a Caranz. Sum. Con. p. 415.

^b Concil. tom. 7. part. 2. p. 1042.

tion is this, Whether the primitive institution be universally obligatory to all Christians or no? For you suppose that either it was only a counsel, or else it had particular reference to the apostles. For the clearing therefore of this question, there are but two ways whereby we can judge of the obligatory nature of such institutions; either by an express declaration of the will of the first institutor, or by the universal sense of the church concerning the nature of that institution. And if these two appear evident in this present case, you will have no cause to question but the "communion in one kind" is a violation of the institution of Christ. There are two ways whereby we may judge what the will of the legislator is: first, by an express positive command; secondly, by an unalterable reason on which the institution is founded. Now that both these are clear in the case of communion in both kinds, I now come to manifest. First, by a positive command: for although we grant a difference between an institution and a command, in this respect, that the institution properly respects the thing, and a command the person, and that an institution, barely considered as such, doth not bind all persons to the observance of it; as we say matrimony is instituted by God, but do not thence assert that all persons are bound to it; but 538 yet take an institution as it refers to persons, and so it is equipollent with a command: and so Christ's instituting that all who believe should be baptized, is of the nature of a command to that purpose. But here is a great difference to be made between such things as were done at the institution, and such things as were instituted to be done afterwards. Thus Christ washed his disciples' feet, administered after supper, and only to twelve; but it doth not follow that these circumstances must be still observed, because, though they were done then at that celebration, yet Christ doth not institute or appoint the doing of them whenever that sacrament should be administered afterwards. For we are to consider, that though there were some things peculiar to the first institution, yet the main of it was intended for the church in all following times: or else we must make the celebration of the eucharist itself to be a mere arbitrary thing; which if it be not, there must lie an obligation on men for the participation of it: now this obligation must suppose a law; and therefore

we have gained this, that the institution of the eucharist doth imply a command for its observation in the church. So that this action of Christ was not merely a matter of counsel, but there is something in it perpetually obligatory; because it was not a peculiar rite appropriated to the present time, but intended for the future ages of the church. This being proved in the general, that there is a perpetually obligatory command implied in the institution, we are now to inquire how far this command extends, whether it extended only to the apostles, or else to all believers? That it was administered then to the apostles only is granted; but the question is, in what capacity it was administered to them, whether only as apostles, or as believers? and that must be judged by the intention of the institution, whether it were of that nature as to respect their apostolical office, or else something which would be common with them to all other believers to the world's end. If it were only and wholly proper to the apostles, there can be no reason given why the institution of the sacrament should continue after their times; neither could any other but the apostles have any right either to administer or to receive it. It follows then, that this sacrament was not instituted merely for the apostles: if not for them merely, then what was contained in the institution doth concern others as well as them. Now there are four things commanded in the institution, "Take, eat," "Drink ye all of this," and, "This do in remembrance of me." If the institution doth not merely respect the apostles as such, but others also, then some of these things at least must extend to others too considered as believers; and if some, why not all of them? Were the apostles considered as believers when they were bid to "take and eat," and as apostles when Christ said, "Drink ye all of this?" What reasonable pretext can be imagined for such a groundless fancy? If they were not considered as believers when Christ said "Take, eat," by what right can any believers take and eat? if they were then, so were they likewise afterwards, when Christ said to them, "Drink ye all of this." As far therefore as I can possibly see, you must either admit the people to *drinking all of this*, or else deprive them of their right of *taking and eating*. And if you did speak consistently, you must say that the people's being admitted at all to the eucharist

is an act of favour and indulgence in the church, but not necessary by any command of Christ, the eucharist being administered to the apostles, and not the people; and therefore it being indulgence to admit them at all, it is in the church's power to admit as far and to what she pleases. This is the only rational way I can imagine, whereby you may defend the excluding the people from the cup; but this you dare not say, and therefore are put to the weakest shifts imaginable to reconcile it with the institution of Christ.

Some therefore say that all these are words only of invita- 539
tion, and not of command, and that they only give a right, and not oblige men to do it. But if these be only words of invitation, what precept is there any where extant for the celebration of the eucharist? That they are an invitation we deny not; but we say they are such an invitation as imply a duty to come too. When a father bids his children come and sit down at table, take and eat their meat, this is an invitation, but such as by reason of the authority of the person carries a command with it. So it is here: Christ invites to come, to take, eat, and drink, but so that it implies a command that men should come; or else it must be wholly left at men's liberty, so that it is no sin for men to neglect or refuse to come. And if the institution of Christ only gives men a liberty to take, eat, and drink, without any obligation to these things as a duty, how comes the administration of the eucharist at all to become a duty, since there are no other words of command than what are contained in the institution? which others being sensible of, they most unreasonably distinguish between *taking and eating*, which they make an absolute command, and *drinking all of this*, which they say is only a conditional precept; and the reason they give is, because St. Paul saith, "This do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remem- 1 Cor. xi. 25.
brance of me;" and so, say they, "*Do this* doth not imply a command for the doing it, but only the relation which that action hath to the death of Christ when they do it; for those words, *as oft as you do it*, do suppose it not to be simply necessary, but only shew, when they do it, to what purpose it should be done." But if there be any weight in this, it will as well hold still concerning the participation of the bread as the cup; for as the apostle saith, "This do, as oft as ye drink

ver. 26.

Luke xxii.
19.

it, in remembrance of me," so he adds, in the words immediately following, "for as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew forth the Lord's death till he come." If therefore it notes only the relation of the action to its end, without a command for performance in the one, it must do so in the other also; and so all the sacrament will be a mere matter of liberty in the church, whether men will observe it or no. But Bellarmine^c, with wonderful subtilty, hath found a command for the one, and not the other; which is, "that in Luke, after the bread, Christ saith, 'This do in remembrance of me,' but omits it wholly after the cup; by which," saith he, "we are to understand that Christ commanded that the sacrament should be administered to all under the species of bread, but not under that of wine." And this he is so transported with, that in a rapture he admires the wonderful providence of God in the scripture, who by this means hath taken away all possibility of evasion from the heretics. So it should seem indeed, when even his brethren the Jesuits can scarce hold laughing at this subtilty; since St. Paul puts that expression, "This do in remembrance of me," not after the bread, but after the cup. And therefore may we not more justly admire at the providence of God in thus suffering men who will not see the truth under a pretence of subtilty, to infatuate themselves: and although it be added here, "as oft as ye do it," yet both Vasquez and Suarez ingenuously confess, that contains under it a command for the doing it; for, saith Vasquez, *Qui præcipit ut opere aliquo commemoratio fiat alicujus beneficii accepti, ex modo ipso præcipiendi præcipit etiam ut fiat opus ipsum. Quis hoc non videat^d?* "He that commands that by something to be done a commemoration should be made of a benefit received, from the manner of commanding it he doth command that very action to be done. Who doth not see this?" And Suarez saith, "Those words, 'Do this,' or with that addition, 'in remembrance of me,' or with that condition, 'as oft as ye do it,' *ad eundem sensum referuntur*, come all to the same purpose^e." So that still it follows, if there be a command for one, there is for the other also. But yet there is a subtilty beyond any of these; which

^c De Eucharist. l. 4. c. 25.^d Vasquez. in 3. Thom. c. 2. disput. 213.^e Suarez. in 3. Tom. 3. disput. 2.

is, "that Christ, in those words in Luke after the distribution of the bread, *Hoc facite*, 'Do this,' did make the apostles 540 priests; and therefore, although they did receive the bread as believers, yet they received the cup as priests, and so that belongs only to the priests, and not to the people." What will not these men prove which they have a mind to! But it is their unhappiness, that their own subtilties do them the most mischief, as appears by these things consequent from hence, which are repugnant to their own principles: 1. That priests not consecrating ought to receive the cup, as well as those that do: for it is plain that the apostles did not consecrate now, but only receive; and therefore this belongs to them as receiving, and not as consecrating: and by the same reasons that priests not consecrating may receive, others may receive too. 2. That if they were made priests by those words after the distribution of the bread, then they have no power to consecrate but only the bread; for the words are, *Hoc facite*, "Do this," i. e. that which Christ had then done. Otherwise, if those words be taken with reference to the cup, then if the apostles received the bread as believers, they received the cup so too; for these words, "Do this," must not relate to their receiving, but to their power of consecration. 3. If this be taken generally, "Do this," and so giving them a power to do all that Christ did, then it will amount to a precept for all who administer to follow Christ's example in the institution; and therefore, as he did administer the cup as well as the bread to all that were present, then all others will be bound to do so, if their power of administration be derived from these words, "Do this," and they refer to the whole action of Christ. But I know what answer will be here given, That these words relate to the sacrifice, and not to the sacrament, *Hoc facite* implying their power of sacrificing, as to which, they say, both elements are necessary, but not to the sacrament. But, 1. not to enter on the dispute about the sacrifice; If both elements be necessary to it, then it was great reason that the words making them priests should come after both elements, and therefore it cannot in reason be deduced from those words which are spoken only after the bread. 2. If these words relate to the sacrifice, and not to the sacrament, by what authority do they administer the sacrament?

what other words are there to give them a power to do the one distinct from them, whereby they pretend a right for the other? 3. There is no evidence at all from antiquity that *Hoc facite* hath any respect to the eucharist as a sacrifice, or to the making the apostles priests. And so much is confessed by Estius, viz. that neither is this exposition found in any ancient writer, nor is it suitable to our Saviour's purpose: "for," he saith, "it is not absolutely said, *Facite*, but *Hoc facite*, i. e. that which ye see me do, do ye likewise^f." So that still, by virtue of these words, those who do receive authority to administer are bound to follow Christ's example; and that, as he did administer in both kinds to all who were present, so ought they to do likewise. But there is one exception yet more left, which is the last reserve, viz. "that although it be granted to be a command, that the cup should be administered to all, yet it is only a positive command binding in the general; but yet it is of the nature of all affirmative precepts, that though it always binds, yet not at all times, but only in case of necessity, of which necessity the church is the most competent judge; and therefore if the church do not think it necessary, then the obligation ceases." To which I answer, 1. That upon this ground it will be in the church's power to repeal or suspend all divine positive precepts as well as this; for the reason of this will hold for all others, which is, that they do not oblige, as they speak, *ad semper*, but only *semper*, i. e. not at all times, though they never cease to oblige. And therefore on this ground, for all that I can see, the church may as well repeal the use of baptism, or the eucharist itself, as the communion in both kinds, all being of an equal nature as affirmative precepts. But is it possible to
541 imagine that Christ appointing positive institutions in his church, and giving precepts and plain directions about them, should yet leave it in the power of any men to reverse, alter, suspend the obligation to the performance of those commands? Did not he foresee all cases of necessity when he first appointed these things? and if, notwithstanding that, he makes a plain command for the observance of them, what can such a pretended power in the church signify but an authority to

^f Estius in l. 4. sentent. dist. 12. sect. 11.

alter or repeal what she pleases in the laws of Christ? 2. There is a great deal of difference between the nature of the obligation of affirmative precepts, and the prohibiting the use of something positively commanded: for although positive precepts do not bind at all times, yet that reaches only to the thing itself, and not to the mode of performance. Thus we say that the eucharist, being a positive institution, doth not oblige men at all times to be partakers of it; but if on that account any church should undertake to forbid the celebration of it, this were a direct violation of the law itself, and not an interpretation of it in regard of circumstances. And whatever obligation of this nature there is, it respects the whole duty; but it doth by no means follow, that therefore in the celebration the church may declare what may be used, and what not: for the manner of performance, in case it be performed at all, is absolutely commanded; it is only the performance in general which is of the nature of a positive precept. Thus we say men are not bound to pray at all times, though they be always bound to pray; but in case men do pray, they are indispensably bound to pray as God hath required them to do it: so we say here, that men are not bound at all times to administer or receive the eucharist, but, in case they do, they are indispensably bound to receive it according to Christ's institution. So that this of communion in both kinds relates to the manner of a positive precept, and is not a distinct positive precept by itself, and therefore is indispensable by any authority of the church. Besides, your church doth not merely suspend the exercise of this in case of necessity, but forbids men the doing it, which is a direct and wilful violation of the institution of Christ. And therefore the question is not, as it is strangely perverted by some of you, whether it be necessary at all times to receive the cup, (although even that be true in case of receiving at all,) but whether it be in the church's power at all to prohibit the receiving it; and this we say, and are ready to make good to be a presumptuous violation of the laws of Christ, and an usurping an authority which may as well extend to all positive institutions. And thus I hope I have made that appear which you say his lordship should have done, viz. that Christ did so institute the sacrament of his last supper, that he would not

have one part to be administered without the other, nor one part to be taken without the other."

§. 16. The same I might also at large shew from the reasons of this institution, that they do equally belong to the people as well as the priests, and that those reasons are of a nature as unalterable as the institution itself; whereby I should have shewed the vanity of your distinction of the eucharist into a *sacrament* and a *sacrifice*, and the absurdity of your doctrine of concomitancy; but that would be too large for our present design; and that which you give me not sufficient ground to enter upon, since the obligation is sufficiently cleared from the institution itself. I therefore proceed to shew, that the primitive church did always understand the communion in both kinds to be an indispensable part of the institution of Christ. Which one would think were evident enough from St. Paul, in his bringing the Corinthians back to the primitive institution, as that unalterable rule which they were to observe. For if, because of some ill customs which had obtained
 2 Cor. xi. 20. amongst them, he tells them, "This is not to eat the Lord's supper;" how much more would he have said so if there had
 542 been a mutilation of the parts of it? And all along in his discourse he supposes Christ's institution to be the indispensable rule which they ought to observe; "That which I have received of the Lord, I delivered unto you:" not certainly to leave it in their power whether they would observe it or no, but to shew them what their duty was, and what they ought unalterably to observe. Else he would never have told them so much of the danger of unworthy receiving, in eating the bread and drinking the cup of the Lord unworthily; for can we possibly think, that the rudeness of their access to the Lord's table was so great a sin, and the violation of his institution to be none at all? The apostles were such strangers to the doctrine of concomitancy, that still both eating and drinking were supposed then, even by the most unworthy receivers. There were then no such fears of the effusion of the blood of Christ, or the irreverence in receiving it, and much less of the long beards of the laity; which are the worshipful reasons given by Gerson and others, why the people should not be admitted to the use of the chalice. I do verily think the apostles had as much care to preserve the due reverence of the sacrament,

as ever the councils of Constance or Trent had; but they thought it no way to preserve the reverence of the sacrament, by shewing so little to Christ as not to observe his institution. But you very kindly grant that which you knew was impossible to be denied, viz. "That in ancient times, when," you say, "the number of Christians was small, it was the ordinary custom for all that would (the laity as well as others) to receive the eucharist in both kinds; but," say you, "we aver, this custom proceeded merely out of free devotion, and not out of any belief that it was absolutely necessary so to do by virtue of Christ's precept." It is no great matter what you aver, since you aver so monstrous a doctrine of transubstantiation as confidently as you do this, and with much alike reason. For I have shewed already, that the institution of Christ in reference to this is perpetually obligatory, and that the apostles look upon that as an unalterable rule, and therefore your averring signifies nothing, when you never offer to prove what you aver. But, I pray tell me, by what means would you understand what precepts are perpetually obligatory, which are not clear to our present purpose? If positive command, immutable reason, universal practice of the church, may prove any thing so, we have all these plain and clear for communion in both kinds. And not the least suspicion or intimation given, that they looked on it as a matter of free devotion, but of indispensable necessity. But what mean you in saying, "When the number of Christians was small, they received it in both kinds?" Do Christ's institutions vary according to the numbers of communicants? Hath not Christ the same power to oblige many as a few? or do you think the numbers of breakers of his institution make the fault the less? But when was it the number of Christians was so small? Only in the apostles' times, or as long as the custom lasted of communicating in both kinds? Do you think the number of Christians was so small in the primitive times? If you do, you lamentably discover your ignorance in the history of those times: read the Christians' apologies over, and you will believe the contrary. But did this small number continue in the time of the Christian emperors, even till after a thousand years after Christ? for so long the communion in both kinds continued so inviolably, that neither you, nor any before you,

Lab. p. 290.
n. 4.

are able to produce one instance of a public and solemn celebration of the eucharist in the church wherein the people did not communicate in both kinds. And could a matter so indifferent as you suppose this to be, meet with no persons all this time, who out of reverence to the blood of Christ should deny giving it to the people? Nothing then but an unmeasurable confidence, and a resolution to say any thing, though never so false or absurd, (if it tend to the interest of your
543 church,) could make you say, “that communion in one kind was always, even in the first five or six hundred years, allowed publicly, as well in the church as out of it.” Than which, if you had studied it, you could scarce have uttered a greater untruth, and in which there are such multitudes of your own party bearing witness against you. And Bellarmine is so far from helping you out in it, that he is extremely at a loss to offer at any thing which hath any tendency that way. But before we come to consider the instances and exceptions you make, we must somewhat further see what the practice and sense of the church was, that we may the better judge, whether communion in both kinds were looked on as a matter only of free devotion, or as something necessary by virtue of Christ’s institution. And for this I shall not insist on those multitudes of testimonies which manifest the practice itself, but briefly touch at some few, which more directly prove that what they did was because in doing otherwise they should have violated the institution of Christ. To pass by therefore the testimonies of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, all clear for the practice; the first I insist on is that of St. Cyprian against those who gave water in the chalice instead of wine; for whosoever doth but read the very entrance of that epistle, will soon find that he looked on Christ’s institution in all the parts of it as unalterable. “For,” saith he^g, “although I know, that most bishops do

^g Quanquam sciam episcopos plurimos, evangelicæ veritatis ac dominicæ traditionis tenere rationem, nec ab eo quod Christus Magister et præcepit et gessit, humana et novella institutione decedere; tamen quoniam quidam vel ignoranter vel simpliciter in calice Dominico sanctificando, et plebi ministrando, non

hoc faciunt quod Jesus Christus, Dominus et Deus noster, sacrificii hujus auctor et doctor, fecit et docuit; religiosum pariter ac necessarium duxi, has ad vos literas facere, ut si quis in isto errore adhuc teneatur, veritatis luce perspecta ad radicem atque originem traditionis Dominicæ revertatur.—Cypr. Ep. 63.

keep to that which agrees with the truth of the gospel, and what our Lord hath delivered ; and do not depart from that which Christ our Master hath commanded and practised : yet because some, either through ignorance or simplicity, in sanctifying the cup of our Lord and delivering it to the people, do not that which Jesus Christ our Lord and God, the author and teacher of this sacrifice, did and taught ; I have thought it a necessary part of my duty to write to you, that if any one continue in that error, he may, by discovering the light of truth, return to the root and fountain of our Lord's tradition." I insist on this testimony, not only for the clearness of it as to the custom of giving the cup to the people, but especially for the evidence contained in it of the unalterable nature of the institution of Christ. For that he looks on as the great fault of them who ministered water instead of wine, that they therein departed from the example and precept of Christ. Now there cannot be produced any greater evidence of any obligation as to this, than there is as to the giving the cup itself. For here is Christ's example and institution equally as to both of them, and that in the same words, " Drink ye all of it." If that were such a departing from the institution to alter the liquor, would it not have been accounted as great to take away the cup wholly ? For afterwards he adds, " If men ought not to break the least of Christ's commands, how much less those great ones which pertain to the sacrament of our Lord's passion and our redemption ? or to change it into any thing but that which was appointed by him ?" And if not to change the matter, certainly neither can it be lawful to order the administration otherwise than Christ appointed. I know Bellarmine saith^h, " The parity of reason will not hold, because this is to corrupt the matter of the sacrament : " but St. Cyprian doth not insist on that as his reason, but the departing from the institution of Christ ; and this is done by one as well as the other. But he adds, " that there was a precept for that, Do this." And so, say we, was there as plain for the other, " Drink ye all of this." So that the parity of reason is evident for the one as well as the other. Upon the same ground doth pope Julius afterwards condemn the

^h De Euchar. l. 4. c. 26.

using milk instead of wine, because contrary to Christ's institution; and so he doth the dipping the bread in the chalice: 544 from whence we infer, that they looked on Christ's example and institution in the administration to be unalterable. But most express is the testimony of pope Gelasius, who finding some, from the remainders of Manicheism, did abstain from the cup, gives express orderⁱ, "that they who were infected with this odd superstition either should receive the whole sacrament, or abstain wholly from it; because the dividing one and the same mystery cannot be done without great sacrilege." To this, Bellarmine tells us, two answers are commonly given; one, that these words are meant of priests; another, that they relate only to those superstitious persons; but both of them are sufficiently taken off by the reason assigned, which is not fetched either from their priesthood or superstition, but only from the institution of Christ, that it would be sacrilege to part those things which Christ by his institution had joined together. Thus we see the sense of the church is clear, not only for the practice, but the command too, and the sinfulness of the violation of it. Although to you one would think it were wholly needless to prove any more than the universal practice, since the tradition of the church is equal with you with an unwritten word; but that is, when it makes for your purpose, and not otherwise. For in this case, though the institution be express, the universal practice of the church for at least a thousand years unquestionable; yet because it contradicts the present sense and practice of your church, all this signifies nothing at all with you. So true is it, that it is neither scripture nor antiquity which you really regard, but interest and the present church. And what Cusanus^k, like a downright man, spake out in this case, is that you must all at last take sanctuary in, "that the scriptures must be interpreted according to the current practice of the church;" and therefore "it is no wonder if they be interpreted at one time one way, and another time another way."

ⁱ Comperimus quod quidam, sumpta tantummodo corporis sacri portione, a calice sacri cruoris abstineant. Qui proculdubio (quoniam nescio qua superstitione docentur obstringi) aut sacramenta integra

percipiant, aut ab integris arceantur; quia divisio unius et ejusdem mysterii sine grandi sacrilegio non potest provenire.—Apud Gratian. Comper. de Consecr. dist. 2.

^k Cusan. Ep. 27.

And though this seem a very great absurdity, yet it is no more than is necessary to be said by such who maintain things so contrary to scripture and the practice of former ages of the church.

§. 17. But you are so far from thinking this contrary to the practice of the church in former ages, that you say, “Not only in St. Thomas his time, but in all times of the church, it was both publicly allowed, and commonly by some practised even in churches, to receive under one kind only.” A bold assertion, and which is confidently denied by very many of your own communion. For not only Cassander¹ often confesses, that for above a thousand years after Christ no instance can be produced of public communion in one kind; but father Barns^m acknowledges, not only that communion in both kinds is much more agreeable to scripture, fathers, and the universal church, but that *per se loquendo jure divino præscribitur*, “taking it in itself, it is commanded by a divine law.” But I know these men are too honest for you to own them, but as to the universal practice of the church it is confessed by Ruardusⁿ, Alphonsus à Castro^o, Lindanus^p, and many others. But we need no more than your St. Thomas himself, even in that very place where you say he rather makes for you than against you; for when he says, that *providetur in quibusdam ecclesiis observatur ut populo sanguis non detur*, “it was a custom providently observed in some churches, not to give the sacrament in the form of wine to the laity;” he thereby shews indeed, that in his time, about A. D. 1260, this custom did in some places obtain, but yet so, that the universal practice had been to the contrary; for so much is confessed by him in his Commentaries on St. John, where his words are^q: *Secundum antiquam in ecclesia consuetudinem omnes sicut communicabant corpori, ita communicabant et sanguini, quod etiam adhuc in quibusdam ecclesiis servatur*: “According to the ancient custom of the church, all did communicate in both kinds, which as yet is observed in some churches.” Now 545

¹ Cassander de Commun. sub utraque, p. 1025, 1027, 1039. op. Paris.

^m Barns Catholico-Rom. Paris. sect. 7. tit. 8.

ⁿ Ruard. Tapper. tom. 2. p. 328.

^o Alphons. à Castro, hæres. 38.

^p Lindan. Panop. l. 4. c. 56.

^q Aquinas, p. 3. qu. 80. art. 12.

whether the universal practice of the church in former times, or the practice of some churches in his time, were more agreeable to the divine institution, we may appeal to Aquinas himself, who elsewhere gives this account why the elements of bread and wine were made use of and delivered severally^r, “That they might denote a complete refection, and fully represent the death and passion of our Saviour.” On the same accounts Bonaventure^s and Alensis^t make both kinds necessary to the integrity of the sacrament. And the latter (who was master to the two former) says expressly, “that whole Christ is not contained sacramentally under either kinds; but his flesh under that of bread, and his blood under that of wine.” Than which nothing can be more destructive to the doctrine of concomitancy. And it is learnedly proved by Pet. Picherellus^u, that the bread was appointed to represent, not the body in its complete substance, but the mere flesh, when the blood is out of it, according to the division of the sacrifices into flesh and blood; from whence it appears that the sacrifice of Christ’s death cannot be represented merely by one kind, and that whole Christ is not contained under one in the administration of it. And therefore Alensis^x rightly determines, that the *res sacramenti* cannot be perfectly represented by one kind; and thence says, “He that receives but in one kind doth not receive the sacrament perfectly.” No wonder therefore that he tells us^y, “that some religious persons in his time” (when the contrary custom, through the superstition of people, had somewhat prevailed) “did earnestly desire that the sacrament might again be received in both kinds.” Thus we see, when this custom did begin, reason and argument was still against it, and nothing pleaded for it, but only some superstitious fears of some accidental effusions of the blood of Christ. But you are the man who would still persuade us, “that communion in one kind was not only publicly allowed, but by some practised even in churches in all times of the church.” And therefore in reason we must give attendance to your impregnable demonstrations

^r Aquinas c. Gentes, l. 4. c. 61.

^s Bonavent. l. 4. dist. 8. art. 2. q. 2.

^t Alensis, p. 4. q. 6. memb. 3. art. 2.

^u P. Picherel, de Missa, c. 4.

^x Alens. p. 4. q. 31. memb. 1.

^y Alens. p. 4. q. 53. memb. 1.

of it. For otherwise, say you, "how is it possible that the Manichees should find liberty and opportunity to communicate amongst catholics in catholic churches, without being perceived, since they never drank wine, nor communicated under the form of wine? as it is certain they frequently did in St. Leo's time, and after." But you have very unhappily light of this for your first proof, which is so evident against you. For Leo, who mentions the Manichees' communicating in catholic churches, tells the catholics what way they might discern them from themselves, viz. "that though they received the bread, yet they refused the wine; by which," saith he, "you may discover their sacrilegious hypocrisy, and by that means they may be expelled out of the society of catholics^z." You were therefore very ill advised, to make choice of this for your argument, which makes it plain that all catholics did receive in both kinds, and that the Manichees might be thereby known, that they did not. And if it were the custom for the catholics sometimes to receive in both kinds and sometimes not, (which is all the shift Bellarmine hath,) and the Manichees not at all, this could be no note of distinction between them; for although the Manichees might not receive at one time, they could not tell but they might at another. Now Leo's intention being, to give such a note of distinction that they might not receive at all among them, it evidently follows, that all the catholics did constantly receive in both kinds, and that they were only Manichees who did abstain from the cup. For that story which Bellarmine insists on and you refer to, of the woman who, being a Macedonian heretic, yet pretending to communicate with the catholics, had the bread which her maid brought with her, and 546 which she took instead of the eucharist, turned into a stone in her mouth, upon which she runs presently to the bishop, and with tears confessed her fault; as we take it wholly upon

^z Quum ad tegendam infidelitatem suam nostris audeant interesse mysteriis, ita in sacramentorum communione se temperant, ut interdum tutius lateant, ore indigno Christi corpus accipiunt, sanguinem autem redemptionis nostræ haurire omnino declinant. Quod ideo vestram vo-

lulus scire sanctitatem, ut vobis hujusmodi homines et hisce manifestentur indiciis, et quorum deprehensa fuerit sacrilega simulatio, notati et proditi a sanctorum societate, sacerdotali autoritate pellantur.—Leo. Serm. quadrages. 4.

the faith of Sozomen^a, from whom Nicephorus transcribes it^b, so I cannot imagine what it proves for your purpose, unless it be, that they in whose mouths the bread turns into a stone too, will hardly have patience till the cup be administered to them. For so both Sozomen and Nicephorus relate it, that immediately upon her feeling it to be a stone, she ran to the bishop, and shewed him the stone, acknowledging with tears her miscarriage. But besides this, you bring several instances from the communion of hermits in the wilderness, of travellers on their journey, of sick persons in their beds, and private communions in houses, and lastly, little children in the church, and at home in their cradles, which communicated in form of wine only. And are not all these invincible proofs, that there was a public, solemn administration of the communion in one kind publicly allowed in churches in all times? When you can prove that the communion of hermits was in the church, or that they did not receive as well the wine as the bread in the wilderness, or that such communion was approved by the church:—that the communion of travellers was not mere communion in prayers, as Baronius and Albaspinæus assert^c, without any participation of the eucharist at all; or if it were, that it was only a participation in one kind (against which Albaspinæus gives many reasons):—that the communion of the sick was without wine, when Justin Martyr saith^d, that both bread and wine were sent to the absent; when Eusebius tells us^e: that the bread given to Serapion was dipped; when St. Hierome saith of Exuperius^f, that he preserved the blood in a glass for the use of the sick:—that private communions were without wine, since Gregory Nazianzen saith^g, his sister Gorgonia preserved both the symbols of the body and blood of Christ; and Albaspinæus confesses^h, that one might be carried home as well as the other; or that these were approved by the church, since Durantus saithⁱ, “that the use of private communions coming up by persecutions, were abrogated afterwards;” and are expressly condemned by the

^a Sozom. Hist. l. 8. c. 5.

^b Niceph. l. 13. c. 7.

^c Baron. An. 400. n. 67. Albaspin. Observat. l. 1. c. 3.

^d Justin. Martyr. Apol. 2.

^e Euseb. Hist. l. 6. c. 36.

^f Hieron. Ep. 4.

^g Nazianz. Or. 11.

^h Albaspin. Obs. l. 1. c. 4.

ⁱ Durant. de Ritib. Eccles. l. 2. c. 55.

council of Caesar-Augusta about the year 381, and the first council of Toledo, about A. D. 400:—lastly, that the communion of infants was only in one kind either in the church or at home, or that this communion of infants which the council of Trent condemns, was a due administration of the eucharist:—when, I say, you have proved all these things, the utmost you can hence infer is only, that in some rare cases and accidental occasions, communion in one kind was allowed of. But what is all this to the proving that the stated, solemn administration of the eucharist in one kind was ever practised, much less allowed, within a thousand years after Christ? And yet if you could prove that, you fall short of vindicating your church, unless you add this, which you never so much as touch at, viz. that it was ever in all that time thought lawful to forbid the celebration of the eucharist in both kinds. Prove but this, which is your only proper task, and I say, as his lordship doth in another case, You shall be my Apollo for ever.

§. 18. We proceed to a fourth error, which is the invocation of saints, defined by the council of Trent. As to which, that which his lordship saith may be reduced to three things:

1. That those expressions of the fathers which seem most to countenance it are but rhetorical flourishes. 2. That the church then did not admit of the invocation of saints, but only of the commemoration of martyrs. 3. That the doctrine of the Roman church makes the saints more than mediators of intercession. To these three I shall confine my discourse on this subject, and therefore shall follow you close in your answers to them. For the first, when you are proving that the fathers' expressions were not rhetorical flourishes, you would fain have your own accounted so. For, say you, “how can it seem to any that duly considers it, but most extremely partial and strange, to term so many exhortations, so many plain and positive assertions, so many instances, examples, histories, reports, and the like, which the fathers frequently use, and afford in this kind (and that upon occasions wherein dogmatical and plain delivery of Christian doctrine and truth is expected) nothing but flourishes of wit and rhetoric?” And after, you call these *mere put-offs*, as before you had said, “that when any thing in the fathers is against us, then it is

Conf. p. 232.
sect. 33.
n. 13.

547
Lab. p. 290.
n. 5.

rhetoric only; when against you, then it is dogmatical and the real sense of the fathers." But these are only general words, fit only to deceive such who believe bold affirmations sooner than solid proofs. This is a thing must be tried by particulars, because it is on both sides acknowledged, that the fathers did many times use their rhetoric, and that such things are uttered by them, in their panegyrical orations especially, which will not abide a severe trial. Doth not Belarmine^k confess that St. Chrysostom doth often hyperbolize, and Sixtus Senensis^l say as much of others, that in the heat of their discourses they are carried beyond what they would have said in a strict debate? But who are better judges of these things than the fathers themselves^m? Are not they the men who have bid us distinguish what comes from them in a heat from that which they deliver as the doctrine of the church? Have not they told us, that the popular orations uttered in churches are no rules of opinion? Have not some of them, when they have seemed extreme vehement and earnest, at last come off with this, that they have been declaiming all that while? Witness St. Hierome against Helvidius; and if you make not use of the same rule to put a favourable construction on his books against Jovinian, Vigilantius, Ruffinus and others, you will as little be able to excuse him from strange doctrines as from intemperate heats. What put-off then is it for us to say, that St. Basil, in his oration on Mammias and the forty-eight martyrs; that St. Gregory Nazianzen, in his panegyrical orations on St. Basil, St. Athanasius, St. Cyprian, his sister Gorgonia; St. Gregory Nyssen, in his commendation of Theodorus, do make use of their rhetoric in apostrophes to the persons whom they praise, without any solemn invocation of them? What is there herein unsuitable to their present purpose? is it any more than orators have commonly done? what strange thing is it then that those great masters of rhetoric should make use of their art to raise the people, not only to a high esteem of their persons, but of those virtues which rendered them so illustrious? Might not such expressions, by way of apostrophe, be still used by such who are furthest from the invocation of saints? although by

^k De Missa, l. 2. c. 10.

^l Sixtus Sen. Bibl. Annot. 152. l. 6.

^m Basil. Ep. 64. Theodoret. Dialog. 3.

their example we are taught how dangerous it is to indulge rhetoric too much in such cases. But as though they foresaw the ill use would be made of them, they add such expressions as sufficiently tell us they made no solemn invocation of them; *εἰ τις αἰσθησῆς, ὡς οἶμαι*, and the like. Had these persons a mind to deliver a doctrine of invocation of saints, who speak with such hesitation and doubt as to their sense of what was spoken? (for it is a groundless shift to say, that those expressions imply an affirmation and not doubt.) That which we say then is this, That the doctrine of the church is not to be judged by such encomiastic orations, wherein such rhetorical flourishes are usual; and when you bring us their plain and positive assertions, we will by no means give you that answer, That those are flourishes of wit and rhetoric. But his lordship very well knew how far you were from any such dogmatical assertions of the fathers in this point, and that the most plausible testimonies which you had were taken out of those three great orators in their panegyrics in praise of their friends or of the martyrs; and therefore it was he said, “ Though some of the ancient fathers have some rhetorical flourishes about it, for the stirring up devotion (as they 548 thought), yet the church then admitted not of the invocation of saints.” That is it we stand on, that no such thing was admitted by the church; if we should yield that any particular (though great) persons were too lavish in their expressions this way, must these be the standard which we must judge of the doctrine of the church by? We must consider the church was now out of persecution, and ease and honour attended that profession of Christianity, for which such multitudes had endured the flames; and the people began to grow more loose and vain than when they still expected martyrdoms: this made these great men so highly commend the martyrs in their popular orations, not to propound them as objects of invocation, but as examples for their imitation. Thence they encouraged them to frequent the *memoriæ martyrum*, that by their assemblies in those places they might revive something of that pristine heat of devotion, which was now so much abated among them. But the event was so far from answering their expectation, that by this means they grew by degrees to place much of their religion rather in honouring the former

martyrs and saints, than in striving to imitate them in their virtues and graces. And from the frequenting the places where the martyrs were enshrined through the pretence of some ecstatical dreams and visions, or some rare occurrences which they say happened at those places, they began to turn their real honour into superstitious devotion, which at last ended in solemn invocation. To which no small encouragement was given, when such persons as St. Hierome and others were so far from putting a stop to the growing evil, that though they confessed many miscarriages committed, yet they rather sought to palliate them, and make the best construction of them, still hoping that this zeal in the people to the honour of the martyrs would promote devotion among them, whereas it sunk gradually into greater superstitions. This I take to be the truest and most faithful account of those first beginnings and tendencies to invocation of saints, which appeared in the latter end of the fourth century.

§. 19. For before that time we meet with nothing that can bear the face of any positive and plain assertions, instances, examples, histories, or reports tending that way. Which is so clear, that cardinal Perron after the best use of his wit and diligence to find out something to this purpose within the three first centuries, at last confesses, that in the authors who lived nearer the apostles' times no footsteps can be found of the invocation of saints. But when he gives this account of it, "that most of the writings of that time are lost," it makes us see what poor excuses bad causes will drive the greatest wits to. For are not the writings of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, and others still extant, who were pious and learned men? And is it possible that such men should all of them conceal such a doctrine as this, which would so easily appear in the face of the church? But it is well we have the confession of so great a man for the best ages of the church; and not only so, but he acknowledges withal, "that there is neither precept nor example for it in the scripture." Which othersⁿ not only assert, but offer to give reasons for it, for the Old Testament; "because the fathers were not then ad-

ⁿ Eckius in *Enchirid.* cap. 5. Salmeron. in *1 Tim.* 2. disp. 8. Peres. de *Tradit.* p. 3.

mitted to the beatifical vision :” and for the New Testament, “ because the apostles were men of such piety and humility, that they would not admit of it themselves, and therefore made no mention of it in their writings ; and withal, because in the beginning of Christianity there would have been a suspicion that they had only changed the names of heathen deities, and retained the same kinds of worship.” These for the New Testament we admit of, not as rhetorical flourishes, but as plain and positive assertions, which contain a great deal of truth and reason in them. So that here is a confessed silence as to this doctrine throughout all the story of scripture, and for three hundred years and more after Christ ; and 549 in all this time we meet with no such assertions, instances, examples, reports, and the like, which tend to establish this new doctrine. But instead of this, we meet with very plain assertions to the contrary, backed with strong and invincible reasons ; and herein, not to insist on those places in scripture which appropriate invocation to God only, and that in regard of his incommunicable attributes of omniscieny and infinite goodness and power, which are the only foundations given in scripture for invocation ; nor to mention those places where all tendencies to such kind of worship of any created being are severely checked, and wherein an inferior and relative worship is condemned on this account, because all worship is due to God only ; and wherein that very pretence of humility, in not coming to God but through some mediator, is expressly spoken against ; nor to enlarge how much this doctrine of invocation of saints is injurious to God, by giving that worship to creatures which belongs only to himself, and how repugnant it is to divine worship that prayers should be made to saints for them to intercede with God, when they cannot know what those prayers are till God reveals them ; nor how dishonourable it is to Christ, both in regard of his merits and intercession ; nor how great a check it is to true piety to put men to pray to them, whom they can have no ground to believe do hear or regard their prayers, and in the mean time to take them off from their serious and solemn addresses to God. Not to insist, I say, on these things, because I design no set discourse on this subject, which hath been so amply handled by so many already ; I shall only discover the sense

of the primitive church in this particular by two things, the one of which takes in the first three centuries, and the other extends a great deal further: from which I doubt not but to make it evident how far the invocation of saints was from being received then. The first is from the answers given to the heathens, when it was objected against the Christians that they did worship dead men and angels. I confess some have been so subtle as from hence to infer that they did it; or else, say they, the heathens would never have charged them with it^o. But they who read the Christians' apologies will find far more unreasonable things than this laid to their charge; and I hope they will not say, there must be an equal ground for all the other imputations also. But it seems they more believe the heathens' objections than the Christians' answers, who utterly disavow any such thing. The first mention we find of any such imputation is in that excellent epistle of the church of Smyrna to the church of Philomylium concerning the martyrdom of Polycarp, wherein they tell us how some suggested to Nicetas, that he should desire the proconsul that Polycarp's body might not be granted to the Christians; "lest," say they, "they should leave to worship him that was crucified, and worship him:" to which they return this excellent answer: "They are ignorant that we can never be induced to forsake Christ, who suffered for the salvation of all who shall be saved of the whole world, or to worship any other for him being the Son of God we adore. But the martyrs, as the disciples and followers of the Lord, we love worthily for their exceeding great affection toward their own King and Master, of whom we wish that we may be partners and disciples^p." Can any thing be more express than this is, to shew what difference they put between Christ and the martyrs? Not that they worshipped one as God with an absolute direct worship, and the other as subordinate intercessors, with a relative and

^o Bellarm. de Sanct. Beatit. l. 1. c. 13.

^p Ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι οὔτε τὸν Χριστὸν ποτὲ καταλιπεῖν δυνησόμεθα, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τῶν σωζομένων σωτηρίας παθόντα, οὔτε ἕτερόν τινα σέβειν. τοῦτον μὲν γὰρ Υἱὸν ὄντα τοῦ Θεοῦ προσκυνοῦμεν. τοὺς δὲ μάρτυ-

ρας, ὡς μαθητὰς τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ μιμητὰς, ἀγαπῶμεν ἀξίως ἕνεκα εὐνοίας ἀνυπερβλήτου τῆς εἰς τὸν ἴδιον βασιλέα καὶ διδάσκαλον. ὧν γένοιτο καὶ ἡμᾶς συγκοινωνοὺς τε καὶ συμμαθητὰς γενέσθαι.—Apud Euseb. Hist. Eccles. l. 4. c. 15. ed. Vales.

indirect worship, as you would have told them, but they worshipped Christ, and none but him, because he was the Son of God; but for the martyrs, they loved them indeed, but they worshipped them not at all; for so much is implied in the antithesis between that and their worship of Christ. So that 550 these words are exclusive of any kind of worship which they gave to the martyrs; for they were so far from giving them that worship which belonged to the Son of God, that they only expressed their love to them, without giving them any worship. And in the old Latin translation of this epistle, of which there are two MSS. extant in England, when they say they can worship none else but Christ, it is there rendered, *Neque alteri cuiquam precem orationis impendere*, “nor impart the supplication of prayer to any other;” as the late learned lord primate Usher⁹ hath observed; which utterly destroys the doctrine of *invocation*.

§. 20. We proceed further to see what account Origen gives of the Christian doctrine touching invocation in his answer to Celsus, wherein he had sufficient occasion given him to declare the sense of the church at that time. And if he had known or approved any relative worship given to angels or saints, it is not conceivable that he should express himself in such a manner as he doth: for when Celsus inquires what kind of beings they thought angels to be, Origen answers, that although the scripture sometimes calls them gods, it is not with that intention that we ought to worship them. “For,” saith he, “all prayers and supplications and intercessions and thanksgivings are to be sent up to God the Lord of all, by the High Priest who is above all angels, being the living Word and God: for to call upon angels (we not comprehending the knowledge of them, which is above the reach of man) is unreasonable. And supposing it were granted that the knowledge of them, which is wonderful and secret, might be comprehended; this very knowledge declaring their nature to us, and the charge over which every one of them is set, would not permit us to presume to pray unto any other but God the Lord of all, who is abundantly sufficient for all,

⁹ Answer to the Jesuit's Challenge, p. 426.

by our Saviour the Son of God^r." In which testimony we clearly see what the judgment of the church then was concerning invocation; for in a matter of divine worship equally concerning the whole church, we have no reason to imagine that Origen should deliver any private opinion of his own. And herein we are plainly told, that all prayers and supplications are to be made to God only through Christ; that in such cases where we are ignorant of the nature of beings, it is unreasonable for us to pray to them, (as we certainly are concerning separated souls as well as angels;) that in case we did know them, yet it would not be reasonable to pray to them, both because they are inferior and ministering spirits, and that God himself is abundantly sufficient for all through Christ. Now let any reasonable man judge whether these arguments do not hold as well against a relative and subordinate invocation, as absolute and sovereign. But no such distinctions were thought of then; for they judged all prayer and invocation, by the very nature of it, to import divinity in that it was made to, and therefore that no created beings, how excellent soever, were capable of it. From whence Origen^s afterwards supposing the sun, moon, and stars to be intellectual beings, gives this account why, notwithstanding that, they made no prayers to them: "For," saith he, "since they offer up prayers themselves to God through his only Son, κρίνομεν μὴ δεῖν εὐχεσθαι τοῖς εὐχομένοις, we judge that we ought not to pray to them that pray; since they would rather send us to God, whom they pray to, than bring us down to themselves, or to divide our praying virtue from God to themselves." Can we then suppose that the church at that time did allow of prayers to be made to saints in heaven, supposing their praying there in behalf of the church on earth? For we see Origen goes on this ground, that all intellectual spirits,

^r Πᾶσαν μὲν γὰρ δέησιν, καὶ προσευχὴν, καὶ ἔντευξιν, καὶ εὐχαριστίαν, ἀναπεμπτέον τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀγγέλων ἀρχιερέως, ἐμψύχου λόγου καὶ Θεοῦ. Ἀγγέλους γὰρ καλέσαι μὴ ἀναλαμβάνοντας τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμην, οὐκ εὐλογον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη, θαυμάσιός τις

οὔσα καὶ ἀπόρρητος καταληφθῇ. αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, παραστήσασα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐφ' οἷς εἰσιν ἕκαστοι τεταγμένοι, οὐκ ἐάσει ἄλλω θαρρεῖν εὐχεσθαι, ἢ τῷ πρὸς πάντα διαρκεί (διαρκούντι leg. Usser.) ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεῷ, διὰ τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ.—Orig. c. Celsum, l. 5. p. 233. ed. Cantab.

^s Lib. 5. p. 238.

which pray themselves, are not to be prayed to; and that if they knew of our praying to them, they would send us to God, 551 and not accept of those supplications to themselves which are due only to God. In the beginning of the eighth book, Celsus^t disputes against the Christians because they worship only the supreme God, without giving any to the inferior demons; and that upon this ground, because, saith he, “they who worship the inferior gods, acknowledging them inferior, is so far from dishonouring the supreme, that he doth that which is acceptable to him; Διότι τιμῶν τις καὶ σέβων τοὺς ἐκείνους πάντας, οὐ λυπεῖ τὸν Θεόν, οὐ πάντες εἰσὶ: for he that honours and worships those who are subject to him doth not displease God, whose they are all.” These are Celsus his words; from whence we are to take notice, that Celsus doth not plead for absolute and sovereign worship to be given to these inferior deities or spirits, but only a relative and subordinate worship.” So that if the controversy had been between Celsus and a modern Romanist, all that Celsus here says must have been confessed on both sides, and the whole dispute only have been concerning those demons or spirits which were to have this relative and inferior kind of worship; viz. whether those which Celsus called demons, or only the blessed spirits and glorified saints. But Origen^u, who went upon other grounds, returns a far different answer; “for,” saith he, “it is not lest we should hurt God that we abstain from the worship of any but God, according to this word, (ἐκκλίνομεν τὸ δουλεύειν ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τῷ Θεῷ, to render the inferior worship of δουλεία to any but God,) but lest we should thereby hurt ourselves, by separating ourselves from our portion in God.” And the reason he gives^x why Christ is to be worshipped is, from that divinity which manifested itself in him, and because of the unity of nature between God and him. And although Origen^y saith, “that in some sense we may be said θεραπεύεσθαι, to give some kind of worship to angels and archangels,” yet, he saith, “the sense of the word must be purged, and the actions of the worshippers distinguished;” yet in the following words he attributes that worship which is by supplication only to God and his

^t Lib. 8. p. 381.^u P. 383.^x P. 384.^y P. 385.

only Son^z. So that still he reserves the offering up our prayers as the appropriate worship to God himself, through his only Son; “for to him,” saith he, “we first offer them, entreating him who is the propitiation for our sins, that he would vouchsafe, as our High Priest, to offer our prayers, sacrifices, and intercessions to God over all. Therefore our faith is only in God through his Son, who hath confirmed it to us^a.” And afterwards, “Away,” saith he, “with Celsus his counsel, that we should worship demons (or inferior spirits, not taking them in the worst sense,) *μόνῳ γὰρ προευκτέον τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεῷ*^b, for we must only pray to God over all, and to the Word of God, his only begotten, and firstborn of all creatures; and we must entreat him that he as High Priest would present our prayer, when it is come to him, unto his God and our God, and unto his Father and the Father of them that frame their life according to the word of God.” To the same purpose again in another place^c; “To whom we offer our firstfruits, to him we direct our prayers, having a High Priest who is entered into heaven, Jesus the Son of God; and we hold fast this confession while we live, through the favour of God and his Son, who is manifested to us:” and after saith, “that the angels help forward their salvation, who call upon God, and pray sincerely, to whom they themselves also pray.” But not one word of any praying to them, but only to God through Christ: for as he saith elsewhere, “We must endeavour to please God only, who is over all, and pray that he may be propitious to us, procuring his good will with piety, and all kind of virtue. But if he will yet have us to procure
552 the good will of any others after him that is God over all, let him consider, that as when the body is moved the motion of the shadow doth follow it, so in like manner, having God favourable to us, who is over all, it followeth that we shall have all his friends, both angels and souls and spirits, favourable to us; for they have a sympathy with them that are thought worthy to find favour with God. Neither are they

^z Ἀλλὰ τὸν ἕνα Θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἕνα υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ λόγον καὶ εἰκόνα, ταῖς κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἡμῖν ἱκεσίαις καὶ ἀξιόσεσι σέβομεν, προσάγοντες τῷ Θεῷ

τῶν ὅλων τὰς εὐχὰς διὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς αὐτοῦ.—Orig. l. 8. p. 386.

^a Id. ibid.

^b Id. p. 395.

^c Id. p. 400.

only favourable unto such as be worthy, but they cooperate with them also that are willing to serve God over all, and are friendly to them, and pray with them, and entreat with them; so as we may be bold to say that when men, who with a resolution propose to themselves the best things, do pray unto God, many thousands of the sacred powers pray together with them uncalled upon^d." Here indeed we find that saints and angels do intercede in heaven in behalf of the saints on earth, but that is not the thing in dispute between us: but here we find no such thing at all as an invocation of them; but he says they pray together with us when we pray to God himself, not when we pray first to them to pray with us: for this Origen makes to be wholly needless; for if God be propitious to us, so will all the sacred powers be too. So that still we find in Origen that invocation was only to be made to God over all, although he saith, "that with those who do sincerely call upon God, the holy spirits do join with them." To the same purpose Arnobius speaks, when the heathens asked why they did not worship any inferior gods: *Satis est nobis*, saith he, *Deus primus*^e, "the supreme God is sufficient for us." *In hoc omne quod colendum est colimus; quod adorari convenit adoramus, quod obsequium venerationis poscit, venerationibus promeremur*; "in worshipping him, we worship all that is to be worshipped, we adore all that is fit to be adored, we procure favour by shewing reverence to all that require it:" where we are still to take notice, that the heathens did not blame them for not giving the highest kind of worship to these inferior deities, but for not worshipping them with the subordinate and relative worship which they said belonged to them. Now when in the answer he saith that in worshipping God they worshipped all that was to be worshipped, he utterly

^d Ἐνα οὖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν ἡμῖν ἐξευμενιστέον, καὶ τοῦτον ἴλεω εὐκτέον, ἐξευμενιζόμενον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ πάσῃ ἀρετῇ· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς βούλεται μετὰ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐξευμενίζεσθαι Θεόν· κατανοησάτω ὅτι ὥσπερ τῷ κινουμένῳ σώματι ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ τῆς σκιᾶ αὐτοῦ κίνησις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ ἐξευμενίζεσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεόν, ἔπεται εὐμενεῖς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐκείνου πάντας φίλους ἀγγέλους, καὶ ψυχὰς, καὶ πνεύματα· συναίσθονται γὰρ τῶν ἀξίων

τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ εὐμενισμοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐμενεῖς τοῖς ἀξίοις γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπράττονσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν θεραπεύειν, καὶ ἐξευμενίζονται, καὶ συνεύχονται, καὶ συναξιοῦσιν. ὥστε τολμᾶν ἡμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι ἀνθρώποις, μετὰ προαιρέσεως προτιθεμένοις τὰ κρείττονα, εὐχομένοις τῷ Θεῷ, μυρίαί ὅσαι ἀκλητοισυνεύχονται δυνάμεις ἱεραί.—Orig. l. 8. p. 420.

^e Arnob. l. 3.

destroys any such relative worship which may be given to inferior spirits.

§. 21. For we are to consider that the heathens themselves did not give the same kind of adoration to their heroes and inferior deities, which they did to him whom they accounted supreme. And setting aside the difference of the object, I can find no possible difference between the invocation of saints in the church of Rome, and that of demons among the heathens; and although Bellarmine^f hath taken the greatest pains to clear the nature of that worship which is given to saints, yet, upon a thorough examination of it, we shall find that all his pleas would have held as well for the worship of demons, in the Platonists' sense of them, as they do for the worship of saints among Christians. Three things he tells us adoration consists in:—an act of understanding, apprehending some excellency; an act of the will, whereby we are inwardly inclined to do something by an internal or external act, by which we declare our sense of that excellency, and our subjection to it; and lastly, an external act, in which we bow or kneel, or shew some outward sign of subjection. Now of these three he saith, the second is most proper and essential, because the first may be without adoration, and the last with irrision of that we pretend to worship. Further he observes that there are so many sorts of adoration or worship as there are degrees of excellency, of which he reckons three kinds, divine, human, and between both, as the grace and glory of the saints; and that these several sorts of worship, according to these several excellencies, are not univocal, but analogical; and that they may be very well distinguished by the internal acts, for the inclination of the will is greater or less according
553 to the degree of excellency apprehended in the object: but as to the external acts, it is not easy to distinguish them; for almost all external acts (sacrifice only, and the things referring to it, excepted) are common to all kinds of adoration. This is the substance of what he hath for explaining the nature of divine worship: and by which I cannot possibly see but that kind of worship which was given by the heathens to their demons, was defensible upon the same grounds that the

^f Bellarm. de Sanct. Beatit. l. i. c. 12.

invocation of saints is now: for as these apprehend a greater excellency in God than in the saints, so did they in the supreme God than in those inferior deities, which they did not acknowledge to have an infinite nature in themselves, but only that they had the honour of being solemnly worshipped bestowed upon them. But this will be much clearer in the case of the heroes, or the apotheosis of the Roman emperors, as Augustus for instance. The Roman senate decrees that divine honours shall be given to Augustus: we cannot think that by virtue of this decree he assumed a divine nature, or became absolutely God, so that the act of the understanding was of the same nature which it would have been supposing some Roman catholic should believe Augustus to have been a saint. On which supposition, we will suppose a heathen and him to be at their prayers together to him; I pray now tell me, wherein lies the difference, that one is idolatry, and the other is not? for neither of them suppose him to be the supreme God, both look on him as having a middle kind of excellency between God and man; the external actions are the same in both, and their apprehensions of excellency being equal, the inclinations of their wills to testify their devotion must be equal too. If you answer me, that one looks on him as a saint, and the other doth not, I may soon tell you that is nothing to the purpose; for the question is not, whether he was a saint or no, but whether the apprehension of a middle excellency between divine and human, with a correspondent inclination of the will, testified by external acts of adoration, be idolatry or no? If it be idolatry in the one, it must be in the other; for the *ratio formalis* is the same in both, viz. the apprehension of an excellency between divine and human; for we are not inquiring whether the apprehension be true or false, but what the nature of that act of religion is which is consequent upon such an apprehension. Now if it were not idolatry in him that believed Augustus to be a saint, and worshipped him, how can it be made appear to be so in him that believed him deified, or that divine honours did belong to him? And if this be granted, for my part I cannot tell how you can excuse the primitive Christians, that would rather suffer martyrdom than worship the heathen emperors; for although they all thought it idolatry, yet upon these principles

it could not be so; but the worst that could be made of it was this, that the senate took that upon it which it had nothing to do with, because it belonged to the pope to canonize men, and not to the Roman senate. For let me put it seriously to you, whether you do not attribute the very same kind of authority to the pope now, which the Roman senate challenged in the ἀποθέωσις of the Roman emperors? for whosoever will compare the rites of canonization in Bellarmine's with the ancient rites of the ἀποθέωσις, will find them exactly answering to each other. For, 1. they are put in a catalogue of saints, and must be owned by all for such. 2. *Invocantur in publicis ecclesiae precibus*, "they are prayed to in the public prayers of the church." 3. Temples and altars for their sake are dedicated to God. 4. The sacrifices of the eucharist, of prayers, and praises, are publicly offered to God for their honour; and then follow their festivals, images, relicks, &c. What was there more done then, that public divine honours were made to the deified emperors? not that these honours were wholly terminated upon them, but they thought the giving of this relative honour to them did redound to the
554 greater honour of the supreme Deity. So that we see a new object of divine worship is solemnly appointed upon the pope's canonizing a saint; and no pretence can be made to excuse this from idolatry, which would not have excused all those heathens from it, who believed there was one supreme Deity, and yet allowed divine honours to be given to such spirits which were employed by him or attended on him. So that if the notion of idolatry must only lie in such an act of the will which results from an apprehension of infinite excellency, which is only in the supreme Being, very few, if any, of the more intelligent heathens were ever guilty of it; but if the formal reason of their idolatry lay in offering up those devotions to that which was not God, which only belong to an infinite Being, I see not but the same charge will hold, on the same grounds, against those who invoke saints with those external acts of devotion which are confessed to be the same with those wherewith we call on God. But nothing can be more unreasonable than that Bellarmine should except sacrifices,

and things belonging thereto, from being common to the first and second sort of adoration, and not except invocation: for is it possible to conceive any act which doth more express our sense of an infinite excellency, and the profession of our subjection to it, than invocation doth? which doth it far more than sacrifice doth; for that, being a mere external act, is consistent with the greatest mockery of God; but solemn invocation implies in its own nature our dependence upon God, and an acknowledgment of his infinite knowledge and power. For invocation lies chiefly in the internal acts, and denotes primarily the inward desire of obtaining something from a being above our own; so that though I should grant the mere external acts of bowing and kneeling to be common to adoration given to infinite and finite perfections, yet I utterly deny that these acts are common to both, when the circumstances do determine the end and design of them: as no man, by the mere bowing of Abraham to the children of Heth, could tell whether it were civil or divine adoration which he meant; but none who understood all the circumstances of it would have any reason to question it. But suppose it had been declared before that these men expected a more than civil adoration, and that all the rites of solemn invocation which Abraham at any time used to God must be used to them too, then the same external acts must have received a new denomination. So that though the mere external acts be common to civil and religious worship, yet, as those acts are considered with their several circumstances, they are appropriated to one or the other of them: thus, though a man may use the same form of words to an emperor on his throne, and the same external posture which he doth use after his death in a temple consecrated to him, yet in the one they are merely signs of civil worship, but in the other they become testimonies of religious adoration. So, although in the invocation of saints no other words were used but such as denote them to be creatures still, yet if they be used with all the rites of solemn invocation, in places appropriate to divine worship, and in sacred offices, they thereby declare the adoration intended to be greater than any mere creature is capable of. For we must consider, that as God is owned to be infinite in himself, and to have incommunicable perfections, so, by reason of them,

there ought to be some appropriated acts or signs of worship to declare our subjection to him ; which being determined for this end, either by the law of God, or the consent of people, the attributing of them to any else but him is a public violation of his honour ; although in so doing men profess that they intend them only as expressions of a lower kind of worship than is due to the Supreme Being. But in such cases the protestation avails not, where the fact is evident to the contrary : for when men in the most solemn manner, in public places of devotion, and in sacred offices, do invoke saints, 555 and yet think they dishonour not God by it, because they say they do not worship them as God, it is just as if a man should upon all occasions in the presence chamber address himself to one of the king's subjects as to the king himself, and being questioned for it, should only say he did not dishonour the king by it, because he meant it not to him as a king, but as a subject : but by so much is the dishonour greater, because the sovereignty of the king doth require that the rights of majesty should not be given to any subject whatsoever. So that it is but a vain pretence, when men use all the expressions whereby we declare our sense of the infinite perfections which are in God to any creatures, to say they give them not that worship which belongs to God, merely because they do believe they are creatures still. But is it possible for men to give the honour which is due to God to the creatures, acknowledging them to be creatures still, or is it not ? If not, then none of the heathens could be guilty of idolatry in worshipping demons, heroes, and deified emperors : if it be possible, then the acknowledging the saints not to be God cannot excuse men from the same kind of idolatry in the invocation of them. And it is as frivolous a plea which is made for those forms of invocation which are made to the saints in plain terms, not to intercede with God for them, but to bestow upon them both temporal and spiritual blessings, (of which multitudes have been produced by our writers,) viz. that though the form of words be the same that is used to God, yet the sense is wholly that they would pray to God to bestow them : for how should any other sense be understood, when these forms are allowed in invocation ? For, although the scripture may sometimes attribute the effect to the subordinate instrument, as when

St. Paul is said to “save some,” yet certainly the scripture is far from allowing such a liberty in solemn invocation: for upon this ground it might have been lawful for men to have fallen down upon their knees to St. Paul, and have entreated him to save them. Do you think St. Paul would have approved such phrases in invocation? So that it is not the mere phrase, but as it is joined with all rites of invocation, which makes it look so like the most gross idolatry. When you pray to the virgin Mary to protect you from your enemies, and receive you in the hour of death, and to the apostles to heal your spiritual maladies, which forms are acknowledged by Bellarmine^h, can any reasonable man think that the meaning of them only is, that they would pray to God to do these things for them? If one should bring his petition to a courtier for his pardon, and in plain terms beg that of him which the king only can grant, what man, that had his wits about him, would ever imagine that he only meant by it that he would entreat the king to do it for him? But God is more jealous of his honour than to be put off by such mockeries as these are; nay, when your great men, at the end of their most elaborate works, conclude with a *Laus Deo et beatissimæ Virgini*, what can be meant by it but the attributing an honour of the same kind to the one as the other? And when prayers are made to saints, that through their merits they would do such things for them, it is hard conceiving the meaning should only be that they would pray to God for them. Nay, some have expressly said, that “God hath communicated that which of right belonged to him because of his divinity and omnipotency to the blessed Virgin and the saints, and that which is more wonderful, to their images too.” So Gulielmus Fabricius, in his approbation of Lipsius’s *Diva Virgo Hallensis*, which it is thought by some that Lipsius only writ in imitation of some heathen goddess; which may be a very probable account of that otherwise very unhappy undertaking of that learned man; and, as one said of the pen he offered to the Virgin, “nothing could be lighter, unless it were the book he wrote with itⁱ.”

^h De Sanct. Beatit. l. i. c. 17.

ⁱ Post Tacitum exactum, consummatosque labores
Pennam Lipsiades hanc tibi, Diva, dicat.
Nil potuit penna levius tibi Diva dicare,
Ni fuerit levius quod tibi scribit opus.

But that professed critic understood well enough the exact-
 556 ness of the parallel of the worship of the virgin Mary with
 that of the heathen goddesses, and therefore very suitably
 calls her *tutelarís diva*, by which his meaning might be guessed
 at, as Plato's was, by his using the name of *God*, or *gods*.
 But however that be, we are sure the parallel is so great be-
 tween the worship of saints in the church of Rome, and that
 of heroes and demons amongst the heathens, that if one be
 justified, the other cannot be condemned, and if one be con-
 demned, the other cannot be justified. So that from hence
 it follows, that the arguments used by the primitive Christians
 against that worship will hold against invocation of saints;
 because the heathens pleaded not for an absolute and sove-
 reign worship of them, but only such a kind of relative and
 subordinate worship as you profess to be due to saints. Thus
 much may suffice to clear the notion of worship in the primi-
 tive church, and to shew how far that was from approving
 your doctrine of *the invocation of saints*.

§. 22. The next argument I intended to have insisted on
 should have been the proving the divinity of Christ from the
 invocation of him, as Athanasius and several others do^k;
 which could signify nothing, if invocation were then allowed
 to saints. But this hath been so amply managed by others,
 and the sense of the church having been sufficiently disco-
 vered by our precedent discourse, I shall not need to insist
 any more on those foregoing times, but now come to that age
 of the church, wherein the honour of the martyrs seems to be
 advanced higher upon the ceasing of persecution. But still
 his lordship saith, "that the church then admitted not of the
 invocation of saints, but only of the commemoration of the
 martyrs, as appears clearly in St. Augustine, who saith,
 Although they be at the sacrifice named in their order, *non*
tamen a sacerdote qui sacrificat invocantur^l, 'they are not in-
 voked by the priest who sacrifices.'" Now to this you answer,

Lab. p. 291.
 n. 5.

"The father's meaning is, that the saints departed are not
 invocated, or called upon by way of sacrifice, i. e. as persons
 to whom the sacrifice is offered; which, you say, is a work of
 religion due to God only:" and this you prove was all that

^k Athanas. Orat. 4. cont. Arrian. Novatian. de Trin. c. 14.
 Greg. Nyssen. Orat. 4. cont. Eunom.

^l Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 22. c. 10.

St. Austin meant, "because in other places of his works, where he teaches that not only commemoration is made of the saints departed in time of sacrifice, but that it is done to this particular intent and purpose, viz. that they would pray for us; which doubtless amounts to a virtual invocation of them." And for this you produce several passages out of his works. Two things therefore must be inquired into: 1. What the meaning of St. Austin is, when he saith that the saints are not invoked at the sacrifice; 2. What his meaning is in those places wherein he allows of that you call *virtual invocation*, viz. that the saints would pray for us. 1. We are to inquire what St. Austin's meaning is, when he saith that the saints are not invoked at the sacrifice; "meaning no other," say you, "but the sacrifice of the mass," which you hope the reader will mark for St. Austin's sake; wherein you betray most egregious ignorance or fraud, if you either suppose the Christians called nothing else a sacrifice at that time but what you now call *the mass*, or that they did it in the same respect that you do now. A sacrifice of prayer and praise indeed they had, and a commemoration of Christ's sacrifice in the Lord's supper, but no such thing as a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead; and I pray mark this for your own sake. But, for our better understanding St. Austin's meaning, we must consider that he is there comparing the honours which the heathens gave to their heroes with those which the Christians give to the martyrs: "They," saith he, "to those gods of theirs build temples, erect altars, appoint priests, and offer sacrifices; but we do not build any temples to the martyrs as to gods, but raise sepulchres as to dead men whose spirits live with God; neither do we build altars, at which we may sacrifice to the martyrs, but we offer up a sacrifice only to the God of the martyrs and of us: at which sacrifice," saith he, "as holy men of God, who, through their 557 confession of him, have overcome the world, they are named in their place and order, but are not invoked by the priest who offers up the sacrifice." Two things may here be understood by the *sacrifice*; either the anniversary sacrifice of praise to God on the day of their *natalitia* or martyrdoms; or else the celebration of the eucharist, which was wont to be done at the *memoriæ martyrum*, chiefly upon that anniversary day.

Now there are many reasons to incline me to think that St. Austin doth not speak of any ordinary celebration of the eucharist, but of that anniversary solemnity which was wont to be kept at the tombs of the martyrs on the day of their sufferings; chiefly because St. Austin is here paralleling the honours of the martyrs with those of the heathen heroes, and therefore it was reason he should speak of the greatest solemnities which were used for them. Now it is certain that there were such anniversary days then kept (by many passages of those times, and somewhat before them), especially in the African churches; and at these they offered up solemn prayers and praises to God. Both which are clear from this passage of St. Cyprian; *Sacrificia pro iis semper ut meministis offerimus, quoties martyrum passiones et dies anniversaria commemoratione celebramus*^m: where we find an anniversary commemoration and sacrifices offered at them. What these sacrifices were, Rigaltius, in his observations on that place, tells us; *Christiani, saith he, sacris anniversariis, laudes Deo dicunt, commemoratis eorum nominibus qui pro fide Christo dicta martyrium fortiter obierunt*ⁿ. So that the sacrifice was a sacrifice of praise to God in behalf of the martyrs; at which they had their *orationum sacrificia* too, as Tertullian calls them, who saith, “Under the gospel the pure sacrifice is prayer to God^o;” and that the sinner being cleansed, ought to offer to God *munus apud templum, orationem scil. et gratiarum actionem apud ecclesiam per Jesum Christum catholicum patris sacerdotem*; “a sacrifice in his temple, viz. prayer and praise in his church through Jesus Christ, the catholic High Priest of his Father^p.” Hence St. Cyprian, *Quando in sacrificiis precem cum pluribus facimus*^q, which Rigaltius explains by the public prayers which the priest made for the people, and understands it wholly of the sacrifices of prayers. So that these solemn thanksgivings to God in behalf of the martyrs, and the prayers which were made for others, are those sacrifices which did belong to these anniversary solemnities, *Oblationes pro defunctis, pro natalitiis annua die facimus*^r: those

^m Cyprian. ep. 34. p. 53.

ⁿ Rigalt. Obs. ad Cyprian. p. 50.

^o Tertull. c. Marcion. l. 3. p. 497.

l. 4. p. 502.

^p P. 512. ed. Rigalt.

^q Cypr. ep. 15.

^r Tertull. de Coron. Milit. c. 3.

oblaciones pro natalitiis were nothing else but these solemn eucharistical sacrifices in behalf of the martyrs' sufferings, which were called their *natalitia*. Now to apply this to St. Austin: among the honours belonging to the martyrs, he mentions the sacrifice which was offered to God in commemoration of them; and what can this be other than on that anniversary solemnity which Tertullian and Cyprian mention, that was duly kept on that account? Now at this sacrifice, saith he, "they are named in their order, but not invocated:" which being understood of the anniversary day, and of the sacrifices of prayers and praises, nothing can be more express against invocation of saints than this place is: for if ever they were solemnly invocated, it certainly would be on the day of the great solemnity for them; and if then all prayers and praises were looked on as due only to God, as sacrifices belonging to him, then it cannot but be a robbing God of his honour, to offer up either prayers or praises to any but himself. But because it was the custom at those solemnities to have the eucharist administered, and that St. Austin afterwards mentions this, I shall not exclude the eucharist here, yet that sacrifice may still comprehend all the supplications which were then used; and if the saints were not invocated then, we have reason to conclude they were not at all. For the commemoration of the martyrs was made after the *Ite, missa est*, and the catechumens were departed; so that there was no such occasion for their invocation at any other time as then. 558 So that if there were no invocation of them at the sacrifice, much less was there out of it; since all the solemnities concerning the martyrs were used in the time of celebration. Thus we see this place of St. Austin is full and clear against invocation of saints, and we must now inquire into what he saith elsewhere. Only we take notice here, that St. Austin not only appropriates sacrifices as a thing peculiar to God, but temples and altars too; and that sacrifice which was then appropriated to God was not a propitiatory sacrifice, but eucharistical and supplicatory: and by consequence, if sacrifice only belongs to God, then all thanksgiving and invocation doth too; for both those, we see, were comprehended by the African fathers under the notion of sacrifice.

§. 23. We proceed now to inquire what St. Austin saith

elsewhere, whether he doth anywhere else allow invocation as due to saints: for which we must consider that St. Austin everywhere appropriates all acts of religion only to God^s; for he expressly saith, That we must only ask of God that good which we hope to do; that God alone must be served by the soul, because he alone is the Creator of it; and that every glorified rational creature is only to be loved and imitated: that we ought not to apply our religion to yield service to the dead; that they must be honoured for imitation, not worshipped for religion: that religion is nothing else but the worship of God, and therefore we ought not to consecrate ourselves to anything else by any religious rites: that those who have gone to angels instead of God have fallen into many illusions and deceitful fancies. Now is it conceivable that a person constant to himself should so often and on such good grounds assert that all acts of religion belong only to God, and yet withal ascribe religious invocation as due either to saints or angels? But we must further consider, that the ground of St. Austin's distinguishing between *λατρεία* and *δουλεία* was not to assert different degrees of religious worship, but to make different kinds of worship of those two; the one being properly religious worship, the other only *cultus dilectionis et societatis*, as he calls it, "a worship only of love and respect." So that we quarrel not with the distinction itself, but with your misapplying it: for St. Austin plainly makes the honour given to saints departed to be of the same nature with that which is given them while they live; "all the difference is," saith he, "we may render that honour to them with the more confidence after they have overcome^t;" but still adds that all religious worship is proper only to God. The only difficulty then is, what is to be understood by those other passages you produce out of him; and this we have gained already, that they cannot be understood of any religious worship without an apparent contradiction. Your first citation is, "That the commemoration of martyrs at the holy table is not that we should pray for them, but rather that

^s S. Augustin. Enchirid. c. 114. De Quantitate Animæ, c. 34. De Vera Relig. c. 55. De Civit. Dei, l. 10. c. 1, 4. l. 5. c. 15. l. 7. c. 32. Epist. 49. quæst. 3. Epist. 63. Con-

fess. l. 10. c. 42.

^t Colimus ergo martyres eo cultu dilectionis et societatis, quo et in hac vita coluntur sancti homines Dei.—Cont. Faustum, l. 20. c. 21.

they should pray for us^u." To the same purpose the second is, "That it is an injury to pray for a martyr, to whose prayers we ourselves ought to be recommended^v." The only things which can be drawn from hence are, that the martyrs do pray for the church on earth, and that we ought to recommend ourselves to their prayers; but what is this to an invocation of them, when it doth not so much as imply a direct desire of them to pray for us; when this recommending ourselves to the prayers of the martyrs is probably understood of nothing else but a desire that God would hear the prayers which the saints in heaven do make on our behalf, without any address to the martyrs themselves that they would pray for us? which seems very unreasonable, without good assurance that they did hear or understand those requests of that nature which are made to them. It is not therefore the saying that the saints do pray for us, which makes it either lawful or profitable for us to pray to them: for since they ascribe 559 that honour as alone due to God, so ought we to do too; and I can hardly see how the very praying to saints to pray for us, being performed with all the rites of solemn and religious invocation, can be excused from attributing that honour to the creature which is due only to the Creator. And therefore I cannot but wonder at those who would make this only of the same nature with our desiring fellow Christians to pray for us; for is there no difference between a man's entreating a courtier to present his petition to the king, and his falling down on his knees to him with all the ceremony due to the king himself, and then put it off with saying, that in all that he only desired him to sue to his majesty in his behalf? Although therefore we condemn not the solemn praying to God, not only to hear the prayers of the church militant, but of that part of it which is triumphant in behalf of the other in general, yet this falls far short of solemn addresses in places of divine worship, and in sacred offices to the saints, that they would pray for us. This is it which, as to that you call *virtual invocation*, you should have proved out of St. Austin; and yet even that falls much short of that direct and formal invocation which is both used and allowed in the church of Rome.

^u Tract. 84. in Johan.^v De Verbis Ap. serm. 17. (not.) 34.

But you offer at a further proof of a direct *ora pro nobis* in St. Austin: "for," say you, "St. Austin^x doth profess it to be the general custom of Christians, in their recommending themselves to the saints, to say, *Memor esto nostri*; which surely no man will contend to signify less than *Ora pro nobis*." I grant it signifies as much where St. Austin uses it; but if you had consulted the place, you might easily have seen how wholly impertinent it is to your purpose: for St. Austin speaks not at all there of saints departed, but of them living; and that it was a common thing among Christians to say to any one of them, *Memor esto mei*, Remember me in your prayers; which appears by the whole scope of that chapter, where he speaks of giving alms, and the effect of them on those who received them in making them mindful of them. It cannot be denied but some of them did use such expressions to those who were near their martyrdom; but still this only shews the requesting it of them when they were sure they heard them, but it proves not any solemn invocations of them when they were dead. But if we should grant that there are expressions intimating a desire that saints in heaven should pray for them, which is the utmost you can make of the citation out of the sermon on St. Stephen, (which with the rest *de sanctis* is vehemently suspected, and the other on Job is counterfeit,) yet there is a great deal of difference to be put between such a calling upon martyrs (of whom only St. Austin speaks) out of a desire of their prayers, and a solemn and direct praying to them in the most sacred offices and public devotions, which is used and approved in your church: for whatever there might be of private devotion (not to call it superstition) this way in St. Austin's time, in desiring the prayers of departed saints, whom they could have no ground at all to believe they heard them, yet you can bring no evidence of any use of this in the public offices of the church, much less of that direct invocation which we most of all charge your church with. That then which began in mere hypothetical addresses went somewhat further when they began to grow more confident that in some extraordinary way or other the saints heard them; but still this kept itself within the bounds of the *cultus*

^x De Civit. Dei, l. 21. c. 27.

dilectionis et societatis, that respect which arose from love and communion; but it was a good while after before it obtained a place in the public offices, and yet longer before it came to that height of religious invocation, which is more practised than pleaded for in the church of Rome. For although great endeavours be used to smooth over these gross abuses with fair distinctions of relative and absolute, direct and indirect worship; yet the general practice is incapable of being palliated by these narrow coverings, there being the most formal 560 and direct invocations used to saints for spiritual and temporal blessings. Which being allowed of in common practice and the most sacred offices, can never be excused from as great idolatry as the heathens were guilty of in the worship of their inferior deities. I conclude this therefore with that of Spalatensis^y: Religious invocation of saints is heathenism; and mere civil invocation of them, though not so bad, is yet dangerous. And therefore Wicelius justly saith^z, “that the invocation of saints is to be cast out of the church, because it ascribes God’s honour and attributes to his creatures, and derogates from the office and glory of Christ by making saints mediators and intercessors.”

§. 24. Which is that we now come to consider. For, as his lordship saith, “when the church prayed to God for any thing, she desired to be heard for the mercies and the merits ^{Conf. p. 232. sect. 33. n. 13.} of Christ, and not for the merits of any saints whatsoever. For I much doubt this were to make the saints more than mediators of intercession, which is all that you will acknowledge you allow to the saints. For, I pray, is not by the merits more than by the intercession? Did not Christ redeem us by his merits? And if God must hear our prayers for the merits of the saints, how much fall they short of sharers in the mediation of redemption? Such prayers as these the church of Rome makes at this day, and they stand (not without great scandal to Christ and Christianity) used and authorized to be used in the Missal.” To this you answer in two things: 1. That such prayers as these are used in scripture; ^{Lab. p. 292.} 2. That they are no derogation to the merits of Christ. For ^{n. 6.} the first, you say, “Solomon, Psalm cxxxii, prays to God to

^y Spalat. Osten. err. Suarez. c. 2. sect. 20.

^z Wicel. Via regia de Invocat. Sanct.

hear him, in effect, for the merits of his father David deceased, when he saith, *Memento, Domine, David et omnis mansuetudinis ejus*; ‘Lord, remember David and all his meekness,’ &c. This,” you say, “cannot be understood of God’s covenant and promise made to David, (as protestants vainly pretend,) but of David’s piety and virtue, by which he was acceptable to God. For which reason he adds again, ‘For thy servant David’s sake, turn not away the face of thine anointed.’ The like was done by Daniel, Moses, Hieremias, and other prophets, praying unto God, and desiring their petitions might be heard for Abraham, for Isaac, for Israel’s sake, and for the sakes of other holy men who had lived before, and been in their times persons acceptable to God.” And for this you quote St. Austin and Chrysostom. So far you have very fairly rendered Bellarmine^a exactly in English. But we are yet to seek, why all those expressions in scripture are not to be understood of the covenant and promise God made with those persons who are mentioned by you. For it is considerable, that you instance in none but such whom God had made an express covenant with, as with the patriarchs and with David. But since you say that this answer hath not the least ground from the text, therein you outdo Bellarmine, and speak that which the text evidently contradicts you in. For Psalm cxxxii. 11, next after those very words, “For thy servant David’s sake,” it follows, “The Lord hath sworn in truth unto David;” and in the following verse the covenant God made with David is mentioned: “If thy children will keep my covenant and my testimony that I shall teach them, their children also shall sit upon thy throne for evermore.” You had then much consulted the text when you say, this exposition had not the least ground from it; for that speaks expressly of the promise and covenant which God made with David. And what you add to the text, of David’s piety and virtue, we may more justly say, hath not the least ground from it. For the word doth not signify *meekness* but *affliction*, and therefore Aquila renders it *κακουχίας*, Symmachus *κακώσεως*, and some old copies *ταπεινώσεως*, all referring, not to David’s *merits*, but to his *sufferings*. And it is not improbably

^a De Sanct. Beatit. l. I. c. 19.

conceived by some, that this psalm is not of Solomon's penning, but of David's, and that at the time when the ark was to be brought back from the house of Obededom to Hierusalem. And in all those other places of scripture mentioned, 561 referring to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the scripture is very plain, that they are to be understood of the covenant God made with them; as appears by the very words of Moses, "Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel thy servants, to Exod. 32. whom thou swarest by thine own self," &c. And God himself ^{13.} speaks often of his remembering his covenant which he made Exod. vi. with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and that is the ground ^{5, 8.} why the prophets afterwards plead the remembrance of those Levit. xxvi. 42. 45. persons, because the covenant made with them was the foundation of all those blessings which the children of Israel expected afterwards. The utmost that can be made of St. Augustine's testimony is ^b, that God may sometimes shew favour to a people that hath deserved ill at his hands for the sake of such as pray for them; as he did to the people of Israel for the sake of Moses. And all that St. Chrysostom saith is ^c, "that God may shew mercy to wicked men for the sake of their righteous ancestors who are dead." But this is no more than he hath promised, that he will shew mercy to them that love him to the third and fourth generation. But there is a great deal of difference to be made between the expressions of God's bounty and the foundation of our prayers, which ought to be only a promise of God. And in this case we deny it not to be lawful to pray that God would remember his promise; but that is a quite different thing from praying that we may receive blessings through the merits of the saints in heaven. So that it cannot be hence concluded, that it is no unwarrantable thing to pray that God would hear us for the merits of the saints.

§. 25. But this will be further explained now we come to see how you vindicate this from being any derogation to the merits of Christ. "We believe," say you, "and confess, that Lab. p. 293. Christ alone is our Redeemer; and that he, and none but he, ^{n. 6.} by the just price of his most precious blood, hath paid our ransom, and fully satisfied the justice of God for our sins: all

^b Aug. in *Exod. quæst.* 49.

^c Chrysost. *hom.* 42. in *Gen.* *hom.* 27. in *Matt.*

that we desire of the saints, either when we mention their merits to God, or simply beg their intercession with God for us, is only that they would join with us in prayer to God, and that God would be pleased for their sakes, whose works were so grateful to him, to bestow on us the favours we ask."

When things are so odious in the practice of them that they cause all persons of any ingenuity among yourselves to cry out upon them, then your arts are, to let the same practices continue still, but to find out some plausible pretext to colour them over with. As it is here in the business of praying to saints, and making them thereby to be mediators between God and us; which implying so great dishonour to the all-sufficiency of the merits and intercession of Christ, you are fain to find out the fairest excuses you can make for it, although the practices still continue which overthrow all the distinctions you use. Thus it is plain, that direct and formal prayers in your church are made to saints; but, you say, "these are only to entreat them to pray for us;" you pray

Conf. p. 232.
sect. 33.
n. 13.

expressly, (as his lordship tells you,) "that God by the merits and prayers of saints would deliver you from the fire of hell; that you may obtain the glory of eternity by their merits; and that God would absolve you from your sins by their interceding merits:" and yet for all this, you would have us believe, that you offer no derogation at all to the merits and intercession of Christ. But is it not the great honour of Christ that his merits and intercession alone are all-sufficient to procure all spiritual blessings for us? And can any spiritual blessings be greater than deliverance from hell, eternal glory, and the forgiveness of sins? And when you pray for all these through the merits of the saints, how can you possibly more disparage the all-sufficiency of the merits of Christ? For if those be sufficient, what need any more? Will God grant that for the merits of the saints, which he would not do for the intercession of Christ? or do we want the merits of the saints to apply the merits of Christ? But still
562 something of weakness and defect must be implied in them, if some further additional merits be wanting for the application of the former. If a prince should declare to some of his father's subjects, that he would satisfy his father's displeasure, and intercede for them that they should have an absolute

pardon; would it not argue a distrust of the prince's interest to solicit some inferior attendants to entreat the king to pardon them for their sakes? And it is here a plain case, whatever you pretend, that you do not only pray that the saints would join in prayer to God with you, but you run to them for help and assistance, in order to the obtaining the greatest spiritual blessings from God. For so the council of Trent expressly defines^d, "that it is not only good and profitable to invoke the saints, but *ob beneficia impetranda a Deo per Christum ad eorum orationes, opem auxiliumque confugere*; for the obtaining of blessings from God through Christ, we ought to fly to their prayers, help, and assistance." If nothing else were meant, but only that the saints should pray for us, what means *help* and *assistance* mentioned as distinct from their prayers? And the Roman Catechism^e more fully delivers it, (which was published by order of the council of Trent,) viz. "that saints are not only to be invocated because of their prayers to God, but because God bestows many blessings on us *eorum merito et gratia*, by their merits and favour;" and after adds, *Rogati et peccatorum veniam impetrabunt, et conciliabunt nobis Dei gratiam*; "Being asked, they will obtain the pardon of sin, and procure for us the favour of God." And what can be more said concerning Christ himself? Although therefore you say never so much, that your prayers are made to the saints through the merits of Christ, and that you conclude all your prayers *per Christum Dominum nostrum*, yet all this cannot clear you from offering the greatest dishonour to the merits and intercession of Christ, since it is plain you rely on the saints' merits in order to the obtaining the blessings you pray for. But, say you, "if the saints being rewarded in heaven for their merits be not injurious to the fulness of Christ's merits, why should their being heard by virtue of those merits, when they pray to God for us through Christ, or our desire that they may be heard for them, be thought injurious to Christ's merits?" To which I answer, Those merits which you suppose in saints when they are rewarded in heaven, have either an equal proportion with the reward they receive, or not. If not, then they cease to be merits, and

^d Concil. Trident. sess. ult.^e Catech. Rom. p. 3. p. 504.

the giving the reward (though an act of justice, the promise supposed,) yet in itself is wholly an act of grace and favour; if they have, then the full recompense is received by that reward, and nothing further can be obtained for others on their account. But in the sense it is to be suspected you take *merits* in, we as well assert, that the proportioning the reward in heaven to the merits of saints is injurious to the fulness of Christ's merits, as their obtaining mercies for others by reason of them. Only this latter adds to the dishonour, in that there is not only supposed a proportion between heaven and them, but, as though that were not enough, a further efficacy is attributed to them, for obtaining mercies for others too. His lordship therefore does not go about to pervert the sense of the prayers used in your Missal; but the plain words and sense of them evidently shew how contrary they are to Christian doctrine and piety. Bellarmine's saying, that the saints may in some sense be called our *redeemers*, cannot be vindicated by that saying of St. Paul, that he "became all things to all men, that he might save some;" because *salvation* respects the effect of Christ's death, the promotion of which may in some sense be attributed to the instruments of it, such as St. Paul was here on earth; but *redemption* respects the merits by which that effect was obtained, and so belongs wholly to Christ, and cannot be attributed to any saints either in earth or heaven. When you can prove that any subordinate instruments of God's power are called *numina*, 563 you may then excuse Bellarmine for calling the saints so; but that is so incongruous a sense of the word that it needs no confutation.

§. 26. We are now come to the last error which his lordship here charges your pretended general councils with, which is concerning adoration of images. Of which his lordship says, Conf.p.233. "that the ancient church knew it not. And the modern sect. 33. church of Rome is too like to paganism in the practice of it, n. 13. and driven to scarce intelligible subtleties in her servants' writings that defend it. And this without any care had of millions of souls unable to understand her subtleties or shun her practice." Here you say, "the bishop is very bitter;" but no more than the nature of the thing required. All the answer you return to this lies in these things: 1. That the Lab. p. 294. n. 7.

church of Rome teaches nothing concerning the worship of images, but what the second council of Nice did nine hundred years ago; which is, that they must be had in veneration and due reverence, but not have divine worship given to them. 2. That images were in common use and veneration too among Christians in the ancient church. 3. That what abuses are crept in, are not to be imputed to the church, but to particular persons. This is the substance of what you say to the end of the chapter; as to which a brief answer will suffice, because I design not a full handling the question of the worship of images. If that which you say in the first place be true, it doth the more prove that which his lordship intends, viz. that not one barely, but two of those you own to be general councils, have erred in this particular. If either those councils or you had intended to have dealt fairly and honestly with the world, they and you should have declared what that veneration and reverence is which is due to images; what difference you put between that and the worship due to God; and whether the same pretences and excuses would not as well have justified the pagan idolatries? For this was it which his lordship charged you with, that you came too near paganism in your practice. But as to this you answer nothing, but that if you do, so did the council of Nice too. But is that a sufficient excuse for you? It is well enough known what kind of council that was; how much it was opposed by the synod of Frankford; how many persons both in the eastern and western churches declared themselves against the doctrine of it. But what a pitiful plea is it for you to say, "that the council of Trent had silenced all calumnies by saying, that you attribute no divinity to the images, but only worship them with such honour and reverence as is due to them?" Would not any considerate heathens have said as much as this is? But the question is, whether that veneration of them which is used by you towards images be due to them, or no? This you should have undertaken, and set the distinct limits between the worship due to God and that which is given to these. You should have proved that this is no prohibited way of worship; for if it be, it can in no sense be due to them. For since God may determine the modes of his own worship, what he hath forbidden in his service becomes unlawful; and so

long as that command continues in force, all acts of worship contrary to it are a positive kind of idolatry. For as there is a kind of natural idolatry lying in the worship of false gods instead of the true; so there is that which may be called *positive idolatry*, which is a worshipping God in a way or manner which he hath forbidden. From whence the Israelites in the golden calf, and the ten tribes in the worship of the calves at Dan and Bethel, are charged with idolatry, although they acknowledged the true God, and designed that for a relative worship to him. If it were so then, you should have shewed us how it comes to be otherwise now; where it was God repealed the second commandment; or what there was in it typical and ceremonial, that it must cease to oblige at Christ's coming; or what reasons it was built on which
 564 were only proper to the Jews, and cannot extend to the Christians too; and why relative worship, and the helps for memory and devotion would not as well have justified the use and worship of images before Christ as after; and why the same reasons from the danger of idolatry, low conceptions of God, (and what other reasons you will give of that prohibition then,) may not hold as well still. These and many other things, if you would have vindicated the practice of your church, you ought to have insisted on. But since you omit them wholly, and think to put us off with repeating the decree of the council of Trent, you only shew the weakness of your cause, and of those unintelligible subtleties which are used to defend it.

§. 27. To what his lordship saith, "that in Optatus his time the Christians were much troubled upon but a false report, that an image was to be placed upon the altar^f; what would they have done if adoration had been commanded?" You answer, "that it was either some idol, or common image of a man, or of the emperor, or the governor of the province," or something or other, but you cannot tell what. But if it had been any of all these, how easy had it been for them to have vindicated themselves by saying, that if it had been the image of Christ, or some saint, they would then have worshipped it, but they could not otherwise? But we see, it was not

^f Optat. l. 3.

because it was such or such an image that the displeasure was taken, but that it was any at all; and this was then justly looked on as a strange thing, being so contrary to the practice of the Christian church from Christ's time till that. This you deny, and say, "that the images of Christ and the saints were in common use and veneration too amongst Christians in the ancient church." How is it possible to deal with you, that dare with so much confidence obtrude such notorious falsities upon the world? there being scarce any thing imaginable in which there are more express testimonies for so many ages together, than against the use or veneration of images in the ancient church. With what scorn and contempt do the primitive Christians reject the use of images, and that, not in regard of an absolute, but a relative worship? If you had read the discourses of the Christians in the primitive times, such as Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen against Celsus, Tertullian, Minutius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius, Athanasius, Eusebius, St. Augustine, where they dispute against the heathens, not merely for worshipping idols, but for any worship of images, though merely as they are signs or symbols of the proper objects of worship, you could not possibly have uttered so gross a falsehood as that foregoing, unless you were resolved to offer violence to your conscience in it. If you think the council of Trent brings off all this by saying, "Men must not believe there is any divinity in images," and that it was the worship which arose from such an apprehension which the fathers disputed against; I assure you, you are greatly deceived. For there is no such difference between the heathens' apprehensions and yours, as to the worship of images, as you imagine. "Who is such a fool," saith Celsus^g, "to think that these are gods, and not the bare images of them?" "You are greatly mistaken," saith the heathen in Arnobius^h, "if you think that we worship the images for gods; no, we worship the gods by and through them:" and therefore saith, "that the ancients were not ignorant that the images had neither sense nor divinity in them, but only that the rude and ignorant people wanted such things to put them in mind of the gods." What is there more than this that you have to

^g Orig. c. Cels. l. 7.^h Arnob. l. 6.

plead for the use of them? *Non ipsa timemus simulachra*, (say the heathens in Lactantiusⁱ;) *sed eos ad quorum imaginem ficta, et quorum nominibus consecrata sunt*; “We worship not the images, but them to whom they are consecrated;” which in your language is, “they give them not an absolute, but a relative worship.” *Nec^k simulachrum nec dæmonium colo, sed*
565 *per effigiem corporalem ejus rei signum intueor, quam colere debeo*, saith the heathen in St. Augustine; “I neither worship the image, nor the demon in it, but only by that visible representation I am put in mind of that which I ought to worship.” If you say, this was not the common sense of them, but only some more subtle men asserted this, because they could not defend their gross idolatries otherwise; the very same is most true of yourselves; your distinctions are such which the people are not capable of in the worship they give; and they only serve to answer those who dislike so palpable an imitation of heathenism as is in the worship of images. And it will be hard to find that any heathens had any higher thoughts of their images, or used greater acts of worship towards them, than the people of your church do. For are not miraculous operations among you ascribed to images of saints? And what greater testimony of divinity can be supposed in them? Do not they fall down in the most devout manner to them, and make the most formal addresses before them? and that not merely with a respect to what is represented, but with a worship belonging to the images themselves? And what more than this did ever the heathens do? So that those fathers who so much condemned that use and veneration of images which was among the heathens, must needs be understood to condemn as much that in your church too. And thence Eusebius^l ascribes the setting up the statue at Paneas to a heathen custom; thence Epiphanius^m rent the veil at Anablatha, wherein the image of Christ or some saint was drawn; thence the council of Elvira in Spainⁿ forbids the placing of pictures in churches, lest that which is worshipped or adored should be painted on walls; thence St. Augustine^o condemns the worshippers of pictures;

ⁱ Lact. l. 2. c. 2.^k Aug. in Ps. 113. c. 2.^l Euseb. Hist. l. 7. c. 18.^m Epiph. Ep. ad Joh. Hieros.ⁿ Concil. Eliber. can. 36.^o Aug. de Morib. Eccl. Cath. c. 34.

thence the very art of painting was condemned in the ancient church, as appears by Clemens Alexandrinus and Tertullian^p; and after all this, is it possible to believe what you say, viz. “that images were in common use and veneration too in the ancient church?” But surely we shall have some evident proof for so bold an assertion: it were well if there were any thing looked like it. For all that you produce is only, “that in Tertullian’s time the Christians were abused with the nickname of *crucis religiosi*; and that in Chrysostom’s time the cross made a glorious show upon the altar.” And are not these invincible proofs for the veneration of images in the ancient church? But why do you not as well say, the Christians worshipped an ass’s head, the sun, and Ononychites? for all these are in the same chapter^q, and equally reckoned among the false accusations of the Christians. But it seems you had rather believe the heathens’ objection than the Christians’ denial, whose answer we find express to the contrary in Minutius Felix^r, *Cruces nec colimus, nec optamus*; “We neither wish for, nor worship crosses;” and Tertullian, in answer to the former cavil, saith, *Quod colimus nos, Deus unus est*; “That which we worship is only God.” They were then strangers to any such distinctions of worship as you have invented to answer such places with, viz. that they did not worship them absolutely, but relatively. And for all that I can perceive, by the same distinctions you may prove that the Christians did worship demons and heroes; for although they deny it never so much, I may as well say, they meant only by it, that they did not worship them with the worship proper only to God, but with an inferior and relative worship, as you say as much concerning images; by which art you may evade all denials whatsoever. For your place of St. Chrysostom, the most that Bellarmine makes of it is^s, “that in his time the cross was wont to be painted in all places, in cities, houses, chambers, vessels,” not a word in him of *altars*, which he would not have left out, had he found any such thing in him, but you intended to take care we should not search too far, by not referring us to the edition of St. Chrysostom which

^p Clem. Alex. Protrept. Tertull.
ad Hermog. init.

^q Tertull. Apolog. c. 16.

^r Minut. Fel. p. 33.

^s Bellarm. de Imag. Sanct. l. 2.
c. 28.

you or your author made use of. But what is all this to the
 566 veneration of the cross, if we grant that it did make a glorious
 show on the altar? Could it not make a glorious show unless
 they all fell down and worshipped it? And can you think now
 that these testimonies are sufficient, against the whole strain
 of antiquity, to persuade men that the veneration of images
 was used in the ancient church? But you are men who can
 believe what you have a mind to; any word, clause, or imper-
 tinent allegation, that doth but seem afar off to cast an eye
 towards you, is presently the consent of all antiquity, when
 the most pregnant testimonies of the best writers of the
 church against you are pished at and scorned, or else eluded
 with most frivolous interpretations, or lastly suspected with-
 out any shadow of reasons: as the epistle of Epiphanius and
 the canon of the Eliberine council have been in this present
 controversy. When you shall produce your other testimonies,
 an answer shall attend them; but you must not think the
 story of the statue at Paneas, which Eusebius attributes to a
 heathenish custom, (besides the many improbabilities in it,)
 will ever persuade us that the Christians did then worship
 images. But it would now take up too much time to examine
 that particularly, with others of a like nature. What I have
 said already being sufficient to give an account of the sense of
 the primitive church as to this subject, which is our present
 business.

§. 28. We pass by the resemblance between the feasts
 at the oratories of martyrs and the heathen *parentalia*, be-
 cause you say now it seems wholly extirpated. And I would
 not charge you with more faults than you are guilty of, since
 you have enough without it. An evidence of which is your
 discarding all persons from your communion, who are not such
 bigots as to approve all the abuses and corruptions among
 you: which sufficiently appears by your censure of Cassander;

Lab. p. 298. n. 11. “who,” you say, “seemed to many to halt between God and

Baal; and, although he was not actually excommunicate, yet
 you would have us believe he was meritoriously so, because he
 favoured heresy so much.” By which we see, that we must
 not judge all of the Roman communion who profess them-
 selves to be of it, for so Cassander did to his death. But
 whoever offer to find the least fault with the practices or

doctrine of your church, let them pretend never so much to be of it, yet they may be excommunicate *sententia juris*; and so not only Cassander, but Erasmus, Espenœus, Ferus, Barns, Picherellus, and all other persons of reason and ingenuity among you, ought not to be looked on as persons of your communion, whatever their pretences be. It seems your church bears none but Hectors, and in a short time none shall be accounted papists but Jesuits: but it is hard to determine whether this discovers more the corruption or tyranny of your church; which loves her degeneracy so much, that she proscribes all who dare in the least to tell her of her faults. But how can she be found fault with, that takes such excellent care to prevent all abuses, as appears by the caution of the council of Trent in the present case of your worship of images? For, say you, “as to any matter of abuse in this kind, crept in amongst the ignorant, we have already shewn how careful the council of Trent was to prevent and provide against all inconveniencies that could reasonably be foreseen or feared.” So it seems, by the admirable caution used by the council to prevent giving undue worship to images, by telling men, they must only give that which was due; when all the question was, what was due, and what not. So it seems, by the care used to instruct the people concerning the nature of divine worship and the danger of idolatry. So it seems, by the leaving out the second commandment in the offices of frequent use, lest the people’s consciences should check them for doing that which God had severely prohibited. So it seems, by the unintelligible subtleties concerning the kind of that worship which is to be given to the image; when yet a mistake there makes the person who gives it guilty 567 of idolatry. So it seems, by the continuance of the most gross abuses in this nature still in your church, in this matter of images. Of which such things are related by eyewitnesses, that the most gross heathen idolatries were not more unreasonable, absurd, and ridiculous than they are. And if people continue ignorant and sottish enough, all is well; but if with Cassander they charge you with any corruptions, then they stand meritoriously excommunicate: and it is well if they escape so; for although Cassander did, father Barns did not. But, plead as long as you will for the care your church hath taken

Lab. p. 297.
n. 10.

to prevent all abuses in the worship of images, as long as the worship of images continues, it is impossible to prevent the abuses in it; since that is a great abuse itself, and gives occasion to all others. For the vindication of your doctrine depends on such metaphysical niceties, which the minds of people are incapable of; and, however they may serve you in disputation, are impossible to be reconciled with the practice of your church, and the apprehensions of those who yield the worship you allow to images. And therefore it is no wonder

Lab. p. 298.
n. 11.

at all what Llamas relates of the Spanish people, "that they were so besotted on their old wormeaten images, that when they were to have new ones in their rooms, they begged with tears to have their old ones still." But although you "grant these people guilty of indiscretion, yet by no means of idolatry, because they did not call them their gods." If you think none were idolaters but such as did believe their images to be gods, I doubt you may find the number of atheists as great as that of idolaters in the world. But if we may guess at people's apprehensions by their actions, these seemed as much to believe them to be gods as any heathens you can instance in. Your vindication of Llamas from saying, "that the images of Christ and the saints, as they represent their exemplars, have deity or divinity in them;" as it is undertaken somewhat

Lab. p. 299.
n. 11.

fearfully, "because," you say, "you hope to clear his meaning, whatever his words seem to import:" so at last it stands on the sandy foundation of relative and absolute worship, which being taken away, that and your images fall together.

Conf. p. 235.
sect. 33.
n. 13.

I conclude this subject with his lordship's wish; "That men of learning would not strain their wits to spoil the truth, and rent the peace of the church of Christ, by such dangerous, such superstitious vanities. For better they are not, but they may be worse:" and I fear are so.

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SALVATION IN THE ROMAN CHURCH.

Protestants' concessions ought not to be any ground to prefer the communion of the church of Rome.—How far those concessions extend.—The uncharitableness of Romanists, if they yield not the same to us.—The weakness of the arguments to prove the Roman church the safer way to salvation on protestant principles.—The dangerous doctrines of Romanists about the easiness of salvation by the sacrament of penance.—The case paralleled between the Donatists and Romanists in denying salvation to all but themselves; and the advantages equal from their adversaries' concessions.—The advantage of the protestants, if that be the safest way which both parties are agreed in, manifested and vindicated in several particulars.—The principle itself at large shewed to be a mere contingent proposition, and such as may lead to heresy and infidelity.—The case of the leaders in the Roman church, and others, distinguished.—The errors and superstitions of the Roman church make its communion very dangerous in order to salvation.

§. 1. **T**HE main thing which now remains to be discussed is, whether the communion of your church or ours be rather to be chosen in order to salvation. For that being the great end of our faith, the tendency to the promotion of that ought to be the rule by which we should embrace or continue in the society of any church; and since the regard men ought to have of their eternal welfare doth oblige them to make choice of the best means in order to it, the bare remote possibility of salvation in any church ought to have no force or consideration at all in the determining their choice in a matter of so great importance. As, supposing a pilot at sea, whose only desire is to bring his ship safe into his desired port, should be told that there are two passages homewards, the one free and open, in which there is no danger, the other amidst many rocks and shelves, in which yet there is a possibility of escaping; would not he be accounted a very weak man that should choose this latter way merely because it is possible he may escape, and neglect the other, in which there is no danger of miscarrying? So it is here in our present case;

the protestants confess there is a possibility for some to escape in the communion of the Roman church, but it is as men may escape with their lives in a shipwreck; but they undertake to make it evident there can be no danger if they observe the principles of protestant religion; would it not be madness in any then to neglect this, and make choice of the other, merely because protestants agree with you that there is a possibility of salvation for some in the Roman church? Yet this is the great argument you make use of, whereby to proselyte such persons who want judgment enough to discern the weakness and sophistry of it. That therefore we are now to inquire into is, whether your communion or ours be more eligible upon principles of reason and prudence in order to salvation? And two things are insisted on in behalf of your church: first, That protestants grant the possibility of salvation in your church, but you deny it in ours, and therefore yours is the safer way; secondly, That the faith of protestants doth not stand upon those sure grounds which your faith doth.

§. 2. As to the first, there are two things to be considered:

1. How far we grant a possibility of salvation to those in your church;
2. What can be inferred from that concession

569 in the choice of religion. The occasion of entering upon this debate was the lady's query, whether she might be saved in the Roman faith; to which his lordship answers in general,

Conf.p.236. "That the ignorant, that could not discern the errors of that
sect. 34. church, so they held the foundation, and conformed themselves to a religious life, might be saved;" and more particularly to

the lady, "that it must needs go harder with her even in point of salvation, because she had been brought to understand very much for one of her condition, in these controverted causes of religion. And a person that comes to know much had need carefully bethink himself, that he oppose not known truth against the church that made him a Christian; for salvation may be in the church of Rome, and they not find it that make surest of it." And after, he explains himself more fully,

Conf.p.236. "That *might be saved* grants but a possibility, no sure or safe
sect.35.n.1. way to salvation: the possibility, I think," saith he, "cannot be denied to the ignorants, especially because they hold the foundation, and cannot survey the building: and the foundation can deceive no man that rests upon it; but a secure way

they cannot go that hold with such corruptions when they know them. Now whether it be wisdom, in such a point as salvation is, to forsake a church in which the ground of salvation is firm, to follow a church in which it is but possible one may be saved, but very probable he may do worse, if he look not well to the foundation; judge ye." So that still his lordship asserts the protestants' way to be the only safe way to salvation; and that in the church of Rome there is only a limited possibility of it, which is such that he says A. C. or his fellows can take little comfort in: for, as he after declares himself, "many protestants indeed confess, there is salvation possible to be attained in the Roman church, but yet they say withal that the errors of that church are so many, (and some so great as weaken the foundation,) that it is very hard to go that way to heaven, especially to them that have had the truth manifested:" and a little after, "'but we have not so learned Christ,' as either to return evil for evil in this heady course, or to deny salvation to some ignorant silly souls, whose humble peaceable obedience makes them safe among any part of men that profess the foundation Christ." And in another place, "I do indeed for my part (leaving other men free to their own judgment) acknowledge a possibility of salvation in the Roman church; but so as that which I grant to Romanists is not as they are Romanists, but as they are Christians, that is, as they believe the Creed and hold the foundation Christ himself, not as they associate themselves wittingly and knowingly to the gross superstitions of the Roman church. And I am willing to hope there are many among them which keep within that church, and yet wish the superstitions abolished which they know, and which pray to God to forgive their errors in what they know not, and which hold the foundation firm, and live accordingly, and which would have all things amended that are amiss, were it in their power. And to such I dare not deny a possibility of salvation for that which is Christ's in them, though they hazard themselves extremely by keeping so close to that which is superstition, and in the case of images comes too near idolatry." The substance then of what his lordship saith is, that the protestant way is a safe and secure way to salvation; that in the Roman church there is extreme hazard made of it, which all who love their

Conf. p. 238.

sect. 35. n. 2.

Conf. p. 251.

sect. 35. n. 6.

souls ought to avoid ; but yet for such who by reason of ignorance see not the danger, and by reason of honesty keep close to Christ the foundation, and repent of all miscarriages known or unknown, he dares not deny a possibility of salvation for them : but he is far from asserting it of those who either know the corruptions of that church, and yet continue in them, or such who wilfully neglect the means whereby they may be convinced of them. So that you strangely either mistake or pervert his lordship's meaning when you would

Lab. p. 301.
n. 1.

infer from these passages that he asserts a possibility of being saved to those who join with the Roman church, though their ignorance be not invincible, and though all or the chief motives which the protestants bring against you be never so sufficiently proposed to them : for he still speaks either of such whose mere ignorance doth excuse them where the fundamentals are held, and a life led according to them, or else of such who condemn your superstitions as far as they are discovered to them, and sincerely desire to find impartially the way that leads to heaven ; of such as these he dares not deny a possibility of salvation.

§. 3. And you are the most uncharitable persons in the world, if you dare assert the contrary of protestants. You expressly grant a possibility of salvation to those who join with the protestant church, in case of invincible ignorance ; and dare you deny it where there is a preparation of mind to find out and embrace the most certain way to heaven, where all endeavours are used to that end, and where there is a conscientious obedience to the will of God, so far as it is discovered ? If you dare peremptorily deny a possibility of salvation to such persons, merely because not of the Roman church, this prodigious uncharitableness would make us question the possibility of your salvation more, while you persist in it. For what is there more contrary to the design and spirit of the gospel than this is ? From whence must we gather the terms of salvation, but only from thence ? But it seems by you, although men give never so hearty an assent to the doctrine of the gospel, and live in the most universal obedience to it, and abound in the fruits of the Spirit of God, of which charity is none of the least, yet if they be not in the communion of your church, there is no hopes of salvation for

them. But who is it the mean-while that hath the disposal of this salvation? Is it in your hands or Christ's? If it be in his, we dare rely on his promise, although you pretend to know his mind better than he did himself. For, notwithstanding a sincere endeavour to know and obey the will of God be the great fundamental in order to salvation, which is delivered us by the doctrine of Christ; yet it seems by you there may be this, where there may be not so much as possibility of salvation. By which assertion of yours you are so far from working upon any but very weak persons to bring them over to your church, that nothing can more effectually prejudice it among all such who dare believe Christ to be more infallible than the church of Rome. For what is this else, but to make heaven and eternal salvation stalk to the interest of your church, and to lay more weight upon being in your communion than upon the most indispensable precepts of Christianity? But when we consider how many among you dispute for the possibility of the salvation of heathens, and yet deny it to those who own all the fundamentals of Christianity; when we see how much you lay the weight of salvation upon being in your church, and what ways you have for those who are in it to reconcile the hopes of salvation with the practice of sin, what can we otherwise imagine but it is the interest of your church that you more aim at than the salvation of men's souls? For you have so many ways to give indulgence in sin to those who desire it, and yet such ready ways of pardon, and such an easy task of repentance, and so little troublesome means of obtaining grace by the sacraments, *ex opere operato*, that it is hard conceiving what way a man should sooner take who would live in his sins and come to heaven at last, than to be of your church. And yet you, who are so soft and gentle, so kind and indulgent to the sons of your church, are not more ready to send those who are out of it to the fire in this world, than to eternal flames in another. But "we have not so learned Christ," we dare not deal so inhumanly with them in this world, much less judge so uncharitably as to another of those who profess "to fear God and work righteousness," though they be not of the same opinion or communion with us: yet we tell men of the danger of hazarding their salvation by erroneous doctrines and super-571

stitious practices, and suppose that sufficient to persuade such who sincerely regard their future happiness to avoid all such things as tend so much to their eternal ruin. And such who will continue in such things merely because there is a possibility some persons may be saved in them by reason of ignorance or repentance, are no wiser men than such who should split their ship upon a rock because some have escaped upon a plank notwithstanding. So that considering on what terms we grant this possibility of salvation, this concession of ours can be no argument at all to judge yours to be the safer way; and if upon the same terms you deny it to us, it shews how much more unsafe your way is, where there is so much of interest and so little charity.

Lab. p. 301.
n. 1.

§. 4. But you attempt to prove against all protestants whatsoever, that yours is the safer way to salvation: your first argument in short is, Because we grant that you may be saved upon our own principles, but you deny that we may be saved upon yours. And what is there more in this argument (but a multitude of words to little purpose) than there is in that which his lordship examines? for the main force of it lies in this, That is the safest way which both parties are agreed in; and therefore, although you would have your major proposition put out of all doubt, yet that wants more proof than I doubt you are able to give it. For although we grant men may be saved who have true faith, repentance, and a holy conversation, without any such sacrament of penance which you make necessary for conveying the grace of justification, yet what security can thence come to a man in the choice of his religion, since we withal say, that where there is a continuance in the corruptions and errors of your church, it is hard to conceive there should be that faith and repentance which we make necessary to salvation. You go therefore on a very false supposition, when you take it for granted that we acknowledge that all those whom you admit to your sacrament of penance have all things upon our own principles which are necessary to salvation: and so your minor is as false as your major uncertain, viz. That many are saved in the Roman church according to the principles which are granted on both sides. But you would seem to prove, That all admitted by you at death to the sacrament of penance (as you call it) have

Lab. p. 302.
n. 2.

all things necessary to salvation upon protestant principles, because, you say, that faith, hope, true repentance, and a purpose of amendment are necessary to the due receiving the sacrament of penance, and these are all which protestants make necessary to salvation. But supposing that, is it necessary that all those things must be in them which make the necessary requisites to this sacrament of yours? do none receive this unworthily, as many do a far greater sacrament than this, granting it to be any at all? It seems salvation is very easy to be had in your church then; for this sacrament is supposed by you to be given to men upon their death-beds, when, you say, "it cannot be supposed that men will omit any thing necessary for the attaining salvation; and by virtue of this sacrament they receive the grace of justification, whereby of sinners they are made the sons of God, and heirs of eternal life." But I assure you, we who believe men must be saved only by the terms of the gospel, make no such easy matter of it as you do; we profess the necessity of a thorough renovation of heart and life to be indispensable in order to happiness, for "without holiness no man shall see the Lord:" and although we take not upon us to judge the final estate of men whose hearts we know not, yet the gospel gives us very little ground to think that such who defer the work of their salvation to their death-beds shall ever attain to it; the main design of Christian religion being the turning men's souls from sin to God, in order to the serving him in this world, that they may be happy in another. For if salvation depended on no more than you require, the greatest part of the gospel might have been spared, whose great end is to persuade men 572 to holiness of heart and life. It is not a mere purpose of amendment, when men can sin no longer, that we make only necessary to salvation, but so hearty a repentance of sin past as to carry with it an effectual reformation: without this, men may flatter themselves into their own ruin by your sacraments of penance, and such contrivances of men, but there can be no grounded hopes of any freedom from eternal misery. And their faith too must be as weak as their repentance shallow, who dare venture their souls into another world upon no better security than that by receiving the sacrament of penance they are made the sons of God, and heirs of eternal

life. But you betray men into stupid ignorance and carelessness as to their eternal salvation, and then deal most unfaithfully with them, by telling them that a death-bed repentance will suffice them, and the sacrament of penance will presently make them heirs of eternal life. So that although your doctrine be very unreasonable, and your superstitions very gross, yet this unfaithfulness to the souls of men makes all true lovers of Christian religion, and of the salvation of men's souls, more averse from your doctrine and practices than any thing else whatsoever; for what can really be more pernicious to the world, than to flatter them into the hopes of salvation without the performance of those things which, if the gospel be true, are absolutely necessary in order to it? How quietly do you permit the most stupid ignorance in such who are the zealous practisers of your fopperies and superstitions! what excellent arts have you to allure debauchees upon their death-beds to you, by promising them that in another world which our principles will not allow us to do! how many ways have you to get the pardon of sin, or at least to delude people with the hopes of it, without any serious turning from sin to God! What do your doctrines of the sufficiency of bare contrition, and the sacraments working grace *ex opere operato*, of indulgences, satisfactions, regulating the intention, and the like, tend to, but to supersede the necessity of a holy life? And at last you exchange the inward hatred and mortification of sin for some external severities upon men's bodies, which is only beating the servant for the master's fault. So that it is hard to imagine any doctrine or way of religion which owns Christianity, which doth with more apparent danger to the souls of men undermine the foundations of faith and obedience than yours doth. And as I have at large shewed the former, how destructive your principles are to the grounds of faith; so it hath been fully and lately manifested by a learned bishop of our church^a, what doctrines and practices are allowed in your church, which in themselves or their immediate consequences are direct impieties, and give warranty to a wicked life.

Lab. p. 302.
n. 2.

§. 5. Which being so of your own side, we must see what reasons you give for your most uncharitable censure, "that

^a Bishop Taylor's Dissuasive from Popery, chap. 2.

there are very few or none among protestants that escape damnation:" and this you call *the doctrine of catholics!* The doctrine rather of a proud, tyrannical, and uncharitable faction of men, who, that they might gain proselytes to themselves, shew how little they are themselves the proselytes of Christ. But you offer us a reason for it: "Because all catho-^{Lab. p. 303.} lies hold that neither faith nor hope nor any repentance can^{n. 2.} save us, but that only which is joined with a perfect love of God, without the sacrament of penance actually and duly received;" and because protestants reject this, they cannot be saved. But you are not at all the less excusable because you assert such doctrines from whence such uncharitableness follows; but the dreadful consequence of such doctrines ought rather to make you question the truth of them. For can any one who knows and understands Christianity ever believe, that although he had a most hearty repentance for sin, and a most sincere love to God, he should eternally perish because he did not confess his sins to a priest, and receive absolution⁵⁷³ from him? I can hardly persuade myself that you can believe such things, but that only such doctrines are necessary to be taught to maintain the priest's authority, and to fright men into that picklock of conscience, the useful practice of auricular confession. To what purpose are all the promises of grace and mercy through Christ upon the sincerity of our turning to him, if after all this the effect depends upon that sacrament of penance, of which no precept is given us by Christ, much less any necessity of it asserted in order to eternal salvation? If this then be all your ground of condemning protestants, they may rejoice in this, that your reasons are as weak as your malice strong. But it would be more fit for you to inquire whether such who live and die in such a height of uncharitableness (whether with or without the sacrament of penance) can be in any capacity of eternal salvation; for that is a plain violation of the laws of Christ, this other even among yourselves a disputable institution of Christ, and by many said not to be at all of that necessity which you suppose it to be. For neither Medina nor Maldonate^b, even since the council of Trent, dare affirm the denial of your sacrament of

^b Medina de Confess. tr. 2. qu. 4. Maldon. de Sacram. t. 2. c. 3.

penance to be heresy ; and must then the souls of all protestants be sent to hell for want of that which it is questionable whether it were instituted by Christ or no ? But if this sacrament of penance be so necessary to salvation that they cannot be saved who want it, what becomes then of all the primitive church which was utterly a stranger to your sacrament of penance (as shall be manifested when you desire it) ? what becomes of the Greek church, which as peremptorily denies the necessity of it as protestants do ? both which you may find confessed and proved by father Barns ; and many testimonies of your own authors are brought by him against the divine institution and necessity of it : who very ingenuously confesses that “ by the law of Christ such a one, by the sentence of very many catholics, may be pronounced absolved before God, who manifests the truth of his faith and charity, although he discovers not a word of the number or weight of his sins^c.” What unreasonable as well as uncharitable men are you then, to assert that no protestants can escape damnation for want of that which so many among yourselves make unnecessary for the pardon of sin ? But it is just with God that those who are so ready to condemn others should be condemned by themselves ; and if your consciences do not condemn you here, your sentence may be the greater in another world.

Lab. p. 304.
n. 2.

§. 6. Your second argument against protestants is, “ because they want certainty of faith by denying the infallibility of church and councils ;” but this hath been so thoroughly sifted already, that I suppose none who have read the preceding discourses will have the least cause to stick at this : and therefore we proceed to the vindication of your censures from being guilty of the want of charity. For you are the men who would have us thank God, when you condemn us to hell, that we escape so ; and are angry with us, that we do not believe that you most entirely love us, when you judge us to eternal flames. For you say, that your denial of salvation to us is grounded even upon charity. If it be so, you are the most charitable people in the world, for you deny salvation to all

Lab. p. 305.
n. 3.

^c Cum stando in lege Christi præcise pronunciari possit, ex plurimorum catholicorum sententia, absolutus coram Deo ;—qui manifestis indiciis probat se veram habere

fidem et charitatem : etsi ne verbum propalet de numero, et gravitate peccatorum suorum.—Barns, sect. 8. de Pœnit. Confess. et Satisfactione.

but yourselves and some heathens. “But,” say you, “if salvation may be had in your church, as protestants confess, and there be no true church or faith but one, it follows that out of your church there is no salvation to be had.” To which his lordship had fully answered, by saying, “It is true, there is but one true faith, and but one true church; but that one both faith and church is the catholic Christian, not the particular Roman.” So that this passage is a mere begging the question, and then threatening upon it, without all reason or charity. And all your declamations about the way of knowing the doctrine of the catholic church, have been spoiled by what hath been said already upon that subject. We come therefore to that which is the proper business of this chapter, which is to examine the strength of that inference which is drawn from the protestants’ concession of the possibility of salvation in your church, viz. that thence it follows, that the Roman church and religion is the safer way to salvation. Two things his lordship observes the force of this argument lies in, the one directly expressed, viz. the consent of both parties of the possibility of salvation in the Roman church; the other upon the by, viz. that we cannot be saved, because we are out of the church. And of these two he speaks in order. First he begins with the confession: as to which his answer lies in three things: 1. That this was the way of the Donatists of old, and would hold as well for them as the church of Rome. 2. That if the principle on which this argument proceeds be true, it will be more for the advantage of protestants than of your church. 3. That the principle itself is a contingent proposition, and may justify the greatest heresies in the world. By this methodizing his lordship’s discourse we shall the better discern the strength of your answers to the several particulars of it. In the first place he shews, how parallel this is with the proceedings of the Donatists; for both parts granted, that baptism was true among the Donatists, but the Donatists denied it to be true baptism among the catholic Christians; and therefore on this principle the Donatists’ side is the surer side, if that principle be true, That it is the safest taking that way which the differing parties agree on. To this you answer nothing but what will still return upon yourselves, and discover the weakness of your argument. For the crimes

Conf. p. 239.
sect. 35. n. 2.

Lab. p. 306.
n. 3.
574

Conf. p. 240.
sect. 35. n. 3.

Ibid.

Lab. p. 307.

n. 4.

of schism and unsoundness of faith are still as chargeable upon you, though we may grant a possibility of salvation to some in your church. And I cannot possibly discern any difference between the judgment of the catholics concerning the Donatists and ours concerning you; for if they judged the Donatists' way very dangerous because of their uncharitableness to all others, so do we of yours; but if they, notwithstanding that, hoped that the misled people among them might be saved, that is as much as we dare say concerning you. And you very much mistake if you think the contrary. For his lordship nowhere saith, as you would seem to impose upon him, that a man may live and die in the Roman church, and that none of his errors shall hinder salvation, whatsoever motives he may know to the contrary. But on the other

Conf.p.249.
sect.35.n.6. side he plainly saith, "that he that lives in the Roman church, with a resolution to live and die in it, is presumed to believe as that church believes. And he that doth so, I will not say, is as guilty, but guilty he is more or less, of the schism which that church first caused by her corruptions, and now continues by them and her power together. And of all her damnable opinions too, and all other sins also, which the doctrine and misbelief of that church leads him into." Judge you now, I pray, whether we think otherwise of those in your church than the orthodox did of the Donatists? So that if the argument doth hold for you, it would as well have held for them too. And therefore his lordship well infers, "that this principle, That where two parties are dissenting, it is safest believing that in which both parties agree, or which the adversary confesses, may lead men, by your own confession, into known and damnable schism and heresy; for such, you say, the Donatists were guilty of." And such, his lordship saith,

Conf.p.250.
sect.35.n.6. "there is great danger of in your church too; for," saith he, "in this present case there is peril, great peril of damnable both schism and heresy, and other sins, by living and dying in the Roman faith, tainted with so many superstitions as at this day it is, and their tyranny to boot." I pray now bethink yourself, what difference is there between the orthodox's judgment of the Donatists, and ours concerning your church?

575 And therefore the comparison between Petilian the Donatist and his lordship's adversary holds good still; for all your

answer depends upon a mistake of protestants granting a possibility of salvation, as I have already shewed you. And in what way soever you limit this agreement, you cannot possibly avoid but that it would equally hold as to the Donatists too; for the concession was then as great in order to salvation as it is now. Lab. p. 315. n. 9.

§. 7. But you say, "Whether he asserts it or no, it must needs follow from the bishop's principles, that there can be no peril of damnation by living and dying in the Roman church, because he professedly exempts the ignorant, and grants as much of those who do wittingly and knowingly associate themselves to the gross superstitions of the Roman church, if they hold the foundation Christ, and live accordingly;" from whence you argue, "that if neither voluntary nor involuntary superstition can hinder from salvation, then there is confessedly no peril of damnation in your church." And yet his lordship saith, "All protestants unanimously agree in this, that there is great peril of damnation for any man to live and die in the Roman persuasion. And therefore," saith he, "that is a most notorious slander, where you say, that they which affirm this peril of damnation are contradicted by their own more learned brethren." By which we see the injustice of your proceeding, in offering to wrest his lordship's words contrary to his express meaning: and since all your argument depends upon your adversary's confession, you ought to take that confession in the most clear and perspicuous terms, and to understand all obscure expressions suitably to their often declared sense. Which if you had attended to, you would never have undertaken to prove that his lordship grants, that there is no peril of damnation in your church, which he so often disavows, and calls it "a most notorious slander," and "a most loud untruth, which no ingenuous man would ever have said." And even of those persons whom he speaks most favourably of, he saith, "that although they wish for the abolishing the superstitions in use, yet all he grants them is, a possibility of salvation, but with extreme hazard to themselves, by keeping close to that which is superstition, and comes so near idolatry." Are these then such expressions which import no peril of damnation in the Roman church? And therefore when he speaks of the possibility of the salvation Conf. p. 254. sect. 35. n. 6.

of such who associate themselves wittingly and knowingly to the gross superstitions of the Romish church, he declares sufficiently, that he means it not of those who do in heart approve of them, but only of such, who though they are convinced they are gross superstitions, yet think they may communicate with those who use them, as long as they do not approve of them. Which error of theirs, though he looks on it as dangerous, yet not as wholly destructive of salvation.

Lab. p. 316.
n. 10.

But since your answer to this is, “that he mistakes very much in supposing such persons to belong to your church and communion;” you are not aware how much thereby you take off from the protestants’ confession, since those whom we contend for a possibility of salvation for, are such only whom you deny to be of your church’s communion, and so the argument signifies much less by your confession than it did before. Thus we see how this argument, upon the same terms you manage it against us, would have held as well in the behalf of the Donatists against the communion of the catholic church. For what other impertinencies you mix here and there, it is time now to pass them over, since the main grounds of them have been so fully handled before.

Conf. p. 241.
sect. 35. n. 6.

§. 8. We therefore proceed to the second answer his lordship gives to this argument, viz. “that if the principle on which it stands doth hold, it makes more for the advantage of protestants than against them.” For if that be safest which both parties are agreed in, then, 1. “you are bound to believe with us in the point of the eucharist. For all sides agree in the faith of the church of England, that in the most blessed sacrament the worthy receiver is by his faith made spiritually partaker of the true and real body and blood of Christ, truly and really, and of all the benefits of his passion. Your Roman catholics add a manner of this presence, transubstantiation, which many deny; and the Lutherans consubstantiation, which more deny. If this argument be good then, even for this consent it is safer communicating with the church of England than with the Roman or Lutheran; because all agree in this truth, not in any other opinion.” You say, “this can hold no further than communicating in the belief of this opinion;” let that be granted, and doth it not then follow, that the church of England’s opinion is the safest upon your own ground?

Lab. p. 308.
n. 5.

“No,” say you, “for it is not such a common consent as doth exclude the manner of presence by trans- or consubstantiation.” But how senseless an answer is this ! for the argument proceeds so far as all are agreed : and the church of England asserting that real presence, which all acknowledge as simply necessary in order to the effects of it ; her communion is more desirable on this account than of either of those churches which offer to define the manner of Christ’s presence, since even the greatest men of your persuasion, as Suarez and Bellarmine, assert the belief of transubstantiation not to be simply necessary to salvation, and that the manner of it is secret and ineffable. It is therefore quite beside the purpose, when you offer Lab. p. 308. to prove, that Suarez believed transubstantiation : for although n. 5. he did so, yet since he grants it not simply necessary to do it, his lordship’s argument in behalf of the church of England holds firm still, unless you can prove, that Suarez held the belief of that to be as necessary as the belief of the real and spiritual presence of Christ. But you after attempt at large to prove, that the real participation of Christ in the sacrament in your sense is quite different from that of protestants : if you mean a corporal participation, indeed it is so ; but that is not it which is now inquired after ; but, whether you do not allow any real and spiritual presence of Christ besides the corporal manducation of that you call his *body by transubstantiation*. If you do not, you would do well to shew what effects that hath upon the souls of men ; if you do, then still the church of England is of the safer side, which holds that in which all are agreed. Which is as much as we are here concerned to take notice of as to this subject, the controversy itself having been so lately handled. 2. His lordship instances in the article Conf. p. 255. of our Saviour Christ’s descent into hell ; “both are agreed as sect. 35. n. 7. to the article of descent, but the church of Rome differs in the explication ; therefore it is safer holding with the church of England, which owns the article without defining the manner.” But you say, “he proceeds on a false supposition, for both are Lab. p. 317. not agreed what is meant by *hell*, whether it be the place of n. 11. the damned or no.” But this doth belong to the manner of explication, and not to the article itself, which both equally own, and therefore the church of England hath the advantage there. 3. He instances in the institution of the sacrament in

both kinds; “in which it is agreed by both churches that Christ did institute it so, and the primitive church received it so. Therefore, according to the former rule, it is safest for a man to receive the sacrament in both kinds.” This, you say, “is as little to the purpose as the former, because you do not agree that he did it with an intention, or gave any command that it should be always so received:” but still you are quite besides the business; for that is not our question, but, whether it be more safe to adhere to that which Christ instituted and the primitive church practised, as you confess yourselves; or to your church, which prohibits the doing that which you confess Christ and the primitive church did? And we see how great your charity is, when you “deny a possibility of salvation to those who assert that Christ’s institution is unalterable, or that all who communicate are bound to receive in both kinds.” For all other things concerning this subject I must refer the reader to the precedent chapter, in which they are fully discussed. 4. “The dissenting churches agree, that in the eucharist there is a sacrifice of duty, and a sacrifice of praise, and a sacrifice of commemoration. Therefore it is safest to hold to the church of England in this, and leave the church of Rome to her superstitions, that I say no more.” Here you still pretend you differ in sense; but all this is only to say you assert more than we do; which we grant, but assert upon your principle that we are on the safer side. And so in the “intention of the priest you agree with us as to the necessity of matter and form, and therefore it is safer holding to that than believing the necessity of the priest’s intention, which many deny.” And if the rule doth hold, as you assert, that that which both are agreed in is safer than the contrary, it will hold in matter of opinion too, that it is safer to believe no more is necessary to the sacrament than both parties are agreed in. The last instance is, “that we say there are divers errors, and some gross ones, in the Roman Missal; but you confess there is no positive error in the liturgy of the church of England; and therefore it is safest to worship God by that, and not by the Roman Mass.” This you answer, as all the rest, by running off from the business; for you say, “it cannot be safer to use that, because you catholics say, that to use it in contempt of the Roman Missal is certainly damnable sin, and

Ibid.

Lab. p. 318.
n. 11.Conf. p. 258.
sect. 35. n. 7.
577Lab. p. 319.
n. 11.Conf. p. 258.
sect. 35. n. 7.Lab. p. 320.
n. 11.

destructive of salvation.” But as it is not material what you say in this case, so it is not at all to the purpose ; for if your rule holds good, it must be safer ; and if it be not, you must confess the principle is false, that what both parties agree in is the safest to be chosen in religion. The same might be at large proved concerning the main things in difference between us, that, if this principle be true, we have very much the advantage of you : as, you and we are agreed that the scripture is God’s word, but we deny that tradition is so, therefore it is safer adhering to the scripture, and let tradition shift for itself. You and we are agreed that there are sufficient motives of credibility to believe the scripture, but we deny that there are any such motives to believe the present church’s infallibility ; therefore it is safer to believe the scripture than the present church. So that this principle, if improved by these and other instances, will redound more to our advantage than yours, considering that in the case we grant it as to you, it is joined with a protestation of the extreme hazard which those run who venture on your communion on the account of it ; but there is no such danger upon the agreement with us in those principles which are agreed upon between us.

§. 9. 3. His lordship answers truly, “ that this proposition, Conf.p.243. sect.35.n.4. That in point of faith and salvation it is safest for a man to take that way which the adversary confesses, or differing parties agree in, is no metaphysical principle, but a bare contingent proposition, and may be true or false as the matter is to which it is applied, and so of no necessary truth in itself, nor able to lead in the conclusion. Because consent of disagreeing parties is neither rule, nor proof of truth. For Herod and Pilate, disagreeing parties enough, yet agreed against truth itself. But truth rather is, or should be, the rule to frame, if not to force agreement.” And to prove this further, his lordship shews, “ that if this principle hold good, That it is safest Conf.p.259. sect.35.n.8. to believe as the dissenting parties agree, or as the adverse party confesses, a man must be an heretic in the highest degree, if not an infidel. For, 1. in the question between the orthodox and Arian concerning the consubstantiality of the Son of God with the Father ; the orthodox confessed that which the Arians asserted, viz. that Christ was of a like nature with his Father ; but they added more, viz. that he was of the

same nature. Therefore upon this principle it would be safest holding with the Arians. 2. In the question about the resurrection; the dissenting parties agree that there ought to be a resurrection from sin to the state of grace, and that this resurrection only is meant in divers passages of scripture, together with the life of the soul, which they are content to say is immortal; but they deny any resurrection of the body after death. And therefore if this principle be true, it will be safest
578 to deny the article of the resurrection.” 3. In the great dispute about “the unity of the Godhead; all dissenting parties, Jew, Turk, and Christian, and all sects of Christians, agree in this, that there is but one God; and so by virtue of this principle men will be bound to deny the Trinity.” 4. In the article of the divinity of Christ, “the dissenting parties agree fully and clearly that Christ is man; but the heretics deny him to be God: if it be therefore safest to go by the consent of dissenting parties, or the confession of adversaries, it will be safest believing that Christ is a mere man, and not God.” From whence
his lordship most evidently proves, “that this rule, To resolve
a man’s faith into that in which the dissenting parties agree, or
which the adverse party confesses, is a mere contingent proposition, and is as often false as true. And false in as great, if not greater matters than those in which it is true. And where it is true, you dare not govern yourselves by it; the church of Rome condemning those things which that rule proves.” And his lordship justly admires, “that while you talk of certainty, nay, of infallibility, you are driven to make use of such poor shifts as these, which have no certainty at all of truth in them, but infer falsehood and truth alike. And yet for this also, men will be so weak, or so wilful, as to be seduced by you.” But now it is time to take notice what answer you return to these pregnant instances which his lordship uses; and you
think to take off all this by one general answer, viz. “that the
rule speaks this precisely, and no more, viz. that when two parties differ in point of religion, it is in prudence safest to take that way wherein both parties grant salvation to be obtainable; but in the former instances salvation was not allowed by the orthodox to the dissenters.” But how poor an evasion this is, will be very easily discovered. For, 1. if that principle be true, it must be built on that which his lordship disproves,

Conf. p. 261.
sect. 35. n. 8.

Lab. p. 321.
n. 11.

viz. That when two parties disagree, it is safest believing that which both consent in. For let any reasonable man judge, on what account I ought to make choice of your religion ; you say, Because both parties are agreed that men may be saved in your church ; well then, I ask, why I ought to believe that which both parties are agreed in ? doth it not necessarily resolve itself into this principle, That it is safest believing that which both parties consent in ? For if this be not safest, why should I be more inclined by their consent than otherwise ? So that if you let go this, you let go the only foundation on which that principle stands. For if the consenting parties may agree in a falsehood, what evidence can I have, but that this is one of those falsehoods they may agree in ? And therefore it is far from being the safest way to venture upon that which the dissenting parties agree in. And because salvation is a matter of the highest moment, if the principle will not hold as to matter of particular opinion, much less certainly in the most weighty affair of men's eternal salvation. And it ought to be a safe principle indeed which men should venture their souls upon, and not so uncertain topical an argument as this is. So that it is so far from being a matter of prudence to make choice of religion on such a principle, that no man can be guilty of greater weakness or imprudence than by doing so. 2. If this principle should be limited only to a possibility of salvation, yet, as to that, it is easy to discover how false and uncertain a principle it is, because it is generally the nature of sects to be uncharitable, and to deny salvation to all but themselves ; whereas the orthodox Christians in all ages have hoped the best of those who were misled among them ; and on this ground it would still be safer to be on the sectaries' than the church's side. You have therefore gained an excellent principle for the advantage of your church ; which, if it hold for you, will hold as well for the most uncharitable sectaries that are in the world. Nay, we may go somewhat further, and what think you if heathenism itself will be proved the safest way to salvation ? For many of you agree with them, that many of them might be saved, without any explicit knowledge of Christ ; but they deny you can be saved by it. 579 If then this principle be sound, farewell the church of Rome, and welcome philosophy. If you say, They are only some

among you who assert the possibility of the salvation of heathens; you know the very same answer will hold as to us; for
 Lab. p. 301. n. 2. you confess, that many protestants grant no more to you than you do to them, in order to salvation. If you say, that heathens may be saved only on supposition of a general repentance; that is all that any of us say as to you. So that if the argument will hold one way, it must the other too; and it argues you are very much to seek for proofs, when you make use of this to persuade men to be of your church. And you have no cause to triumph in the conversion of such, who suffer themselves to be imposed on by so palpable a piece of sophistry as this is. But your way is to deal with the weakest, and such as are capable of such easy impressions as these are.

His lordship from that which was expressed comes to that which was implied in this argument, viz. That we cannot be saved, because we are out of the church. As to which he
 Conf. p. 262. sect. 35. n. 9. saith, “We are not out of the catholic church, because not within the Roman.” For the Roman church, and the church of England, are but two distinct members of that catholic church, which is spread over the face of the earth. If you can prove that Rome is properly the catholic church itself,
 Lab. p. 321. n. 11. speak out and prove it. This you say you have done already; but how poorly, let the reader judge. But when you add, “that in the day of account the Roman church will be found not an elder sister, but a mother,” it will be well for her if it prove not only in the sense wherein Babylon the
 Rev. xvii. 5. great is called so, viz. the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth.

§. 10. The controversy, you tell us, goes on touching Roman catholics’ salvation, and we must follow it; though without breaking it into several chapters, as you do, that so we may lay together all that belongs to the same subject. And here
 Lab. p. 222. n. 1. his lordship distinguishes the case of such, whose calling and sufficiency gives them a greater capacity for understanding the truth; and such, whom, as St. Augustin speaks, “the simplicity of believing makes safe.” “So that there is no question,” saith he, “but many were saved in corrupted times of the church, when their leaders, unless they repented before death, were lost.” Which he understands of such leaders as refuse to hear the church’s instruction, or to use all the means

Conf. p. 264. sect. 36.

they can to come to the knowledge of the truth. For if they do this, err they may, but heretics they are not; as is most manifest in St. Cyprian's case of rebaptization. But when leaders add schism to heresy, and obstinancy to both, they are lost without repentance, while many that succeed them in the error only, without obstinacy, may be saved. That is, in case they hold these errors not supinely, not pertinaciously, not uncharitably, not factiously, i. e. in case all endeavours be used after truth and peace, and all expressions of charity shewed to all who retain an internal communion with the whole visible church of Christ in the fundamental points of faith. Such as these he confesses to be in a state of salvation, though their misleaders perish. This is the sum of his lordship's discourse, which you call "a heavy doom against all the Roman doctors in general," (for what you say before is a mere declaration and repetition of what hath been often examined.)^{Lab. p. 323. n. 1.} But you ask, "how could they be all lost, who by the bishop's own principles were members of the true visible church of Christ, by reason of their being baptized and holding the foundation? But doth his lordship say, that all such as are within the church are undoubtedly saved? For he only saith, "that no man can be said simply to be out of the visible church, that is baptized and holds the foundation." The most then that can be inferred merely from being within the church, is only the possibility of salvation, notwithstanding which, I suppose you will not deny but many who have a possibility of salvation may yet certainly perish. For many may hold the foundation itself doctrinally, who may not hold it savingly; and therefore it is a pitiful inference, because he grants they are members of the church, therefore it follows 580 from his principles they cannot be lost. But you are in a very sad condition, if you have no other ground for your salvation but being members of that which you account the catholic church. When Christ himself saith, "Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away;" how much more such, who have nothing else to plead for their salvation but that they are in the church: it is not therefore the bare doctrinal holding that faith which makes them members of the church, which can give them a title to salvation; unless all sincere endeavours be used to find out what the will of God

Lab. p. 324.
n. 1.

is, and to practise it when it is known. But you say, “ your leaders did not refuse the church’s instructions, for they taught as the church taught for many hundred years together ; and, what other means could they be bound to use than they did, to come to the knowledge of the truth ? ” Yes, there were other means which they most supinely neglected themselves, and most dangerously withheld from others, viz. the plain and undoubted word of God, which is the only infallible rule of faith. And let any church whatsoever teach against this, it must incur the same anathema which St. Paul pronounces against an angel from heaven if he teaches any other doctrine. Did those then take care of their own and others’ souls, whose greatest care was to lock the scripture up from the view of the people, and minded it so little themselves, which yet alone “ is able to make men wise to salvation ? ” But you take the greatest advantage of his vindication of St. Cyprian and his followers, for therein you say, “ he vindicates more the Roman catholic doctors, who had always the universal practice of the church on their side which they opposed ; and condemns protestants, because if St. Cyprian’s followers were in such danger for opposing the whole church, so must they be too, who, you say, have opposed the church’s instruction given them by the voice of a general council. ” But who is so blind as not to discern that all this proceeds upon a palpable begging the question, viz. that the whole church is of your side and against us ? which I have so often discovered to be a notorious falsehood, that there is no necessity at all here to repeat it. But if we grant you that liberty to suppose yourselves to be the whole and only church, you will not more easily acquit all your doctors than condemn protestants, both teachers and people. However, by this we see that you have no other way to do the one or the other, but by supposing what you can never prove, and which none in their wits will ever grant you.

Lab. p. 325.
n. 2.

“ The greatest part of the thirty-seventh paragraph in his lordship’s book is,” you say, “ taken up with personal matters, and matters of fact, in which you will not interpose ; ” and you might as well have spared your pains in that which you touch at, since they are spent only upon a bare asserting the Greek church to be guilty of fundamental errors, (which we have at large disproved at the very beginning ; but, as his lordship

says, “you labour indeed but like a horse in a mill; no farther at night than at noon; the same thing over and over again;” and so we find it almost to the end of your book,) and as vain an attempt to clear your church from any error endangering salvation. For whether the errors of your church be fundamental in themselves, or only by reduction and consequence; whether you hold all fundamental points literally, or no; yet if we prove you guilty of any gross, dangerous, and damnable errors, (as his lordship asserts you are,) that will be abundantly sufficient to our purpose, that your’s cannot possibly be any safe way to salvation. And although we should grant your church right in the exposition of the three creeds, yet if you assert any other errors of a dangerous nature, your right exposition of them cannot secure the souls of men from the danger they run themselves upon by embracing the other. So much for the argument drawn from the possibility of salvation in the Roman church.

Conf.p.272.
sect.37.n.8.

Conf.p.269.
sect.37.n.5.

THE SAFETY OF THE PROTESTANT FAITH.

The sufficiency of the protestant faith to salvation, manifested by disproving the cavils against it.—T. C.'s tedious repetitions passed over.—The argument from possession at large considered.—No prescription allowable where the law hath antecedently determined the right.—Of the infallibility of oral tradition.—That contrary to the received doctrine of the Roman church, and in itself unreasonable.—The grounds of it examined.—The ridiculousness of the plea of bare possession discovered.—General answers returned to the remaining chapters, consisting wholly of things already discussed.—The place of St. Cyprian to Cornelius particularly vindicated.—The proof of succession of doctrine lies on the Romanists by their own principles.

§. I. **A**LTHOUGH this subject hath been sufficiently cleared in the controversy concerning the resolution of faith, yet the nature of our task requires that we so far resume the debate of it, as any thing undiscussed already offers itself to consideration. For I cannot think it a civil way of treating the reader, to cloy him with tautologies or repetitions; nor can I think it a way to satisfy him rather by some incidental passages than by a full and free debate. In all those things then which we have had occasion to handle already, I shall remit the reader to the precedent discourses; but whatever hath the face of being new and pertinent, I shall readily examine the force of it. The occasion of this fresh debate was a new question of the lady: "Whether she might be saved in the protestant faith?" In answering whereof, you say, "the parties conferring are put into new heats; Upon my soul (said the bishop) you may. Upon my soul (said Mr. Fisher) there is but one saving faith, and that is the Roman." Since the confidence seems equal on both sides, we must examine which is built on the stronger reason. And his lordship's comes first to be examined, which he offers very freely to examination. "For," saith he, "to believe the scripture and the creeds; to believe

these in the sense of the ancient primitive church; to receive the four great general councils so much magnified by antiquity; to believe all points of doctrine generally received as fundamental in the church of Christ, is a faith, in which to live and die cannot but give salvation. And therefore," saith he, "I went upon sure ground in the adventure of my soul upon that faith. Besides, in all the points controverted between us, I would fain see any one point maintained by the church of England, that can be proved to depart from the foundation. You have many dangerous errors about the very foundation, in that which you call the Roman faith; but there I leave you to look to your own soul, and theirs whom you seduce." Thus far his lordship. Two things you seem to answer to this: 1. That such a faith may not be sufficient: 2. That ours is not such a faith. 1. That such a faith may not be sufficient, because you suppose it necessary to believe the infallibility of the present church and general councils: but that we are now excused from a fresh inquiry Lab. p. 328. into; but you would seem to infer it from his own principles n. 3. of submission to general councils. But by what peculiar arts you can thence draw that something else is necessary to be believed in order to salvation besides what hath been owned as fundamentals in all ages, I am yet to learn. And sure you were much to seek for arguments, when you could not distinguish between the necessity of external submission and internal assent.

§. 2. But the second is the main thing you quarrel with, viz. that the English protestant faith is really and indeed such a faith; and this you undertake at large to disprove. 582 You ask first, "whether we believe all scripture, or only a Lab. p. 329. part of it?" We answer, "all without exception that is scripture, i. e. hath any evidence that ever it was of divine revelation. In this," you say, "we profess more than we can make good, seeing we refuse many books owned for canonical by the primitive church, and embrace some which were not." But in both you assert that which we are sure you are never able to defend; since we are content to put it upon as fair a trial as you can desire, viz. that the church of England doth fully agree with the primitive church as to the canon of scripture. Which hath been already made

good by the successful diligence of a learned bishop of our church^a, to whom I refer you either for satisfaction or confusion. But you are the men whose bare words and bold affirmations must weigh more than the greatest evidence of reason or antiquity. You love to pronounce where you are loath to prove; and think to bear men down with confidence, where you are afraid to enter the lists. But our faith stands not on so sandy a foundation to be blown down with your biggest words, which have that property of wind in them to be light and loud. When you will attempt to prove that the books called Apocrypha have had an equal testimony of divine authority with those we receive into the canon of scripture, you may meet with a further answer upon that subject. Just as much you say to disprove our believing scripture, and the creeds in the primitive church; for you say the fathers oppose us, we deny it: you say the councils condemn us, we say and prove the contrary. You offer again at some broken evidences of the pope's supremacy from councils and fathers; but those have been discussed already, and the sense of the church at large manifested to be contrary to it. But I fear your matters lie very ill concocted upon your stomach, you bring them us so often up; but I am not bound to dance in a circle because you do so. And therefore I proceed: but when I hope to do so, you pull me back again to the infallibility of councils and the church, the question of fundamentals and the Greek church; and scarce a page between, but in comes again the pope's supremacy as fresh as if it had been never handled before. But I assure you after this rate, I wonder you ever came to an end, for you might have writ all your lifetime after that manner. For the Decretal Epistles (those impregnable testimonies) St. Cyprian, Optatus, Hierome, Austin, the council of Sardica, Ephesus, Chalcedon, and all the baffled and impertinent proofs you think on, must be pressed to do new service, though they had run out of the field before. And this you call a general consent of the fathers of the primitive church; but I must beg the reader not to be scared with these vizards, for if he touches them they fall

Lab. p. 330.
n. 4.

Lab. p. 331.
n. 4.

Lab. p. 332.
n. 4.

Lab. p. 334.
n. 4.

Lab. p. 335.
n. 4.

^a Bishop Cosen's Scholastical History of the Canon of Scripture.

off, and then you will see them blush that they are so often abused to so ill an end. But this is not the only subject (viz. the pope's supremacy) which you give us so often over, but, within a page or two following, enter again worship of images with as much ceremony as if it had never appeared; but till you have answered what I have said already, all that you have here is vain and impertinent: in the next page enter transubstantiation; in the following, enter again infallibility of councils, resolution of faith, apocrypha books, fundamentals, communion in one kind, &c., to the end of the chapter. In all which I find but two things new, the one about purgatory, which we shall meet with again; and the other you call a note only by the way, but it is so rare a one, it ought to be considered.

§. 3. Which is, that protestants ought to prove their faith agreeable to that of the primitive church by special undeniable evidence; but they have not the like reason to require it of you catholics, (good reason for it,) but, you say, "not that you are unable to do it, (no, who would ever suspect that who reads your book?) but because you are in full and quiet possession of your faith, religion, church, &c., by immemorial tradition and succession from your ancestors, that you do, upon that sole ground of quiet possession, justly prescribe against your adversaries. And your plea," you say, "must in all law and equity be admitted for good, till they do by more pregnant and convincing arguments disprove it, and shew that your possession is not *bonæ fidei*, but gained by force or fraud, or some other wrongful and unhallowed means." To this, because I have not yet considered it, I shall now return the fuller answer. And it appears that the proof lies upon you: for they who challenge full and quiet possession by virtue of immemorial tradition and succession from their ancestors, ought to produce the conveyance of that tradition from him who alone could invest them in that possession. For although this title of possession be of late so much insisted on by those who see the weakness of other arguments, and are ashamed to use them, yet who-soever thoroughly searches it will find it as weak and ridiculous as any other. For it is plain in this case the full right depends not upon mere occupancy, but a title must

be pleaded to shew that the possession is *bonæ fidei*; so that the question comes from the bare possession to the goodness of the title, and the validity of it in justice and equity. Your title then is immemorial tradition from your ancestors; but here several things are to be contested, before your prescription be allowed. 1. That no antecedent law hath determined contrary to what you challenge by virtue of possession; for if it hath, no prescription is allowable in it. For prescription can only take place where the law allows a liberty for prescription; but if the law hath antecedently determined against it, possession signifies nothing but the liberty to make good the title. Would any man be so mad as to think that prescription of threescore years would have been sufficient in the Judaical law, when all possessions were to return to their first owners by law at every year of jubilee? So then the matter to be inquired here is, what liberty of prescription is allowed by virtue of the law of Christ; for since he hath made laws to govern his church by, it is most senseless pleading prescription till you have particularly examined how far such prescription is allowed by him. Let us then suppose that any of the matters in difference between us, are one way or other determined by him, viz. whether the bishop of Rome be head of the church or no; whether the present church be infallible or no. What do you say? Hath he determined these things, or hath he not? If he hath determined them one way or other, it is to no purpose in the world to plead possession or prescription, for these signify nothing against law. So that the question must be wholly removed from the plea of possession, and it must be tried upon this issue, whether Christ by his law hath determined on your side or ours? It may be you will tell me, "that in this case prescription interprets law, and that the church's possession argues it was the will of Christ." But still the proof lies upon your side, since you run yourself into new briers; for you must prove that there is no way to interpret this law but by the practice of the church, and which is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of all, that the church cannot come into the possession of any thing but what was originally given her by the legislator. Which is a task necessarily incumbent on you to prove, and I suppose you will find so much

difficulty in it, that you had as good run back to *super hanc Petram* and *pasce oves*, as undertake to manage it. He that undertakes to prove it impossible that the church should claim possession by an undue title, must prove it impossible that the church should ever be deceived. And herein we see the excellent way of this proof. For suppose the matter in dispute be the Roman church's infallibility, "this," you say, "you are in possession of," (though that be the thing in question:) well, we will suppose it, that we may discern your proofs. I demand then, on what account do you challenge this? You say, "By prescription." I further ask, how you prove this prescription sufficient? You say, "Be- 584 cause the church cannot challenge any thing but what belongs to her." I demand a proof of that; your answer must be, Because the church cannot be deceived: so that the proof at last comes to this—The church is infallible because she is infallible.

§. 4. Well, but suppose this infallibility challenged be only an infallibility of tradition, and not a doctrinal infallibility in either pope or councils; yet still I am as unsatisfied as ever. For I ask, whether am I bound to believe what the present church delivers to be infallible? Yes. On what account am I bound to believe it? Because the present church cannot be deceived in what the church of the former age believed, nor that in the preceding, and so up till the time of Christ. But, I. how can you assure me the present church obliges me to believe nothing but only what and so far as it received it from the former church? What evidence can you bring to convince me, both that the church alway observed this rule, and could never be deceived in it? For I see the Roman church asserts that things may be *de fide* in one age which were not in another; at least pope and councils challenge this, and this is the common doctrine maintained there, and others are looked on as no members of their church who assert the contrary, but as persons, at least meritoriously, if not actually, excommunicate. Where then shall I satisfy myself what the sense of your church is as to this particular? Must I believe a very few persons whom the rest disown as heretical and seditious persons? or ought I not rather to take the judgment of the greatest and most approved persons in that church? And

these disown any such doctrine, but assert that the church may determine things *de fide* which were not so before: in which case I ask, whether, when a thing is *de novo* determined to be *de fide*, that church believed as the precedent did, or no? If it did, how comes any thing to be *de fide* which was not before? If it did not, what assurance can I have that every age of the church believes just as the precedent did, and no otherwise, when I see they profess the contrary? And if a thing may be *de fide* in one age which was not in a foregoing, then a church may deliver that as a matter of faith at one time which was never accounted so before: by which means the present church may oblige me to believe that as a matter of faith which never was so in Christ or the apostles' times, and so the infallibility on the account of tradition is destroyed. 2. What security is there that in no age of the church any practices should come in which were not used in the precedent? You may say, Because they could not be deceived what their forefathers did; but that satisfies not, unless you prove that all the church in every age looked upon itself as obliged to do nothing at all but what their forefathers did. For although they might know never so much what was done by them, if they did not judge themselves bound to observe unalterably what they did, this doth not hinder at all but new customs and opinions might be introduced in the church. And therefore I cannot but justly wonder, that any men of parts, who professedly disown the vulgar ways of establishing the Roman church, should think to satisfy themselves with oral tradition, and cry it up as so impregnable a thing, "because no age of the church can be deceived in what the foregoing did and taught:" whereas a very little of that reason which these men pretend to might acquaint them, that the force of it doth not lie in their capacity to know what was done by others, but in their obligation not to vary at all from it. For the main weight of the argument lies here, That nothing hath been changed in the faith or practice of the church; which being the thing to be proved, the bare knowledge of what was believed or practised is not sufficient to prove it; for men may know very well what others believe and do, and yet may believe and do quite contrary themselves. But the only thing to be proved in this case is, that every age of the church and all persons in it looked upon

themselves as obliged not to vary in any thing from the doctrine or practice of the precedent age. And I pray let me know by what demonstrative medium can this be proved ; for no less than demonstrations are spoken of by the magnifiers of this way ; although there be so little evidence in it, that it cannot work but upon a very weak understanding. Must that obligation to observe all which the precedent age believed or practised be proved by reason, particular testimony, or universal tradition ? And let the extollers of this way take their choice, so they will undertake to bring evidence equal to the weight which depends upon it. It is hard to conceive what reason should enforce it, but such as proves the impossibility of the contrary : and they have understandings of another mould from others, who can conceive it impossible that men should not think themselves obliged to believe and do all just as their predecessors did. If particular testimonies could be produced, they signify no more than their own judgments ; but we are inquiring for the judgment of every age of the church, and the persons who live in it. And to prove an universal tradition of this obligation is the most difficult task of all, for it depends upon the truth of that which is to be proved by it. For if they did not think themselves obliged to believe and do what their predecessors did, they could not think themselves bound to deliver such an obligation to their posterity to do it. And therefore you must first prove the obligation itself, before you can prove the universal tradition of it. For although one age may deliver it, yet you cannot be assured that a former age did it to them ; unless you can prove the same sense of this obligation ran through them all. But this is so far from being an universal tradition, that the present age from which it begins was never agreed in it, as I have shewed already.

§. 5. 3. It is to no purpose to prove the impossibility of motion, when I see men move : no more it is to prove that no age of the church could vary from the foregoing, when we can evidently prove that they have done it. And therefore this argument is intended only to catch easy minds, that care not for a search into the history of the several ages of the church, but had rather sit down with a superficial subtlety than spend time in further inquiries. For this argument proceeds just as if men should prove the world eternal by this medium ; the

present age sees no alteration in it, and they could not be deceived in what their forefathers believed, nor they in theirs, and so on *in infinitum*; for no men did ever see the world made: and therefore it was never made, and so eternal. But if we go about to prove by reason the production of the world, or by scripture to shew that it was once made, then this oral tradition is spoiled. And so it is in the present case: these men attempt to prove there could never be any alteration in the faith or practice of the church since Christ's time; for the present age delivers what it had from the precedent, and so up till the first institution of the church: but in the mean time, if we can evidently prove that there hath been such alterations in the church, then it is to no purpose to prove that impossible which we see actually done. And this appears, not only because the scripture supposes a degeneracy in the Christian church, which could never be, if every age of the church did infallibly believe and practise as the precedent up to Christ's time did; but because we can produce clear evidence that some things are delivered by the present church which must be brought in by some age since the time of Christ. For which I shall refer you to what I have said already concerning communion in one kind, invocation of saints, and worship of images. In all which I have proved evidently, that they were not in use in some ages of the Christian church; and it is as evident that these are delivered by the present church, and therefore this principle must needs be false. For by these things it appears that one age of the church may differ in practice or opinion from another, and therefore this oral tradi-
586 tion cannot be infallible. And yet this is the only way whereby a prescription may be allowed, for this offers to give a sufficient title if it could be made good. But bare possession in matters of religion is a most senseless plea, and which would justify heathenism and Mahometism as well as your church.

§. 6. 2. It were worth knowing, what you mean by full and quiet possession of your faith, religion, and church, which you say you were in. Either you mean that you did believe the doctrines of your church yourselves, or that we were bound to believe them too. If you mean only the former, you are in as full possession of them as ever, for I suppose all in your church do believe them; if you intend by this possession, that we

ought to believe them because you did, this is a prescription indeed, but without any ground or reason. For even Tertulian, whom you cite for prescribing against heretics, says, “that nothing can be prescribed against truth^b,” *Non spatium temporum, non patrocinia personarum, non privilegium regionum*. “Neither length of time, nor authority of persons, nor privilege of places.” If you say it was truth you were in possession of, that is the thing to be proved; and if you can make that appear, we will not disturb your possession at all. But you must be sure to prove it by something else besides your quiet and full possession, unless you can prove it impossible that you should be possessed of falsehoods; but we have evidently shewn the contrary already. And if we examine a little further what this possession is, we shall see what an excellent right it gives you to prescribe by. You were possessed of your faith, religion, and church, i. e. you did believe the Roman church infallible, you believed the pope’s supremacy, transubstantiation, purgatory, &c. And what then? do you not believe them still? Yes, doubtless. But what is your quarrel with us then? do we hinder you the possession of them? No, but we ought to believe them too. But why so, because you are in possession of them? What! must we then believe whatever you do, whether it be true or false? If this be the meaning of your *possession*, you ought well to prove it, or else we shall call it *usurpation*. For it is a most ridiculous thing for you to talk of possession, when the question is, whether there be any such things in the world or no as those you say you are possessed of: we deny your church’s infallibility, the pope’s supremacy, purgatory, &c. You must first prove there are such things *in rerum natura* as purgatory, transubstantiation, &c., before you can say you are possessed of them: you must convince us that your church is infallible, and that the pope was made head of the church by Christ, and then we will grant you are in full possession of them, but not before. So that you see the question is not concerning the manner of possession, but of the things themselves, which you call your faith, religion, and church, in opposition to ours; and therefore it is impossible to plead prescription, where

^b Tertull. de Virg. Veland. cap. 1.

there never was any possession at all. And therefore you clearly mistake when you call us the aggressors, for you are plainly the imposers in this case, and quarrel with us for not believing what you would have us; and therefore you are bound to prove, and not we. So that there is nothing you could challenge any possession of in the church of England, but some authority which the pope had, which you elsewhere confess he might be deprived of, as he was in king Henry's time; and which we offer to prove that he was not possessor *bonæ fidei* of, but that he came to it by fraud and violence, and was deprived of it by a legal power. Thus I have fully examined your argument from possession, because it presents us with something which had not been discussed before.

§. 7. But having taken a view of all that remains, I find that it consists of a bare repetition of the controversies before discussed, especially concerning the certainty and grounds of faith, the infallibility of the church and general councils, and 587 the authority of the Roman church; so that if you had not an excellent faculty of saying most where there is least occasion, I should wonder at your design in spending several chapters in giving the same things under other words. Unless it were an ambition of answering every clause in his lordship's book which carried you to it, though you only gave over and over what you had said in many places before. Which is a piece of vanity I neither envy you for, nor shall I strive to imitate you in; having made it my endeavour to lay those grounds in the handling each controversy, that there should not need any such fruitless repetitions as you here give us. His lordship, though he complains much of it, was forced by his adversary's importunity to return the same answers in effect which had been given before by him in the proper places; but whosoever compares what his lordship saith with what you pretend to answer, will find no necessity at all of my undergoing the same tedious and wearisome task. Instead therefore of a particular answer, I shall give only some general strictures on what remains of these subjects, where there is any appearance of difficulty; and conclude all with the examination of your Defence of Purgatory, that being a subject which hath not yet come under our inquiry. Your main business is to persuade us that your's is the only saving faith;

which you prove by this: "The saving faith is but one; your's Lab. p. 349. is confessed by us to be a saving faith still; therefore your's is ^{n. 1.} the only saving faith." But if you had considered on what that confession depends, you could have made no argument at all of it; for when we say that your faith is saving, we mean no more but this, that you have so much of the common truths of Christianity among you that there is a possibility for men to be saved in your church: but doth this imply, that your's is a saving faith, in that sense wherein it is said, there is but one saving faith; for in that proposition it is understood of all those common fundamental truths which the Christian church of all ages hath been agreed in. And the saying there is but one saving faith, is of the same sense with the saying there is but one true religion in the world.

The substance of what you would infer from the saying of Athanasius's Creed, "which if a man keeps whole and invio- Lab. p. 351. late," (as you would have it,) is this, "that a man is equally ^{n. 2.} bound to believe every article of faith." But you cannot mean that it is simply necessary to do it, for that you disclaim elsewhere, by your distinction of things necessary from the matter and the formal reason of faith; and therefore it can only be meant of such to whom those objects of faith are sufficiently proposed; and so far we acknowledge it too, that it is necessary to salvation for every man to believe that which he is convinced to be an object of faith. For otherwise, such persons must call in question God's veracity; but if you would hence make it necessary to believe all that your church proposes for matter of faith, you must prove, that whatever your church delivers is as infallibly true as if God himself spake; and when you can persuade us of this, we shall believe whatever is propounded by her. When you say, "we cannot believe all articles of Lab. p. 352. faith on the same formal reason, because we deny the church's ^{n. 3.} infallibility, it is apparent that you make the church's testimony the formal reason of faith, and that you are bound to prove the church absolutely infallible before we can believe any thing on her account. Neither does it follow, because Lab. p. 353. we deny that, therefore we pick and choose our faith; for ^{n. 4.} we believe all without reservation which you or any man can convince us was ever revealed by God. As to what at large occurs here again about the infallibility of counsels, Lab. p. 355. &c.

there is nothing but what hath been sufficiently answered on that subject; and so reserving the question of purgatory, which is here brought in by his lordship as a further instance of the errors of general councils, I pass on to the two last chapters: in which we meet again with the objected inconveniences from questioning the infallibility of the church and councils, that then faith would be uncertain, and private persons might judge of councils; and if they may err in one they may err in all; as fresh as if they had never been heard of before. Only the argument from Rom. x. 15, That because none can preach except they be sent, therefore the present church is infallible, is both new and excellent, on which account I let it pass. If your church with all her infallibility can do no more, as you confess, in reference to heresies, but only secure the faithful members of the church who have due care of themselves, and perform their duty well towards their lawful pastors, you have little cause to boast of the great privilege of it, and as little reason to contend for the necessity of it, since so much is done without it, and on surer grounds by the scriptures, and the use of other means which fall short of infallibility.

Lab. p. 373.
n. 1.

Lab. p. 376.
&c.

Lab. p. 375.
n. 2.

Lab. p. 386.
n. 9.

§. 8. In the beginning of your last chapter we have a large dispute concerning St. Cyprian's meaning in his 45th epistle to Cornelius, where he speaks of the root and matrix of the catholic church: viz. whether by that the Roman church be understood or no? His lordship saith not, and gives many reasons for it; you maintain the contrary: but the business may be soon decided upon a true state of the occasion of writing that epistle. Which in short was this: it seems, letters had been sent in the name of Polycarp, bishop of the colony of Adrumyttium, directed to Cornelius at Rome; but Cyprian and Liberalis coming thither, and acquainting the clergy there with the resolution of the African bishops to suspend communion either with Cornelius or Novatianus till the return of Caldonius and Fortunatus, who were sent on purpose to give an account of the proceedings there, the clergy of Adrumyttium, upon this writing to Rome, direct their letters, not to Cornelius, but to the Roman clergy. Which Cornelius, (being, it seems, informed by some as though it were done by St. Cyprian's

counsel) takes offence at, and writes to Cyprian about it: who gives him in this epistle the account of it,—that it was only done, that there might be no dissent among themselves upon this difference at Rome; and that they only suspended their sentence till the return of Caldonius and Fortunatus, who might either bring them word that all was composed at Rome, or else satisfy them who was the lawfully ordained bishop. And therefore, as soon as they understood that Cornelius was the lawful bishop, they unanimously declare for him, and order all letters to be sent to him, and that his communion should be embraced. This is the substance of that epistle. But it seems Cornelius was moved at St. Cyprian's suspending himself, as though it were done out of disfavour to him; which Cyprian, to clear himself of, tells him, that his design was only to preserve the unity of the catholic church. "For," saith he, "we give this advice to all those who the mean time had occasion to sail to Rome, *ut ecclesiæ catholicæ radicem et matricem agnoscerent et tenerent*, that they would acknowledge and hold to the root and matrix of the catholic church; by which his lordship understands the unity of the church catholic; you, the particular church of Rome. But it is apparent, the meaning of this counsel was to prevent their participation in the schism. So that if, upon their coming to Rome, the schismatical party was evidently known from the other, (which they might, I grant, soon understand there, by the circumstances of affairs,) they should join themselves with that part which preserved the unity of the catholic church. Which I take to be the true meaning of St. Cyprian. But in case the matter should prove disputable at Rome, and the matter be referred to other churches, then, by virtue of this advice, they were bound to suspend their communion with either party, till the catholic church had declared itself. By this account of the business, all your arguments come to nothing; for they only prove that which I grant, viz. that in case it appeared at Rome which was the catholic party, they were to communicate with it; but this was not, because the catholic party at Rome was the root and matrix of the catholic church, (for on that account the party of Novatianus might have been so too, if Novatianus had been lawful bishop,) but their holding to the

Lab. p. 391.

n. 1.

Lab. p. 392.

n. 1.

589

root of the catholic church would oblige them to communicate only with that part which did preserve the unity of it. For the controversy now at Rome was between two parties both challenging an equal right; and therefore if St. Cyprian had only advised them to communicate with the Roman church, because that was the root and matrix of the catholic church, his advice had signified nothing; for the question was not between the church of Rome and other churches, in which case it might have been pertinent to have said they should adhere to the church of Rome, because that was the root, &c. But when the difference was at Rome itself between two bishops there, this reason had been wholly impertinent; for the only reason proper in this case must be such as must discriminate the one party from the other, which this could not do, because it was equally challenged by them both, and had belonged to one as well as the other, in case Novatianus had proved the lawful bishop, and not Cornelius. And therefore the sense of Cyprian's words must be such as might give direction which party to join with at Rome, on which account they cannot import any privilege of the church of Rome over other churches, but only contain this advice, that they should hold to the unity of the catholic church, and communicate only with that party which did it. This reason is so clear and evident to me that this place cannot be understood of any privilege of the church of Rome above other churches, that if there were nothing else to induce me to believe it, this were so pregnant that I could not resist the force of it.

Conf. p. 307.
sect. 38.
n. 27.

§. 9. But besides this, his lordship proves that elsewhere St. Cyprian speaks in his own person with other catholic bishops, *nos qui ecclesiæ unius caput et radicem tenemus*, “we who hold the head and root of one church;” by which it appears he could not make the church of Rome the root and matrix of the catholic; this being understood of the unity and society of the catholic church, without relation to the church of Rome: and St. Cyprian^c writes to Cornelius, that they had sent Caldonius and Fortunatus to reduce the church of Rome to the unity and communion of the catholic church; and because no particular church can be the root of the catholic, and

^c Cypr. ep. 73.

if any were, Jerusalem might more pretend to it than Rome ; and because St. Cyprian and his brethren durst not have suspended their communion at all, if they had looked on the church of Rome as the root and matrix of the catholic, as Baronius confesses they did : all which things are largely insisted on by his lordship, and do all confirm that hereby was not meant any authority or privilege of the church of Rome above other apostolical churches, which in respect of the lesser churches which came from them are called *matrices ecclesiæ* by Tertullian and others. But you are still so very unreasonable, that though no more be said of the church of Rome than might be said of any other apostolical church, yet because it is said of the church of Rome it must import some huge authority, which if it had been said of any other would have been interpreted by yourselves into nothing : for so do you deal with us here ; for because it is said that they who joined with Cornelius did preserve the unity of the catholic church, therefore it must needs be understood that the Roman church is the root of the catholic. But he must have a very mean understanding that can be swayed by such trifles as these are : for was there not a catholic and schismatical party then at Rome ? and if they who joined with Novatianus did separate from the catholic church, then they who were in communion with Cornelius must preserve the unity of it. And would not this argument as well prove the catholic party at Carthage to be the root and matrix of the catholic church as at Rome ? But such kind of things must they deal with who are resolved to maintain a cause, and yet are destitute of better means to do it with. So that I cannot find any thing in all your answer but what would equally hold for any other church at that time which was so divided as Rome was, considering the great care that then was used to preserve the unity of the catholic church. And what particularly St. Cyprian's^d apprehension was concerning the nature and unity of the catholic church, we have at large discoursed already, to which place we refer the reader, if he desires any further satisfaction.

§. 10. Your whole no. 5 depends on personal matters concerning the satisfaction of the lady's conscience ; but if you

Lab. p. 394.
n. 2.

Lab. p. 399,
&c.

^d Part 2. ch. 2. sect. 8, 9.

would thence infer that she did well to desert the protestant communion, you must prove that it can be no sin to follow the dictates of an erroneous conscience ; for such, we say, it was in her, and you denying it, all this discourse signifies nothing, but depends on the truth of the matters in controversy between us. But you most notoriously impose on his lordship, when, because he asserts the possibility of salvation of some in your church, you would make him say that it is no sin to join with your church : you might as well say, because he hopes some who have committed adultery may be saved, therefore it is no sin to commit adultery. So that while you are charging him falsely for allowing dissimulation, you do that which is more, in saying that which you cannot but know to be a great untruth.

Lab. p. 401. n. 5.

Lab. p. 402. n. 6.

If our religion be not the same with yours, as you eagerly contend it is not, let it suffice to tell you that our religion is Christianity, let yours be what it will. And if it please you better to have a name wholly distinct from us, yours shall be called the *Roman* religion, and ours the *Christian*. If you judge us of another religion from yours, because we do not believe all that you do, we may judge you to have a different religion from the Christian, because you impose more by your own confession to be believed as necessary in order to salvation than ever Christ or the apostles did ; and certainly the main of any religion consists in those things which are necessary to be believed in it in order to eternal happiness.

Lab. p. 403. n. 6.

In your following discourse, you are so far from giving us any hopes of peace with your church, that you plainly give us the reason why it is vain to expect or desire it ; which is, that if your church should recede from any thing, it would appear she had erred, and if that appears, farewell infallibility ; and then if that be once gone, you think all is gone : and while you maintain it, we are so far from hoping any peace with you, that the peace of Christendom may still be joined in the Dutchman's sign with the quadrature of the circle, and the philosopher's stone for the sign of the three hopeless things.

How far we are bound to submit to general councils, hath been so fully cleared already, that I need not go about here to vindicate his lordship's opinion from falsity or contradiction, both which you unreasonably charge it with, and that still from

no wiser a ground than not being able to distinguish between Lab. p. 404.
the submission of obedience and faith: for his lordship saith, ^{n. 7.}

“It may be our duty not to oppose general councils in case they err, and yet it may be no pride not to believe known and gross errors of general councils;” and, I pray, what shadow of a contradiction is here? And if it be pride in us not to believe Lab. p. 406.
gross errors imposed on us, is it not much more intolerable in ^{n. 8.}
them who offer to impose them? What authority the pope hath either to order or confirm councils, it is not here a place to enter upon again, since it hath been so largely discoursed of in so many places. But you force me, though not to the repetition of matter, yet to the repeating my saying that I will not, oftener than I should, but only to shew how little you deserve any further answer.

There is nothing now remaining to the end of your book **591**
which hath not been over and over, even in these last chapters, but only a long discourse touching succession, which you shew yourself of how little importance it is, when after you have endeavoured at large to prove the necessity of personal succession, you grant, “that it is not sufficient without succession Lab. p. 409.
of doctrine too:” and on that account you deny the Greek ^{n. 9.}
church to have a true succession. And in vindication of Lab. p. 410.
^{n. 9.}
Stapleton, you say, “all the succession which he and you con- Lab. p. 411.
tend for is a succession of pastors, which hold entire both the ^{n. 10.}
unity and the faith of the church.” So that it comes to this at last, that you are bound to prove a continual succession of all that which you call the faith of your church, in every age from the apostles’ times; if you would have us believe that doctrine, or own your church for the true church of Christ. And therefore I conclude these general answers with his lordship’s words; “If A.C., T.C., or any Jesuit, can prove, that by a Conf. p. 322.
visible continued succession from Christ or his apostles to this ^{sect. 39. n. 7.}
day, either transubstantiation in the eucharist, or the eucharist in one kind, or purgatory, or worship of images, or the intention of the priest of necessity in baptism, or the power of the pope over a general council, or his infallibility with or without it, or his power to depose princes, or the public prayers of the church in an unknown tongue, with divers other points, have been so taught; I for my part will give the cause.

CHAP. VI.

THE SENSE OF THE FATHERS CONCERNING PURGATORY.

The advantage which comes to the church of Rome by the doctrine of purgatory, thence the boldness of our adversaries in contending for it.—The sense of the Roman church concerning purgatory explained.—The controversy between the Greek and Latin church concerning it.—The difference in the church of Rome about purgatory.—Some general considerations about the sense of the fathers as to its being an article of faith.—The doubtfulness and uncertainty of the fathers' judgments in this particular manifested by St. Austin, the first who seemed to assert a purgation before the day of judgment.—Prayer for the dead used in the ancient church doth not infer purgatory.—The primate of Armagh vindicated from our adversaries' calumnies.—The general intention of the church distinguished from the private opinions of particular persons.—The prayers of the church respected the day of judgment.—The testimonies of the fathers in behalf of purgatory examined ; particularly of the pretended Dionysius, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Hierome, St. Basil, Nazianzen, Lactantius, Hilary, Gregory Nyssen, &c.—And not one of them asserts the purgatory of the church of Rome.—St. Austin doth not contradict himself about it.—The doctrine of purgatory no elder than Gregory I. and built on credulity and superstition.—The church's infallibility made at last the foundation of the belief of purgatory.—The falsity of that principle : and the whole concluded.

§. I. **T**HESE general answers being dispatched, there remains only now this question concerning purgatory to be discussed. Which being the great Diana of your church, no wonder you are so much displeased at his lordship for speaking against it ; for by that means your craft is in danger to be set at nought. There being no opinion in your church which brings in a more constant revenue, by masses for the dead and indulgences, besides casualties and deodands, by dying persons or their friends, in hopes of a speedier release
592 out of the pains of purgatory. So that if this opinion were once out of countenance in the world, you would lose one of the best arts you have of upholding the grandeur of your church. For then farewell indulgences, and years of jubilee ;

farewell all those rich donations which are given by those at their death who hope by that means to get the sooner out of the suburbs of hell to a place of rest and happiness. For what engine could possibly be better contrived to extort the largest gifts from those whose riches were as great as their sins, than to persuade them, that by that means they would be sooner delivered out of the flames of purgatory, and need not doubt but they should come to heaven at last? And would not they be accounted great fools, that would not live as they pleased in this world, as long as they could buy themselves out of the pains of another? And by this means your church hath not only eaten, but grown fat, by the sins of the people; it being truly observed by Spalatensis ^a, “that the doctrine of purgatory hath been that which hath most enriched the church of Rome;” which he gives as the reason of the most zealous contending for that doctrine among those of your party who find so much advantage by it. And we might easily believe there was something extraordinary in it, when you tell us, “it ^{Lab. p. 371.} is therefore firmly to be believed by all catholics that there is ^{n. 14.} a purgatory; yea, we are as much bound to believe it as we are bound to believe (for instance) the Trinity or incarnation itself; because, since it is defined by the church, we cannot lawfully, or without sin and peril of damnation, deny or question this doctrine.” We had need then look to ourselves, who look on this doctrine as a mere figment, that hath no foundation at all either in scripture, reason, or tradition of the primitive church; but much more had you need to look to yourselves, who dare with so much confidence obtrude so destructive a doctrine to a Christian life, without any evidence of the truth of it, to be believed as much as the Trinity or incarnation itself; which expressions, take them in the mildest sense you can give them, carry a most insufferable boldness with them. But these are not all the bold words which you utter on this subject; for you say elsewhere, “that Bellarmine ^{Lab. p. 359.} doth not more boldly than truly affirm, yea evidently prove, ^{n. 9.} that all the fathers, both Greek and Latin, did constantly teach purgatory from the very apostles’ times, and consequently that it must be held for an apostolical tradition, or

^a De Repub. Eccles. l. 5. c. 8. sect. 73.

nothing can be." So then, if confidence would carry it, we must not only tremble at the fears of purgatory, but we must firmly believe it as an article of faith, and as a most undoubted apostolical tradition.

§. 2. But before we can digest these things, we must see a little more ground for them than as yet we do; and therefore you must be content to hear our reasons, why we neither look on it as a matter of faith or apostolical tradition; in order to which nothing is more necessary than to inquire what you mean by purgatory. For as long as you can shelter yourselves under general words, you think you are safe enough; but when we once bring you to a fuller explication of your meaning, purgatory itself is not half so evident as those impostures are whereby you would maintain it. But for our clear understanding this controversy, we must find out what your doctrine is concerning it; for as confident as you are of it, there are not a few among you who are afraid to declare what you mean by it, lest by that means the world should see how far it is from having foundation either in scripture or antiquity. We are therefore told by some who either are ashamed of the doctrine itself, or loath to betray their cause (by declaring themselves), that your church requires no more than to believe that there is a purgatory, for which they avouch the council of Trent, which only defines, 'That the sound doctrine concerning purgatory should be taught. This was indeed necessary to be
593 said by such who do not at all believe the Roman doctrine concerning it whatever they pretend, but rather agree with the Greek church about the middle state of souls. But although the council of Trent did not expressly define what they meant by purgatory, yet the sense of the council concerning it is easy to be gathered from the comparing of places together in it. For the council of Trent, in the last session when it passed the decree of purgatory, refers us to two things by which we may fully understand the meaning of it; for in the preface to the decree it saith, "that the catholic church had, in this and former œcumenical councils, taught that there was a purgatory;" by which we may understand what this purgatory is which was now decreed, and you say we are bound to believe it as an article of faith. Now in all the former decrees and anathematisms of the council, there is

no place which seems to concern the doctrine of purgatory so much as the thirtieth anathema of the sixth session, in these words: *Si quis ita reatum pænæ æternæ deleri dixerit; ut nullus remaneat reatus pænæ temporalis exsolvendæ vel in hoc seculo vel in futuro in purgatorio, antequam ad regna cælorum aditus patere possit; anathema sit*: “If any one shall affirm that the guilt of eternal punishment is so forgiven, as that there remains no guilt of temporal punishment to be paid, either in this life, or hereafter in purgatory, before there can be any entrance into the kingdom of heaven; let them be anathema.” From whence it evidently follows, that the doctrine of purgatory, as it is taught by the council of Trent, doth depend upon this principle: That there is a guilt of temporal punishment remaining after the sin is pardoned, which temporal punishment is to be satisfied for, either in this life or in purgatory. So that all those who are in purgatory are there on that account, that they might satisfy the justice of God for the temporal punishment of sin; for the guilt of mortal sin being remitted by the merits of Christ, the punishment is supposed still to remain, which being exchanged from eternal to temporal by the keys of the church, this punishment remains to be satisfied for in the pains of purgatory. But this punishment being temporal, the possibility of a release from them is necessarily supposed before the day of judgment; for the council of Trent, in the decree of purgatory, declares that the souls there detained are relieved by the prayers of the faithful, and especially by the sacrifice of the altar. Which in the 22nd session, it saith, is offered *pro defunctis in Christo nondum ad plenum purgatis*, “for the departed in Christ not yet fully purged.” So that the satisfaction of the debt of temporal punishment which remains when the sin is pardoned, and the translation of souls from thence to heaven, by the prayers of the living and the sacrifice of the mass, are the main foundations of the doctrine of your church concerning purgatory.

§. 3. And this will further appear by the state of the controversy between the Greek and Latin church upon this subject. For the main thing which the Greeks objected against the Latins was this temporary punishment for sin in a future state: for they say, in their apology delivered in to the council of Basil, “We own no purgatory fire, nor any temporary

punishment by fire which shall have an end; for we received no such thing by tradition, nor doth the eastern church confess it." And afterwards, "We deny that any souls pass through this life to eternal fire; for in saying so we should weaken the consent of the whole church: and it is to be feared, if we should assert such a temporary fire, that people would be apt to believe that all the fire in the other life were only temporary; by which means they would fall into such neglect and carelessness, that they would make the more fuel for eternal fire^b." And therefore they conclude that they neither have
 Lab. p. 358. nor shall assert any such purgatory fire. But you would seem
 n. 8. to persuade us that the contest between the Greeks and Latins was only whether the fire of purgatory were material or no; for you say, "The Greeks in the council of Florence never
 594 doubted in the least measure nor denied purgatory itself, but only questioned whether the fire were material or metaphorical." But if you speak of those Greeks who held to what was generally received in the Greek church, you are very much deceived therein; for the sense of the Greek church was fully delivered by them in this apology, penned, as is supposed, by Marcus Ephesius but the year before at the council of Basil: and herein they not only dispute against the fire, but against any such state of purgation after this life, by the undergoing any temporary punishment for sin. For thus that apology ends: "For these causes the doctrine proposed of a purgatory fire is to be cast out of the church, as that which tends to slacken the endeavours of the diligent, and which hinders them from doing their utmost to purge themselves in this life, since another purgation is expected after it^c." Is not this plain enough for their denial of any state of purgation after this life, by which men might satisfy for the temporary punishment of sin, and be translated out of that state to the kingdom of heaven? And thence, although in the bull of union published by Eugenius IV. at the concluding the Florentine council, no more was concluded than that those penitents who departed this life before they had satisfied for their former sins by

^b Apolog. Græcorum de Igne Purgat. p. 66. ed. Salmas.

^c Διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν καὶ τὸ προκείμενον δόγμα τοῦ καθαρτηρίου πυρὸς ἀποβλητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὥς

ῥαθυμίαν ἐμποιοῦν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ἐπιπείθον αὐτοὺς μὴ πᾶσι τρόποις ἀγωνίζεσθαι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκκαθαίρειν, ὥς προσδοκούμενης ἐτέρας καθάρσεως.—P. 93.

worthy fruits of penance should have their souls purged after death *pœnis purgatoriis*, “with purgatory punishments,” yet Marcus Eugenius utterly refused to subscribe it thus; which certainly he would never have done, if all the controversy had been only whether the fire were real or metaphorical. And the whole Greek church utterly refused those terms of union, and therefore Alphonsus à Castro recounts the denying purgatory among the errors of the Greeks^d. The Greeks indeed do not believe that any souls enjoy the beatifical vision before the day of judgment, and on that account they allow of prayer for the dead, not with any respect to a deliverance of souls out of purgatory, but to the participation of their happiness at the great day. But there is a great deal of difference between this opinion and that of your church; for they believe all souls of believers to be in expectation of the final judgment, but without any temporary punishment for sin, or any release from that punishment by the prayers of the living, which your church asserts, and is the proper state of the question concerning purgatory; which is not whether there be any middle state wherein the souls of the faithful may continue in expectation of the final consummation of their happiness at the great day; nor whether it be lawful in that sense for the church on earth to pray for departed souls in order to their final justification at the day of judgment, or, in St. Paul’s language, “that God would have mercy on them in that day;” but whether there be such a state wherein the souls of men undergo a temporary punishment for sin, the guilt being pardoned, out of which they may be released by the prayers of the living, and translated from purgatory to the kingdom of heaven before the day of resurrection. This is the true state of the question between us and the church of Rome. And now we come to examine whether your doctrine concerning purgatory be either an article of faith or apostolical tradition; which how confidently soever you may assert, we shall find your confidence built on very little reason.

§. 4. Which we may the easier believe, since there are so many among yourselves who do not think themselves obliged to own this doctrine of your church concerning purgatory:

^d Alphons. à Castro, l. 12. tit. purgat.

nay, we have not only the confession of several of your party, that your doctrine of *purgatory* was not known in the primitive church, as Alphonsus à Castro, Roffensis, Polydore, &c., and of others that it cannot be sufficiently proved from scripture, as Petrus à Soto, Perionius, Bulenger, whose testimonies
 595 are produced by others; but there are some persons of note among you who have expressly denied the doctrine itself, and confuted the pretended reasons which are given for it. Petrus Picherellus saith, “There is no fuel to be found in scripture either to kindle or maintain the fire of purgatory^e,” and which afterwards he largely disproves in his excellent discourse *de Missa*. Father Barns acknowledges “that the punishment of souls in purgatory is a thing which lies merely in human opinion, which cannot be firmly deduced from scriptures, fathers, or councils; yea,” (saith he, with submission to better judgments,) “the opposite opinion seems more agreeable to them^f.” But later than these, you cannot but know who it is here at home that hath not only pulled down the superstructure, but razed the very foundations of your doctrine of purgatory, in his discourse *de medio Animarum Statu*; wherein he professedly disproves the doctrine of your church (though he is loath to own it to be so) in this particular, and shews at large that it hath no foundation at all either in scripture, antiquity, or reason. But if your doctrine of purgatory be to be believed as an article of faith, and apostolical tradition, if any be, how come these differences among yourselves about it? how comes that author not to be answered, and his reasons satisfied? But if you be not agreed among yourselves what this article of faith is, you are most unreasonable men to tell us we are as much bound to believe it as *the Trinity*, or *incarnation*. We ask you what it is we are bound to believe; you tell us, according to the sense of your church, “the punishment of souls in a future state, out of which they may be delivered by the prayers of the faithful, and translated into the kingdom of heaven.” Another he denies all this, and saith we are in effect only bound to believe that faithful souls do

^e Picherellus de Missa, c. 2. p. 150.

^f Punitio ergo in purgatorio est res in opinione humana posita: quæ nec ex scripturis nec patribus, nec conciliis deduci potest firmiter: immo,

(salvo meliori judicio) opposita sententia eis conformior videtur.—Barns Catholic. Rom. Pacif. sect. 9. l. D. ad fin. Paralip.

not enjoy their full happiness till the resurrection, and that there is no deliverance at all out of any state in which men's souls are after death, till the day of judgment, and that the prayers of the church only respect that day; but that the former doctrine is so far from being an article of faith, that it is contrary to scripture, antiquity, and reason. If such a state of expectation wherein faithful souls are at rest (but according to different degrees of grace which they had at their departure hence, and look for at the day of resurrection, when they shall have a perfect consummation of their bliss) were all the purgatory which your church asserted, the breach might be far nearer closing as to this article than now it is: for although we find some particular persons ready to give a fair and tolerable sense of your doctrine herein, yet we cannot be ignorant that the general apprehension and sense of your church is directly contrary; and those persons who have discovered the freedom of their judgments as to this and other particulars, know how much it concerns them to keep a due distance from Rome, if they would preserve the freedom of their persons. But you are not one of those that hath cause for any such fears; for whatever Bellarmine saith, you are ready to swear to it, and accordingly set yourself to the defence of purgatory upon his principles, which are far more suitable to the doctrine of your church than to scripture or antiquity.

§. 5. But because this controversy is not managed between his lordship and you about the sense of the scripture but the fathers concerning it, I must therefore inquire, whether your doctrine of purgatory were ever owned by the fathers as an article of faith or apostolical tradition. And that I may the more fully clear it, before I come to examine your proofs for it, I shall lay down some general considerations.

I. Nothing ought to be looked on as an article of faith among the fathers, but what they declare that they believe on the account of divine revelation. As to all other things which they assert, we may look on them as private opinions of parti- 596
cular persons, but not as such things which were received as articles of faith. For whatsoever is received as such, it must be wholly on the account of God's revealing it, who only can oblige us to believe with that assent which is required to faith. And if it be so as to all other things, much more certainly as

to the future state of souls, of which we can know nothing certainly without divine revelation. For since the remission of sins and the happiness of the future life depend upon the goodness and mercy of God, we can define nothing as to these things any further than God hath declared them. If God hath declared that remission of sins lies in the taking away the obligation to punishment, it will be a contradiction to say that he pardons those whom he exacts the punishment of sin from purely to satisfy his justice; if he hath declared that the souls of the faithful are in joy and felicity as soon as they are delivered out of this sinful world, it is impossible they should undergo unsufferable pains, though not to eternity. I dispute not now whether he hath so revealed these things, but that it is impossible for any thing to be looked on as an article of faith but what hath clear divine revelation for it. And therefore, although many testimonies of the fathers might be produced one way or other as to these things, when they speak only their own fancies and imaginations, and not what God hath revealed, they cannot, all put together, make the opinion they assert to be an article of faith. Nothing is more apparent than that the itching curiosity of human nature to know more than God hath revealed concerning the future state of souls did betimes discover itself in the church. But the strange diversity of these imaginations were a sufficient evidence that they spake not by any certain rule, but according to their different fancies; and therefore that they did not deliver any doctrine of faith, but only their own private opinions. If you would therefore prove that the fathers did own purgatory as an article of faith, you must not think it enough to prove that one or two of the fathers did speak something tending to it, but that all who had occasion to mention it did speak of it as the doctrine of the church, and that which came from an immediate divine revelation.

2. There is no reason that should be looked on as an article of faith, which they who seemed to assert it most did build on such places which they acknowledged themselves to be very obscure. For since they deduced it from scripture, it is apparent that they did not believe it on the account of any unwritten word or divine revelation conveyed merely by tradition; and since they confess the places to be very difficult, it is

unreasonable to judge that they looked on that as a matter of faith which they supposed was contained in them. As for instance, St. Austin in several places asserts, that all things necessary to be believed are clearly revealed in scripture^f; and withal he says, that the place 1 Cor. iii. 15. is very difficult and obscure, and that it is one of those places in St. Paul which St. Peter saith “are hard to be understood;” and therefore it is not conceivable that St. Austin should make any thing a matter of faith which he founds upon this place. And this is the great and almost only considerable place which he or the rest of the fathers did insist on as to the nature of that purgation which was to be in a future state.

3. That cannot be looked on as an article of faith to such persons who express their own doubts concerning the truth of it. For whatever is owned as an article of faith by any person is thereby acknowledged to be firmly believed by him. Now upon our inquiry into the fathers we shall find, the first person who seemed to assert that any faithful souls passed through a fire of purgation before the day of judgment was St. Austin; but he delivers his judgment with so much fear and hesitancy, that any one may easily see that he was far from making it an article of faith. We must consider then, 597 that in St. Augustine’s time there were many, who, though they denied Origen’s opinion as to the salvation at last of all persons, yet were very willing to believe it as to all those who died in the communion of the church, that though they passed through the flames of hell for their sins, yet at last they should be saved; and for this they mainly insisted on 1 Cor. iii. 15, where it is said that some should be saved, but as by fire. “Such,” say they, “build upon the foundation gold, silver, precious stones, who to their faith add good works; but they hay, wood, and stubble, whose life is contrary to their faith; and yet these latter they asserted should come to heaven at last, but they must undergo the torments of hell first.” Against these St. Austin writes his book *De Fide et Operibus*, wherein he proves that such as live in sin shall be finally excluded the kingdom of heaven; and when he comes to the interpretation of that place, he gives this account of it; That

^f Aug. de Fide et Oper. c. 15, 16.

those who do so love Christ as rather to part with all things for him than to lose him, but yet have too great a love to the things of the world, shall suffer grief and loss on that account. *Sive ergo in hac vita tantum homines ista patiuntur, sive etiam post hanc vitam talia quædam judicia subsequuntur; non abhorret, quantum arbitror, a ratione veritatis istæ intellectus hujus sententiæ* §. “Whether,” saith he, “men suffer these things in this life, or such judgments follow after it, I suppose this sense of St. Paul’s meaning is not dissonant from truth.” So far was he from being certain of it, that he puts in *quantum arbitror*, “as far as I suppose;” and yet he would not define whether that loss which they were to suffer were only in this life or no. And in his Enchiridion to Laurentius^h, where he disputes the very same matter, he saith, *Tale aliquid post hanc vitam fieri incredibile non est; et utrum ita sit quæri potest, et aut inveniri aut latere, nonnullos fideles per ignem quendam purgatorium, quanto magis minusve bona pereuntia dilexerunt, tanto tardius citiusve salvari*. “It is not incredible that such a thing should be after this life, and it may be inquired after whether it be found to be so or no, that some faithful souls pass through a purging fire, and are saved sooner or later according to the degree of their affection to worldly things.” Will any man in his wits think that St. Austin spake this of any matter of faith, or that was generally received in the church as an apostolical tradition? Did he ever speak so concerning the Trinity or the incarnation of Christ, which you parallel with purgatory? What would men have thought of him if he had said of either of those articles, It is not incredible they may be true, and, It may be inquired into whether they be or no? Whatever then St. Austin’s private opinion was, we see he delivers it modestly and doubtfully, not obtruding it as an article of faith, or apostolical tradition, if any be. And the very same he repeats in his answer to the first question of Dulcitius; so that this was all that ever he asserted as to this controversy. What you offer to the contrary from other places of St. Austin shall be considered in its due place.

4. Where any of the fathers build any doctrine upon the

§ Aug. de Fide et Oper. c. 16.

^h Enchirid. c. 69.

sense of doubtful places of scripture, we have no further reason to believe that doctrine, than we have to believe that it is the meaning of those places. So that in this case the inquiry is taken off from the judgment of the fathers, and fixed upon the sense of the scriptures, which they and we both rely upon. For since they pretend themselves to no greater evidence of the truth of the doctrine than such places do afford, it is the greatest reason that the argument to persuade us be not the testimony of the father, but the evidence of the place itself. Unless it be evident some other way that there was an universal tradition in the church from the apostles' times concerning it, and that the only design of the father was to apply some particular place to it. But then such a tradition must be cleared from something else besides the sense of 598 some ambiguous places of scripture, and that tradition manifested to be universal both as to time and place.

§. 6. These things being premised, I now come particularly to examine the evidence you bring, that all the fathers both Greek and Latin did constantly teach purgatory from the apostles' times, and consequently that it must be held for an apostolical tradition, or nothing can be. And as you follow Bellarmine in your way of proving it, so must I follow you: and he divides his proofs, you say, into two ranks. 1. Such who affirm prayer for the dead. 2. Such who in the successive ages of the church did expressly affirm purgatory. 1. With those who affirm prayer for the dead, which, you say, doth necessarily infer purgatory, whatever Lab. p. 360. the bishop vainly insinuates to the contrary. The question^{n. 9.} then between us is, whether that prayer for the dead which was used in the ancient church doth necessarily infer that purgatory was then acknowledged. This you affirm; for say you, if there were no other place or condition of being for departed souls but either heaven or hell, surely it were a vain thing to pray for the dead; especially to pray for the remission of their sins, or for their refreshment, ease, rest, relaxation of their pains, as ancients most frequently do. From whence you add, that purgatory is so undeniably proved, that the relator finding nothing himself sufficient to answer, was forced to put us off to the late primate of Armagh's Answer to the Jesuit's Challenge. Which, you say,

you have perused, and find only there that the author proves that which none of you deny, viz. that the prayers and commemorations used for the dead had reference to more souls than those in purgatory. But you attempt to prove that the nature and kind of those prayers do imply that they were intended for other ends than merely that the body might be glorified as well as the soul, and to praise God for the final happy end of the deceased: whereas that answerer of the Jesuit would, you say, by his allegations insinuate to the reader a conceit that it was used only for those two reasons and no other; which, you say, you must needs avouch to be most loudly untrue, and so manifestly contrary to the doctrine and practice of the fathers, as nothing can be more. A high charge against two most reverend and learned primates together: against the one, as not being able to answer, and therefore turning it off to the other; against the other for publishing most loud untruths, instead of giving a true account of the grounds of the church's practice. It seems, you thought it not honour enough to overcome one, unless you led the other in triumph also; but you do neither of them, but only in your own fancy and imagination. And never had you less cause to give out such big words than here, unless it were to amuse the spectators, that they might not see how you fall before them. For it was not the least distrust of his sufficiency to answer which made his lordship to put it off to the primate of Armagh, but because he was prevented in it by him, "who," as he truly saith, "had very learnedly and at large set down other reasons which the ancients gave for prayer for the dead, without any intention to free them from purgatory. Which are not only different from but inconsistent with the belief of purgatory; for the clearing of which, and vindicating my lord primate from your calumnies rather than answers, it will be necessary to give a brief account of his discourse on that subjectⁱ. He tells us therefore at first, that we are here prudently to distinguish the original institution of the church from the private opinions of particular doctors, which waded further herein than the general intendment of the church did give them warrant. Now he evidently proves that the memorials, oblations, and

ⁱ Answer to the Jesuit's Challenge, p. 195.

prayers made for the dead at the beginning had reference to such as rested from their labours, and not unto any souls which were thought to be tormented in that Utopian purgatory, whereof there was no news stirring in those days. This he gathers first by the practice of the ancient Christians, laid down by the author of the commentaries on Job, who saith, the 599 memorials of the saints were observed as a memorial of rest to the souls departed, and that they therein rejoiced for their refreshing. St. Cyprian saith they offered sacrifices for them, whom he acknowledgeth to have received of the Lord palms and crowns; and in the author of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the party deceased is described by him to have departed this life replenished with divine joy, as now not fearing any change to worse, being come unto the end of all his labours, and publicly pronounced to be a happy man, and admitted into the society of the saints; and yet the bishop prays that God would forgive him all his sins he had committed through human infirmity, and bring him into the light and band of the living, into the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, into the place from whence pain and sorrow and sighing flieth. And St. Chrysostom shews that the funeral ordinances of the church were appointed to admonish the living that the parties deceased were in a state of joy and not of grief; and therefore they sung at the burial, *Return, my soul, to thy rest, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee.* And this he proves likewise from the ancient liturgies, wherein prayers are made for all saints, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and others. And St. Ambrose, after he had said that Valentinian and Gratian were both blessed, and enjoyed the pleasures of everlasting life, and yet subjoins his orisons for them, thus he prays for Theodosius, of whom he had said that he enjoys everlasting light and continual tranquillity; and so for his brother Satyrus, when he had pronounced of him before that he had entered into the kingdom of heaven. The same doth Gregory Nazianzen for his brother Cæsarius. Now is it possible that you should think that prayer for the dead, as used in the ancient church, doth necessarily infer purgatory, when they who made these prayers did suppose the persons they made them for to be at rest and in joy and in the kingdom of heaven? And I hope that is a different state from that of purgatory. Therefore, you see, it is not barely proved that

some different accounts are given of prayer for the dead, but such as are exclusive of it, and those such as appear from the eldest times of the church, when such prayers were used. Now, having thus shewed for whom these prayers were made, he proceeds to shew of what kinds they were; whereof, he saith^k, some were eucharistical, for the blessed estate of the party deceased; others deprecatory and petitory, that God would forgive him his sins, keep him from hell, and place him in the kingdom of heaven: which, though at first well meant, were turned to an ill use afterwards, when these intercessions began once to be applied not only to the good but evil livers also, unto whom by the first institution they were never intended. And he at large proves by very many examples^l, that the primary intention of the church in her supplications for the dead was, that the whole man (not the soul separated only) might receive public remission of sins, and a solemn acquittal in the judgment of that great day, and so obtain both a full escape from all the consequences of sin and a perfect consummation of bliss and happiness. And of this nature he shews afterwards were the prayers of the church used in Epiphanius's time^m, which Acrius was condemned for rejecting of; and he plainly proves that the church of Rome comes nearer the opinion of Acrius than they would seem to do. For they agree with Acrius in rejecting that kind of praying and offering for the dead which was used in the church at that time, which was for such as were believed to be in bliss. For since the Romanists say, that without the supposition of purgatory prayer for the dead would be unprofitable, and at that time the souls they prayed for are supposed to be already in bliss, therefore they do as much condemn those prayers for the dead which were then used as Acrius did. And it is very strange, if the releasing of souls out of purgatory had been any ground
600 then of praying for the dead, that Epiphanius, among all his far-fetched reasons, should never assign that which you think to be the only proper ground of such prayers. Thus we see what was the general intention of the church in those prayers which were made for the dead, and how far this was from inferring purgatory.

^k Answer, &c. p. 204.^l P. 224.^m P. 265.

§. 7. But besides this, there were several particular opinions among the ancient fathers touching the place and condition of souls separated from their bodiesⁿ: and according to the several apprehensions which they had thereof, they made different interpretations and applications of the use of praying for the dead; whose particular intentions and devotions in that kind must of necessity therefore be distinguished from the general intention of the whole church. Thus there were two opinions much in vogue among many of the fathers, viz. of souls being kept in secret receptacles till the day of resurrection, and the purging of them in the fire of conflagration at the day of judgment; of which opinion were not only St. Augustine, but Origen, Lactantius, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, and others. Now according to these opinions they interpreted the use of praying for the dead. And thence St. Augustine saith^o, “that the oblations and alms usually offered in the church for all the dead that received baptism, were thanksgivings for such as were very good, propitiations for such as were not very bad; but as for such as were very evil, although they were no helps of the dead, yet were they some kind of consolations of the living;” but this was only a private exposition of the church’s meaning in her prayers, because it is not to be found in the writings of the former fathers; and because it suiteth not well with the general practice of the church, which it intendeth to interpret. For it is somewhat too harsh an interpretation, to imagine that one and the same act of praying should be a petition for some, and for others only a thanksgiving. Some other private opinions there were besides these: as that of Theophylact^p, that “God did not always cast grievous sinners into hell, but that the prayers of the church might keep them from being cast into hell;” another, “that an augmentation of glory might be procured for the saints,” and either a total deliverance, or a diminution of torment at least, obtained for the wicked; to which St. Chrysostom and others incline. Besides there were different opinions concerning the benefit which the dead received by the prayers of the living^q. For the author of the questions and answers in Justin Martyr’s works^r, Gregory Nazianzen, Theodoret, Diodorus Tarsensis, and St. Hierome,

ⁿ P. 229.^o P. 207.^p P. 241.^q P. 243.^r P. 270.

all conclude that there is no release to be expected for the sins of those who were dead. But others supposed the dead might receive profit by the prayers of the living, either for remission of their sins or the ceasing of their punishment; but they were not agreed as to the nature of the sins which might be pardoned, or the manner of the benefit which they received, whether their punishment were only lessened, or at last extinguished. And Stephanus Gobarus in Photius tells us, “that though some held these things, yet the true sentence of the church was, that none at all was freed from punishment.” But that still this was a question in the church, whether the dead received profit by the prayers of the living, that learned author more at large proves; but my design is only to give a very brief extract of his discourse, that you may from thence see, how far by the intention of the church in praying for the dead you are from gathering the necessary belief of purgatory.

Iab. p. 361.
n. 9

§. 8. And by this a full answer is given to what you object concerning the practice of the fathers to pray for the soul and not the body; and that when we pray for them they receive ease, comfort, and refreshment by our prayers; and that they obtain pardon and mercy and deliverance from pain for them, and that by the help of our prayers they are brought to eternal rest and happiness. But all this falls short of your purpose, unless you can prove that any of them either believed or prayed that any such ease and refreshment were obtained by the prayers of the living before the day of resurrection. That they prayed that God would have mercy upon them in that day, we deny not, which implies ease, comfort, refreshment, pardon, deliverance from pain, and eternal happiness; but then all this refers not to any purgatory pains which they had undergone before, but those eternal pains which their sins deserved, if God should deal in justice with them. We grant then that supplications and intercessions were used in the church for the dead, but we say, they did respect by the intention of the church the day of judgment, and God’s final justification of them by his sentence at that day. For the scriptures (as my lord primate truly saith) every where do point out that great day to us, as the day wherein mercy and forgiveness, rest and refreshing, joy and gladness, redemption

and salvation, rewards and crowns, shall be bestowed upon all God's children^s: 2 Tim. i. 16, 18. 1 Cor. i. 8. Acts iii. 19. 2 Thess. i. 6, 7. Phil. ii. 19. 1 Thess. ii. 16. 1 Pet. i. 5. 1 Cor. v. 5. Ephes. iv. 30. Luke xxi. 28. 2 Tim. iv. 8. Luke xiv. 14. From whence it is no improbable deduction, that even the souls of good men do not enjoy their full and complete felicity till the great day; not that they either sleep or undergo any purgatory pains, but that they are at rest from their labours, and in a blessed condition, but still waiting with a solicitous expectation for the glorious coming of Christ, that they may then receive the reward prepared for them before the beginning of the world. But whether those souls be in heaven, (as it notes a place, and not a state,) whether the degrees of their happiness be proportionable (till the great day) to the degrees of grace which they had when they left the world, are questions of more curiosity than necessity to be resolved. But as long as the scripture doth insist so much on the proceedings of the great day both as to rewards and punishments, we do not condemn the practice of the ancient church in those prayers which did thus respect the day of resurrection. If any of the fathers had any particular opinions concerning the state of the dead, and of the benefit which came to them by the prayers of the living, we are no more concerned to defend them, than you are to defend those whom you acknowledge to hold that no souls did enjoy the beatifical vision before the day of judgment; against whom Bellarmine and others dispute at large. Since you therefore confess yourselves that some of the greatest of the fathers did for many ages hold erroneous opinions concerning the state of the dead, with what reason can you press us with the testimonies of those whom you refuse yourselves: and since they had so many different opinions concerning the state of souls, it seems strange that none of them (at least till St. Augustine's time) should hit upon such a state of purgation whereby they might be freed from pains before the day of judgment. And yet we find not one of them which did so much as dream of that purgatory which you call the upper region of hell, or of any punishment which they who died in favour with God should undergo

^s Answ. p. 217.

between death and judgment, out of which they might be delivered by the prayers of the living. Many of them indeed supposed, that souls were kept in secret receptacles; but they were far from asserting that they underwent at all any pains equal to the damned, much less that any souls were translated thence to glory upon the intercessions made for them: others supposed, that the souls of all good men were at last to pass through the fire of conflagration at the day of judgment: others, that the souls of wicked men might either escape, or have their torments mitigated: but all this while your purgatory was unthought of, and was not conceived till afterwards, through the ignorance and superstition of some, countenanced by pretended apparitions and visions of souls departed, till at last it grew to be one of the favourite opinions of the Roman church. From whence it may easily appear, how very much you were deceived when you would infer, because prayer for the dead, as it is now used in the Roman church, doth necessarily suppose purgatory, therefore it must do so in the ancient church; for although we should grant the same prayers to be still used, yet since they are used for a quite different intent, that may be supposed by you which was not at all supposed by them, nor could be inferred from what they did. And yet it is plain, that in some cases you have changed the prayers for the saints into prayers to them; for whereas in the old Gregorian Sacramentary it was, “Grant unto us, O Lord, that this oblation may profit the soul of thy servant Leo^t,” in the latter books it is turned into this: “Grant unto us, O Lord, that by the intercession of thy servant Leo this oblation may profit us.” From whence you may see that your prayers are changed from what they were; for the ancient church prayed universally for all saints and martyrs, but you think it a disparagement to them to pray for them, and therefore from your kind of prayers for the dead we may well say that purgatory is supposed, but we cannot possibly infer it from those prayers which were made for such who, if any, were supposed in a state of bliss and happiness.

§. 9. And that the intention of your church is quite different from the ancient, we now come more fully to make manifest;

^t Answer to the Jesuit, p. 210.

because none of them did believe that doctrine of purgatory which you assert. But herein we must follow your footsteps, and consider the many authorities which you produce out of Bellarmine, and undertake to vindicate in behalf of purgatory: o which I give this general answer, That some authors are counterfeit, and the places supposititious: of those that are true, some speak only of commemoration of the dead, and oblations made for them; others respect the day of resurrection, and the fire of conflagration; others, the purging of the wicked; others, only of a purgation in this life: but none of them all speak of any purgatory pains of those who die in favour with God, which they undergo as the temporal punishment of sin, from whence they may be delivered by the prayers of the living; which is the only thing you should prove from them. And this I come to make appear by the examination of the particulars as they occur in order.

The first you begin with is Dionysius Areopagita; and “is Lab. p. 361. not he,” say you, “an author of the first three hundred years?”^{n. 9.} as though this had never been questioned by any. If you had asked whether he had been an ancient and learned author, living some time within the first four hundred years, you should not have met with any opposition from me; but if you will needs have him to be the true Dionysius, you must prove it better than by mere referring us to what Bellarmine, Baronius, and Del Rio have said upon that subject; and you are very strangely deceived when you say that only Erasmus and Valla, and some few others, did doubt of it, but at present you suppose few learned men doubt of the matter; for even Bellarmine^m himself doubts of it: and what think you of Habertus, Sirmondus, Launæus, Petavius? Are not all these with you learned men, who have all declared their doubts of it? and so will any one else do that impartially examines the arguments brought on both sides. But we have no reason to insist longer upon this, since you say it is sufficient that he is acknowledged for a writer of great antiquity. Well, but what is it then this author saith? Only that prayers were made for the deceased party, that God would forgive his sins, and place him in the light and country of the living. “But,” say you, “both the

^m De Confirm. l. 2. c. 7.

archbishop and primate would have thought that man a papist who would have made the like prayer for his deceased friend in their hearing." And very good reason they might have to
 603 think so, when they know beforehand that your intention of praying for the dead is to deliver their souls from the pains of purgatory; but if they had heard one use such a prayer in the ancient church, they could not have imagined it was for any such intention, since the same person in Dionysius is said to be "replenished with divine joy, and not fearing any change to the worse, but knowing well that the good things possessed shall be firmly and everlastingly enjoyedⁿ;" as he speaks at his entrance upon that discourse: and if this be in effect to teach purgatory, as you would have it, you must set your purgatory a great deal higher than you do; for you say it is but an upper region of hell, a little after, when Dionysius speaks of those who were in a region of rest and happiness.

Your second author is Tertullian; and three citations you produce out of him. In the first^o he only mentions the oblations for the dead, which we have confessed to be used already, but without any respect to purgatory. In the second^p, a mention is made of begging of God *refrigerium*, refreshment for the soul of one departed: this were something to the purpose, if you had first proved that Tertullian did suppose that soul to be then in the pains of purgatory; for then it were but reason to think this *refrigerium* did relate to the easing of them. But he elsewhere tells us what he means by this *refrigerium*^q, *Sinus Abrahæ interim refrigerium præbiturus est animabus justorum*, by which he understands not any deliverance from pains, but contentment in expectation of the future resurrection. It was the ardency of the desire after that which made them pray for this *refrigerium*, not out of any punishment they were supposed to be under for sin, but their earnest expectation of future glory. And since they supposed different degrees of refreshment which the souls had in the bosom of Abraham, this prayer only notes the desire of the continuance and increase of it, and not being under present pains for the want of it.

ⁿ Dionys. Areop. de Eccles. Hier.
 c. 7.

^o De Coron. Milit. c. 3.

^p De Monog. c. 10.

^q C. Marc. l. 4. c. 34.

In the last place of Tertullian^r, you would fain have the *carcer infernus* to be purgatory, but he means no more by it than Hades, or the common receptacle of souls till the day of resurrection, which Irenæus calls *locum invisibilem*^s, which renders ἀδης exactly, in which he makes souls to stay till the day of resurrection; and Tertullian explains himself afterwards, when he says, *Constituimus omnem animam apud inferos sequestrari in diem Domini*; and therefore Bellarmine^t confesses Tertullian to be one of those that held that no souls did enjoy the beatifical vision till the day of resurrection; at which time he supposed the order of rising to be according to the degrees of holiness; and therefore he makes the punishment of souls not to be any purgatory pains, but the *mora resurrectionis*, that they should be longer before they rise from the dead, viz. towards the latter end of the thousand years: for so he makes the resurrection to continue the thousand years of Christ's reign upon earth; and as the highest rank of Christians should rise in the beginning of it, so others in their order according to their degrees; and the most slothful and negligent to be punished *mora resurrectionis*, by their resurrection being deferred to the conclusion of it. By which we fully understand Tertullian's meaning, *Judex in carcerem te mandet infernum, unde non dimittaris, nisi modico quoque delicto mora resurrectionis expenso*; by which "lower prison" he intends neither hell nor purgatory, but the common receptacle of souls, wherein they were held till they should rise sooner or later according to the measure of their graces and sins.

§. 10. The next place to be examined is the noted one of St. Cyprian to Antonianus, where he gives an account of the difference between the lapsed persons who become penitents, and the martyrs: *Aliud est ad veniam stare, aliud ad gloriam pervenire; aliud missum in carcerem non exire inde, donec solvat novissimum quadrantem; aliud statim fidei et virtutis* 604 *mercedem accipere; aliud pro peccatis longo dolore emendari, et purgari diu igne, aliud peccata omnia passione purgasse.* "It is one thing to stay in hope and expectation of pardon, another thing to come presently to glory; it is one thing to be cast into prison, and not to come out thence till

^r De Anima, c. 34.^s Iren. l. 5. cap. 25.^t De Anima, c. 55.

you have paid the last farthing, another to receive presently the reward of our faith; it is one thing to be amended for sins by long grief, and to be purged with fire a great while, another to have purged away all his sins by suffering martyrdom." "Did not St. Cyprian," say you, "think of purgatory when he taught this?" No, that did he not, if we believe your own writers: for Rigaltius tells us that St. Cyprian here speaks of the severities of penance, which the lapsed persons underwent in order to pardon^u; and compares them with the present felicity which martyrs were possessed of; and this was that purging fire in order to their amendment, which he insists on to shew what great disparity there was between the state of these penitents and the martyrs, thereby to shew that though penitents were admitted by the church, yet it was with so much severity that might give little encouragement for men to fall in hopes of admission: for that was the main thing which St. Cyprian there discourses of. And thus likewise Albaspinæus understands it of such who suffered penance all their lifetime, and were absolved only at the point of death^x; these were they who were held in prison till they paid the utmost farthing. Neither may it seem strange that this should be called *a purging fire*; since St. Hierome, describing the penance of Fabiola, saith, *Sedit super carbones ignis*, "she sat upon coals of fire^y;" and pope Siricius, in his epistle to Himerius, extant in the Councils, calls perpetual penance *purificatorium pœnitudinis ignem*, "the purging fire of penance." And this seems a great deal more probable to be St. Cyprian's meaning, because he speaks most clearly of any of the fathers of the immediate happiness of all God's children after death, in his excellent book of Mortality; wherein he comforts the Christians of Carthage against the fears of death by reason of the raging plague which was then among them. "It is for him," saith he, "to fear death, that would not go to Christ; it is for him not to be willing to go to Christ, that doth not believe he shall begin to reign with him;" with much more to the same purpose throughout that book, which I pray read, and then tell me whether St. Cyprian did think of purgatory or no.

^u Rigalt. Observ. ad Cypr. 68.

^y Hieron. Ep. Fab. ad Ocean.

^x Albaspin. Observ. l. 2. c. 12.

§. 11. I wonder with what face you produce Origen's testimony in behalf of your doctrine of *purgatory*, since Bellarmine confesses that he held all punishment to be only purgatory; and that this opinion of his was condemned in the fifth œcumenical council. "But," you say, "in the place produced by you he saith no such thing, but that men are purged according to the mixture of lead and gold in them, but that those who have all lead shall sink down to the bottomless pit for ever; than which," you say, "nothing can be spoken more clearly ^{Lab. p. 363.} for purgatory." To which a short answer shall serve by this ^{n. 10.} dilemma—either you have faithfully represented this place of Origen, or not: if you have, it is plain that Origen hath been infinitely abused, or else apparently contradicts himself; for you make him here plainly to assert the eternity of punishment, which the fifth general council, according to you, infallibly condemned him for denying: if you have unfaithfully represented him, then still Origen cannot be understood of such a purgatory as you speak of, but of such a one which all must pass through, good and bad; and their continuance in it is according to the proportions of good or evil in them. And of such a purgatory as this Bellarmine^z confesses that Origen speaks; and which he places after the resurrection, and saith that even Peter and Paul must pass through it^a. And for such purgatory as this is, many places are produced out of Origen by Sixtus Senensis and many others: but this is an 605 universal purgatory for good and bad, after the resurrection, and for the body as well as the soul; and judge you now whether this be the purgatory you contend for or no. The following testimonies of St. Ambrose, Hilary, Lactantius, St. Hierome, &c., are taken off by Bellarmine himself; since, although in his first book he produceth them for the Roman doctrine of purgatory, yet in the beginning of the second he confesseth that all these were for such an universal purgatory at the day of judgment, through which all must pass, not the Virgin Mary herself excepted. And St. Hierome, though he denies Origen's hypothesis as to the final salvation of all, yet seems, by the places you cite out of him, very willing to admit of it as to all such who die in the church's communion; against

^z De Purgat. l. 2. c. 1.^a Biblioth. l. 5. Annot. 170.

which opinion St. Augustine at large disputes, as I have shewed already. I acknowledge then that these authors do speak of a purging fire, but such a one as yourselves disown and dispute against; and Bellarmine could no other ways bring any of them off, but by saying that they speak of the fire of the last judgment; by which we see the apparent sophistry in bringing those as plain places for your purgatory, which you confess yourselves are understood of something else; it being confessed that they speak of purging consequent to the resurrection^b, which is quite another thing from what you plead for. And besides, it is plain from St. Hierome's words that he speaks of wicked men dying in the communion of the church, that they shall at last be saved. And if you will needs have *arbitramur*, when it is opposed to *credimus*, to signify "a firm belief," (which is another proof of your skill in lexicons,) that which you can only infer thence is, that St. Hierome did as firmly believe that wicked men (if Christians) should at last be saved, as that devils and atheists, and other wicked men, should be finally damned: for these are his words; *Et sicut diaboli et omnium negatorum atque impiorum qui dixerunt in corde suo, Non est Deus, credimus æterna tormenta; sic peccatorum atque impiorum, et tamen Christianorum, quorum opera in igne probanda sunt atque purganda, moderatam arbitramur et mixtam clementiæ sententiam judicis*^c. And the same he rather more fully asserts in the other place; *et Christianos, si in peccato præventi fuerint, salvandos esse post pœnas*^d; but you, who are never backward in helping the fathers to speak out, very commodiously render it, "such as die before full and perfect penance for the sins of which they had truly repented:" which is as far from purgatory as from St. Hierome's meaning; for he doth not oppose penitent sinners to impenitent, but opposes wicked men dying in the church's communion to the devil and his angels, and all other wicked persons, "all which," he saith, "shall perish eternally, but such as are Christians should be saved at last after undergoing punishment." And it is to be observed, that at the end of the commentaries on Isaiah he immediately before speaks of that which is supposed to be the Origenical

^b Sixtus Sen. Biblioth. l. 5. annot. 171.

^c Comment. in Isa. 66. ad fin.

^d Con. Pelag. l. 1.

hypothesis, viz. “that the torments of the other life shall after a long time be ended;” and when he hath produced the places of scripture which the favourers of it did produce, he only passes this censure of it, *quod nos Dei solius scientiæ debemus derelinquere*, “which we ought to leave to the knowledge of God alone;” and then concludes with that moderation of his sentence, “that he did believe the eternity of torments of devils, atheists, &c., but of such who were Christians he did suppose God would mingle mercy with his justice, and that after they had been sufficiently purged by fire they might escape at last.” If he had intended only a mitigation of their torments who were Christians, the opposition could not lie, as it doth, between the eternity of some and the clemency of God in others, but the eternity must have been confessed in both, and the opposition made only in the weight of the torments of such who were not Christians above such as were. If St. Hierome 606 doth (as Bellarmine contends) elsewhere contradict this, by so much the less is his testimony of any validity in this case, it being plain what his meaning is here; but that seems the less probable, because he writ his books against the Pelagians, in which he asserts the same, not long before his death. This purging fire then of St. Hierome makes little for your purpose, since it is only a more refined branch of Origen’s hypothesis, and is understood of a fire after the resurrection, and that of hell, and not of purgatory, and wherein wicked men shall be purged if they died in the church’s communion, and not such who repented of their sins in this life. But if St. Hierome himself do not speak to the purpose, you hope one under his name may do it, (and we must needs say purgatory hath been always beholding to forgeries;) for you cite his Commentaries on the Proverbs, which are rejected as counterfeit by Sixtus Senensis, Canus, Marianus Victorius, and Bellarmine himself.

§. 12. But from St. Hierome we proceed to St. Basil, who, you say, “teaches the same doctrine with him:” if he doth, it Lab. p. 365. is very little for your comfort. But so far was St. Basil from n. 10. asserting your doctrine, that although he speaks of a purging fire^e, he speaks not at all concerning it in another life, but only of

^e Comment. in Isa. ix.

that which purgeth out sins in the souls of men in this life. For he calls the Spirit of God working upon men's souls that πῦρ καθαρτικὸν which consumes sin within them; as may be seen by comparing his commentaries on the sixth and the ninth of Isaiah together. And where he afterwards speaks not of an utter rejection, but an expurgation as by fire, it is plain that he understands it of the fire of affliction in this life, and not the fire of purgatory in another. But wherever you meet with *fire* and *purging*, you think it impossible to be understood of any thing but your *purgatory*; it seems you are hugely possessed with the fears of it, that you think you meet with it wherever you go. But if you will needs have St. Basil to speak of a future state, then your own Sixtus Senensis^f and Estius^g will tell you that he is to be understood of the fire of conflagration at the day of judgment; of which he speaks in several other places. And so Nicetas understands the place of Gregory Nazianzen^h which you produce about baptism by fire, for, saith he, *per ignis baptismum, examen censuramque divini judicii intelligit*, and for that cites the place of the apostle, "Every man's work shall be tried by fire." This he calls elsewhere *the last fire* by which our works shall be judged and purged. And of this Lactantiusⁱ and Hilary^k are to be understood: for Hilary expressly saith, "that even the Virgin Mary shall pass through it," whom I hope you will not place in purgatory. The testimony of Boetius shall then be taken when you prove that he doth not speak in the person of a philosopher, but of a Christian, delivering matters of faith with an *ut puto*; but if you had considered the design of his book, for the sake of philosophy you might have spared his citation. And so you might for your own sake that of Theodoret, which not only the Greeks in their Apology cry out on as counterfeit, but no such place as yet appears in any edition of Theodoret. And the same Greeks tell you, if you consulted the honour of Gregory Nyssen you would spare him too, because he was a favourer of the Origenical hypothesis concerning the redintegration of all things; and so many places are produced out of him wherein he makes the nature of all pains to be purgatory, that the patriarch Germanus (of whom Photius

Lab. p. 367.
n. 11.

^f Sixtus Sen. l. 5. Annot. 171.

^g Estius in 1 Cor. iii.

^h Nazian. Orat. 39.

ⁱ Orat. 26.

^k In Psal. 118.

speaks¹) had no other way to vindicate him, but by saying that the Origenists had foisted many places into his works. If you will therefore say that it is a groundless calumny to say that any of the fathers did corrupt the Christian doctrine by the opinions of Plato, you must either deny that Origen and his followers ever asserted any doctrine contrary to Christianity, and therein contradict the fifth œcumenical council; or that any of the fathers had any touch of Origen's opinion: both which I suppose are tasks you will be unwilling to undertake. 607

But whether their opinions are true or false, (which we are not now inquiring after,) to be sure they are far enough from your doctrine of purgatory, which supposeth the sin pardoned in this life, and yet the punishment undergone for it in another; which doctrine if it were granted at all reasonable, it would be much more, asserting it to be after the resurrection, when the body might endure pains as well as the soul, than so absurdly as you make the soul only to suffer, and that too in a way the most unlike of all other, viz. by a material fire.

§. 13. But it is time we come to the succour of St. Austin, who it seems hath his share of purgatory in this life; for you Lab. p.368. say, "he hath the ill hap to be used the worst of all other."^{n. 12.} Because his lordship represents him as dubious and uncertain (as no doubt he was) in this point; which argues indeed that he was a novice in your Roman faith, but thereby the more a father of the church. But you are the man that, let St. Augustine say what he will himself, will prove to his face that he could not possibly be thought to deny or doubt of purgatory. And it is a combat worth seeing, to see you dispute against St. Augustine; but you do it so pitifully, that St. Austin remains as uncertain as ever he was. The only place which seems to the purpose, *Constat animas purgari post hanc vitam*, &c., is so notorious a counterfeit, that not only Vives confesses no such words appeared in the ancient copies, but they are wholly left out, not only in the Basil edition, 1556, but in that of Lyons, 1560, and in the latter Lovain and Paris editions. The other places, you confess yourself, relate to the benefit which the dead receive by the prayers of the living, of which a large account hath been already given

¹ Biblioth. Cod. 233.

without any supposition of purgatory. Whether St. Austin's doubts did refer only to the circumstances of purgatory, and not to the thing itself, I leave it to the consideration of any reasonable man who will read the places already cited, wherein those doubts are expressed. By which one may see at what rate you use your expressions, when you can have the face to say, "that St. Austin no less constantly teaches the doctrine of purgatory than he doth the doctrine of heaven and hell." Which, after the language of the Sorbonne censures, is a false, rash, and scandalous assertion, and as ungrounded as purgatory itself. The remaining testimonies of St. Cyril and St. Chrysostom only speak of prayer for the dead and the benefit of that, and so offers nothing new to our consideration. But at last we are come to a man who did in good earnest believe purgatory, and was the first of any name in the church who did so, and that is Gregory I. But whosoever reads in his Dialogues the excellent arguments he builds it on and confirms it with, will find as much reason to pity his superstition and credulity as to condemn his doctrine. And "after this time," his lordship saith truly, "purgatory was found too warm a business to be suffered to cool again; and in the after-ages more were frightened than led by proof into the belief of it." And although amidst the variety of judgments among the fathers concerning the state of the dead, not one of them affirmed your doctrine of purgatory before Gregory I.; yet by all means you will needs have it to have been still owned as an apostolical tradition and an article of faith. But I commend you, that knowing the weakness of the arguments brought from the fathers and scripture, you at last take sanctuary in

Lab. p. 372. the church's definition; on the account of which you say, "we
n. 14. are as much bound to believe it as any other article of faith, yea as the Trinity or incarnation itself." But this holds for none but only those who so little understand the grounds of their religion as to believe it on the account of your church's infallibility; which is so far from being any ground of faith,

608 that if we had nothing more certain than that to establish our faith upon, you would be so far from making men believe purgatory on that account, that you would sooner make them question whether there were either heaven or hell. But though

your church be so far from infallibility that we have found her guilty of many errors, yet the word of God abideth for ever, which alone is the sure foundation for our faith to rest upon. And so I conclude with your own prayer: "I beseech God to give all men light to see this truth, and grace to assent unto it; to the end that by living in the militant church in the unity of faith, we may come at last to meet in glory in the triumphant church of heaven, which we may hope for by the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: to whom, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, be all honour and glory, world without end."



THE END.

H. HEINRICH
Buchbinderei
Rottenburg/L.

Stillingfleet, Edward,

A rational account of the grounds of protestant religion: being a
vindication of the Lord Archbishop (Land) of Canterbury s relation of a
conference & c. from the pretended answer by T. C
Bd.: 2

Oxford 1844

Dogm. 982 wx-2

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10399629-4